State v. Tyler , 918 N.W.2d 306 ( 2018 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    10/19/2018 08:12 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    301 Nebraska R eports
    STATE v. TYLER
    Cite as 
    301 Neb. 365
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Avery R. Tyler, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed October 19, 2018.   No. S-17-870.
    1.	 Postconviction: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim
    raised in a postconviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a
    question of law which is reviewed independently of the lower court’s
    ruling.
    2.	 Postconviction: Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. In appeals
    from postconviction proceedings, an appellate court reviews de novo
    a determination that the defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to
    demonstrate a violation of his or her constitutional rights or that the
    record and files affirmatively show that the defendant is entitled to
    no relief.
    3.	 Postconviction: Constitutional Law: Judgments. Under the Nebraska
    Postconviction Act, a prisoner in custody may file a petition for relief
    on the ground that there was a denial or infringement of the prisoner’s
    constitutional rights that would render the judgment void or voidable.
    4.	 Postconviction. In the absence of alleged facts that would render the
    judgment void or voidable, the proper course is to dismiss a motion for
    postconviction relief for failure to state a claim.
    5.	 Postconviction: Appeal and Error. A motion for postconviction relief
    is not a substitute for an appeal.
    6.	 ____: ____. A motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to secure
    review of issues which were known to the defendant and could have
    been litigated on direct appeal; such issues are procedurally barred.
    7.	 Postconviction: Prosecuting Attorneys: Appeal and Error. Whether
    a claim of prosecutorial misconduct could have been litigated on direct
    appeal and is thus procedurally barred from being litigated on postcon-
    viction depends on the nature of the claim.
    8.	 ____: ____: ____. Where the claim of prosecutorial misconduct is
    such that a determination of the merits is possible based on the record
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    on direct appeal, it is procedurally barred from being litigated on
    postconviction.
    9.	 Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys. In assessing allegations of prosecutorial
    misconduct in closing arguments, a court first determines whether the
    prosecutor’s remarks were improper. It is then necessary to determine
    the extent to which the improper remarks had a prejudicial effect on the
    defendant’s right to a fair trial.
    10.	 Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To show prejudice on a claim of inef-
    fective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate a reason-
    able probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result
    of the proceeding would have been different.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Duane
    C. Dougherty, Judge. Affirmed.
    Michael J. Wilson and Glenn Shapiro, of Schaefer Shapiro,
    L.L.P., for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Erin E. Tangeman
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, and
    Papik, JJ.
    Funke, J.
    Avery R. Tyler appeals from the district court’s denial of
    postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Tyler
    asserts claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective
    assistance of trial and appellate counsel. For the reasons set
    forth herein, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    This appeal follows our decision in State v. Tyler,1 which
    affirmed Tyler’s jury trial convictions and sentences therefrom,
    including one count of premeditated first degree murder, a
    Class IA felony for which Tyler received a sentence of life
    imprisonment, and one count of use of a firearm to commit a
    1
    State v. Tyler, 
    291 Neb. 920
    , 
    870 N.W.2d 119
    (2015).
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    STATE v. TYLER
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    felony, a Class IC felony for which Tyler received a sentence
    of 20 to 30 years imprisonment. The trial court ordered the
    sentences to run consecutively.
    1. Facts
    On September 3, 2012, Delayno Wright was shot and killed
    outside Halo Ultra Lounge (Halo) in Omaha, Nebraska. Prior
    to the shooting, Wright, his girlfriend Brittany Ashline, and
    his cousin LaRoy Rivers were walking through the parking lot
    toward Wright’s vehicle when two men walked past them. One
    of the men grabbed or brushed against Ashline, which led to
    Ashline and Wright’s confronting the men. Rivers thought he
    recognized one of the men who was wearing a brown, striped
    shirt and saw that man break away from the group. Rivers saw
    a dome light turn on in a vehicle in the parking lot, heard the
    voice of the man he thought he recognized yelling, “‘What’s
    up now?’” and heard gunshots. Rivers could not see the
    shooter, but Ashline said she saw a man run to a tan or gold
    sport utility vehicle or Jeep and leave the scene after the shots
    were fired. Wright indicated he had been shot, was driven to
    a hospital, and was subsequently pronounced dead due to a
    gunshot wound to his torso.
    When Rivers spoke to investigators, he informed them that
    he thought he recognized the man wearing the brown, striped
    shirt as a person he played basketball with in high school.
    Rivers explained that he thought the man’s first name was
    Avery, but that he was unsure of his last name. While on a
    detective’s computer, Rivers accessed a social media page,
    viewed Tyler’s profile picture, and identified him as the indi-
    vidual in the brown, striped shirt.
    During the investigation of the shooting, investigators
    obtained a photograph of Tyler from a wedding he attended
    the day before the shooting in which he was wearing a brown,
    striped shirt. Investigators also obtained security footage show-
    ing a sport utility vehicle leaving the scene near the time of the
    shooting at a high rate of speed. It was subsequently discov-
    ered Tyler’s girlfriend owned a silver Jeep Commander. At the
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    STATE v. TYLER
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    scene of the shooting, investigators found eight shell casings.
    A crime laboratory technician reported that the casings were
    all fired from the same gun and that there are about 20 guns
    capable of firing them, including an “FN Five-seveN” pistol. It
    was discovered Tyler had purchased an FN Five-seveN pistol
    approximately 21⁄2 months prior to the shooting.
    Investigators obtained and executed four search warrants for
    Tyler’s car and for his grandparents’, mother’s, and girlfriend’s
    residences. During the searches, investigators discovered a cell
    phone from Tyler’s car, a gunlock bearing the “FN” logo from
    his grandparents’ residence, and a letter from his mother’s
    residence. Tyler signed a consent form that allowed investiga-
    tors to download and search the contents of the cell phone.
    On the cell phone, investigators discovered another picture of
    the September 2, 2012, wedding in which Tyler was wearing a
    brown, striped shirt; a deleted text message from September 2
    that read, “What’s it like and where is halo?”; and call records
    and location information.
    Based upon this information, Tyler was arrested and charged
    for the shooting.
    2. Trial
    A jury trial was held in June 2014. At trial, the court
    heard testimony from 24 witnesses for the State and 5 for the
    defense. Among the State’s witnesses were Ronald King and
    Jelani Johnson. Tyler’s assignments of error in the current
    appeal concern King’s and Johnson’s testimony; therefore, a
    summary of their testimony and the State’s arguments concern-
    ing their testimony is provided in relevant part below.
    (a) King’s Testimony
    King testified he met Tyler and Johnson playing basketball
    for Bellevue University in Nebraska from 2008 to 2010. After
    those 2 years, King moved back to his hometown in Illinois.
    In September 2012, King returned to Nebraska for the wed-
    ding of a former teammate and stayed with Johnson who was
    also attending the wedding. King testified that Tyler attended
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    the wedding and was wearing a brown, striped shirt. King
    testified that he left the wedding to go to Halo with Tyler in
    the vehicle Tyler was driving, a “light-colored Jeep.” King
    explained that once they got to Halo, they parked in the park-
    ing lot and were walking on a sidewalk leading into the club
    when they passed two men and a woman. King testified that he
    brushed against the woman as she was walking by and that the
    woman and one of the men confronted them about the contact.
    King explained that Tyler and the man who confronted them
    got into a heated exchange and that the other man and King
    had to separate the two. King testified that Tyler left at some
    point and that when King walked back toward Tyler’s Jeep,
    he saw Tyler walking from the Jeep toward the location where
    the confrontation happened with something in his hand. King
    testified he saw Tyler fire three to five gunshots in the direc-
    tion where King had last seen the group of three people. After
    firing the shots, King testified that Tyler returned to the vehicle
    and Tyler drove them to a second bar. King then texted another
    friend for a ride and parted ways with Tyler. King testified that
    he returned to Illinois on his scheduled return flight. Later,
    King was arrested in Illinois for an unrelated matter and held
    for a Nebraska warrant. King obtained a lawyer when Omaha
    Police Department detectives began to question him about the
    shooting. Eventually, he was given immunity. King explained
    the terms of the immunity by describing that he gave a formal
    interview to the police and that if called to testify, he would
    “have to say the exact same thing.”
    During cross-examination, King was asked by Tyler’s coun-
    sel to look at a letter leading to the following exchange:
    Q. Do you recognize [the letter]?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Is it something that you authored, you wrote it?
    A. Yes.
    Q. When?
    A. I don’t believe that I wrote it. I probably was speak-
    ing and somebody else wrote it.
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    Q. Okay. What were the circumstances of you making
    those statements and giving that information?
    A. You know, just follow-up on my reactions and how
    I felt about the situation.
    Q. Okay. Was it before you spoke to the cops or after
    you spoke to the cops?
    A. After.
    Q. And who — you say you don’t think you typed it,
    someone else did?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Who?
    A. My attorney, possibly.
    Q. Well, what do you mean “possibly?”
    A. I don’t remember who wrote it.
    Q. Okay. But it’s your words?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And you say this was done after the police spoke to
    you in Illinois?
    A. Correct.
    The letter was not offered into evidence, and King pro-
    vided no other testimony concerning the letter outside of this
    exchange. However, Tyler attached a letter to his motion for
    postconviction relief and alleged the document was the letter
    his counsel questioned King about at trial. Tyler alleges his
    trial counsel was informed by the State during an off-the-
    record recess that the letter discussed was actually written by
    Johnson. Neither the State nor Tyler’s trial counsel disclosed to
    the jury that Johnson had authored the letter.
    (b) Johnson’s Testimony
    Johnson testified he has known Tyler since childhood.
    Johnson played basketball at Bellevue University with Tyler
    and King and asserted that he is friends with both men.
    On September 2, 2012, King and Johnson attended a
    wedding where they saw Tyler. King and Tyler left the wed-
    ding reception without Johnson, and Johnson did not see
    King again until the next day. The next morning, Johnson
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    had a conversation with King about what had occurred the
    night before. Tyler showed up uninvited at Johnson’s house,
    where he talked to Johnson and had a private conversation
    with King.
    Johnson testified that days after the wedding, Tyler came
    to the restaurant where Johnson worked and told Johnson
    that Tyler’s property had been searched by police. Tyler
    also told him that “his car couldn’t be placed at Halo that
    night,” to which Johnson agreed. Johnson further testified that
    after the meeting at Johnson’s workplace, Tyler again came
    over to Johnson’s house and used Johnson’s cell phone to
    call King.
    In October 2012, Omaha Police Department detectives initi-
    ated an interview with Johnson. Johnson testified that during
    the interview, detectives questioned him about the night of
    the wedding and Johnson lied and told them King had driven
    his car from the wedding and had come back to pick him up
    later. A couple weeks after this initial interview, detectives
    again attempted to interview Johnson. Johnson declined to talk
    with the detectives without an attorney and was charged with
    accessory to a felony. After Johnson hired an attorney, another
    interview was set up and Johnson admitted that King did not
    take his car the night of the wedding and that King did not
    return later to pick him up.
    At trial, Johnson was questioned concerning whether he
    had a plea agreement. On direct examination, the following
    exchange occurred:
    Q. Are you testifying here today pursuant to any type
    of agreement with the Douglas County Attorney’s Office?
    A. Are you asking if I do have an agreement?
    Q. Yes.
    A. No.
    Q. Okay. Has there been any type of plea agree-
    ment entered into between you and the Douglas County
    Attorney’s Office regarding this case?
    A. No.
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    Q. Is there any reason why you haven’t already pled to
    this charge?
    A. I mean, I had conversations with my lawyer, and he
    told me just by coming . . . forth and being truthful that
    that would be the best route.
    On cross-examination, Johnson again testified that he did
    not have a plea agreement worked out in exchange for his
    testimony. Johnson explained that after consulting with his
    attorney, he believed coming forward and being truthful would
    be the best thing to do. Johnson believed that testifying truth-
    fully would lead to a lesser charge or a dismissal of the acces-
    sory charge.
    (c) State’s Closing Argument
    In the State’s closing argument, the State addressed both
    King’s and Johnson’s testimony and stated, in relevant part:
    King and . . . Johnson were put in a bad place. Their
    teammate and their friend did something very bad. He
    told them to be quiet about it. He told them to lie about
    it. When . . . King is approached by the police, sure, he’s
    scared. He’s worried he’s going to get arrested. He was
    at a crime scene, a very serious crime scene, one where
    someone was killed, and he doesn’t even bother calling
    the cops to tell them about it. He leaves the scene, doesn’t
    tell anyone about it. He remains quiet. He was probably
    scared. He probably didn’t want . . . Tyler to get in trou-
    ble because it’s a friend of his.
    So when he’s in jail and the police want to talk to
    him, he wanted a deal. And [defense counsel] criticizes
    us for giving him that deal. But keep in mind what the
    police knew versus what . . . King knew. And what I
    would argue to you is the police and prosecutors don’t
    give deals to liars. We didn’t give a deal to . . . Johnson.
    In fact, the police arrested him and that charge is still
    pending. But what we knew about . . . King when he
    said, “Hey, I want immunity,” frankly, it’s easy to give it
    to him. Why? Because all the evidence was pointing to
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    . . . Tyler being the shooter; Jeep Commander leaving the
    scene that we tied to his girlfriend; FN Herstal gun was
    the weapon used to kill, we tied that to . . . Tyler; we have
    a witness, not only identify him at the scene, telling the
    . . . police, not coincidentally, what he was wearing that
    night and a picture of him. We have cell phone evidence
    of him using his phone that night. There was nothing to
    suggest . . . King was the shooter, and the cops knew
    that. So to tell . . . King, “We aren’t going to arrest you
    as long as you tell the truth,” was simple, which is why it
    was different with [Johnson]. He didn’t tell the truth, so
    he was arrested.
    3. Disposition and Direct A ppeal
    The jury found Tyler guilty of first degree murder and use
    of a firearm to commit a felony. Utilizing the same counsel he
    had at trial, Tyler filed a direct appeal with this court claim-
    ing errors relating to the district court’s denial of various
    motions to suppress. We concluded the district court did not
    err by overruling Tyler’s motions to suppress and affirmed
    Tyler’s convictions.2
    4. Tyler’s Motion for
    Postconviction R elief
    In October 2016, Tyler filed a motion for postconviction
    relief alleging prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assist­
    ance of trial counsel. As to prosecutorial misconduct, Tyler
    claimed the State (1) allowed King’s known, false testimony
    concerning the authorship of the letter provided by Tyler’s
    counsel to go uncorrected; (2) introduced new and imper-
    missible evidence during closing arguments in providing the
    reasoning for King’s immunity deal; (3) improperly vouched
    for and bolstered King’s testimony by stating during closing
    arguments that “‘the police and prosecutors don’t give deals
    to liars’”; (4) lied to the jury during closing arguments in
    2
    See 
    id. - 374
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    representing that Johnson would not receive a deal; and (5)
    failed to disclose to Tyler’s counsel that Johnson’s charge
    would be dropped in exchange for his testimony at trial. As to
    ineffective assistance, Tyler claimed trial counsel (1) allowed
    King’s false testimony to go uncorrected, (2) failed to object
    to prosecutorial misconduct in introducing new and imper-
    missible evidence during closing arguments and vouching
    for and bolstering a State’s witness, and (3) failed to appeal
    the comments made by the county attorney. Tyler addition-
    ally argued the cumulative effect of these errors denied him
    a fair trial.
    In an amended order, the district court denied Tyler’s motion
    without an evidentiary hearing. The court found Tyler’s claims
    were procedurally barred, insufficiently pled, and affirma-
    tively refuted by the record. Tyler appeals this order.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Tyler assigns, consolidated and restated, that the district
    court erred in finding an evidentiary hearing was not war-
    ranted and (1) dismissing his claims of prosecutorial miscon-
    duct regarding King’s and Johnson’s testimony and the State’s
    closing argument and (2) dismissing his claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel for not objecting, correcting, or appeal-
    ing the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding
    is procedurally barred is a question of law which is reviewed
    independently of the lower court’s ruling.3
    [2] In appeals from postconviction proceedings, an appel-
    late court reviews de novo a determination that the defendant
    failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a violation of his
    or her constitutional rights or that the record and files affirm­
    atively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief.4
    3
    State v. Haynes, 
    299 Neb. 249
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 40
    (2018).
    4
    State v. Collins, 
    299 Neb. 160
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 721
    (2018).
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    IV. ANALYSIS
    [3] Under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, Neb. Rev. Stat.
    §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 (Reissue 2016), a prisoner in custody
    may file a petition for relief on the ground that there was a
    denial or infringement of the prisoner’s constitutional rights
    that would render the judgment void or voidable. This category
    of relief is “very narrow.”5
    [4] Section 29-3001(2) entitles a prisoner to an evidentiary
    hearing on a claim for postconviction relief, unless “the motion
    and the files and records of the case show to the satisfaction
    of the court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” In order
    to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a prisoner must allege
    facts in the motion for postconviction relief that, if proved,
    would constitute a violation of his or her rights under the
    U.S. or Nebraska Constitution.6 A prisoner is not entitled to
    an evidentiary hearing on the basis of claims that present only
    conclusory statements of law or fact.7 In the absence of alleged
    facts that would render the judgment void or voidable, the
    proper course is to dismiss the motion for postconviction relief
    for failure to state a claim.8
    [5-8] A motion for postconviction relief is not a substitute
    for an appeal.9 Therefore, a motion for postconviction relief
    cannot be used to secure review of issues which were known
    to the defendant and could have been litigated on direct appeal;
    such issues are procedurally barred.10 Whether a claim of
    prosecutorial misconduct could have been litigated on direct
    appeal and is thus procedurally barred from being litigated on
    postconviction depends on the nature of the claim.11 Where
    5
    Haynes, supra note 
    3, 299 Neb. at 260
    , 908 N.W.2d at 51.
    6
    State v. Dubray, 
    294 Neb. 937
    , 
    885 N.W.2d 540
    (2016).
    7
    Id.
    8
    See State v. Ryan, 
    287 Neb. 938
    , 
    845 N.W.2d 287
    (2014).
    9
    State v. Torres, 
    295 Neb. 830
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 191
    (2017).
    10
    
    Id. 11 Id.
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    the claim of prosecutorial misconduct is such that a determi-
    nation of the merits is possible based on the record on direct
    appeal, it is procedurally barred from being litigated on post-
    conviction.12 But where an evidentiary hearing is necessary
    to decide the merits of the claim, the failure to raise the issue
    on direct appeal does not preclude it from being litigated
    on postconviction.13
    1. Prosecutorial Misconduct
    On appeal, Tyler’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
    include (1) the prosecutor knowingly misrepresented to the
    jury that Johnson would not receive a deal before dismissing
    his felony charge and committed a Brady v. Maryland 14 viola-
    tion by failing to disclose the deal to Tyler, (2) the prosecutor
    failed to correct King’s testimony about authoring the letter, (3)
    the prosecutor introduced new and impermissible facts during
    closing arguments, and (4) the prosecutor improperly bolstered
    a witness during closing arguments.
    Prosecutors are charged with the duty to conduct criminal
    trials in a manner that provides the accused with a fair and
    impartial trial.15 Because prosecutors are held to a high stan-
    dard for a wide range of duties, the term “prosecutorial mis-
    conduct” cannot be neatly defined.16 Generally, prosecutorial
    misconduct encompasses conduct that violates legal or ethical
    standards for various contexts because the conduct will or may
    undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial.17
    (a) Plea Deal
    Tyler claims that the State committed prosecutorial mis-
    conduct in failing to disclose to the jury that Johnson had
    12
    See 
    id. 13 Id.
    14
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L. Ed. 2d 215
    (1963).
    15
    State v. Dubray, 
    289 Neb. 208
    , 
    854 N.W.2d 584
    (2014).
    16
    
    Id. 17 Id.
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    received a plea deal. Tyler also claims that the State com-
    mitted a violation of Brady18 when it failed to disclose that
    Johnson had received a plea deal.
    These claims center on Tyler’s allegation that the prosecutor
    told the jury during his closing argument that Johnson would
    not be getting a deal and that after trial, Johnson had his crimi-
    nal case dismissed as a result of his testimony. A determination
    of these claims on the merits is possible based on the record
    without further evidentiary hearing.
    [9] In assessing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in
    closing arguments, a court first determines whether the pros-
    ecutor’s remarks were improper.19 It is then necessary to deter-
    mine the extent to which the improper remarks had a prejudi-
    cial effect on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.20
    A prosecutor must base his or her argument on the evidence
    introduced at trial rather than on matters not in evidence.21
    However, a prosecutor is entitled to draw inferences from the
    evidence in presenting his or her case, and such inferences
    generally do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.22 As we
    stated in State v. Dubray 23:
    [W]hen a prosecutor’s comments rest on reasonably
    drawn inferences from the evidence, he or she is permit-
    ted to present a spirited summation that a defense theory
    is illogical or unsupported by the evidence and to high-
    light the relative believability of witnesses for the State
    and the defense. These types of comments are a major
    purpose of summation, and they are distinguishable from
    attacking a defense counsel’s personal character or stating
    18
    Brady, supra note 14.
    19
    State v. Johnson, 
    298 Neb. 491
    , 
    904 N.W.2d 714
    (2017).
    20
    Id.; State v. Nolan, 
    292 Neb. 118
    , 
    870 N.W.2d 806
    (2015).
    21
    Johnson, supra note 19.
    22
    
    Id. 23 Dubray,
    supra note 
    15, 289 Neb. at 227
    , 854 N.W.2d at 604-05.
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    a personal opinion about the character of a defendant
    or witness.
    During trial, Johnson testified that he did not have a deal
    with the State but that he hoped his cooperation would lead to
    a lesser charge or dismissal of his accessory charge. In closing
    arguments, the State asserted that Johnson had been arrested,
    had a charge pending, and did not have a deal in place at the
    time of trial.
    Even if Johnson later received a dismissal or reduction
    of his charge, it would not make Johnson’s testimony or
    the State’s assertions during closing arguments untrue. In
    fact, in review of Johnson’s testimony and the State’s asser-
    tions during closing arguments, the record makes clear that
    Johnson believed it possible and the State did not dispute that
    Johnson’s charge or sentence might be modified as a result of
    his testimony. As such, the State’s assertions during closing
    arguments did not mislead or unduly influence the jury. As
    we have previously stated, a prosecutor’s conduct that does
    not mislead and unduly influence the jury does not constitute
    misconduct.24 Tyler’s claim that the prosecutor misled the jury
    is without merit.
    In regard to an alleged Brady violation, the U.S. Supreme
    Court has held that the prosecution has a duty to disclose all
    favorable evidence to a criminal defendant prior to trial.25
    Favorable evidence includes both exculpatory and impeach-
    ment evidence.26
    Tyler’s motion for postconviction relief alleges that the State
    committed the Brady violation when the State gave Johnson a
    plea deal after telling the jury that Johnson would not be given
    a deal. More specifically, Tyler alleges the prosecutor stated
    24
    See Johnson, supra note 19.
    25
    Brady, supra note 14.
    26
    See United States v. Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 3375
    , 
    87 L. Ed. 2d 481
    (1985), citing Giglio v. United States, 
    405 U.S. 150
    , 
    92 S. Ct. 763
    , 
    31 L. Ed. 2d 104
    (1972).
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    in closing that Johnson would not be getting a deal and that
    therefore, the State was precluded from giving Johnson a deal
    after trial.
    However, the record does not support this allegation. Instead,
    the record indicates that the prosecutor stated that “[w]e didn’t
    give a deal to . . . Johnson.” The prosecutor’s statement was
    made during rebuttal argument in response to defense counsel’s
    questioning as to why King wanted immunity. The prosecutor’s
    statement was a correct statement of the evidence which indi-
    cated that Johnson lied to investigators, that he was charged
    with accessory to a felony, and that he did not have a deal at
    the time of trial.
    Tyler’s motion for postconviction relief did not allege that
    Johnson’s testimony was false or that the State had a plea
    agreement with Johnson at the time of trial and failed to
    disclose that fact to Tyler. As a result, Tyler did not present
    allegations that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory
    or impeachment evidence to support a Brady violation. This
    assignment of error is without merit.
    (b) False Testimony
    Tyler alleges that the State committed prosecutorial mis-
    conduct in failing to correct King’s testimony about author-
    ing the letter provided by Tyler’s counsel. In his motion for
    postconviction relief, Tyler noted that, though King testified
    he authored the letter, the State informed Tyler’s counsel
    during an off-the-record recess that the letter was written
    by Johnson. Neither the State nor Tyler’s counsel disclosed
    Johnson’s authorship of the letter to the jury. Tyler claims he
    could not have brought this claim of prosecutorial misconduct
    on direct appeal, because the State’s disclosure that Johnson,
    not King, authored the letter occurred off the record. However,
    Tyler acknowledges in his motion for postconviction relief that
    this issue was known to Tyler’s counsel at the time of trial,
    and there is no evidence that it was raised on direct appeal. It
    is well settled that a motion for postconviction relief cannot
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    be used to secure review of issues which were known to the
    defendant and which were or could have been litigated on
    direct appeal.27 Therefore, Tyler’s claim of prosecutorial mis-
    conduct for failing to correct known, false testimony is proce-
    durally barred.
    (c) Comments During Closing
    Tyler alleges that the State committed prosecutorial mis-
    conduct in introducing new and impermissible facts during
    closing arguments. On this claim, Tyler asserts the State com-
    mitted prosecutorial misconduct in informing the jury that the
    reason King was offered immunity was because King was at
    the scene of a crime and failed to report it to the police. Tyler
    asserts this information was not introduced at trial and, as
    such, the State should have been precluded from discussing
    these facts during closing arguments.
    A review of the trial record and the State’s comments in
    closing is sufficient to determine whether the State intro-
    duced new and impermissible information during closing
    arguments. Therefore, Tyler could have raised this claim on
    direct appeal, but failed to do so. As such, this claim is proce-
    durally barred.
    (d) Witness Bolstering
    Tyler alleges that the State committed prosecutorial mis-
    conduct by improperly bolstering a witness during closing
    arguments. Tyler argues that the prosecution’s statement that
    “the police and prosecutors don’t give deals to liars” bolstered
    King’s credibility.
    As with Tyler’s previous claim, Tyler’s bolstering claim is
    based on the record of what occurred during closing arguments.
    The issues of whether the State’s comments were improper
    or materially prejudicial could have been resolved on direct
    appeal. Because Tyler failed to raise the claim on direct appeal,
    the claim is procedurally barred.
    27
    Torres, supra note 9.
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    In consideration of all of the above, we conclude that the
    district court did not err in dismissing Tyler’s claims of pros-
    ecutorial misconduct without an evidentiary hearing.
    2. Ineffective Assistance
    of Counsel
    As to his claims for ineffective assistance, Tyler alleged that
    his trial counsel allowed King’s false testimony to go uncor-
    rected, failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct in introduc-
    ing new and impermissible evidence during closing arguments
    and bolstering a State’s witness, and failed to appeal the com-
    ments made by the county attorney. Tyler additionally argued
    the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial.
    Stated another way, Tyler claims his counsel was ineffective
    in failing to object, correct, or appeal the alleged instances of
    prosecutorial misconduct.
    [10] Where trial counsel and appellate counsel are the same,
    a postconviction motion is a defendant’s first opportunity to
    raise a claim of ineffective assistance.28 A proper ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim alleges a violation of the funda-
    mental constitutional right to a fair trial.29 To prevail on a
    claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
    Washington,30 the defendant must show that his or her coun-
    sel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient perform­
    ance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.31 To show
    prejudice under the prejudice component of the Strickland test,
    the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that
    but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the pro-
    ceeding would have been different.32 A reasonable probability
    28
    State v. Payne, 
    289 Neb. 467
    , 
    855 N.W.2d 783
    (2014).
    29
    State v. Vela, 
    297 Neb. 227
    , 
    900 N.W.2d 8
    (2017).
    30
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
          (1984).
    31
    Vela, supra note 29.
    32
    
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    does not require that it be more likely than not that the defi-
    cient performance altered the outcome of the case; rather, the
    defend­ant must show a probability sufficient to undermine
    confidence in the outcome.33 In determining whether counsel
    was ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial miscon-
    duct, an appellate court must first determine whether the
    petitioner has alleged any action or remarks that constituted
    prosecutorial misconduct.34
    (a) King’s Testimony
    In his motion for postconviction relief, Tyler alleged his
    counsel was ineffective for failing to correct King’s known,
    false testimony that King authored the letter and, on direct
    appeal, in failing to allege prosecutorial misconduct that the
    State allowed known, false testimony to go uncorrected. This
    claim is without merit, because Tyler has failed to allege suf-
    ficient facts to show King’s testimony misled or unduly influ-
    enced the jury.
    Tyler contends that correcting the testimony about the letter
    would have provided the jury evidence relevant to King’s cred-
    ibility which was at issue as a primary witness for the State.
    However, Tyler’s counsel cross-examined King at trial and
    questioned King’s credibility, including the amount of alcohol
    he consumed on the day of the shooting, his receiving immu-
    nity for his cooperation, and his statements to law enforcement.
    The jury was able to compare King’s testimony with the other
    witnesses’ accounts and consider the terms of King’s immunity
    deal. The authorship of a letter that the jury did not review or
    have substantive information about had little probative value to
    King’s credibility. Tyler failed to show how evidence that King
    authored the letter caused any prejudicial effect.
    Tyler also claims his counsel should have introduced the
    letter to impeach King’s testimony that he saw Tyler firing
    33
    
    Id. 34 Johnson
    , supra note 19.
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    the gun, because the letter allegedly states that the author did
    not see the shooting. However, Tyler admits that the letter
    was actually written by Johnson, so regardless of the alleged
    content of the letter, any statements about what the author of
    the letter observed are irrelevant to King’s testimony about his
    own observations.
    Therefore, based on all of the above, Tyler has failed
    to state sufficient allegations under the prejudice prong of
    Strickland to show that, but for counsel’s failure to correct
    King’s testimony about the letter and failure to allege on direct
    appeal that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in
    not correcting King’s testimony, the result of trial would have
    been different.
    (b) Closing Arguments
    Tyler’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance consist
    of his counsel’s failure to object to the State’s statements dur-
    ing closing arguments and failure to raise the issue on appeal.
    Specifically, these claims concern the State’s comments about
    King’s immunity deal and Johnson’s lack of a plea deal.
    (i) New Evidence
    Tyler claims his counsel failed to object to prosecutorial
    misconduct when the State discussed the reasoning for King’s
    immunity deal. Specifically, Tyler claims prosecutorial mis-
    conduct in the State’s explaining that the reason King was
    offered immunity was because King was at the scene of a
    crime and failed to report it to the police. According to Tyler,
    this amounts to misconduct, because “information was not
    introduced into evidence during the trial to show that King
    had broken the law in any way” for which he would need the
    immunity deal. He further asserts that “[w]ithout this evidence
    being introduced improperly, the jury very well could have
    concluded that King was hiding something or testifying falsely
    because most witnesses with no involvement in a crime do not
    need immunity to testify.”
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    Here, the record shows King testified that he was with Tyler
    on the night of the offense, that King was involved in the
    altercation which eventually led to the shooting, that King saw
    Tyler shoot a gun toward the group with whom they had the
    altercation, that King rode in Tyler’s vehicle after witnessing
    him shoot the gun, that King flew back to Illinois, and that
    King received an immunity deal before he gave an interview
    about the shooting. King did not testify to notifying the police
    of the shooting before the Omaha Police Department detec-
    tives initiated contact. In addition, Tyler’s counsel argued in
    closing that if King was not the shooter, then he would not
    need immunity.
    It was a reasonable inference for the State to draw from
    this testimony that King received his immunity deal to protect
    him from possible charges connected with his participation in
    the events surrounding the shooting, and it was appropriate to
    rebut Tyler’s closing argument. As such, the State’s assertion
    that King received his immunity deal in connection with wit-
    nessing the shooting and not reporting it does not amount to
    prosecutorial misconduct.
    (ii) Witness Bolstering
    Tyler claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to
    object to the State’s improperly bolstering King’s testimony.
    Specifically, Tyler points to the State’s comment that “the
    police and prosecutors don’t give deals to liars” while noting
    King received an immunity deal as opposed to Johnson, who
    did not. Such a statement, Tyler argues, implied that King must
    be honest because he got an immunity deal.
    The trial testimony of both King and Johnson support
    the State’s comments in closing. King testified that he was
    approached by investigators, that he demanded an immunity
    deal in exchange for an interview, and that he received the
    deal. Johnson, in turn, testified that he lied to investigators,
    that he was charged with accessory to a felony, and that he did
    not have a deal at the time of trial. The inferences made by the
    State were reasonable given these facts.
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    In addition, the jury was able to determine on its own the
    weight and credibility to be given to King’s testimony as it
    heard King testify, heard King being cross-examined as to his
    credibility, heard testimony from other witnesses concerning
    King, and heard Tyler’s closing argument which addressed
    concerns about King’s truthfulness.
    Further, the prosecutor’s statement was made in the State’s
    rebuttal argument. In U.S. v. Delgado,35 the court held that the
    prosecutor did not commit misconduct by arguing during clos-
    ing arguments that the defendant had lied. The court noted that
    “context is crucial” and that the prosecutor’s statement was
    made in response to defense counsel’s attack of government
    witnesses and after a detailed summary of the evidence.36 The
    statement that the defendant lied, the court explained, was a
    commentary on what the evidence showed; it was not an asser-
    tion of the prosecutor’s personal opinion or an attack on the
    defendant’s character.37
    Here, Tyler’s counsel, during closing, raised the issue of
    King’s credibility repeatedly. More specifically, Tyler’s coun-
    sel questioned why King would need immunity if he had not
    done anything illegal. To rebut that contention, the prosecu-
    tor addressed the reason King was granted immunity and the
    reason Johnson was not granted immunity. The prosecutor’s
    statement was a commentary on what the evidence showed; it
    was not an assertion of the prosecutor’s personal opinion or a
    bolstering of King’s credibility.
    Lastly, the trial judge instructed the jury that the attorneys’
    statements were not to be taken as evidence. Therefore, absent
    other evidence, the State’s comment that “the police and pros-
    ecutors don’t give deals to liars” and the State’s emphasis on
    King’s having received an immunity deal does not amount
    to prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel is not ineffective for
    
    35 U.S. v
    . Delgado, 
    672 F.3d 320
    (5th Cir. 2012).
    36
    
    Id. at 335.
    37
    
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    failing to make an objection that has no merit.38 As a result,
    Tyler’s trial counsel could not be ineffective for failing
    to object.
    (iii) Plea Deal
    Tyler argues that the State’s comment during closing argu-
    ments, “what I would argue to you is the police and pros-
    ecutors don’t give deals to liars[; we] didn’t give a deal to
    . . . Johnson,” amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, because
    Johnson received a deal to drop his pending charge after he
    provided his testimony. Such a statement, Tyler claims, bol-
    stered Johnson’s credibility with the jury, because it appeared
    as if Johnson were providing testimony against his own best
    interests even though he had not been given a plea deal.
    As discussed in a previous section, however, this ignores
    Johnson’s testimony concerning the status of his then-current
    charge. Johnson testified that he did not have an agreement
    with the State in exchange for his testimony and explained
    that he decided to testify after consulting with his attorney and
    determining that testifying would be the best decision to lead
    to his own best outcome. He further explained that the best
    outcome in his situation would hopefully be that his coop-
    eration would lead to a reduction or dismissal of his acces-
    sory charge.
    The State’s assertion during closing arguments that Johnson
    had been arrested, had a charge pending, and did not have a
    deal in place at the time of trial aligns with this testimony.
    Further, the State’s explanation that Johnson did not currently
    have a deal in place because he lied to police and “the police
    and prosecutors don’t give deals to liars” is a natural inference
    from the evidence.39
    Tyler further argues the State’s assertion that Johnson lied to
    the police and “the police and prosecutors don’t give deals to
    38
    See State v. Stricklin, 
    300 Neb. 794
    , 
    916 N.W.2d 413
    (2018).
    39
    See Johnson, supra note 19.
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    liars” implied the State meant Johnson would never be given
    a deal because of his untruthfulness. However, in review of
    the record, the State commented only that Johnson had been
    arrested and charged because he had lied and that Johnson
    did not have a deal at the time of trial. The State did not say
    Johnson could not redress his incorrect statements and reha-
    bilitate himself to obtain a deal. Through Johnson’s testimony,
    it is clear that he believed there was a possibility for a future
    deal if he testified truthfully at trial. Therefore, these claims
    fail to make sufficient factual allegations to lead to a finding of
    prosecutorial misconduct.
    In consideration of all of the above, Tyler failed to allege
    sufficient facts that the complained-of remarks in the State’s
    closing argument misled and unduly influenced the jury and
    constituted prosecutorial misconduct.40 Therefore, the district
    court did not err in dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing,
    the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
    object and appeal the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Tyler was not
    entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims of prosecutorial
    misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. We further
    conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Tyler’s
    motion for postconviction relief. Therefore, we affirm the dis-
    trict court’s order.
    A ffirmed.
    Freudenberg, J., not participating.
    40
    See id.