Williams v. Frakes ( 2023 )

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/03/2023 01:06 AM CDT
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379Justeen Williams, appellant, v. Scott Frakes,
in his official capacity as director of the
Nebraska Department of Correctional
Services, et al., appellees.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed October 27, 2023. No. S-22-719.
1. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. A district court’s grant of a
motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo.
2. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. When reviewing an
order dismissing a complaint, the appellate court accepts as true all facts
which are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences of law and
fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the plaintiff’s conclusion.
3. Immunity: Jurisdiction. Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,
and courts have a duty to determine whether they have subject matter
jurisdiction over a matter.
4. Jurisdiction: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Subject matter jurisdic-
tion is a question of law. An appellate court independently reviews ques-
tions of law decided by a lower court.
5. Jurisdiction: Dismissal and Nonsuit. Consideration should first be
given to subject matter jurisdiction before considering possible dismissal
based on a failure to state a claim for relief.
6. Jurisdiction: Courts. Ripeness is one component of subject matter
jurisdiction; its fundamental principle is that courts should avoid entan-
gling themselves, through premature adjudication, in abstract disagree-
ments based on contingent future events that may not occur at all or may
not occur as anticipated.
7. ____: ____. A determination regarding ripeness depends upon the cir-
cumstances in a given case and is a matter of degree.
8. Actions: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court uses
a two-part inquiry to determine ripeness: (1) the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 3799. Jurisdiction: Courts. Ripeness involves a jurisdictional question of the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision, which goes to a court’s ability
to visit an issue and safeguards against judicial review of hypothetical or
speculative disagreements, and a prudential question concerning whether
hardship will result if court consideration is delayed.
10. Habeas Corpus: Prisoners. Challenges to the validity of a pris-
oner’s confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus, while requests for relief concerning circum-
stances of confinement may be presented in an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2018).
11. Actions: Prisoners: Proof. A state prisoner’s action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2018) is barred if success in that action would necessarily dem-
onstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.
12. Administrative Law: Immunity: Waiver: Jurisdiction: Declaratory
Judgments. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-911 (2014) provides a limited statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity and confers subject matter jurisdiction for
a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of a state agency’s rule
or regulation.
13. Administrative Law: Statutes: Jurisdiction: Declaratory Judgments.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-911 (Reissue 2014) does not confer jurisdiction for
declaratory relief concerning judicial interpretation of a statute.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Kevin
R. McManaman, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald L. Soucie for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and James D. Smith
for appellees.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Cassel, J.
INTRODUCTION
Inmate Justeen Williams sued the Nebraska Department of
Correctional Services (DCS) and three of its officials regarding
computation of her tentative mandatory release date (TRD).
The district court dismissed the case, and Williams appeals.
Because Williams’ first two claims attacked the duration of
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379her confinement, they failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2018). And because the complaint’s third claim failed
to challenge the validity of a DCS rule or regulation, the waiver
of sovereign immunity under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-911 (Reissue
2014) did not apply. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Sentencing Background
In 1994, the district court sentenced Williams to life impris-
onment for a murder that she committed as a juvenile. It
imposed a consecutive sentence of 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment
for a use of a firearm conviction, with credit for 224 days of
time served.
In 1995, the court imposed a sentence of 1 year’s impris-
onment for an assault by a confined person conviction. The
court ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to any
other sentence.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama 1 and its progeny, Williams moved for postconviction
relief. The district court sustained the motion. It determined
that Williams was entitled to a resentencing hearing, and it
vacated her sentence on “Count 1 Murder in the First Degree.”
Upon resentencing in 2016, the court imposed a sentence of
60 to 80 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction. The
court ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to the
use of a firearm conviction. It granted credit for time served
of 8,147 days against the sentence for murder only. The court’s
sentencing order also stated that good time shall be calculated
“pursuant to LB191.”
TRD Inquiry and Grievances
Williams questioned the computation of her TRD under
68 Neb. Admin. Code, chs. 1 (2008) and 2 (2023). She sent
1
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407(2012).
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379an inquiry to “NCCW inmate records,” stating her belief that
DCS should have discharged her from two sentences that she
claimed to have completed and that DCS incorrectly claimed
she was serving a combined sentence of 63 to 86 years with
a TRD in 2036. The records administrator replied with a
sentencing calculation and an explanation that the combined
sentence had been correctly calculated. Williams filed an
informal grievance and received a response. She subsequently
filed a “Step One” grievance, which the warden denied.
Williams then filed a “Step Two” grievance, and the director
denied it.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
Following the denial of Williams’ grievances, she filed an
action for declaratory judgment under § 1983 and § 84-911
against DCS and three individuals in their official capacities.
Williams alleged that DCS, its director, its records administra-
tor, and a warden (hereinafter collectively DCS) were responsi-
ble for actions that infringed on her constitutional rights under
the 8th Amendment and under the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment to have her TRD determined consistent with
Nebraska statutes and case law.
Williams set forth two claims for declaratory relief under
§ 1983. In the first claim, she asserted that it was a violation
of the Eighth Amendment for DCS to determine that her TRD
was 3 years longer than that authorized under Nebraska law.
Williams asserted that as a matter of law, DCS must discharge
her from the two shorter sentences. She sought a declaratory
judgment that under the Eighth Amendment, her TRD should
be in 2033 rather than 2036.
In Williams’ second claim for declaratory relief under
§ 1983, she alleged that it was a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment for DCS to determine that her
TRD was 3 years longer than that authorized under Nebraska
law. She sought a declaratory judgment that under the
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, her TRD should
be November 23, 2033.
Williams also set forth a claim for relief under § 84-911. She
sought declaratory relief that under Nebraska law, she com-
pleted the sentence of 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment with credit
for 224 days and the sentence of 1 year’s imprisonment before
being resentenced in 2016 to 60 to 80 years’ imprisonment.
The prayer for relief in Williams’ complaint requested sev-
eral declarations concerning her sentences. It requested the
court declare that (1) Williams’ sentence of 2 to 5 years’
imprisonment with credit for 224 days in custody began on
July 1, 1994; (2) Williams’ sentence of 1 year’s imprisonment
must be combined with the 1994 sentence for a total sentence
of 3 to 6 years’ imprisonment with credit for 224 days, effec-
tive and implemented as of July 1, 1994; (3) the combined
sentence of 3 to 6 years’ imprisonment was not affected by the
order vacating the life sentence on the murder conviction and
that DCS had no authority to suspend execution of the com-
bined 3-to-6-year sentence; (4) the combined sentence of 3 to
6 years’ imprisonment with credit for 224 days was completed
on or about November 19, 1997; and (5) the only sentence
being served by Williams is the sentence of 60 to 80 years’
imprisonment with credit for 8,147 days imposed on March
16, 2016.
Motion to Dismiss
DCS moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion asserted
that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
due to sovereign immunity.
Judgment
The district court dismissed the case. With respect to
the claim under § 1983, the court determined that Williams
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379cited a U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that “a prisoner
in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the
fact or duration of his [or her] confinement.’” 2 As to the chal-
lenge under § 84-911, the court determined that the State
had not waived its sovereign immunity for a challenge to
DCS’ interpretation of state law. The court concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction.
Williams appealed, and we granted her petition to bypass
review by the Nebraska Court of Appeals. 3
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Williams assigns, consolidated and restated, that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing her claims under § 1983 and
§ 84-911.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss is
reviewed de novo. 4 When reviewing an order dismissing a
complaint, the appellate court accepts as true all facts which
are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences of law
and fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the plaintiff’s
conclusion. 5
[3,4] Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, and
courts have a duty to determine whether they have subject
matter jurisdiction over a matter. 6 Subject matter jurisdiction
is a question of law. 7 An appellate court independently reviews
questions of law decided by a lower court. 8
2
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253(2005).
3
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
4
Schaeffer v. Frakes, 313 Neb. 337, 984 N.W.2d 290 (2023).
5
Id.6
Id.7
Id.8
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379ANALYSIS
[5] At this juncture, whether DCS correctly computed
Williams’ TRD is not before us. Instead, we accept as true the
factual allegations in Williams’ complaint. The issues framed
before the district court and by Williams’ assignments of error
on appeal would constrain our review to whether she stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted under § 1983 and
whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider her
claim under § 84-911. However, on appeal, DCS now urges
that the case is not ripe. Because consideration should first
be given to subject matter jurisdiction before considering pos-
sible dismissal based on a failure to state a claim for relief, 9
we address that argument first.
Ripeness
[6-8] Ripeness is one component of subject matter juris-
diction; its fundamental principle is that courts should avoid
entangling themselves, through premature adjudication, in
abstract disagreements based on contingent future events that
may not occur at all or may not occur as anticipated. 10 A deter-
mination regarding ripeness depends upon the circumstances
in a given case and is a matter of degree. 11 An appellate court
uses a two-part inquiry to determine ripeness: (1) the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the par-
ties of withholding court consideration. 12
As to Williams’ § 84-911 claim, our task is simple. The
district court concluded that this claim was barred by sov-
ereign immunity. As we noted above, sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional in nature, and courts have a duty to determine
whether they have subject matter jurisdiction over a matter. 13
9
See Engler v. State, 283 Neb. 985, 814 N.W.2d 387 (2012).
10
Great Plains Livestock v. Midwest Ins. Exch., 312 Neb. 367, 979 N.W.2d
113 (2022).
11
Id.12
Id.13
Schaeffer v. Frakes, supra note 4.
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379In this regard, DCS’ ripeness argument would, at most,
merely prefer one jurisdictional argument over another. We
need not do so.
[9] But regarding Williams’ § 1983 claim, the answer is not
quite as simple. It is not clear that the limitation on § 1983
actions recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and upon
which the district court relied on below is, like sovereign
immunity, jurisdictional in nature. At the same time, however,
we have recognized that ripeness has a jurisdictional aspect
and a mere prudential aspect. 14 Specifically, we have said that
ripeness involves a “jurisdictional question of the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision,” 15 which “goes to a court’s
ability to visit an issue [and] safeguards against judicial
review of hypothetical or speculative disagreements,” 16 and
a “prudential question” 17 concerning whether hardship will
result if court consideration is delayed. Put another way, we
have summarized the jurisdictional ripeness inquiry as asking
whether a court “can act at a certain time” and the prudential
ripeness inquiry as asking whether the court “should act at
that time.” 18
In this case, we discern no jurisdictional ripeness barrier.
Accepting the factual allegations in Williams’ complaint as
true, the parties currently have a nonhypothetical disagreement
regarding whether DCS is violating her constitutional rights
in its calculation of her mandatory discharge date. Assuming
Williams presented this dispute in a cognizable vehicle, that
type of legal question is typically one that is fit for a judi-
cial decision.
14
See City of Omaha v. City of Elkhorn, 276 Neb. 70, 752 N.W.2d 137(2008).
15
Stewart v. Heineman, 296 Neb. 262, 288, 892 N.W.2d 542, 560 (2017).
16
Id. at 289, 892 N.W.2d at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17
Id. at 288, 892 N.W.2d at 560.
18
City of Omaha v. City of Elkhorn, supra note 14, 276 Neb. at 79, 752
N.W.2d at 145.
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WILLIAMS V. FRAKES
Cite as 315 Neb. 379Of course, as explained above, even if a case is jurisdiction-
ally ripe, it may not be prudentially ripe, because there would
be little to no hardship in delaying resolution. DCS’ ripeness
argument emphasizes this idea. It contends that there would be
no harm in delaying resolution, because, even under Williams’
calculations, she will not be entitled to discharge for another
decade, and the dispute may, for some reason, dissipate by
then. We need not, however, resolve this case on prudential
ripeness grounds. Because prudential ripeness is not a matter
of jurisdiction, we are not required to address it. And, as we
will explain below, there is another issue that prevents us from
reaching the merits of Williams’ § 1983 claim and disposes of
her assignment of error on that issue.
§ 1983 Claims
Williams’ complaint set forth two claims for declaratory
relief under § 1983. The first sought declaratory relief that it
is an Eighth Amendment violation for DCS “to claim authority
not to discharge her from the lawfully completed sentences and
imprison [her] beyond the maximum term authorized by state
law.” The second sought declaratory relief that it is a viola-
tion of the 14th Amendment to imprison her beyond the term
authorized by law. The issue before us is whether relief can be
granted for such claims under § 1983.
[10] Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivations
of federally protected rights caused by persons acting under
color of state law. 19 A claim may fit within the contours of
§ 1983, but that does not necessarily mean such an action
is proper. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, challenges
to the validity of a prisoner’s confinement or to particulars
affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus, while
requests for relief concerning circumstances of confinement
may be presented in an action under § 1983. 20 While this rule
19
Schaeffer v. Frakes, supra note 4.
20
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 158 L. Ed. 2d 32(2004).
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Cite as 315 Neb. 379may seem straightforward, the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken
to its application numerous times. 21
Fifty years ago, the Court held that a § 1983 action could
not be used when a state prisoner sought to challenge “the fact
or duration of his [or her] confinement” 22 and sought either
“immediate release from prison or . . . shortening the length of
[his or her] confinement.” 23 There, prisoners brought § 1983
actions to challenge the constitutionality of prison disciplin-
ary proceedings that led to the loss of their good time credits.
The Court determined that the prisoners could not pursue
their claims under § 1983 because they were seeking a speed-
ier release.
The following year, the Court considered a case where
prisoners sought restoration of their good time credits, a dec-
laration that prison disciplinary procedures were invalid, and
damages. 24 The Court determined that the prisoners’ good time
credits could not be restored in an action under § 1983. But
the Court stated that the prisoners could use § 1983 to obtain
a declaration that disciplinary procedures were invalid and
seek to have enjoined the prospective enforcement of invalid
prison regulations.
[11] In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 25 the Court reviewed sev-
eral of its decisions concerning § 1983 and habeas corpus.
It observed that the focus had been on “the need to ensure
that state prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar state
remedies) when they seek to invalidate the duration of their
21
See Wilkinson v. Dotson, supra note 2 (discussing Court’s previous
decisions). See, also, Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 131 S. Ct. 1289,
179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 126 S. Ct.
2096, 165 L. Ed. 2d 44 (2006).
22
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439(1973).
23
Id., 411 U.S. at 482.
24
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935(1974).
25
Wilkinson v. Dotson, supra note 2.
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Cite as 315 Neb. 379confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling
speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determina-
tion that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s
custody.” 26 The Court summarized that
a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior
invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages
or equitable relief), no matter the target of the pris­
oner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or inter-
nal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or
its duration. 27
In that case, the prisoners alleged due process violations in
connection with parole adjudications and sought a new parole
hearing under proper procedures. The Court found the claims
to be cognizable under § 1983, because “neither prisoner’s
claim would necessarily spell speedier release.” 28 It explained:
Success for [William] Dotson does not mean immediate
release from confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it
means at most new eligibility review, which at most will
speed consideration of a new parole application. Success
for [Rogerico] Johnson means at most a new parole hear-
ing at which Ohio parole authorities may, in their discre-
tion, decline to shorten his prison term. 29
Williams argues that she is not challenging the valid-
ity or the length of her sentences. Instead, she claims to be
challenging the “administration of [the] sentences.” 30 But
success for Williams on the merits would necessarily imply
the invalidity of the duration of her confinement as deter-
mined by DCS. She seeks a declaration that her TRD is 3
years earlier than that calculated by DCS. Because the relief
26
Id., 544 U.S. at 81 (emphasis in original).
27
Id., 544 U.S. at 81-82 (emphasis in original).
28
Id., 544 U.S. at 82.
29
Id. (emphasis in original).
30
Brief for appellant at 27.
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Cite as 315 Neb. 379she seeks would “necessarily spell speedier release,” 31 she
has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under
§ 1983.
§ 84-911 Claim
Williams’ complaint states that she “seeks declaratory relief
as provided under . . . § 84-911 et seq. that pursuant to
Nebraska statutes and case law she completed the [two shorter
sentences].” The district court determined that the State had
not waived its sovereign immunity under § 84-911 for such a
challenge. We agree.
[12] Section 84-911 provides a limited statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity and confers subject matter jurisdic-
tion for a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of a
state agency’s rule or regulation. 32 The Legislature authorized
judicial review “if it appears that [a] rule or regulation or its
threatened application interferes with or impairs or threatens
to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of
the petitioner.” 33 A “[r]ule or regulation” is defined to mean
“any standard of general application adopted by an agency in
accord­ance with the authority conferred by statute.” 34
Williams’ complaint referred to DCS regulations in connec-
tion with her allegations regarding exhaustion of administrative
remedies. For example, it set forth how Williams exhausted
the DCS inquiry and grievance process under 68 Neb. Admin.
Code, chs. 1 and 2.
The complaint also referenced regulations pertaining to
completion of sentences. It stated that DCS is responsible for
implementing sentences under the law as required by 68 Neb.
Admin. Code, ch. 1, and is required to release the inmate
31
Wilkinson v. Dotson, supra note 2, 544 U.S. at 82.
32
Schaeffer v. Frakes, supra note 4.
33
§ 84-911(1).
34
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-901(2) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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Cite as 315 Neb. 379upon completion of his or her sentence or term of parole
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,118(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022) and 68
Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2. The complaint quoted four regula-
tions found in 68 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, and emphasized a
regulation pertaining to an inmate’s questions regarding com-
putation of TRD. 35 Williams alleged that she had “the right to
the accurate and correct computation of her mandatory date
release from incarceration” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,106
(Reissue 2014) and 68 Neb. Admin., chs. 1 and 2. She also
made several references about how her TRD and mandatory
discharge dates can be extended if good time is forfeited under
68 Neb. Admin. Code, chs. 5 and 6 (2023).
[13] After scouring Williams’ complaint for a challenge to
the validity of an agency rule or regulation or its threatened
application, we find none. Rather, as the district court deter-
mined, Williams is challenging DCS’ interpretation of state law
relating to sentencing calculations rather than the validity of a
rule or regulation. Section 84-911 does not confer jurisdiction
for declaratory relief concerning judicial interpretation of a
statute. 36 We conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction under
§ 84-911 for Williams’ claims against DCS.
Other Avenue of Relief
According to the district court’s judgment, Williams
brought the wrong causes of action. It stated that “instead
of challenging the calculation of her sentences under . . .
Nebraska’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 25-21,149 to [25-21,164], she brought this case
under . . . § 1983 and . . . § 84-911 . . . , also seeking attor-
ney fees.” DCS’ brief also observed that “Williams’ com-
plaint did not allege a cause of action under Nebraska’s
Uniform Declaratory Judgment[s] Act, which does not allow
35
See 68 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 004.
36
See, Schaeffer v. Frakes, supra note 4; Perryman v. Nebraska Dept. of
Corr. Servs., 253 Neb. 66, 568 N.W.2d 241 (1997), disapproved on other
grounds, Johnson v. Clarke, 258 Neb. 316, 603 N.W.2d 373 (1999).
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Cite as 315 Neb. 379for recovery of attorney fees.” 37 Given that Williams asserted
no claim regarding the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
we express no opinion on the availability of relief under it.
CONCLUSION
Because Williams’ complaint essentially challenged the
duration of her confinement, we conclude that it failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 1983. And
because Williams failed to challenge the validity of a rule or
regulation, the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 84-911 did
not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis-
trict court.
Affirmed.
37
Brief for appellees at 5.