Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Tribedo, LLC , 307 Neb. 716 ( 2020 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    307 Nebraska Reports
    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 716
    Douglas County School District No. 10, also known
    as the Elkhorn School District, appellant,
    v. Tribedo, LLC, a Nebraska limited
    liability company, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed November 6, 2020.   No. S-19-986.
    1. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. A trial court has the discretion to
    determine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and such deter-
    minations will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse
    of that discretion.
    2. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a civil case, the admission or exclu-
    sion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a
    substantial right of the complaining party.
    3. Eminent Domain: Verdicts: Appeal and Error. A condemnation action
    is reviewed as an action at law, in connection with which a verdict will
    not be disturbed unless it is clearly wrong.
    4. Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. To establish reversible
    error from a court’s failure to give a requested jury instruction, an appel-
    lant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct
    statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction was warranted by the
    evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s failure to
    give the requested instruction.
    5. Motions for New Trial: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews
    a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.
    6. Constitutional Law: Eminent Domain: Damages: Words and
    Phrases. The Nebraska Constitution provides that property shall not
    be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation, and the
    phrase “or damaged” provides that consequential damages may be an
    element of recovery in some situations.
    7. Eminent Domain: Damages. The measure of damages for land taken
    for public use is the fair and reasonable market value of the land
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
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    actually appropriated and the difference in the fair and reasonable mar-
    ket value of the remainder of the land before and after the taking.
    8.   ____: ____. Severance damages for land taken for public use are
    measured by all factors and inconveniences that would influence a
    purchaser.
    9.   Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. If the jury instructions given,
    which are taken as a whole, correctly state the law, are not misleading,
    and adequately cover the issues submissible to a jury, there is no preju-
    dicial error concerning the instructions and necessitating a reversal.
    10.   Trial: Expert Witnesses. Expert witness testimony is not binding on the
    triers of fact.
    11.   Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. When an attorney fee is authorized,
    the amount of the fee is addressed to the trial court’s discretion, and its
    ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
    12.   Attorney Fees. An award of attorney fees involves consideration of
    such factors as the nature of the case, the services performed and results
    obtained, the length of time required for preparation and presentation
    of the case, the customary charges of the bar, and general equities of
    the case.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J
    Russell Derr, Judge. Affirmed.
    Duncan A. Young, Jeff C. Miller, and Keith I. Kosaki, of
    Young & White Law Office, for appellant.
    Adam W. Barney, Trenten P. Bausch, and Sydney M. Huss,
    of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for
    appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller‑Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller‑Lerman, J.
    I. NATURE OF CASE
    To acquire property for a new high school site, Douglas
    County School District No. 10, also known as the Elkhorn
    School District (Elkhorn), condemned 43.36 acres of a
    73.99‑acre tract owned by Tribedo, LLC. The board of apprais-
    ers issued an award of $2,601,600 for the taking. Tribedo
    appealed the award to the district court for Douglas County
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 716
    and alleged that the award did not reflect the fair market value
    of the property taken and did not adequately compensate for
    damages to the remainder of Tribedo’s property.
    At trial, the parties offered evidence of the value of the
    taken property and the severance damages to the remainder
    property. Elkhorn unsuccessfully objected to Tribedo’s pre-
    sentation of evidence regarding the factors which went to
    the damages related to the change in fair market value of
    the remainder property. The jury returned a verdict finding
    compensation totaling $4,625,967. Elkhorn moved for a new
    trial, which was denied. The court granted Tribedo’s posttrial
    motions for an award of interest and attorney fees. Elkhorn
    appeals, and it assigns several errors related to the compen-
    sation awarded Tribedo and the award of attorney fees to
    Tribedo. We affirm.
    II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
    In April 2015, Tribedo executed a purchase agreement to
    acquire a 73.99‑acre tract located on the northeast corner
    of West Maple Road and 180th Street in Douglas County,
    Nebraska (Property). The Property was zoned for agricultural
    use and was used as farmland. The managing agent of the
    partnership that owns Tribedo testified that Tribedo purchased
    the Property for $60,000 per acre with the intent to develop
    it into a mixed‑use development. The sale closed on October
    20, 2016.
    The intersection of West Maple Road and 180th Street,
    where the Property is located, is designated as a “[C]ommunity
    165” intersection on the city of Omaha’s future land use map.
    A Community 165 designation refers to a large mixed‑use
    development area of at least 165 acres, which includes big‑box
    stores, grocery stores, office buildings, and other commercial
    development. There is evidence that it is the most intensive
    land use development that is allowed within the city of Omaha.
    Another such example is Village Pointe, located at 168th Street
    and West Dodge Road.
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
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    Tribedo planned to develop the Property with the use of a
    sanitary and improvement district. Pursuant to the purchase
    agreement for the Property, Tribedo began implementing land
    use planning and zoning processes to enable development of
    the land.
    Subsequent to the execution of the purchase agreement, the
    180th Street viaduct bridge, which connects Blondo Street to
    north of the Property, received federal funding and an environ-
    mental impact review. At the time of trial, Tribedo was acquir-
    ing right‑of‑way for the bridge project for construction to start
    in 2020, which it claims adds significant value to the Property.
    Tribedo had attempted to rezone the Property, which approval
    Tribedo believes it could have obtained, but once Elkhorn’s
    condemnation occurred, the process was halted.
    On February 22, 2017, 4 months after Tribedo closed on
    the land, Elkhorn condemned 43.36 acres of the Property for
    a new high school site. The board of appraisers appraised the
    43.36‑acre tract at $60,000 per acre, awarding Tribedo a total
    amount of $2,601,600 for the taking. Tribedo appealed to the
    district court, where it alleged that the award was inadequate
    and that the highest and best use of the Property was as a
    mixed‑use commercial development.
    1. Total Compensation: Condemned Property
    Plus Diminished Fair Market
    Value of Remainder
    As we explain in greater detail below, at trial, the experts
    addressed their opinions to both the 43.36 acres taken and
    the diminished fair market value of the 30.63‑acre remainder,
    as well as a dollar value of total compensation incorporating
    both aspects of the award. Tribedo’s first real estate appraiser,
    Kevin Kroeger, valued the total compensation at $5,890,000;
    Tribedo’s second appraiser, Nicholas Dizona, valued the total
    compensation at $7,022,000; and Elkhorn’s appraiser, Martin
    Giff, valued the total compensation at $2,601,600.
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
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    2. Compensation for the 43.36 Acres
    of Condemned Property
    Both parties presented evidence of the value of the con-
    demned parcel. Kroeger valued the 73.99‑acre Property at
    $98,010 per acre and the taken property at $4,249,720. Dizona
    valued the Property at $124,769 per acre and the taken prop-
    erty at $5,410,000. Giff valued the Property at $60,000 per
    acre, the same price it had sold for previously, and calculated
    the value of the taken property at $2,601,600.
    3. Compensation for Severance Damages
    to the Remaining 30.63 Acres
    At trial, Tribedo sought compensation for both the 43.36
    acres taken and the reduction in fair market value to the
    remaining 30.63 acres. According to the evidence, after the
    condemnation, Tribedo’s 30.63 acres remained in a Community
    165 intersection and Tribedo’s revised preliminary plat to
    develop that parcel into a mixed‑use development had been
    approved at the time of trial.
    Prior to trial, Elkhorn filed a motion in limine seeking to
    exclude testimony and evidence relating to Tribedo’s “item-
    ized” damages, based on the contention that they were not
    related to the reduction in fair market value to the remaining
    30.63 acres. During trial, the district court overruled Elkhorn’s
    evidentiary objections and motions to strike concerning the
    loss of market value of the remaining 30.63 acres.
    Tribedo’s first appraiser, Kroeger, testified that the high-
    est and best use of the Property was “for a future mixed‑use
    development, which would incorporate a combination of com-
    mercial, retail, office, and multi‑family uses.” He calculated
    severance damages to the 30.63 acres of $1,640,280, based on
    the impact of the project on the remainder and included grad-
    ing costs. Kroeger explained that the topography of the site
    varied by 80 feet from very low‑lying along the south side to
    significantly higher elevations on the north side. Potential wet-
    lands had been identified on the low‑lying south side.
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
    Cite as 
    307 Neb. 716
    Kroeger noted that there would be additional expenses to
    implement a new development plan, due to the condemna-
    tion and losses to the condemnee incurred because of lag
    time caused by starting over with a new development model.
    Kroeger explained that Tribedo would now have overall fixed
    costs for any future mixed‑use development spread over fewer
    acres. For example, a mixed‑use development on the remain-
    der property would likely lose 1.5 acres of developable land
    required to address wetlands mitigation required by the city of
    Omaha, which would previously have been spread out across
    the larger parcel.
    The second appraiser, Dizona, opined that the 30.63 acres
    suffered diminution in the fair market value of approximately
    $1,500,000. On direct examination, Dizona testified that the
    highest and best use for the remaining 30.63 acres had changed
    from mixed‑use “anchored development” to a development
    without an anchor tenant. According to Dizona, “the boulevard
    made it so that any potential anchored development would be
    impossible” because any improvements would have to face the
    boulevard, which could limit the useable space for Tribedo’s
    new proposed development. He opined that a parcel the size
    of the Property would have attracted a higher dollar purchaser,
    because it could support a larger market participant like a
    grocery store, with mixed‑use surrounding, and high‑density
    residential to the north. He stated that comparable sales of sites
    20 to 30 acres were more appropriate to determine the present
    value after the condemnation, because of the differences in
    functionality and usability as compared to a development of a
    larger area. Dizona incorporated an estimate of $937,000 asso-
    ciated with site elevation issues such as grading and dirt work
    in reaching his opinion.
    Elkhorn’s expert, Giff, valued the 30.63 acres at $69,000
    per acre after the taking, and he concluded that the remain-
    der property suffered no diminution in fair market value. He
    opined that the highest and best use of the condemned portion
    of the Property would have been as low‑density residential
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
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    development and that the highest and best use of the remain-
    der of the Property would be for commercial development.
    Giff testified that in reaching his valuation, he performed a
    comparable sales analysis on the remaining 30.63 acres by
    comparing the remainder with sales of three other properties
    situated nearby, all of which had at least a quarter mile of
    frontage on West Maple Road, including a sale on the south-
    west corner of the West Maple Road and 180th Street intersec-
    tion. Giff attributed the higher price per acre he assigned to the
    remainder property to its proximity to the West Maple Road
    frontage road.
    Other evidence at trial showed that Tribedo’s preliminary
    plat to develop the remaining 30.63 acres included no imported
    dirt. However, the managing agent of Tribedo testified that
    importing dirt is a “cost benefit” for a developer that he needed
    to think through to evaluate the rewards compared to the risks
    of developing the site.
    4. Jury Instructions
    At the jury instruction conference, Elkhorn proffered the fol-
    lowing jury instruction regarding Tribedo’s severance damages:
    To determine the fair market value of the property
    taken in this case and to determine if there is a reduc-
    tion in the fair market value of the property that was not
    acquired, you may consider everything which affects the
    market value of the subject property.
    You have heard some testimony about [sic] from the
    witnesses regarding the “costs to cure,” and like mat-
    ters. You may only consider such “costs to cure” if they
    have an impact on the diminution of the fair market
    value of the remaining [30.63] acres as a result of the
    condemnation.
    The district court refused this jury instruction, and instead
    instructed the jury, inter alia, that “Tribedo is entitled to recover
    the fair market value of the 43.36 acres taken by Elkhorn, and
    the diminished value, if any, of the remaining 30.63 acres
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
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    owned by Tribedo, figuring the value as of February 22, 2017.”
    Instruction No. 4 defined “fair market value” as follows:
    The “fair market value” of a piece of property is the
    price that someone ready to sell, but not required to do so,
    would be willing to accept in payment for the property,
    and that someone ready to buy, but not required to do so,
    would be willing to pay for the property.
    In determining fair market value, you may consider
    the uses to which the property has been put and the
    uses to which it might reasonably be put in the immedi-
    ate future.
    5. Jury Verdict and Posttrial
    Pproceedings
    The jury found that Elkhorn owed compensation to Tribedo
    totaling $4,625,967, broken down as follows: $3,295,967
    “[f]or the 43.36 acres owned by Tribedo taken by Elkhorn”
    and $1,330,000 “[f]or the decrease in value, if any, of Tribedo’s
    remaining 30.63 acres.”
    After the conclusion of the jury trial and after the jury
    returned its verdict, the district court issued an order setting
    forth its rationale for denying Elkhorn’s motions and objec-
    tions concerning the testimony and evidence of the severance
    damages. The May 24, 2019, order stated, inter alia, that the
    $937,000 to import dirt was not an impermissible “consequen-
    tial cost” to the taking, but was “part of the diminished value
    of the remaining property,” because imported dirt was needed
    to level the remaining property, and that without imported fill,
    the property would be worth less than if it had been level.
    Elkhorn moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
    and for a new trial, and Tribedo moved for attorney fees,
    expert witness fees, and costs. Hearing was held on June 14,
    2019. Elkhorn argued that the verdict was not supported by the
    evidence with respect to severance damages, because there was
    no evidence to support an amount of $1,330,000 for the dimin-
    ished fair market value of the remainder property. The district
    court ultimately denied Elkhorn’s motions.
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    DOUGLAS CTY. SCH. DIST. NO. 10 v. TRIBEDO, LLC
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    With respect to Tribedo’s request for attorney fees, expert
    witness fees, and interest, Tribedo submitted affidavits of three
    attorneys who had reviewed Tribedo’s billing records and
    opined that the amount of fees requested was reasonable.
    Elkhorn objected to the affidavits, because they did not include
    actual billings and Elkhorn could not verify that the work was
    applicable and that the fees were not duplicative. The district
    court overruled Elkhorn’s objections to the attorney fees affi-
    davits. The district court rejected Elkhorn’s opposition to the
    attorney fees request and stated that under the circumstances, it
    could determine the reasonableness of an attorney fees request
    even in the absence of a detailed billing record.
    On September 16, 2019, the district court entered judgment
    for Tribedo for $4,625,967 on the jury’s verdict; $143,681.89
    in prejudgment interest; postjudgment interest at $295.58 per
    day or as permitted by law; and $590,924.89 in attorney fees.
    In a written order, the district court found that the requested
    attorney fees were reasonable, given the complexity and dura-
    tion of the litigation; the number of issues litigated; the result
    of a judgment exceeding the award by the board of appraisers
    by over 75 percent; and the size of the judgment, which it
    believed to be one of the largest jury awards in a condemnation
    matter on record.
    Elkhorn appeals.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Elkhorn first assigns various errors related to the loss
    in value of Tribedo’s remainder property. Summarized and
    restated, these claims are that the district court erred (1) when
    it denied Elkhorn’s motions to strike appraisal evidence offered
    by Tribedo; (2) when it instructed the jury regarding severance
    damages; (3) when it accepted the jury’s award of damages,
    which Elkhorn claims was excessive; and (4) when it denied
    Elkhorn’s motion for a new trial.
    Elkhorn further claims that the district court erred when it
    awarded attorney fees, expert fees, and interest to Tribedo.
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    IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1] A trial court has the discretion to determine the relevancy
    and admissibility of evidence, and such determinations will not
    be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of that
    discretion. Walker v. BNSF Railway Co., 
    306 Neb. 559
    , 
    946 N.W.2d 656
    (2020).
    [2] In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is
    not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial
    right of the complaining party.
    Id. [3]
    A condemnation action is reviewed as an action at law, in
    connection with which a verdict will not be disturbed unless it
    is clearly wrong. Curry v. Lewis & Clark NRD, 
    267 Neb. 857
    ,
    
    678 N.W.2d 95
    (2004).
    [4] To establish reversible error from a court’s failure to
    give a requested jury instruction, an appellant has the burden
    to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement
    of the law, (2) the tendered instruction was warranted by the
    evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s
    failure to give the requested instruction. Hike v. State, 
    288 Neb. 60
    , 
    846 N.W.2d 205
    (2014).
    [5] An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion for new
    trial for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Babbe, 
    304 Neb. 186
    , 
    933 N.W.2d 813
    (2019).
    V. ANALYSIS
    1. Damage to Remainder Property
    and Law on Severance Damages
    Elkhorn claims generally that the district court improperly
    allowed Tribedo’s expert appraisers to itemize damages to the
    remainder property. Specifically, it claims that reversible error
    occurred when the district court admitted evidence of Tribedo’s
    increased costs, when it instructed the jury regarding severance
    damages, when it accepted the jury’s award of damages, and
    when it denied Elkhorn’s motion for a new trial. We consider
    each claim in turn below.
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    [6] Several principles of law govern damages to the remain-
    der property in this case. The Nebraska Constitution provides
    that property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
    without just compensation, and the phrase “or damaged” pro-
    vides that consequential damages may be an element of recov-
    ery in some situations. See Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 
    164 Neb. 196
    , 
    82 N.W.2d 274
    (1957). See, also, NJI2d Civ. 13.01,
    comment & authorities, § X(G) (discussing just compensation
    as it relates to consequential damages).
    [7,8] The measure of damages for land taken for public
    use is the fair and reasonable market value of the land actu-
    ally appropriated and the difference in the fair and reasonable
    market value of the remainder of the land before and after the
    taking. Armbruster v. Stanton‑Pilger Drainage Dist., 
    169 Neb. 594
    , 
    100 N.W.2d 781
    (1960). Severance damages for land
    taken for public use are measured by all factors and incon-
    veniences that would influence a purchaser. See, Sorenson
    v. Lower Niobrara Nat. Resources Dist., 
    221 Neb. 180
    , 
    376 N.W.2d 539
    (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds);
    State v. Dillon, 
    175 Neb. 444
    , 
    122 N.W.2d 223
    (1963). A jury
    may take into account “‘every (nonspeculative) element of
    annoyance and disadvantage resulting from the improvement
    which would influence an intending purchaser’s estimate of the
    market value of such property.’” Armbruster v. Stanton‑Pilger
    Drainage 
    Dist., 169 Neb. at 610
    , 100 N.W.2d at 792. For
    example, “‘[t]he burden of additional fencing, and like mat-
    ters, are to be included, not by being added together item by
    item, but to the extent that, taken as a whole, they detract from
    the market value of the property.’”
    Id. at 609, 100
    N.W.2d
    at 791. Other such elements which could influence market
    value include
    expenses for additional fencing, repairs, removal, and
    rebuilding thereof; the expenses of removal and repair of
    plaintiffs’ private roads and bridge, together with incon-
    venience and disadvantage caused thereby; the expenses
    of repair and the threatened peril and damages to one
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    of plaintiffs’ two valuable irrigation wells, irrigation and
    sewer systems, and to their buildings; and the expenses
    incurred attempting, in good faith, to stop the erosion and
    damages when defendant refused to do so, and like mat-
    ters . . . .
    Id. at 
    610, 100 N.W.2d at 792
    . Ultimately, evidence of itemized
    damages may be considered only if such damages diminish the
    market value of the property. See Armbruster v. Stanton‑Pilger
    Drainage 
    Dist., supra
    .
    2. Elkhorn’s Claims
    (a) Motion to Strike and Objections to
    Tribedo’s Appraisers’ Testimony
    Elkhorn argues that the district court abused its discretion
    when it allowed Tribedo’s expert appraisers to testify about
    damages to the remainder over Elkhorn’s objections. As stated
    previously, a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence
    is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Walker v. BNSF Railway
    Co., 
    306 Neb. 559
    , 
    946 N.W.2d 656
    (2020). In a civil case,
    the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error
    unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complain-
    ing party.
    Id. Elkhorn specifically objects
    to evidence by Kroeger, who
    testified to a number of factors that diminished the value of the
    remainder for the property owner. Kroeger first testified that
    he believed the value of the property taken was $4,249,720.
    Kroeger later opined that the total amount of compensation due
    for the taking, composed of property taken and diminution of
    fair market value of the remainder, was $5,890,000.
    Regarding the remainder, Kroeger presented evidence of the
    costs of several restoration items, such as grading and addi-
    tional wetland rehabilitation that he stated were necessary as a
    result of dividing the Property. Kroeger testified that compen-
    sation was payable to the property owner based on a change in
    the fair market value of the remainder.
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    Elkhorn also argues that Dizona’s testimony should not have
    been admitted, because Dizona utilized a summation approach
    by tacking on itemized damages to determine the reduction
    in fair market value. To illustrate, Elkhorn notes that Dizona
    referred to elements influencing value, including dirt fill and
    leveling costs, a decrease in usable space, and changes in high-
    est and best use. The question is whether Dizona’s “itemized”
    costs were improperly considered as add‑ons to the market
    value or whether they were properly considered as factors
    influencing his opinion of the fair market value of the remain-
    der property. We find the factors to which Tribedo’s experts
    referred were properly considered in reaching their opinions
    regarding the fair market value of the remainder.
    Consistent with the district court ruling, Kroeger and Dizona
    detailed numerous elements that influenced their valuations,
    and both appraisers testified that their references to dam-
    ages related to a reduction in fair market value. Items such
    as grading and importing dirt may properly be considered to
    the extent they affected the fair market value of the remain-
    ing property. To the extent that Elkhorn notes conflicting
    testimony by Tribedo’s experts, or doubts the propriety of ele-
    ments considered in the valuation, such conflicting testimony
    is a question of fact. See Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat.
    Bank, 
    236 Neb. 173
    , 
    459 N.W.2d 718
    (1990). The district court
    did not abuse its discretion when it admitted expert testimony
    regarding the diminution of market value to Tribedo’s remain-
    ing property.
    (b) Jury Instruction
    Elkhorn next contends that the district court erred when
    it refused to give its proposed jury instruction relating to the
    remainder which stated that the “‘costs to cure’” could be con-
    sidered only if they have an impact on the fair market value of
    the remaining property.
    [9] As set forth above, a court’s failure to give a requested
    jury instruction is not reversible error unless an appellant
    shows that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement
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    of the law, (2) the tendered instruction was warranted by the
    evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s
    failure to give the requested instruction. Hike v. State, 
    288 Neb. 60
    , 
    846 N.W.2d 205
    (2014). However, if the instructions
    given, which are taken as a whole, correctly state the law, are
    not misleading, and adequately cover the issues submissible to
    a jury, there is no prejudicial error concerning the instructions
    and necessitating a reversal. See
    id. Although the requested
    instructions are a correct statement
    of the law, Elkhorn was not prejudiced by the district court’s
    refusal to give them. The instruction actually given on this ques-
    tion stated that “Tribedo is entitled to recover the fair market
    value of the 43.36 acres taken by Elkhorn, and the diminished
    value, if any, of the remaining 30.63 acres owned by Tribedo,
    figuring the value as of February 22, 2017.” Instruction No. 4
    defined “fair market value” as follows:
    The “fair market value” of a piece of property is the
    price that someone ready to sell, but not required to do so,
    would be willing to accept in payment for the property,
    and that someone ready to buy, but not required to do so,
    would be willing to pay for the property.
    In determining fair market value, you may consider
    the uses to which the property has been put and the
    uses to which it might reasonably be put in the immedi-
    ate future.
    Instruction No. 5 stated, “The Nebraska and United States
    Constitutions provide that the property of no person shall be
    taken for public use without just compensation therefore.”
    “‘Just Compensation,’” as defined in instruction No. 5, is “the
    fair market value of the property at the time it was taken and
    the diminished value, if any, of the remainder as a result of the
    taking which occurred on February 22, 2017.”
    The substance of the proposed instruction was consistent
    with the instructions given by the district court. Because the
    jury was adequately instructed on the measure of damages
    to the remaining property, this assignment of error is with-
    out merit.
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    (c) Amount of Damages
    Elkhorn next argues that the district court erred when it
    accepted the jury verdict with respect to damages to the
    remaining property. The crux of Elkhorn’s argument is that the
    jury awarded severance damages which, Elkhorn argues, were
    not specifically supported by the opinion of any expert.
    The amount of damages sustained in a condemnation action
    is peculiarly a question of a local nature and ordinarily is to be
    determined by a jury. Patterson v. City of Lincoln, 
    250 Neb. 382
    , 
    550 N.W.2d 650
    (1996). Where the evidence is conflict-
    ing, an appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with the
    verdict of the jury unless it is clearly wrong.
    Id. [10]
    Here, the jury’s total award of $4,625,967, as com-
    pensation for both the taken property and diminution to the
    fair market value of the remainder, was supported by suf-
    ficient evidence. Kroeger valued the total compensation at
    $5,890,000; Dizona valued the total damages at $7,022,000;
    and Giff valued the total damages at $2,601,600. Expert
    witness testimony is not binding on the triers of fact.
    Id. In condemnation cases,
    we generally do not set aside a jury
    award which has fallen within the range of conflicting sets
    of testimony. See In re Petition of Omaha Pub. Power Dist.,
    
    268 Neb. 43
    , 
    680 N.W.2d 128
    (2004). The jury award of
    $4,625,967 in total compensation was supported by sufficient
    competent evidence. We will not speculate as to how the jury
    reached the amount of its award. This assignment of error is
    without merit.
    (d) Motion for New Trial
    Elkhorn’s claim arising out of the denial of its motion for
    new trial is generally grounded in the question of whether
    Kroeger and Dizona testified to an improper measure of dam-
    ages, particularly with respect to the remainder property.
    Because we have found the district court did not err when it
    admitted such testimony, it likewise did not abuse its discretion
    when it denied the motion for a new trial.
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    3. Attorney Fees
    There is no dispute in this case that Tribedo had a right to an
    award of attorney fees. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76‑720 (Reissue
    2018). Elkhorn claims that the amount of the fees was unrea-
    sonable. We recognize that the attorney fees are substantial, but
    we find no abuse of discretion.
    [11,12] When an attorney fee is authorized, the amount of
    the fee is addressed to the trial court’s discretion, and its rul-
    ing will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discre-
    tion. ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Baldwin Hackett & Meeks, 
    296 Neb. 818
    , 
    896 N.W.2d 156
    (2017). An award of attorney fees
    involves consideration of such factors as the nature of the
    case, the services performed and results obtained, the length
    of time required for preparation and presentation of the case,
    the customary charges of the bar, and general equities of the
    case.
    Id. In support of
    its fee application, Tribedo offered affida-
    vits of three members of the Nebraska bar, who testified that
    they had reviewed the fees charged by Tribedo’s attorneys,
    received a detailed summary of the work provided by coun-
    sel, and stated that they found the requested fees reasonable.
    Following submission of evidence and briefing, the district
    court found:
    The amount sought by Tribedo is extremely reasonable,
    particularly given the fact that the judgment exceeded the
    award by more than 75%, the judgment is believed to be
    one of the largest jury awards in a condemnation matter
    to be found in a reported court decision in this State, the
    litigation was fairly complex and, thus far, has persisted
    over a nearly 2 1⁄2 year period, complex appraisals had to
    be prepared by highly trained and experienced apprais-
    ers, the experience and professional training of Tribedo’s
    attorneys, the customary charges of the bar and the gen-
    eral equities of the case.
    After reviewing the district court’s detailed explanation for
    its award of attorney fees, we agree that the above factors
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    support the attorney fees awarded. The district court did not
    abuse its discretion when it awarded Tribedo $590,924.89 in
    attorney fees.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district
    court did not err in its trial rulings nor in accepting the jury ver-
    dict for total compensation due Tribedo of $4,625,967. Further,
    the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded
    Tribedo $590,924.89 in attorney fees. All assignments of error
    have been considered and are without merit. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
    Affirmed.
    Papik, J., not participating.