In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Maronica B. ( 2023 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/30/2023 08:06 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of
    Maronica B., a protected person.
    Ronald Branch, appellant, v. Davion Brewer
    and Student Transportation of
    Nebraska, Inc., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed June 30, 2023.    No. S-22-239.
    1. Jurisdiction: Statutes. Subject matter jurisdiction and statutory inter-
    pretation present questions of law.
    2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
    not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
    matter of law.
    3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently
    reviews questions of law decided by a lower court.
    4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. It is the power and duty of an appel-
    late court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before
    it, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by the parties.
    5. ____: ____. If the court from which an appeal was taken lacked jurisdic-
    tion, then the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction.
    6. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
    power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class or
    category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
    the general subject matter involved.
    7. Courts: Jurisdiction: Equity. Although county courts lack general
    equity jurisdiction, they may apply equitable principles to matters that
    are within their exclusive jurisdiction.
    8. Pleadings. When the title of a filing does not reflect its substance, it is
    proper for a court to treat a pleading or motion based on its substance
    rather than its title.
    9. Actions: Rescission: Equity. An action for rescission or a defense
    based on the same principles sounds in equity.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    10. Contracts: Rescission: Fraud. Grounds for the remedy of rescission of
    a contract include fraud and misrepresentation.
    11. Releases: Fraud. A release of a claim for relief should not be upheld if
    fraud, deceit, oppression, or unconscionable advantage is connected with
    the transaction.
    12. Actions: Equity: Jurisdiction. An action in equity must be founded on
    some recognized source of equity jurisdiction.
    Appeal from the County Court for Douglas County: John E.
    Huber, Judge. Order vacated, and appeal dismissed.
    Joel M. Carney, of Goosmann Law Firm, P.L.C., for
    appellant.
    Michael T. Gibbons and Raymond E. Walden, of Woodke &
    Gibbons, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee Davion Brewer.
    Andrew D. Wurdeman, Stephen L. Ahl, and Kathryn J. Van
    Balen, of Baylor, Evnen, Wolfe & Tannehill, L.L.P., for appel-
    lee Student Transportation of Nebraska, Inc.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    I. NATURE OF CASE
    Maronica B., a minor, was injured when a car in which
    she was a passenger and that was driven by her cousin,
    Davion Brewer (Davion), collided with a schoolbus. In 2017,
    Maronica’s mother, and then-conservator, Macosha Brewer
    (Brewer), applied to the county court for Douglas County to
    permit her to settle Maronica’s personal injury claim against
    Davion and his automobile insurance carrier. The county
    court found the settlement was in Maronica’s best interests
    and entered an order in which it authorized the settlement.
    In 2021, Maronica’s father, Ronald Branch, who was also
    the successor conservator (Conservator), relying on equity,
    filed a motion in the county court to rescind and unwind
    the 2017 settlement agreement. The motion sought an order
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    vacating the county court’s prior order authorizing settlement
    on the grounds that the resulting settlement potentially limited
    Maronica’s recovery against nonsettling parties. The county
    court found no basis or authority to rescind the settlement
    agreement and denied the motion to vacate the prior order.
    The Conservator appeals, but waived preparation of a bill of
    exceptions. Because the county court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction to rescind the personal injury settlement agree-
    ment, we vacate the order of the county court and dismiss
    this appeal.
    II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Maronica sustained severe injuries in an automobile colli-
    sion that occurred on April 25, 2017, in Omaha, Nebraska. A
    schoolbus operated by an employee of Student Transportation
    of Nebraska, Inc., collided with the car in which Maronica
    was a passenger. The driver of Maronica’s car was her cousin,
    Davion. In 2017, Brewer petitioned the county court for
    Douglas County for appointment as a conservator for her
    daughter, Maronica, for the purpose of handling personal
    injury claims arising out of the collision. According to the
    petition, the schoolbus pulled in front of Davion’s car, and
    Davion was contributorily negligent in the collision. The
    county court appointed Brewer as conservator on August
    2, 2017.
    Brewer subsequently applied for leave from the county
    court pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2653
    (d) (Reissue 2016)
    to settle a portion of Maronica’s tort claims and, specifically,
    to execute a release in favor of Davion and his automobile
    insurance carrier for policy limits of $250,000. The applica-
    tion stated that the settlement was in the best interests of
    Maronica. Brewer’s application stated that after the pay-
    ment of existing medical bills, medical liens, attorney fees,
    and reimbursement of expenses, the remaining net proceeds
    would be placed in a conservatorship account in the amount
    of $155,850.37. With respect to future medical care, the
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    application explained that Maronica was continuing treatment
    with her doctors and further represented that future medical
    bills and medical liens could be paid out of future recovery
    against nonsettling, remaining negligent parties involved in
    the collision.
    In 2017, the county court issued an order in which it autho-
    rized the proposed settlement with Davion and his insurer.
    Based on a hearing and evidence not in the record on appeal,
    the order states that the county court found the settlement to be
    in Maronica’s best interests and ordered that the net proceeds
    be placed in an insured account for Maronica’s benefit.
    Maronica’s father was later appointed as the Conservator.
    On February 18, 2021, the Conservator filed a motion in this
    conservatorship case asking the county court to vacate “nunc
    pro tunc” the 2017 order authorizing the settlement agreement.
    No statute authorizing the undoing of settlements was cited.
    The motion stated that the “balance of equities” weighed in
    favor of vacating the county court’s prior order and rescind-
    ing the settlement agreement with Davion and his insurer.
    The motion also expressed the Conservator’s concern that the
    settlement agreement with Davion and his insurer could poten-
    tially prevent Maronica from recovering fully in a separate tort
    action pending against Student Transportation of Nebraska and
    the busdriver.
    The county court held at least one hearing on the motion
    to vacate, although we are without a bill of exceptions show-
    ing the proceedings. Following the hearing, the county court
    found no basis or authority under Nebraska law to void
    the settlement agreement and release executed by Brewer
    as then-conservator, and it denied the motion to vacate. The
    Conservator appeals.
    III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    The Conservator assigns, summarized and restated, that the
    county court erred when it declined to vacate its 2017 order
    that authorized the settlement.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1-3] Subject matter jurisdiction and statutory interpreta-
    tion present questions of law. In re Estate of Adelung, 
    306 Neb. 646
    , 
    947 N.W.2d 269
     (2020). A jurisdictional question
    which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by
    an appellate court as a matter of law. 
    Id.
     An appellate court
    independently reviews questions of law decided by a lower
    court. 
    Id.
    V. ANALYSIS
    The Conservator appeals from an order that denied a motion
    asking the county court to exercise equity to rescind a contract
    that had released Davion and his insurer from tort liability to
    Maronica. Because the nature of the Conservator’s request
    was in equity, even if the county court had had the equitable
    power asserted by the Conservator, in the absence of a bill of
    exceptions, this court would have been hampered in our de
    novo assessment of the merits. Nevertheless, the record sup-
    plied is adequate to show that the Conservator’s request was
    not related to the conservatorship, the county court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction over the substance of the motion,
    and the county court could not afford the relief sought by the
    Conservator. We vacate the order of the county court and dis-
    miss this appeal.
    1. General Principles of Subject
    Matter Jurisdiction
    [4,5] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
    it is the power and duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespec-
    tive of whether the issue is raised by the parties. County of
    Lancaster v. County of Custer, 
    313 Neb. 622
    , 
    985 N.W.2d 612
     (2023). If the court from which an appeal was taken
    lacked jurisdiction, then the appellate court acquires no juris-
    diction. 
    Id.
    We begin by reciting several familiar principles of law.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    [6] Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal
    to hear and determine a case in the general class or cat-
    egory to which the proceedings in question belong and to
    deal with the general subject matter involved. In re Estate of
    Adelung, 
    supra.
    [7] County courts maintain exclusive original jurisdiction
    of all matters related to a conservatorship of a person. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517
    (3) (Cum. Supp. 2022). The Legislature
    has specifically provided that in matters arising under the
    Nebraska Probate Code, including conservatorships, “[t]o
    the full extent permitted by the Constitution of Nebraska, the
    court has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to . . .
    protection of minors and incapacitated persons . . . .” 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2211
    (a) (Reissue 2016). See, also, § 30-2201
    (Cum. Supp. 2022) (including conservatorships and guardian-
    ships in Nebraska Probate Code). Although county courts lack
    general equity jurisdiction, they may apply equitable prin-
    ciples to matters that are within their exclusive jurisdiction.
    In re Guardianship of Brydon P., 
    286 Neb. 661
    , 
    838 N.W.2d 262
     (2013).
    2. The Conservator Sought Rescission,
    Which Sounds in Equity
    The subject before the county court was rescission of a tort
    settlement contract. Like the county court, we understand these
    proceedings as a purported action in equity. As we explain, for
    the county court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the
    Conservator’s motion, it must possess a recognized source of
    equity jurisdiction.
    (a) Notwithstanding Its Caption, the Motion Sought
    to Rescind a Contract of Settlement and
    Release of Tort Liability
    [8] Although the Conservator characterized the motion
    shaping this proceeding as a motion to vacate “nunc pro
    tunc,” we read the substance of the motion as a request for
    rescission of the 2017 settlement agreement executed by
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    Brewer, Maronica’s prior conservator, with Davion and his
    insurer. When the title of a filing does not reflect its sub-
    stance, it is proper for a court to treat a pleading or motion
    based on its substance rather than its title. Gerber v. P & L
    Finance Co., 
    301 Neb. 463
    , 
    919 N.W.2d 116
     (2018). The
    Conservator’s motion sought the following relief: The county
    court should (1) vacate the order authorizing the tort claim
    settlement, (2) order Conservator to repay the $250,000 to
    Davion’s insurance carrier, and (3) order that “any settlement
    or release entered into between anyone on behalf of Maronica
    . . . and Davion . . . and/or his insurance carriers is hereby
    declared void ab initio and of no legal force or effect.”
    The Conservator’s motion did not attack the county court’s
    2017 order; instead, the Conservator challenges the effect of
    the 2017 settlement agreement. The Conservator’s motion gen-
    erally expressed concern that the settlement agreement with
    Davion would adversely impact future recovery from nonset-
    tling tort-feasors against whom Maronica had asserted claims.
    (b) Rescission of Contract Is
    Equitable in Nature
    [9-11] An action for rescission or a defense based on the
    same principles sounds in equity. See In re Claims Against
    Pierce Elevator, 
    291 Neb. 798
    , 
    868 N.W.2d 781
     (2015).
    Grounds for the remedy of rescission of a contract include
    fraud and misrepresentation. See 
    id.
     We have also said that
    a release of a claim for relief should not be upheld if fraud,
    deceit, oppression, or unconscionable advantage is connected
    with the transaction. See Gonzalez v. Union Pacific RR. Co.,
    
    282 Neb. 47
    , 
    803 N.W.2d 424
     (2011).
    (c) County Courts’ Exclusive Original Jurisdiction
    Over Conservatorships Does Not Include Power
    to Grant Equitable Relief Unrelated
    to Conservatorship.
    [12] An action in equity must be founded on some rec-
    ognized source of equity jurisdiction. In re Claims Against
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    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    Pierce Elevator, supra. The county courts have jurisdiction
    over “all matters relating to conservatorship of any person.”
    § 24-517(3). However, they are not empowered to use conser-
    vatorship proceedings to grant equitable relief unrelated to the
    conservatorship.
    We have long held that the county court has been given
    equity powers as to all matters within or incidental to its
    exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Estate of Adelung,
    
    306 Neb. 646
    , 
    947 N.W.2d 269
     (2020); In re Guardianship
    of Brydon P., 
    286 Neb. 661
    , 
    838 N.W.2d 262
     (2013); Eden
    v. Asa, 
    178 Neb. 651
    , 
    134 N.W.2d 600
     (1965); In re Estate
    of Jensen, 
    135 Neb. 602
    , 
    283 N.W. 196
     (1939); Youngson v.
    Bond, 
    69 Neb. 356
    , 
    95 N.W. 700
     (1903). However, contrary
    to the Conservator’s urging, the county court’s subject matter
    jurisdiction over conservatorships is not an independent basis
    to grant the Conservator’s motion that sought rescission of
    a contract.
    We note that the Legislature has empowered conservators
    to, inter alia, “prosecute or defend actions, claims or proceed-
    ings in any jurisdiction for the protection of estate assets
    and of the conservator in the performance of his duties.”
    Section 30-2653(24) (emphasis supplied). Actions on behalf
    of the protected person are not confined to proceedings in the
    county court, and not all legal proceedings that may affect the
    estate of the protected person are within the scope of the con-
    servatorship. Compare Miller v. Janecek, 
    210 Neb. 316
    , 
    314 N.W.2d 250
     (1982) (determining that equity matter concern-
    ing personal representative did not relate to county courts’
    exclusive original jurisdiction), with In re Estate of Kentopp.
    Kentopp v. Kentopp, 
    206 Neb. 776
    , 
    295 N.W.2d 275
     (1980)
    (determining that exercise of equity related where property
    involved belonged to decedent and subject to administration
    of county court), and In re Estate of Layton, 
    207 Neb. 646
    ,
    
    300 N.W.2d 802
     (1981) (same). An equity action to protect
    the ward may be appropriate in another forum. However,
    the fact that the Conservator is involved in another lawsuit
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    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    does not make the matter statutorily one relating to the
    conservatorship, and the county court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction of the motion to vacate and rescind the contract
    of settlement.
    3. Statutes Pertaining to the Courts’ Power to
    Vacate a Prior Order Do Not Confer Equity
    Jurisdiction on the County Court
    Perhaps recognizing the absence of equity jurisdiction in
    the county court to achieve his objectives, on appeal, the
    Conservator refers us to statutes that permit courts to vacate
    orders out of term and that, as the Conservator urges, supply
    the needed equity power he seeks to employ in this matter.
    These statutes do not empower the county courts with equity
    jurisdiction, and we reject the Conservator’s argument.
    The Conservator refers us in particular to two statutes. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2720.01
     (Reissue 2016) provides:
    The county court, including the Small Claims Court
    and the county court when sitting as a juvenile court,
    shall have the power to set aside default judgments and
    to vacate or modify its own judgments or orders during
    or after the term at which such judgments or orders were
    made in the same manner as provided for actions filed in
    the district court.
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001
    (2) (Reissue 2016) provides: “The
    power of a district court under its equity jurisdiction to set
    aside a judgment or an order as an equitable remedy is not
    limited by this section.”
    Relying on § 25-2720.01 regarding vacating orders after
    the county court term, the Conservator believes that the statu-
    tory language authorizing county courts to vacate orders “in
    the same manner as provided for actions filed in the district
    court” means that county courts have all the powers of the
    district courts. This reading is in error. Instead, we give a
    sensible reading to § 25-2720.01. The Conservator’s read-
    ing overlooks the inferential language of the phrasal verb
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    314 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARONICA B.
    Cite as 
    314 Neb. 597
    “provided for”—a phrase we logically complete to mean “as
    provided [by the Constitution or statutes] for actions filed
    in the district court.” The Nebraska Constitution provides
    independent equity jurisdiction to the district court, see Neb.
    Const. art. 5, § 9, complemented by concurrent statutes. There
    is no comparable root source of equity power “provided for”
    the county courts, and § 25-2720.01 does not serve to do so.
    Having likened the powers of the county courts to those of
    the district courts, the Conservator argues that the reference to
    “equity jurisdiction” in § 25-2001(2) applies equally to district
    courts and county courts, purportedly bestowing equity power
    on county courts. We do not agree.
    Section 25-2001(2) states its provisions do not limit the
    power of the district court under its equity jurisdiction. This
    section does not confer equitable power; it merely refers to
    the existing “equity jurisdiction” of the district court. We have
    observed that its provisions are compatible with independent
    equity jurisdiction of the district court. See Howard Stove &
    Furnace Co. v. Rudolf, 
    128 Neb. 665
    , 
    260 N.W. 189
     (1935).
    Although county courts can apply equity power within the
    confines of their statutorily granted jurisdiction as we have
    indicated above, the statutes pertaining to vacating orders after
    the term do not confer additional equity jurisdiction on the
    county courts.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    The Conservator’s motion to vacate an earlier tort settle-
    ment was a request for rescission of contract sounding in
    equity over which the county court did not have jurisdiction in
    this conservator matter. The statutes regarding vacating orders
    after the term, §§ 25-2720.01 and 25-2001(2), do not confer
    equity jurisdiction on the county courts. The county court
    did not have jurisdiction; therefore, we do not have jurisdic-
    tion, and we vacate the order of the county court and dismiss
    this appeal.
    Order vacated, and appeal dismissed.