State v. Moody , 311 Neb. 143 ( 2022 )


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    03/24/2022 01:05 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    311 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. MOODY
    Cite as 
    311 Neb. 143
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    David J. Moody, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 11, 2022.    No. S-21-303.
    1. Constitutional Law: Speedy Trial: Final Orders. A pretrial order
    denying a motion for discharge on constitutional speedy trial grounds
    does not affect a substantial right in a special proceeding for purposes of
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    2. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s
    determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial
    grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
    clearly erroneous.
    3. Speedy Trial: Proof. When calculating the time for speedy trial pur-
    poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4) (Reissue 2016).
    4. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Words and Phrases. “Good cause,” for
    purposes of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f ) (Reissue 2016), means a
    substantial reason and one that affords a legal excuse.
    5. Good Cause: Proof. Good cause is a factual question dealt with on a
    case-by-case basis. A trial court’s good cause findings must be supported
    by evidence in the record, and the State bears the burden of establishing
    facts showing that good cause existed.
    6. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. When a trial court relies on 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f ) (Reissue 2016) to exclude time from the speedy trial
    calculation, a general finding of “good cause” will not suffice. Instead,
    the court must make specific findings as to the good cause which
    resulted in the delay.
    7. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Appeal and Error. An appellate court
    will give deference to a trial court’s factual findings as to good cause
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f ) (Reissue 2016) unless they are
    clearly erroneous.
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    STATE v. MOODY
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    8. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. Evidence of good cause is properly pre-
    sented at the hearing on the motion for absolute discharge and need
    not be articulated at the time of the trial court’s sua sponte order delay-
    ing trial.
    9. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Appeal and Error. In determining whether
    the trial court clearly erred in finding good cause after a hearing on a
    motion for discharge, an appellate court looks not just to the evidence
    presented at the hearing on the motion for discharge, but to the whole of
    the record.
    10. Speedy Trial. The only timing requirement implicit in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f) (Reissue 2016) is that the substantial reason affording a
    legal excuse objectively existed at the time of the delay.
    11. ____. To calculate the time for statutory speedy trial purposes, a court
    must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months,
    back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can
    be tried.
    12. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. When a court makes a finding of “good
    cause” under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f) (Reissue 2016), the court
    is required to make specific findings as to the cause or causes of such
    extensions and the period of extension attributable to such causes.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Thomas
    A. Otepka, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part dismissed.
    Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
    Jessica C. West for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    David J. Moody appeals the order of the district court
    for Douglas County which overruled his motion for absolute
    discharge wherein he alleged violations of his statutory and
    constitutional rights to speedy trial. Moody claims on appeal
    that the district court erred when it found that the continuances
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    STATE v. MOODY
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    that the district court ordered resulted from the COVID-19
    pandemic and were for “good cause” and, as a consequence,
    should be excluded from the calculation of the time for bring-
    ing him to trial. He contends that good cause was not shown
    and also that the evidence fails to show why his case was con-
    tinued when other criminal trials were being held in the court.
    As explained below, we affirm in part, and in part dismiss.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On May 15, 2020, the State filed an information charging
    Moody with domestic violence assault in the third degree, sec-
    ond offense, and strangulation, both Class IIIA felonies under
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-323
    (1) and (4) and 28-310.01(1) and (2)
    (Reissue 2016). Three continuances were ordered. Below, we
    briefly describe the continuance orders and thereafter describe
    each one in detail. The trial was originally set for November 9,
    but the district court held a rescheduling hearing on November
    6, and on November 10, the court entered an order contin­uing
    the trial until January 20, 2021. Trial did not commence on
    January 20; instead, the court set a rescheduling hearing for
    that date, and Moody requested that the hearing be moved to
    January 25. On January 25, the court held the rescheduling
    hearing and announced that it would continue the trial until
    March 17. The order for the second continuance was filed on
    February 2. On March 16, the court held a rescheduling hear-
    ing on its own motion and, at that hearing, stated that it would
    continue trial until April 14. The order for the third continu-
    ance was filed on March 18. At each of the rescheduling hear-
    ings, the court received into evidence an affidavit of the court’s
    bailiff in which the bailiff stated, inter alia, that the next avail-
    able jury trial date to set Moody’s trial was the date to which
    the court continued the trial. In each of the three orders contin­
    uing the trial, the district court made a finding that the period
    of delay resulting from the continuance should be excluded in
    calculating the time for trial for good cause shown pursuant to
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f ) (Reissue 2016).
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    STATE v. MOODY
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    311 Neb. 143
    In the first continuance order, announced on November 6,
    2020, and filed on November 10, the court cited an October
    21 order issued by the presiding judge of the district court for
    Douglas County which stated that because of reasons related
    to the COVID-19 pandemic and the district court’s efforts to
    mitigate the effects of the pandemic, the number of criminal
    jury trials held during the November 2020 term would be lim-
    ited to 24, and that all other criminal cases scheduled for that
    month should be continued “for good cause pursuant to Neb.
    Rev. Stat. Sec. 29-1207(4)(f )” to the next available trial date
    for the assigned judge. The next available date for the judge
    in this case was January 20, 2021, and the court ordered this
    case to be scheduled for that date “as back-up.” The court
    attached the presiding judge’s October 21 order to its order,
    and the presiding judge’s order stated, inter alia, that holding
    additional trials at that time “would be impossible due to the
    ongoing social distancing restrictions for the public,” because
    there was not “space available to accommodate any additional
    jury trials while at the same time maintaining social distanc-
    ing restrictions.”
    In the second continuance order, announced on January 25,
    2021, and filed on February 2, the court cited a December 11,
    2020, order issued by the presiding judge of the district court
    for Douglas County which ordered that for reasons related to
    the COVID-19 pandemic, all criminal cases scheduled for the
    January and February 2021 terms be continued “for good cause
    pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. 29-1207(4)(f )” to the next
    available trial date for the assigned judge. The next available
    trial date for the judge assigned to this case was March 17, and
    the court ordered this case to be scheduled for that date “as
    back-up.” The court attached the presiding judge’s December
    11, 2020, order, and it stated, inter alia, that there had been
    a “resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic within Douglas
    County, Nebraska” that was “more severe . . . than it has been
    since its inception” and that “jury trials during this spike in
    the COVID-19 pandemic pose a clear and present danger to
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    STATE v. MOODY
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    the members of the public, participants in the judicial process,
    Douglas County Sheriff Deputies, law enforcement officers,
    attorneys, court staff, Judges, and all potential jurors.”
    In the third continuance order, announced March 16, 2021,
    and filed March 18, the court cited a January 29 order issued
    by the presiding judge of the district court for Douglas County
    which ordered that for reasons related to the COVID-19 pan-
    demic, a limited number of criminal cases should be scheduled
    for the March 2021 term and that all other criminal cases should
    be continued “for good cause pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec.
    29-1207(4)(f )” to the next available trial date for the assigned
    judge. The next available trial date for the judge assigned to
    this case was April 14, and the court ordered that this case
    be scheduled for that date. The court attached the presiding
    judge’s January 29 order, which referred to the district court’s
    “inability to safely call and retain an adequate cross-section of
    jurors” and stated that as a consequence, “the backlog of crimi-
    nal and civil cases requesting jury trials has increased.” The
    presiding judge’s order listed the specific criminal cases that
    would take place in the district court during the March 2021
    panel, and Moody’s case was listed as one of several cases that
    would be on “[b]ack-up” to the one case that was to be held by
    the judge assigned to Moody’s case.
    Moody filed a motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds
    on March 31, 2021. He asserted violations of his statutory right
    to trial within 6 months under § 29-1207 and 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208
     (Reissue 2016) and of his right to a speedy trial
    under the federal and Nebraska Constitutions. In the motion,
    Moody stated that excluding 1 day attributed to a discovery
    motion he filed, he should have been brought to trial on or
    before November 16, 2020. Moody contended that the delays
    related to the continuances ordered by the court should not
    have been excluded. He generally contended that some crimi-
    nal trials were held during the period in which his case had
    been continued, and he asserted that the court set forth no
    reason why the trial of his case in particular could not be held
    when others were being held.
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    STATE v. MOODY
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    311 Neb. 143
    At a hearing on the motion to discharge, the district court
    received evidence offered by the State, including the affida-
    vit of the bailiff for the trial judge in this case. The bailiff
    stated in the affidavit, inter alia, that there had been “several
    months where jury trials were not empaneled, because of the
    pandemic” and that when jury trials resumed in March 2021,
    each judge “was allotted one day for a criminal jury trial to
    be empaneled for that month.” The bailiff also stated that on
    the date in March 2021 assigned to the judge in this case, a
    jury was empaneled for a criminal case that “had been bound
    over in the district court since March 7, 2019.” The bailiff also
    stated that the judge’s “next allotted jury trial date is April 14,
    2021,” and that Moody’s case was “scheduled as the primary
    case that day.” The evidence offered by the State also included
    several orders of the district court, including the three orders
    of continuance. The court also took judicial notice of the files
    in this case. Moody offered into evidence the affidavit of an
    attorney who represented a defendant in a criminal jury trial
    that took place in March 2021; the State objected based on
    relevance, and the court sustained the objection.
    In an order filed April 9, 2021, the court overruled Moody’s
    motion to discharge. The court first agreed with Moody’s cal-
    culation that the 1-day delay caused by Moody’s discovery
    motion extended the speedy trial time to November 16, 2020,
    and it stated that the parties agreed that the original trial date
    of November 9 was within the statutory speedy trial dead-
    line. However, the court also found that there were additional
    excludable periods based on its three orders continuing the
    trial: first, until January 20, 2021, then to March 17, and then
    to April 14.
    The court noted that in each of those orders, it had found
    that the delays caused by the continuances were excludable
    for good cause pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(f ). The court rejected
    Moody’s argument that the continuances were not shown to
    be for good cause. Moody had contended that “there [was]
    not enough evidence to establish why his case was not called
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    before others or why more efforts could not have been made
    to get his case to trial despite there being a global pandemic.”
    The court found that the evidence presented by the State and
    the evidence it considered by judicial notice answered Moody’s
    concerns regarding efforts to bring his case to trial and the
    reasons it could not be scheduled for trial. The court reviewed
    evidence, notably the affidavit of the court’s bailiff and the
    orders of the presiding judge. The court found that the evi-
    dence showed that “it was not possible to take this particular
    case to trial between November 2020 and April 2021, because
    of the COVID-19 pandemic.” The court stated that “the pre-
    siding judge continued jury trials and this [c]ourt followed
    those orders.” The court found that “the COVID-19 pandemic
    is sufficient good cause to toll the speedy trial clock in this
    case.” The court therefore found that under the speedy trial
    statute, the period of delay caused by the three continuances
    was excludable for good cause, and it concluded that Moody’s
    motion for discharge based on statutory speedy trial rights
    should be overruled.
    The court also considered Moody’s constitutional right to
    speedy trial. The court stated that at the hearing, Moody
    focused on the statutory right and provided no argument or
    authority to support a constitutional claim. Nevertheless,
    the court considered factors set forth in case law regarding
    the constitutional right, and it concluded that this was not the
    “unusual case” in which there was no violation of the statutory
    right to speedy trial but there was a constitutional speedy trial
    violation. The court therefore overruled Moody’s motion to
    discharge in its entirety.
    Moody appeals the district court’s order which overruled his
    motion for discharge.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Moody claims that the district court erred when it overruled
    his motion for discharge. Moody contends that the contin­
    uances were not shown to be for good cause and that therefore,
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    his statutory right to speedy trial was violated. He further
    claims that the court erred when it failed to make specific find-
    ings as to the cause or causes of the extensions of his trial date
    beyond 6 months and the period of extension attributable to
    each of such causes.
    [1] Moody also claims that the delays violated his federal
    and state constitutional rights to speedy trial. As we recently
    held in State v. Abernathy, 
    310 Neb. 880
    , 891, ___ N.W.2d
    ___, ___ (2022), “a pretrial order denying a motion for dis-
    charge on constitutional speedy trial grounds does not affect a
    substantial right in a special proceeding for purposes of [Neb.
    Rev. Stat.] § 25-1902(1)(b) [(Cum. Supp. 2020)],” and there-
    fore that issue is not reviewable in the interlocutory appeal
    of an order overruling a motion for discharge on statutory
    speedy trial grounds. We therefore lack appellate jurisdiction
    to review Moody’s claim that he was entitled to absolute dis-
    charge on constitutional speedy trial grounds, and we dismiss
    that part of the appeal.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [2] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether
    charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a
    factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
    clearly erroneous. State v. Brown, 
    310 Neb. 224
    , 
    964 N.W.2d 682
     (2021).
    ANALYSIS
    Moody claims that the district court erred when it found
    that the continuances ordered by the court were for good cause
    under § 29-1207(4)(f ). He repeats the argument that he made
    to the district court that there was no showing why his case
    in particular could not have been tried when other trials were
    being held during the months at issue. Moody also claims
    that the court’s order overruling his motion for discharge did
    not include specific findings as required by our holding in
    State v. Alvarez, 
    189 Neb. 281
    , 292, 
    202 N.W.2d 604
    , 611
    (1972), that when a court makes a finding of “good cause”
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    under § 29-1207(4)(f ), the court is “required to make specific
    findings as to the cause or causes of such extensions and the
    period of extension attributable to such causes.”
    We first review standards regarding statutory speedy trial
    rights and good cause for delays. Applying those standards,
    we conclude that the court’s finding that the continuances
    were for good cause was not clearly erroneous and that the
    court’s order was sufficiently specific regarding the periods
    of delay occasioned by its continuances and the causes of
    such continuances.
    Standards Governing Speedy
    Trial and Good Cause.
    The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in §§ 29-1207
    and 29-1208. Section 29-1208 provides that if a defendant is
    not brought to trial within the time provided for in § 29-1207,
    as extended by excluded periods, the defendant will be enti-
    tled to absolute discharge from the charged offense. Under
    § 29-1207(1), “[e]very person indicted or informed against
    for any offense shall be brought to trial within six months,
    and such time shall be computed as provided in this section.”
    Section 29-1207(2) generally provides that the “six-month
    period shall commence to run from the date the indictment is
    returned or the information filed.” Certain periods of delay are
    excluded from the speedy trial calculation. As relevant to this
    case, § 29-1207(4)(f ) provides that other periods of delay not
    specifically enumerated in the statute may be excluded in the
    speedy trial computation, “but only if the court finds that they
    are for good cause.”
    [3-5] The State bears the burden to show, by a preponder-
    ance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the
    excluded time periods under § 29-1207(4). State v. Brown,
    
    supra.
     “Good cause,” for purposes of § 29-1207(4)(f ), is not
    defined by statute, but we have found it fitting to apply the
    meaning for “good cause” that we have used in other contexts,
    which is that “good cause” means a substantial reason and
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    one that affords a legal excuse. State v. Brown, 
    supra.
     We have
    also recognized that good cause is a factual question dealt
    with on a case-by-case basis. 
    Id.
     A district court’s good cause
    findings must be supported by evidence in the record, and as
    noted, the State bears the burden of establishing facts showing
    that good cause existed. 
    Id.
    [6,7] When a trial court relies on § 29-1207(4)(f ) to exclude
    time from the speedy trial calculation, a general finding of
    “good cause” will not suffice. State v. Brown, 
    310 Neb. 224
    ,
    
    964 N.W.2d 682
     (2021). Instead, the court must make specific
    findings as to the good cause which resulted in the delay. 
    Id.
    An appellate court will give deference to such factual findings
    unless they are clearly erroneous. 
    Id.
    [8] In State v. Chase, 
    310 Neb. 160
    , 168, 
    964 N.W.2d 254
    ,
    261 (2021), we stated that a continuance by the court’s own
    motion, or “judicial delay,” does not toll the speedy trial statute
    “absent a showing by the State of good cause” and that “when
    a trial court relies on § 29-1207(4)(f ) to exclude time from the
    speedy trial calculation, it must make specific findings as to the
    good cause which resulted in the delay.” The continuances in
    Chase were ordered in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
    but the defendant did not specifically argue on appeal that the
    evidence in the record pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic
    failed to provide good cause for the delays resulting from the
    court’s sua sponte orders. Instead, the defendant’s challenge on
    appeal was to the timing of the presentation of the evidence
    supporting good cause and of the court’s articulation on the
    record of the reasons the delays were for good cause. We held
    that the evidence of good cause is properly presented at the
    hearing on the motion for absolute discharge and need not be
    articulated at the time of the court’s sua sponte order delaying
    trial. Chase, supra. We reasoned in Chase that “[w]ithout a
    motion for absolute discharge under [§ 29-1208], a defendant
    waives the statutory right to a trial within 6 months and no evi-
    dentiary showing of good cause is necessary at all.” 310 Neb.
    at 172, 964 N.W.2d at 263.
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    [9,10] With regard to our review of a trial court’s finding
    that a judicial delay was for good cause, we stated in Chase,
    
    supra,
     that in determining whether the trial court clearly erred
    in finding good cause after a hearing on a motion for discharge,
    we look not just to the evidence presented at the hearing on
    the motion for discharge, but to the whole of the record. The
    only timing requirement implicit in § 29-1207(4)(f ) is that the
    substantial reason affording a legal excuse objectively existed
    at the time of the delay. Chase, 
    supra.
     In the present case, the
    district court has assisted our review by making findings at the
    time of each of the three continuances.
    [11] To calculate the time for statutory speedy trial pur-
    poses, “a court must exclude the day the complaint was filed,
    count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any
    time excluded under § 29-1207(4) to determine the last day
    the defendant can be tried.” Brown, 
    310 Neb. at 233
    , 964
    N.W.2d at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying
    this formula, the State and Moody agree that based on the
    filing of the information on May 15, 2020, and the exclusion
    of 1 day for Moody’s discovery motion, the last day for trial
    in the absence of all good cause continuances would have
    been November 16. Trial was originally set to begin prior to
    that date, on November 9. However, the parties differ on how
    much time, if any, should have been excluded from the statu-
    tory speedy trial calculation for the delay caused by the court’s
    continuance of the trial from November 9 to January 20, 2021,
    then to March 17, and finally to April 14. We next consider
    this disagreement.
    District Court’s Finding That COVID-19 Pandemic
    and Restrictions and Limitations Related
    Thereto Established Good Cause for
    the Delay of Moody’s Trial.
    The district court in this case found that “the COVID-19
    pandemic [was] sufficient good cause” and that therefore,
    the entire period of delay pursuant to its three continuance
    orders “constitute[d] an excludable period of delay pursuant to
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    § 29-1207(4)(f ).” The court stated that the record in this case
    was “replete with explanation that it was not possible to take
    this particular case to trial between November 2020 and April
    2021, because of the COVID-19 pandemic.” As explained
    below, we agree with the court’s assessment of good cause;
    its decision that the period of the continuances was excludable
    was not clearly erroneous.
    In State v. Brown, 
    310 Neb. 224
    , 
    964 N.W.2d 682
     (2021),
    the defendant challenged the district court’s finding that
    delays occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic were for good
    cause for statutory speedy trial purposes. We concluded that
    “[c]onsidering the evidence that was presented at the hearing
    on the motion to discharge and the facts of which the district
    court properly took judicial notice, . . . the district court’s
    finding of good cause for the continuances when made was
    not clearly erroneous.” 
    Id. at 238
    , 964 N.W.2d at 692. We
    reasoned that the circumstances entailed by the pandemic
    were such that the court could find “good cause” in the sense
    of “a substantial reason . . . that affords a legal excuse.” Id.
    (internal quotation marks omitted). In support of our conclu-
    sion in Brown, we cited U.S. v. Olsen, 
    995 F.3d 683
    , 693 (9th
    Cir. 2021), in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
    applied the federal Speedy Trial Act and its exclusion of time
    for “ends of justice” and stated that “surely a global pandemic
    . . . falls within such unique circumstances to permit a court to
    temporarily suspend jury trials in the interest of public health.”
    We note for completeness that the opinion in Olsen has now
    been amended and superseded by the opinion in U.S. v. Olsen,
    
    21 F.4th 1036
     (9th Cir. 2022), in which petitions for panel
    rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied. However, the
    language we quoted from the original opinion remains in the
    amended opinion.
    Our opinion in Brown provides precedent that as a gen-
    eral matter, the COVID-19 pandemic and the public health
    interests related thereto may provide good cause. However,
    in Brown, we were careful to state that our determination in
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    that case that good cause was shown “considers the context
    of the COVID-19 pandemic circumstances and conditions that
    existed at the time the continuances were ordered.” 310 Neb. at
    238, 964 N.W.2d at 692. Brown involved continuances ordered
    between March and August 2020, and our determination in
    Brown was based on the specific context and circumstances in
    existence at those times.
    The present case involves continuances ordered at a later
    time, specifically between November 2020 and April 2021,
    when the record shows that circumstances and conditions of the
    pandemic were different. In Brown, the continuances occurred
    in a time when the court was holding no trials, and during part
    of the period of delay in this case, the district court for Douglas
    County was holding no trials. However, during at least part of
    the time when continuances were ordered in this case, the court
    had resumed holding a limited number of trials.
    At the hearing on the motion for discharge in this case,
    the court took judicial notice of the files in this case and it
    also received evidence offered by the State which included
    affidavits of the court’s bailiff and orders filed by the court
    and by the presiding judge of the district court. The court’s
    contin­uance orders in this case were prompted by the presid-
    ing judge’s orders that required judges of this district court
    to limit the number of criminal jury trials and to continue all
    other trials that required a jury. The presiding judge’s orders
    described the specific context and circumstances at the time
    of the delays, noting factors such as “ongoing social distanc-
    ing restrictions,” lack of space to accommodate multiple jury
    trials while adhering to such restrictions, a “resurgence of the
    COVID-19 pandemic” that was “more severe” than earlier
    times, the “inability to safely call and retain an adequate cross-
    section of jurors,” and the resulting “backlog of criminal and
    civil cases requesting jury trials.”
    The record in this case provides sufficient evidence regard-
    ing the context and circumstances that were in existence at
    the specific periods that the continuances were ordered in
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    this case for reasons relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
    related public health concerns and restrictions, and the effect
    of the pandemic and related restrictions on the district court’s
    ability to hold jury trials. We discuss the evidence regarding
    the court’s backlog in greater detail below. At this point, we
    note that the record shows that docket congestion had been cre-
    ated by the pandemic, that this judge was permitted to try only
    a limited number of jury cases, and that the judge was directed
    to proceed to trial on a criminal case that had been pending
    significantly longer than Moody’s. Given the facts and circum-
    stances, Moody’s claim that his specific case should have gone
    to trial fails. The State was not obligated to show that conven-
    ing a jury trial would have been literally impossible. See U.S.
    v. Olsen, 
    21 F.4th 1036
     (9th Cir. 2022). The State’s showing
    was sufficient, and good cause was demonstrated.
    We determine that based on the evidence before it at the
    time of Moody’s motion for discharge, the district court did
    not clearly err when it found that the COVID-19 pandemic,
    the public health concerns related thereto, and the restrictions
    on the district court’s ability to carry out jury trials at the
    specific times of the continuances in this case provided good
    cause not to bring this specific case to trial.
    District Court’s Findings in Its Order Regarding
    Cause of Continuances and Period of Delay
    Attributable to Such Continuances
    Were Sufficiently Specific.
    [12] Moody also claims that the district court’s order was not
    adequately specific. He cites State v. Alvarez, 
    189 Neb. 281
    ,
    292, 
    202 N.W.2d 604
    , 611 (1972), in which we held that when
    a court makes a finding of “good cause” under 29-1207(4)(f ),
    the court is “required to make specific findings as to the cause
    or causes of such extensions and the period of extension attrib-
    utable to such causes.” With regard to specific findings as
    to the cause or causes, we determine that the district court’s
    order was specific that the causes of the delays were the
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    COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions related thereto that
    limited the district court’s ability to carry out jury trials.
    Moody argues that the findings were not specific enough to
    his particular case, because the court did not make findings why
    his specific case could not be brought to trial when other cases
    were being tried. We note, however, that the district court’s
    order was specific in setting forth the orders of the presiding
    judge that prompted each of the continuances of Moody’s trial.
    The evidence in this case shows that during part of the period
    of delay, there were no trials being held in the district court. At
    other times during that period, only a limited number of jury
    trials were being held and all other cases, including Moody’s,
    were required to be continued.
    The presiding judge’s order with regard to March 2021
    shows that the specific judge assigned to this case was limited
    to holding only one criminal jury trial and that several other
    cases, including Moody’s, were in “back-up” status. The affi-
    davit of the bailiff also provided evidence that the one case
    that was heard by the judge in March 2021 had been pend-
    ing in the district court since March 2019 as compared to the
    information against Moody which was filed on May 15, 2020.
    We think that the district court’s order was adequately specific
    that Moody’s case was being continued because of restrictions
    required by the pandemic and by the presiding judge’s orders
    permitting only a limited number of specified jury trials to be
    held, while other trials, including Moody’s, were required to
    be continued in order to comply with restrictions in the limited
    space available.
    Moody also argues the order was not sufficiently specific
    regarding the period of delay attributable to the finding of
    good cause. He argues the court was not specific in identify-
    ing the period of delay, including the number of days excluded
    and the last date for which trial could be held for Moody. As
    a general matter, we require a more explicit calculation of
    the speedy trial period to aid our appellate review than that
    which was provided by the court in this case. However, the
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    court’s order in this case was sufficiently clear to show that the
    period that was excluded was sufficient to extend the last date
    for trial past March 31, 2021, when Moody filed his motion
    for discharge.
    The court found that “it was not possible to take this par-
    ticular case to trial between November 2020 and April 2021,
    because of the COVID-19 pandemic.” The court also found
    that the delay caused by “the continuance of the November
    9, 2020 trial date,” the “continuance of the January 20, 2021
    trial date,” and the “continuance of the March 17, 2021 trial
    date” constituted an excludable period of delay pursuant to
    § 29-1207(4)(f ). As we stated earlier, under State v. Chase,
    
    310 Neb. 160
    , 
    964 N.W.2d 254
     (2021), we review a finding
    of good cause based on evidence presented at the hearing on
    a motion for absolute discharge and the whole of the record at
    that time. Therefore, the district court’s finding that the period
    of delay was excludable was made from the perspective of the
    record as it existed at the time of the motion for absolute dis-
    charge. From that vantage, the court found that the period of
    delay included the entire time from November 9, 2020, the first
    date set for trial, and April 14, 2021, the date set for trial in the
    last of the continuances.
    For completeness, we note that the court stated that the first
    continuance began on November 9, 2020, the date the trial was
    originally scheduled. Moody asserts that the excluded period
    should not start until November 10, when the court filed its
    order, and in contrast, the State asserts that the excludable
    period should start on November 6, which was the date of
    the hearing at which the court announced it would order the
    continuance. We need not resolve the “correct day-one issue”
    because it is of no consequence in this case.
    Moody filed his motion for discharge on March 31, 2021.
    The excludable period of delay related to the continuances
    began before November 16, 2020, which otherwise would have
    been the last day for trial, and continued to April 14, 2021,
    the date set for trial in the last continuance. Because the last
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    date of the period excluded was April 14, it is clear that the
    period of exclusion was of sufficient duration that the last date
    for trial was no earlier than April 14. Therefore, when Moody
    filed his motion for discharge on March 31, the statutory time
    for speedy trial had not ended. We therefore determine that the
    district court’s order was sufficiently specific regarding the
    period of delay, and on appeal, it is clear that the motion
    for discharge was filed before the last day for trial under the
    speedy trial statute.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court’s order was sufficiently specific regarding
    the causes of the delay and the period of delay, and the court’s
    finding that Moody’s case should not be dismissed on statutory
    speedy trial grounds was not clearly erroneous. We therefore
    determine that the district court did not err when it overruled
    Moody’s motion for discharge based on statutory speedy trial
    grounds, and we affirm the district court’s order in this respect.
    We lack appellate jurisdiction to review Moody’s claim that he
    was entitled to absolute discharge on constitutional speedy trial
    grounds, and we therefore dismiss that part of the appeal.
    Affirmed in part, and in part dismissed.