Karas v. Karas ( 2023 )

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
08/04/2023 09:11 AM CDT
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
314 Nebraska Reports
KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857Leslie Irene Karas, appellee, v.
Brian Anthony Karas, appellant.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed August 4, 2023. No. S-22-693.
1. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony. In an action for dissolution of
marriage, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) allows the district
court to order payment of such alimony by one party to the other and
division of property as may be reasonable.
2. Property Division: Alimony: Appeal and Error. An appellate court
reviews a district court’s determinations of alimony and division of
property de novo on the record to determine whether there has been an
abuse of discretion.
3. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an
appellate court is required to make independent factual determinations
based upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent con-
clusions with respect to the matters at issue.
4. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the
reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
submitted for disposition.
5. Alimony: Time. The reasonable duration of an alimony award depends
on the specific facts in a given case, often the amount of time required
to allow the recipient spouse to support himself or herself.
6. Alimony. Alimony should not be used to equalize the incomes of the
parties or to punish one of the parties.
7. ____. The primary purpose of alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for a
period of time necessary for that individual to secure his or her own
means of support.
8. Alimony: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an alimony award, an
appellate court does not determine whether it would have awarded the
same amount of alimony as did the trial court, but whether the trial
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314 Nebraska Reports
KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857court’s award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial
right or just result with the ultimate criterion being reasonableness.
9. Divorce: Property Division. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue
2016), the equitable division of property is a three-step process: (1) clas-
sify the parties’ property as either marital or nonmarital, setting aside the
nonmarital property or nonmarital portion of the property to the party
who brought the property to the marriage; (2) value the marital assets
and marital liabilities of the parties; (3) calculate and divide the net
marital estate equitably between the parties.
10. ____: ____. Generally, all property accumulated and acquired by either
spouse during a marriage is part of the marital estate.
11. Property Division. Marital debt includes only those obligations incurred
during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties.
12. Divorce: Property Division: Proof. The burden of proof to show that
property should not be included in the marital estate in a dissolution
decree rests with the party claiming that that property is nonmarital.
13. Divorce: Property Division: Equity. The purpose of assigning a date
of valuation in a dissolution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is
equitably divided.
14. Divorce: Property Division. The date for valuation of property included
in the marital estate in a dissolution decree must be rationally related to
the property being divided.
15. ____: ____. The ultimate test in determining the appropriateness of the
division of property is fairness and reasonableness as determined by the
facts of each case.
16. ____: ____. A district court generally has discretion in a dissolution
decree to award each spouse between one-third and one-half of the mari-
tal estate.
17. Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements: Final Orders. A decree is
a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its mean-
ing, including the settlement agreement incorporated therein, is deter-
mined as a matter of law from the four corners of the decree itself.
18. Judgments: Final Orders. It is inherent to a judgment’s finality that all
are bound by the original language used, and all ought to interpret the
language the same way.
19. Property Division. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the
court may take the economic circumstances of the parties into account
and is not limited to the assets divided as part of the marital estate.
20. ____. There is nothing in the language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365(Reissue 2016) that prevents the court from ordering an equalization
payment without awarding liquid assets from the marital estate.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
314 Nebraska Reports
KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Michael
A. Smith, Judge. Affirmed.
Adam R. Little, of Nebraska Legal Group, for appellant.
April M. Lucas, Susan Reff, and Tracy Hightower-Henne, of
Hightower Reff Law, L.L.C., for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Freudenberg, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The district court entered a stipulated decree of dissolution
of marriage based on a written agreement between a husband
and wife. Due to inaccurate information during settlement
negotiations, which ultimately resulted in the failure of a por-
tion of the stipulated agreement, the district court granted the
husband’s motion to alter or amend. The court vacated por-
tions of the stipulated decree concerning spousal support and
division of property, and it ordered the wife to pay alimony
for the life of the parties and the equitable division of prop-
erty as calculated by the court. On the wife’s motion to alter
or amend, the court recalculated the division of property and
limited the alimony award to 15 years. The husband appeals,
arguing that the court abused its discretion by limiting the ali-
mony award to 15 years, dividing the marital estate by includ-
ing several postseparation debts, treating monthly payments
from the wife as property equalization instead of alimony, and
ordering him to pay a substantial equalization payment when
he did not possess the resources to do so. Based upon the fol-
lowing reasoning, we disagree with the husband’s arguments
and affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Leslie Irene Karas and Brian Anthony Karas were married
in September 1994. The parties separated on March 28, 2019.
Leslie filed for dissolution of their marriage on that same
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KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857day, and Brian filed an answer and counterclaim shortly there-
after. The Karas’ have four children born of their marriage, two
of whom had reached the age of majority at the time of the
decree of dissolution. Custody, parenting time, and other child-
related matters are not at issue in this appeal.
On July 22, 2020, the district court entered a decree of dis-
solution based on a written agreement between the parties. The
decree stated that neither party would receive alimony from the
other, nor would they be “eligible for alimony to be awarded in
the future.” The decree awarded Leslie “100% of her military
disability and any payment related thereto” and stated that the
parties “shall split equally (50/50) [Leslie’s] military pension.”
The decree also ordered Leslie to pay Brian “a monthly equal-
ization payment” of $750 for a total of 59 months, under the
section titled “EQUALIZATION PAYMENT.”
Starting in July 2020, Leslie paid Brian $2,063 per month,
representing 50 percent of Leslie’s monthly payment received
from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).
Brian applied to DFAS to receive payment directly. In January
2021, Brian received a letter from DFAS denying his applica-
tion because “[t]he entire amount of [Leslie’s] retired/retainer
pay is based on disability, and thus, there are no funds avail-
able for payment under [10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2018)].” After
January 2021, Leslie stopped paying Brian the $2,063 monthly
payment because she believed there was no “disposable mili-
tary retirement” she was required to divide under the dissolu-
tion decree.
1. Brian’s Motion to
Alter or Amend
Brian filed a motion to alter or amend the decree of dis-
solution in February 2021, requesting the district court vacate
the portions of the decree dealing with alimony and Leslie’s
military pension and disability. Brian alleged that Leslie had
elected to receive the entirety of her military retirement as dis-
ability, thereby eliminating any military pension payments she
would have to split with Brian.
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KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857Brian requested alimony in an amount equal to the $2,063
he had previously been receiving from Leslie. After an evi-
dentiary hearing, the district court determined that Leslie
had withheld information about the DFAS payments and it
vacated the portions of the dissolution decree concerning the
retirement payments, alimony, and the division of property.
The district court found that it did not have enough evidence
to make a ruling on issues of equitable property division
and alimony and set the matter for an additional eviden-
tiary hearing.
At the second evidentiary hearing, Leslie testified that she
had a master’s degree in nursing. She earned $58.36 an hour,
or approximately $115,000 a year, working full time as a nurse
practitioner at a medical facility. She also received around
$5,000 per month from DFAS and around $3,500 per month
from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. At the time
of the decree, she worked full time as a nurse practitioner at
a different health center. She testified that at the time of the
hearing, she still worked at that health center once a month.
Leslie offered an exhibit listing her monthly expenses at
over $15,000.
Leslie also testified to her debts around the time she filed
for divorce in March 2019. Leslie testified that she has been
the only person making payments toward these debts since the
original decree. Leslie testified to several credit card debts,
including $3,356 with Citi, $1,086.73 with PayPal, $3,941.50
with Ulta Beauty, $3,009.16 with USAA, $1,508.05 with
Sam’s Club, $2,975.05 with Bank of America, $5,185.92 with
Chase, $4,215.75 with Old Navy, $116.04 with Kohl’s, and
$472.89 with Victoria’s Secret. She also testified to an account
with Nebraska Furniture Mart with an outstanding balance of
$4,538.66 and a SoFi loan with a balance of $19,794.84.
Leslie testified to several debts valued after the parties had
separated, but before the original dissolution decree. There
was a Target credit card with a balance of $2,237.33 as of
July 2020 and a Best Egg loan with a balance of $9,949.72 as
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KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857of October 2019. She testified that she owed over $11,000 in
back taxes from 2019 when the parties were still married.
Brian testified that he had been working at a hospital since
December 2019, earning approximately $15 an hour. He testi-
fied that the marital home was the parties’ largest asset and
that he did not possess any significant assets at the time of the
second hearing. Brian offered an affidavit listing $3,765.30 in
monthly income and $4,251 in monthly expenses. Brian did
not work from 1997 to 2005 while he studied for a bachelor’s
degree in business. Brian worked until 2007, when the parties
decided he would stay home to take care of the parties’ chil-
dren. Leslie testified that they had agreed Brian would return
to work when the children were in school, but that he refused
to return to work. Brian testified that it was difficult to restart
his career because he was over 50 years old. Brian testified
that he had been treated for colon cancer, but admitted it did
not affect his ability to do his job. Brian also suggested that
he may have access to Leslie’s Social Security benefits in
the future.
In April 2022, the district court modified the dissolution
decree with respect to property division and alimony. The
court divided the parties’ assets and debts and required Brian
to pay Leslie $7,500 to balance the distribution. The balance
sheet attached to the district court’s order did not include the
Sam’s Club, Ulta Beauty, Target, or USAA credit card debts
or the 2019 tax debt. The court also ordered Leslie to pay
Brian $2,000 in alimony for the life of the parties. It found
that Brian’s career was hampered by his childcare duties and
frequent relocations due to Leslie’s military service but that he
also chose not to work for large periods of time. It noted the
significant economic disparity between the parties. The court
ordered Leslie to pay Brian $10,000 in attorney fees.
2. Leslie’s Motion to
Alter or Amend
Leslie filed a motion for new trial or to alter, amend, or
reconsider the order modifying the dissolution decree. She
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KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857alleged that the court’s order was contrary to the evidence pre-
sented. She alleged that the court erroneously credited several
assets to her, failed to credit several debts to her, miscalculated
the parties’ incomes when determining the alimony award, and
failed to make specific findings regarding the award of attor-
ney fees.
In July 2022, the district court sustained Leslie’s motion in
part and denied it in part. The court adjusted the property divi-
sion balance sheet to show a mortgage value of $420,759.94
and add the debts to Sam’s Club, Ulta Beauty, and USAA. The
order did not mention the 2019 tax debt or the Target credit
card debt, nor did it include them in the attached balance sheet.
The court also ordered Brian to pay back the $15,000 in prop-
erty settlement payments that Leslie had paid since the original
decree. These adjustments increased the equalization payment
Brian was required to pay to Leslie to $25,436.04. The court
limited the alimony award to 15 years rather than for the life
of the parties.
Brian filed a motion to alter, amend, vacate, or reconsider
the court’s July 2022 order, challenging the court’s division of
property and claiming he was entitled to $28,000 in backdated
alimony. After oral argument, the district court denied the
motion. Brian appeals.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Brian assigns that the district court abused its discretion by
reducing the duration of the alimony award to 15 years, instead
of for the life of the parties, and by improperly valuing and
dividing the marital estate.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court reviews
the case de novo on the record to determine whether there has
been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 1
1
Kauk v. Kauk, 310 Neb. 329, 966 N.W.2d 45 (2021).
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314 Nebraska Reports
KARAS V. KARAS
Cite as 314 Neb. 857In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court is
required to make independent factual determinations based
upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent
conclusions with respect to the matters at issue. 2
A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or rul-
ings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a
litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
submitted for disposition. 3
V. ANALYSIS
[1] In an action for dissolution of marriage, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 42-365 (Reissue 2016) allows the district court to “order
payment of such alimony by one party to the other and divi-
sion of property as may be reasonable.” To determine such
reasonable alimony award and division of property, the court
may consider
the circumstances of the parties, duration of the marriage,
a history of the contributions to the marriage by each
party, including contributions to the care and education
of the children, and interruption of personal careers or
educational opportunities, and the ability of the supported
party to engage in gainful employment without interfering
with the interests of any minor children in the custody of
such party. 4
The statute explains, “While the criteria for reaching a rea-
sonable division of property and a reasonable award of ali-
mony may overlap, the two serve different purposes and
are to be considered separately.” 5 “The purpose of property
division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between
the parties.” 6 “The purpose of alimony is to provide for
2
Id.3
Id.4
§ 42-365.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857the continued maintenance or support of one party by the
other when the relative economic circumstances . . . make
it appropriate.” 7
[2-4] We review a district court’s determinations of alimony
and division of property de novo on the record to determine
whether there has been an abuse of discretion. 8 In a review
de novo on the record, an appellate court is required to make
independent factual determinations based upon the record, and
the court reaches its own independent conclusions with respect
to the matters at issue. 9 A judicial abuse of discretion exists
if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying
just results in matters submitted for disposition. 10
Brian argues that the district court abused its discretion
in limiting the alimony award to 15 years because it was a
replacement for the DFAS payments, which had been awarded
for life in the original decree. Brian argues the court abused its
discretion in dividing the marital estate by including the Best
Egg loan, ordering him to repay Leslie $15,000 for property
equalization payments she made under the original decree, and
ordering him to pay a substantial equalization payment when
he was not awarded enough liquid assets to pay it. We hold that
the district court’s order was not an abuse of discretion because
its determinations regarding alimony and property division
were reasonable.
1. Alimony
[5-8] The reasonable duration of an alimony award depends
on the specific facts in a given case, often the amount of time
required to allow the recipient spouse to support himself or
7
Id. Accord Dooling v. Dooling, 303 Neb. 494, 930 N.W.2d 481 (2019).
8
See Kauk, supra note 1.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857herself. 11 Alimony should not be used to equalize the incomes
of the parties or to punish one of the parties. 12 Rather, the pri-
mary purpose of alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for a period
of time necessary for that individual to secure his or her own
means of support. 13 In reviewing an alimony award, an appel-
late court does not determine whether it would have awarded
the same amount of alimony as did the trial court, but whether
the trial court’s award is untenable such as to deprive a party of
a substantial right or just result. 14 The ultimate criterion is one
of reasonableness. 15
Brian points us to Pyke v. Pyke, 16 in which we upheld an
award of alimony for the life of the parties, subject to future
amendment by the court. Although we said that the lifetime
award was reasonable in that case, we have also upheld ali-
mony awards limited to a term of years, even where the recipi-
ent spouse’s economic opportunities were limited by age and
career delays. 17
In Bergmeier v. Bergmeier, 18 for instance, we upheld an
alimony award that would terminate at the latest after 8 years,
when the recipient spouse turned age 65. During the marriage,
the wife had quit her job as a teacher to stay home and raise
the children. 19 She also obtained a master’s degree in health
11
See, e.g., Bergmeier v. Bergmeier, 296 Neb. 440, 894 N.W.2d 266 (2017);
Kalkowski v. Kalkowski, 258 Neb. 1035, 607 N.W.2d 517 (2000); Pyke v.
Pyke, 212 Neb. 114, 321 N.W.2d 906 (1982) (superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Polly v. Polly, 1 Neb. App. 121, 487 N.W.2d 558(1992)).
12
Kalkowski, supra note 11.
13
Anderson v. Anderson, 290 Neb. 530, 861 N.W.2d 113 (2015).
14
Bergmeier, supra note 11.
15
Id.
16
Pyke, supra note 11.
17
See, Bergmeier, supra note 11; Amen v. Amen, 207 Neb. 694, 301 N.W.2d
74 (1981).
18
Bergmeier, supra note 11.
19
Id.
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857education during the marriage. 20 The husband worked as an
insurance agent and was entitled to termination payments for
life upon leaving that employment. 21 The trial court awarded
the wife a share of the husband’s termination payments to
be paid out monthly once he began receiving them. 22 It also
awarded the wife $2,000 in monthly alimony that would auto-
matically terminate when she began receiving her share of the
termination payments, turned 65 years old, remarried, or died,
whichever occurred first. 23 The wife argued the alimony award
was an abuse of discretion because she could turn age 65 before
the husband would begin receiving the termination payments,
so there could be a period of time where she would receive
neither alimony nor her share of the termination payments. 24
We acknowledged that, at the time of our decision, the wife
was 57 years old with “limited earning power.” 25 However,
we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because
the wife would be eligible to receive Social Security payments
upon turning 65 years old. 26
Weighing the factors from § 42-365, it was reasonable for
the district court to limit the alimony award to 15 years. Brian
has a bachelor’s degree in business and has held various jobs
before and after taking time off work to care for the parties’
children. And although Brian’s career was interrupted by the
parties’ decision for him to stay home to care for their chil-
dren, there was evidence that Leslie asked him to return to
work when the children were of school age and he refused.
Brian testified that his current income is not enough to cover
his monthly expenses, but he presented no evidence that he
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 457, 894 N.W.2d at 278.
26
Id.
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857will not be able to obtain better paying employment or another
source of income in the next 15 years. Brian testified that he
had been treated for cancer, but that it did not impair his abil-
ity to work; nor did he present evidence that it will affect his
earning potential in the future. Leslie contributed the signifi-
cant majority of the parties’ income during the marriage. And
while Leslie’s earning potential is significantly greater than
Brian’s, she testified that her income will decrease after she
retires. We note that Brian may also be able to receive Social
Security benefits when he reaches retirement age. Under these
facts, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to limit
the alimony award to 15 years.
We reject Brian’s argument that he is entitled to alimony
for life because it was awarded to make up for his share of
the DFAS payment he was to receive for the life of the par-
ties under the original decree. Those portions of the original
decree dealing with the DFAS payment, alimony, and division
of property were all vacated by the district court. The dis-
trict court then determined a reasonable alimony award under
§ 42-365 for the first time without regard to the vacated por-
tions of the decree. Because the 15-year alimony award gives
Brian a reasonable opportunity to support himself, it was not
an abuse of discretion.
2. Division of Property
[9] We also hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining the contents of the marital estate
and equitably dividing it. Under § 42-365, the equitable divi-
sion of property is a three-step process. 27 The first step is to
classify the parties’ property as either marital or nonmarital,
setting aside the nonmarital property or nonmarital portion
of the property to the party who brought the property to the
marriage. 28 The second step is to value the marital assets
27
Parde v. Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023).
28
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857and marital liabilities of the parties. 29 And the third step is to
calculate and divide the net marital estate equitably between
the parties. 30
(a) Best Egg loan
[10-12] The district court did not abuse its discretion by
including the Best Egg loan in the marital estate on Leslie’s
motion to alter or amend. First, Brian failed to show that the
Best Egg loan was not marital debt. Generally, all property
accumulated and acquired by either spouse during a marriage
is part of the marital estate. 31 Marital debt includes only those
obligations incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of
the parties. 32 The burden of proof rests with the party claiming
that property is nonmarital. 33
The district court reasonably concluded that the Best Egg
loan was marital debt. 34 Leslie testified that she took out the
loan during the marriage to pay off other marital debts. Brian
offered no evidence to rebut this testimony.
[13,14] Second, we disagree with Brian’s argument that
the district court abused its discretion by classifying the
Best Egg loan as marital debt because it was valued as of
October 2019, when the other debts were valued closer to the
date of separation in March 2019. The purpose of assigning
a date of valuation in a dissolution decree is to ensure that
the marital estate is equitably divided. 35 Frequently, a single
valuation date will be appropriate; but sometimes it will not. 36
In reviewing a trial court’s valuation of marital assets, we
29
Id.30
Id.31
Dooling, supra note 7.
32
Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76, 907 N.W.2d 275 (2018).
33
Dooling, supra note 7.
34
See Vanderveer v. Vanderveer, 310 Neb. 196, 964 N.W.2d 694 (2021).
35
Rohde v. Rohde, 303 Neb. 85, 927 N.W.2d 37 (2019).
36
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857have declined to mandate that a trial court must use only one
valuation date in equitably dividing a marital estate. 37 The
date for valuation must be rationally related to the property
being divided. 38
In Dooling v. Dooling, 39 we held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in valuing the husband’s employment
benefit account over a year after the parties separated. The hus-
band argued that an earlier account statement more accurately
reflected the value of the account, but he did not offer the
account statement into evidence. 40 Because the husband admit-
ted that the asset was marital property and failed to present evi-
dence of its value earlier than the account statement presented
as evidence to the court, we found no abuse of discretion in the
court’s valuation date. 41
Brian offered no evidence to show that the value of the Best
Egg loan in March 2019 differed from its demonstrated value
in October 2019. Because Brian offered no evidence that the
Best Egg loan was not marital debt or that the October 2019
valuation did not reflect the value of the loan in March 2019,
we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by
including the Best Egg loan in the marital estate.
(b) Property Equalization
[15,16] The district court also did not abuse its discretion
in requiring Brian to pay over $25,436.04 in property equal-
ization. The ultimate test in determining the appropriateness
of the division of property is fairness and reasonableness
as determined by the facts of each case. 42 A district court
37
Id.38
See Blaine v. Blaine, 275 Neb. 87, 744 N.W.2d 444 (2008).
39
Dooling, supra note 7.
40
Id.41
Id.42
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857generally has discretion to award each spouse between one-
third and one-half of the marital estate. 43
The district court acted within its discretion by dividing the
marital estate equally. The balance sheet attached to the district
court’s order shows that Brian received one-half of the total
marital estate, which included more debts than assets. Leslie
received the marital home with the associated marital debt,
resulting in over $17,000 in debt. Brian received a retirement
account and a Best Buy credit card debt, resulting in over
$3,500 in assets. To equalize these amounts, the district court
ordered Brian to pay $10,436.04. After equalization, both par-
ties were responsible for around $6,800 in debt. Given Leslie’s
significant contributions to the income of the parties during the
marriage, we cannot say it was unreasonable to equalize the
estate so that Brian would be responsible for at least an equal
share. 44 The district court did not abuse its discretion in divid-
ing the marital estate.
Having reasonably determined that the marital estate should
be equally divided, the district court properly ordered Brian
to repay Leslie for the $750 monthly property equalization
payments she had made under the vacated decree, totaling
$15,000. It was within the district court’s reasonable discretion
to order Brian to return the $15,000 so he would not receive a
windfall due to the vacated decree and avoid responsibility for
his fair share of the marital debts.
[17,18] We reject Brian’s suggested interpretation of the
$750 monthly payments as alimony despite the stipulated
agreement and original decree labeling such payments as prop-
erty equalization. A decree is a judgment, and once a decree
for dissolution becomes final, its meaning, including the set-
tlement agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a
43
Id.44
See, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000); Keim v.
Keim, 228 Neb. 684, 424 N.W.2d 112 (1988).
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857matter of law from the four corners of the decree itself. 45 It is
inherent to a judgment’s finality that all are bound by the orig-
inal language used, and all ought to interpret the language the
same way. 46 The four corners of the decree clearly classify the
$750 monthly payments as property equalization. The decree
referred to them as “a monthly equalization payment” under
the heading “EQUALIZATION PAYMENT.” The decree also
explicitly stated that no alimony was awarded. Brian asserts
that the parties understood that the payments were alimony,
but purposely mislabeled them to avoid the tax consequences.
Even assuming this is the case, we will not enforce such an
understanding that cannot be determined from the language of
the decree.
[19,20] We also reject Brian’s argument that the district
court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay an equaliza-
tion payment without awarding him sufficient liquid assets to
cover the payment. 47 Under § 42-365, the court may take the
economic circumstances of the parties into account and is not
limited to the assets divided as part of the marital estate. 48 The
statute clearly states that the purpose of a property division is
to equitably distribute marital assets. 49 There is nothing in the
language of § 42-365 that prevents the court from ordering an
equalization payment without awarding liquid assets from the
marital estate.
Accordingly, we have found that an equitable distribu-
tion of property required equalization payments greater than
the liquid assets awarded to the paying party. 50 In Meints
45
Bayne v. Bayne, 302 Neb. 858, 925 N.W.2d 687 (2019).
46
Id.47
See, Dooling, supra note 7; Osantowski v. Osantowski, 298 Neb. 339, 904
N.W.2d 251 (2017); Meints, supra note 44.
48
See Dooling, supra note 7.
49
§ 42-365.
50
Osantowski, supra note 47; Meints, supra note 44.
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857v. Meints, 51 for instance, we determined that the equitable
distribution of marital assets required the wife to make a
property equalization payment despite her receiving no liquid
assets from the marital estate. The district court had awarded
the wife net assets over $36,000 while making the husband
responsible for approximately $25,000 in net debts. 52 We
held that this division of property was an abuse of discretion
because it failed to equitably distribute the parties’ marital
debts. 53 Although the wife was not awarded any liquid assets,
we held that the wife had to pay over $28,000 to equalize the
division of property. 54
Brian’s reliance on the Nebraska Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion in Verzal v. Verzal 55 is misplaced. The Court of Appeals
determined that it was an abuse of discretion under the spe-
cific facts of that case to order a cash equalization payment in
excess of liquid assets instead of making a qualified domestic
relation order (QDRO) to divide the husband’s retirement
account. 56 The Court of Appeals did not determine that a trial
court can never order an equalization payment in excess of
a party’s liquid assets. Additionally, Verzal is factually dis-
tinguishable from the present case. The trial court in Verzal
had classified the husband’s retirement account as a marital
asset but awarded it in its entirety to the husband. The trial
court then ordered the husband to pay a cash equalization pay-
ment of over $57,000. 57 The Court of Appeals held that the
trial court abused its discretion by ordering the equalization
payment rather than dividing the retirement account through
51
Meints, supra note 44.
52
Id.53
Id.54
Id.55
Verzal v. Verzal, 29 Neb. App. 904, 962 N.W.2d 563 (2021).
56
Id.57
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Cite as 314 Neb. 857a QDRO. 58 Brian does not argue that his retirement account
should have been classified as marital property or that the
court should have used a QDRO to divide it. Therefore, Verzal
is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
The district court reasonably divided the parties’ assets and
debts and determined that Brian owed $25,436.04 to equalize
the division. The court was not required to ensure that Brian
received liquid assets from the division of the marital estate
sufficient to cover this payment. We also note that Brian did
not show he is unable to make the equalization payment. Brian
did not claim that he no longer possesses any of the $15,000
he received from Leslie since the original decree. And although
it was not included in the marital estate, the record shows that
Brian has access to a retirement account with a balance over
$68,000. He was also awarded $10,000 in attorney fees. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Brian
to pay $25,436.04 to Leslie to equalize the division of mar-
ital property.
VI. CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the
alimony award to 15 years or in classifying and dividing the
marital estate.
Affirmed.
58
Id.