Midland Properties v. Wells Fargo ( 2017 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/23/2017 09:14 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    Midland Properties, L.L.C., and Jerry Morgan,
    appellants, v. Wells Fargo, N.A.,
    et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed April 14, 2017.    No. S-16-260.
    1.	 Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will
    affirm a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings
    and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from
    those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law.
    2.	 ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
    judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences deducible from the evidence.
    3.	 Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews the
    trial court’s conclusions with regard to evidentiary foundation for an
    abuse of discretion.
    4.	 Pleadings: Appeal and Error. Permission to amend a pleading is
    addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will
    not disturb the trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion.
    5.	 Summary Judgment: Proof. A party moving for summary judgment
    has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
    must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that if the evidence
    presented for summary judgment remains uncontroverted, the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    6.	 ____: ____. After the moving party has shown facts entitling it to a
    judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party has the burden to pre­
    sent evidence showing an issue of material fact which prevents judg-
    ment as a matter of law for the moving party.
    7.	 Evidence: Witnesses. Communications by telephone are admissible in
    evidence where otherwise relevant to the fact or facts in issue, provided
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    the identity of the person with whom the witness spoke or the person
    whom he or she heard speak is satisfactorily established.
    8.	 Torts: Intent: Proof. To succeed on a claim for tortious interference
    with a business relationship or expectancy, a plaintiff must prove (1) the
    existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge
    by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy, (3) an unjustified
    intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer, (4) proof that
    the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party
    whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted.
    9.	 Summary Judgment: Affidavits. Affidavits and other sworn statements
    offered in support or opposition of summary judgment shall be made on
    personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
    evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
    testify to the matters stated therein.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Timothy
    P. Burns, Judge. Affirmed.
    Douglas W. Ruge for appellants.
    Jennifer L. Andrews and Alison M. Gutierrez, of Kutak
    Rock, L.L.P., for appellee Wells Fargo, N.A.
    Thomas J. Young, and Lilly Richardson-Severn, of
    H & S Partnership, L.L.P., for appellees HBI, L.L.C., and
    H & S Partnership, LLP.
    H eavican, C.J., Wright, Cassel, Stacy, K elch, and
    Funke, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    This appeal arises from an action for wrongful foreclosure
    of a deed of trust, quiet title, tortious interference with business
    relationships, and declaratory relief. The district court granted
    summary judgment of dismissal and denied leave to file an
    amended complaint. Because there was no genuine issue of
    material fact and no abuse of discretion in denying leave to
    amend, we affirm the judgment.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    II. BACKGROUND
    1. Foreclosure
    Jerry Morgan purchased property in Douglas County,
    Nebraska, by obtaining a loan secured by a deed of trust. He
    conveyed the property to his company, Midland Properties,
    L.L.C., and managed the property as a rental.
    Wells Fargo, N.A., was eventually assigned the lender’s
    interest in the promissory note and deed of trust. Several years
    later, it initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on the deed of trust,
    citing as cause Morgan’s failure to make payments as they
    became due. HBI, L.L.C., purchased the property at a trustee’s
    sale and later conveyed the property to H & S Partnership,
    LLP (H&S).
    2. Proceedings on
    A mended Complaint
    Morgan and Midland Properties (collectively appellants)
    filed an amended complaint against Wells Fargo, HBI, and
    H&S. Appellants generally alleged that they were not in default
    on the loan, that Wells Fargo wrongfully foreclosed, and that
    there were irregularities in the assignment of the deed of trust
    and promissory note, in the substitution of trustees, and in the
    trustee’s sale. The complaint also alleged that Wells Fargo, or
    its agents, improperly interacted with appellants’ tenants before
    the trustee’s sale, thereby committing tortious interference
    with business relationships and causing $50,000 in damages.
    Appellants sought declaratory relief, monetary damages, and
    equitable relief setting aside the trustee’s sale and quieting title
    to the property.
    Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment.
    Appellants later moved for leave to file a “Second Amended
    Complaint” that added another defendant. After a hearing, the
    court found that Wells Fargo established a prima facie case for
    summary judgment. The court disregarded certain statements
    offered in Morgan’s affidavit and deposition as hearsay and
    otherwise found that appellants offered only general allegations
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    unsupported by the evidence. Because the court determined
    that appellants’ evidence failed to rebut Wells Fargo’s evi-
    dence, it sustained the motion for summary judgment and
    dismissed the amended complaint. After finding that appellants
    failed to show why another defendant should be added so late
    in the proceeding, the court also denied appellants’ motion to
    file a second amended complaint.
    A timely appeal followed, which we moved to our docket.1
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Appellants made four assignments of error which, con-
    solidated and restated, assert that the district court erred in (1)
    determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact,
    (2) excluding Morgan’s testimony of (a) conversations with
    Wells Fargo representatives for lack of proper foundation and
    (b) statements from appellants’ tenants establishing wrongful
    interference, and (3) not allowing appellants to file a sec-
    ond amended complaint which added another defendant. Our
    restatement renders moot Wells Fargo’s suggestion that appel-
    lants’ first three assignments were too generalized and vague.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant
    of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.2 In reviewing a summary judgment, an appel-
    late court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    party against whom the judgment was granted and gives that
    party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
    the evidence.3
    1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2016).
    2
    Bixenmann v. Dickinson Land Surveyors, 
    294 Neb. 407
    , 
    882 N.W.2d 910
          (2016), modified on denial of rehearing 
    295 Neb. 40
    , 
    886 N.W.2d 277
    .
    3
    
    Id. - 411
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    [3] An appellate court reviews the trial court’s conclu-
    sions with regard to evidentiary foundation for an abuse of
    discretion.4
    [4] Permission to amend a pleading is addressed to the dis-
    cretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not disturb
    the trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion.5
    V. ANALYSIS
    1. Summary Judgment
    [5,6] A party moving for summary judgment has the burden
    to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and must
    produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that if the evidence
    presented for summary judgment remains uncontroverted, the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6 After
    the moving party has shown facts entitling it to a judgment as
    a matter of law, the opposing party has the burden to pre­sent
    evidence showing an issue of material fact which prevents
    judgment as a matter of law for the moving party.7
    All of appellants’ arguments opposing the entry of sum-
    mary judgment are premised on excluded evidence which they
    contend established genuine issues of material fact. According
    to appellants, the district court improperly excluded and disre-
    garded parts of Morgan’s deposition and affidavit testimony.
    Specifically, they allege that Morgan’s testimony concerning
    conversations with Wells Fargo employees were admissible
    as nonhearsay and refuted Wells Fargo’s right to foreclosure.
    They also allege that reports from his tenants were admissible
    as “rebuttal” evidence and supported their claim for tortious
    interference with business relationships.8
    4
    See State v. Casterline, 
    293 Neb. 41
    , 
    878 N.W.2d 38
    (2016).
    5
    Golnick v. Callender, 
    290 Neb. 395
    , 
    860 N.W.2d 180
    (2015).
    6
    SID No. 196 of Douglas Cty. v. City of Valley, 
    290 Neb. 1
    , 
    858 N.W.2d 553
          (2015).
    7
    Id.
    8
    Brief for appellants at 17.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    (a) Right to Foreclosure
    Appellants claimed that Wells Fargo had no right to foreclo-
    sure, because Morgan was not in default and had insufficient
    notice. They rely upon Morgan’s deposition testimony that
    unknown representatives of Wells Fargo told him not to make
    the payments and they would not foreclose. Wells Fargo ini-
    tially offered evidence to the contrary.
    Wells Fargo established that Morgan failed to make pay-
    ments as they were due and that it notified him of the default
    and its consequences. It acknowledged that Morgan was
    approved for a trial mortgage modification period but that his
    application was ultimately denied due to title issues. It also
    produced evidence of compliance with all notice and recording
    requirements for the trustee’s sale. Documents that appellants
    produced, which Wells Fargo had sent to Morgan’s address,
    directly contradicted the verbal instructions Morgan claimed to
    have received. This was sufficient to establish that Wells Fargo
    was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, the burden
    shifted to appellants to present evidence showing an issue of
    material fact.
    Appellants offered Morgan’s deposition. He testified to
    telephone conversations during which he was “instructed by
    Wells Fargo personnel not to make any . . . payments until
    they gave [him] the test payments to pay” for the trial mort-
    gage modification period. He also claimed that he was never
    told that his loan modification request was denied and that
    “Wells Fargo personnel told [him] they wouldn’t foreclose”
    on the property. But appellants failed to establish the required
    foundation.
    [7] Morgan was unable to identify any of the purported
    representatives or specify any date of a conversation. It is
    well established that communications by telephone are admis-
    sible in evidence where otherwise relevant to the fact or facts
    in issue, provided the identity of the person with whom the
    witness spoke or the person whom he or she heard speak is
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
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    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    satisfactorily established.9 Morgan could not do so. Based upon
    this lack of foundation, the district court excluded Morgan’s
    deposition testimony. We find no abuse of discretion in exclud-
    ing this evidence.
    Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
    allowing Morgan’s testimony, appellants failed to establish the
    existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, Wells
    Fargo was entitled to summary judgment on the claims for
    declaratory relief, quiet title, and wrongful foreclosure.
    (b) Tortious Interference
    [8] To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with a
    business relationship or expectancy, a plaintiff must prove (1)
    the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy,
    (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expect­
    ancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the
    part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference caused the
    harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relation-
    ship or expectancy was disrupted.10
    Wells Fargo established that its records did not indicate
    any representatives would have had contact with appellants’
    tenants prior to the trustee’s sale. It produced evidence that
    it hired an independent contractor who performed multiple
    “occupancy checks” of the property subject to foreclosure
    and made direct contact once with an individual identified as
    “mortgagor” (Morgan). This does not suggest interaction with
    the tenants. Wells Fargo also offered the affidavit of one of
    appellants’ tenants, who denied ever being “contacted by Wells
    Fargo, or any agent or employee of Wells Fargo, by phone or
    in person.” Thus, the burden shifted to appellants to estab-
    lish a genuine issue of material fact regarding their claim for
    tortious interference.
    9
    Linch v. Carlson, 
    156 Neb. 308
    , 
    56 N.W.2d 101
    (1952).
    10
    Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Neb., 
    289 Neb. 927
    , 
    857 N.W.2d 816
          (2015).
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    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    Appellants offered Morgan’s testimony of reports from all
    four of his tenants, including the affiant, alleging that they
    had been harassed by different Wells Fargo representatives. In
    their brief, appellants implicitly concede that this testimony is
    hearsay. But they argue that such statements are admissible as
    “rebuttal,” since Wells Fargo offered the affidavit of one of the
    four tenants. This argument is contrary to law.
    [9] Affidavits and other sworn statements offered in sup-
    port or opposition of summary judgment shall be made on
    personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
    admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
    affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.11
    Morgan admitted during his deposition that he lacked personal
    knowledge of any communications made by Wells Fargo or its
    representatives to appellants’ tenants. Appellants failed to pro-
    duce an affidavit or deposition from any of the tenants, based
    on personal knowledge, to establish a genuine issue of fact.
    Morgan’s testimony was entirely dependent upon inadmissible
    hearsay. Therefore, the district court was correct in excluding
    such statements from the evidence.
    Because there was no genuine issue of material fact regard-
    ing the absence of any act of interference on the part of Wells
    Fargo or its independent contractor, the district court correctly
    granted summary judgment dismissing appellants’ claim for
    tortious interference with a business relationship.
    2. Motion for Leave to A mend
    Lastly, appellants argue that the district court abused its
    discretion in denying their motion for leave to file a successive
    amended complaint. We disagree.
    Appellants attempted to add Wells Fargo’s independent
    contractor as a defendant to its claim for tortious interfer-
    ence nearly 9 months after the deadline to amend pleadings.
    11
    See Green v. Box Butte General Hosp., 
    284 Neb. 243
    , 
    818 N.W.2d 589
          (2012).
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    MIDLAND PROPERTIES v. WELLS FARGO
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 407
    They claimed not to know of the independent contractor until
    2 months before it filed its motion. However, the record
    shows that Wells Fargo identified the independent contractor
    at a deposition at least 7 months before they filed their motion
    to amend.
    Appellants have failed to explain why another defendant
    should be added so late in the proceeding. We also note that
    such a claim would be futile for the same reasons that it was
    unsuccessful against Wells Fargo. Therefore, the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    The district court properly excluded evidence for lack of
    foundation and hearsay. As a result, the admitted evidence did
    not support appellants’ claims or establish a genuine issue of
    material fact. Because we also conclude that the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for
    leave to amend their complaint, we affirm its judgment.
    A ffirmed.
    Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.