In re Estate of Filsinger ( 2021 )


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    05/04/2021 08:13 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    29 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
    Cite as 
    29 Neb. App. 809
    In re Estate of Orville W.
    Filsinger, deceased.
    Marvin O. Filsinger et al., appellants and
    cross-appellees, v. Robert Rauner, Jr., Personal
    Representative of the Estate of Orville W.
    Filsinger, deceased, appellee
    and cross-appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed May 4, 2021.     No. A-20-347.
    1. Appeal and Error. An appellate court does not consider an argument or
    legal theory raised for the first time on appeal.
    2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will
    affirm a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings
    and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from
    those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law.
    3. ____: ____. In reviewing a lower court’s grant of summary judgment,
    an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    party against whom the judgment was granted, giving that party the
    benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.
    4. Limitations of Actions: Appeal and Error. Which statute of limitations
    applies is a question of law that an appellate court must decide indepen-
    dently of the conclusion reached by the trial court.
    5. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews pro-
    bate cases for error appearing on the record made in the county court.
    6. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
    appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms
    to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary,
    capricious, nor unreasonable.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    7. Decedents’ Estates. As a fiduciary, the personal representative is
    required to make a full disclosure of all facts within his knowledge
    that are material for the beneficiaries to know so that they can protect
    their interest.
    8. Decedents’ Estates: Wills. The personal representative is under a duty
    to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the
    terms of any probated and effective will and the Nebraska Probate Code
    as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of
    the estate.
    9. Decedents’ Estates: Damages: Liability. If the personal representative
    of an estate exercises his or her power improperly and damages the
    estate or causes a loss as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty, then
    the personal representative is liable to interested persons in the estate.
    10. Decedents’ Estates. A devisee or claimant may proceed against a per-
    sonal representative for breach of fiduciary duty under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-24
    ,119 (Reissue 2016).
    11. Decedents’ Estates: Limitations of Actions. Under the plain language
    of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-24
    ,119 (Reissue 2016), the claimant must bring
    the action for breach of fiduciary duty within 6 months of the closing
    statement’s being filed.
    12. ____: ____. The statutory time bar found within 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-24
    ,119 (Reissue 2016) does not apply if the plaintiff is seeking to
    recover from a personal representative for fraud, misrepresentation, or
    inadequate disclosure related to the settlement of the decedent’s estate.
    13. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. In interpreting the various sec-
    tions of the Nebraska Probate Code, an appellate court may examine the
    comments to the Uniform Probate Code.
    14. Decedents’ Estates. A closing statement is an affirmation by the per-
    sonal representative that he or she believes the affairs of the estate to
    be completed.
    15. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain
    and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
    pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
    direct, and unambiguous.
    16. Decedents’ Estates: Fraud: Limitations of Actions. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2206
     (Reissue 2016) requires that an action in a probate case based
    on fraud must be commenced within 2 years following the discovery of
    the fraud.
    17. Decedents’ Estates: Notice. If a personal representative files a peti-
    tion for an order of complete settlement, he or she is required to give
    all interested persons notice, consistent with 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2220
    (Reissue 2016), the general notice provision of the probate code.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    18. Trial: Evidence. Where reasonable minds could draw different conclu-
    sions from the facts presented, a triable issue of material fact arises.
    19. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
    presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
    20. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Time: Appeal and Error. An appellate
    court has jurisdiction over final orders that are appealed within 30 days
    from their entry.
    21. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (Cum. Supp. 2020), an appellate court may review an order that affects
    a substantial right made during a special proceeding.
    22. Decedents’ Estates: Final Orders. Proceedings under the Nebraska
    Probate Code are special proceedings under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    23. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential
    legal right, not a mere technical right.
    24. Final Orders. Substantial rights under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Cum.
    Supp. 2020) include those legal rights that a party is entitled to enforce
    or defend.
    25. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. If a substantial right is affected, an
    order is directly appealable as a final order even though it does not ter-
    minate the action or constitute a final disposition of the case.
    26. Decedents’ Estates: Final Orders: Claims: Fees. Fee orders in a pro-
    bate case are made in a special proceeding; an order awarding a personal
    representative fees affects a substantial right when it finally determines
    the personal representative’s claim for reasonable compensation under
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2480
     (Reissue 2016).
    Appeal from the County Court for Cheyenne County:
    Russell W. Harford, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part
    dismissed.
    Robert M. Brenner, of Robert M. Brenner Law Office, for
    appellants.
    Torrey J. Gerdes, J. Michael Hannon, and Randall L.
    Goyette, of Baylor Evnen, L.L.P., and R. Kevin O’Donnell, of
    Law Office of R. Kevin O’Donnell, P.C., L.L.O, for appellees.
    Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Arterburn,
    Judges.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    Arterburn, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Marvin O. Filsinger, Javonne Krueger, and Gloria Vegas (the
    Claimants) appeal the order of the county court for Cheyenne
    County, Nebraska, which granted summary judgment in favor
    of Robert Rauner, Jr., the personal representative of the estate
    of Orville W. Filsinger (the Personal Representative). The order
    dismissed the claim filed by the Claimants against the Personal
    Representative which challenged the amount distributed to
    Orville’s wife, Berniece Filsinger. The Personal Representative
    cross-appeals a separate order from the county court which
    denied his claim for attorney fees and his renewed application
    for attorney fees related to prior litigation. For the reasons set
    forth herein, we affirm the order of the county court granting
    summary judgment to the Personal Representative. We dismiss
    the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    Orville died in September 2009 in Cheyenne County.
    Pursuant to a provision found in the will signed by Orville in
    December 2002, Rauner was nominated by both Marvin and
    Berniece to be the Personal Representative. He accepted the
    appointment. Orville’s will stated, as is relevant to this appeal,
    that upon his death, Berniece would receive the personal resi-
    dence where they resided; Orville’s personal effects, jewelry,
    and tools; and a further sum of $1 million reduced by probate
    or nonprobate transfers of real and personal property. The will
    goes on to state:
    It is my intent that in the event the total value of the real
    estate and personal property owned in joint tenancy with
    or payable on death to Berniece . . . or in which Berniece
    . . . is a beneficiary, equals or exceeds One Million
    Dollars ($1,000,000.00), that the said Berniece . . . not
    receive any additional sums pursuant to this my Last Will
    and Testament.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    A postnuptial agreement signed by Orville and Berniece in
    October 2002 mirrored the language of Orville’s will, stating
    that Berniece would receive the personal residence of the par-
    ties and the furniture, fixtures, and appliances in the property,
    as well as Orville’s personal effects, jewelry, and tools upon
    Orville’s death. The postnuptial agreement further mirrored his
    will by also stating that Berniece would receive the further sum
    of $1 million reduced by nonprobate transfers of real estate and
    personal property. Orville signed a codicil to his will in April
    2006; however, the codicil did not change the portions of the
    will which are relevant to this appeal.
    On August 10, 2010, the Personal Representative filed the
    initial inventory of property owned by Orville at the time of his
    death. This inventory disclosed that there was real and personal
    property owned in joint tenancy with Berniece in the approxi-
    mate amount of $1.8 million. The inventory also disclosed that
    Berniece would receive a parcel of real property, commonly
    referred to as the “Sunol Property.”
    The Claimants are Orville’s children. Pursuant to the terms
    of Orville’s will, they would receive the remainder of the
    estate. After the Personal Representative’s appointment, he
    communicated with the Claimants via letter explaining that
    the Sunol Property would be a part of the estate. However,
    the Personal Representative explained that Berniece would
    disclaim her rights to this property but, in so doing, wished to
    receive an assignment of the rights to a promissory note for a
    loan that was given to a debtor known as the Andersons in the
    amount of $25,000. The Personal Representative determined
    that this was a reasonable request, in light of the value of the
    Sunol Property, which was estimated to be $600,000. By virtue
    of Berniece’s disclaimer, the Sunol Property would be devised
    to the Claimants. Subsequent to this letter, a “Disclaimer and
    Renunciation Pursuant to Agreement” executed by Berniece,
    wherein she renounced all rights to the Sunol Property, was
    filed on October 8, 2010.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    After the filing of the disclaimer and renunciation, an
    amended inventory was filed by the Personal Representative
    on November 16, 2010, listing the nonprobate property Orville
    had owned in joint tenancy with Berniece and valuing that
    property at approximately $1.2 million. A second amended
    inventory was later filed on December 7 showing that the value
    of the nonprobate property Orville owned in joint tenancy with
    Berniece was also approximately $1.2 million.
    In July 2012, two of the Claimants, Krueger and Vegas
    (then known as Gloria Haines), sent an electronic communi-
    cation to the Personal Representative and his counsel stating
    their concern regarding Orville’s estate and the distribution of
    assets. In that communication, they asserted that their inter-
    pretation of the postnuptial agreement and of Orville’s will
    was that the distributions to Berniece were limited to a total
    value of $1 million. They also stated that based on the account-
    ing submitted to the county court at that time, the value of
    Berniece’s distributions were $1,186,686. They contended that
    after adding the life insurance policy and the loan made to the
    Andersons, the total amount that Berniece would receive would
    be $1,314,352. A response was sent to Krueger and Vegas by
    Steven Matoon, then counsel for the Personal Representative.
    Matoon expressed his opinion that the will and postnuptial
    agreement did not place a $1 million maximum on the amount
    Berniece could receive in total from all assets when nonpro-
    bate transfers were considered. He also noted that Berniece
    had renounced her claim to the Sunol Property in which she
    had a joint tenancy interest, an action she was not required to
    take. He noted that the Sunol Property was worth $587,000 and
    would now be divided between the Claimants. Following this
    exchange, our record reveals no further protest of the amount
    received by Berniece until 2015.
    In January 2014, the Personal Representative prepared a
    formal petition for complete settlement after the informal tes-
    tate proceeding (the Formal Petition), which was file stamped
    by the county court on January 10, 2014. In the Formal
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    Petition, the Personal Representative affirmed the following:
    He collected and managed the assets for the estate; he filed a
    first inventory, second amended inventory, and final report; he
    paid all lawful claims against the estate; he distributed assets
    and proposed distribution of further assets as designated in
    the schedule of distribution that was attached to the Formal
    Petition; and there were no contingent, unliquidated, or future
    claims against the estate. He also stated that the Nebraska
    inheritance tax had been paid in full. He disclosed an addi-
    tional asset, not previously inventoried, which was a promis-
    sory note of $60,000 payable to Orville’s estate. He disclosed
    that Berniece would receive, by virtue of joint tenancy owner-
    ship and transfer and assignment of the promissory note of the
    Andersons, at least $1 million. He asked the court to approve
    the distributions made in the final report and in the schedule
    of distribution. He also asked for the court to discharge him as
    the personal representative.
    That same day, January 10, 2014, the Personal Representative
    also submitted a final report. In the final report, the Personal
    Representative affirmed that he had received all income, pay-
    ments, and receipts in Orville’s estate and paid all costs,
    expenses, and disbursements. An accounting of the estate
    account from October 22, 2010, through January 2, 2014, was
    included with this final report. A schedule of distribution, also
    file stamped on January 10, was prepared. The schedule of
    distribution listed distributions to the Claimants and listed one
    distribution to Berniece. This distribution was the loan to the
    Andersons valued at approximately $25,000. On January 10,
    the county court set February 13 as the date for a hearing on
    the Formal Petition.
    The Personal Representative filed an affidavit of mailing
    notice of complete settlement on January 17, 2014. This affi-
    davit stated that the Personal Representative’s attorney sent to
    the Claimants by U.S. mail a copy of the notice required for
    the February 13 hearing and copies of the Formal Petition,
    the schedule of distribution, and the final report. Additionally,
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    the Personal Representative’s attorney filed an affidavit stat-
    ing that he mailed a notice of hearing of the complete settle-
    ment after the informal testate proceeding in Orville’s estate
    to all interested parties on or about January 16. He also
    stated in his affidavit that he did not receive these mailings as
    returned mail. The Sidney Sun Telegraph, a legal newspaper in
    Cheyenne County, published notice for the hearing on January
    15, 22, and 29.
    The county court entered the formal order for complete
    settlement after the informal testate proceeding (the Formal
    Order) on February 13, 2014. In the Formal Order, the court
    noted that it considered the Formal Petition. The court found
    that the Personal Representative collected and managed the
    assets of the estate, filed an inventory and final account-
    ing, paid all lawful claims against the estate, and performed
    all other acts required. The court stated that Berniece would
    receive a total of 28.61 percent of the probate and nonprobate
    assets of Orville’s estate. It specifically noted that Berniece
    would receive at least $1 million from the estate. The court
    further found that Orville’s will and codicil were declared to be
    valid and formally probated. The court allowed and approved
    the final accounting and the distributions made and reported
    on the final accounting and the schedule of distribution.
    The court also determined that the authority of the Personal
    Representative should be terminated and that he would be dis-
    charged from further claims when the final fiduciary income
    tax return was filed with the Internal Revenue Service. This
    was the last action taken in the estate until almost 3 years later,
    in December 2016.
    In the interim, Berniece passed away in 2015. On September
    25, the Claimants filed a claim in Berniece’s estate, alleg-
    ing that she received an excessive distribution from Orville’s
    estate. The Claimants alleged that the distribution was in
    violation of the postnuptial agreement entered into between
    Orville and Berniece during their lifetimes. As part of this
    claim, the Claimants deposed the Personal Representative in
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    IN RE ESTATE OF FILSINGER
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    29 Neb. App. 809
    July 2016. Ultimately, the county court determined that the
    allegation of an improper distribution was filed in the wrong
    estate and that the claim should have instead been brought in
    Orville’s estate. The county court stated that “[a]lthough the
    Claimants have filed their claim in this case, it is actually a
    claim that should be asserted in the Estate of Orville Filsinger,
    PR 09-48, because the claim asserts an improper distribution
    in that estate. Berniece . . . was simply the benefactor of the
    alleged improper distribution.” The Claimants appealed the
    county court’s decision to this court, alleging the lower court
    erred in determining that the claim must be filed in Orville’s
    estate and in not finding that fraud was perpetrated on the
    Claimants. We affirmed the county court’s decision. See In
    re Estate of Filsinger, 
    27 Neb. App. 142
    , 
    927 N.W.2d 391
    (2019) (Filsinger I).
    In our opinion, we first determined that if the claim was
    alleging there was a breach of contract by virtue of Orville’s
    will’s not conforming to the postnuptial agreement, the claim
    would be against Orville’s estate, and thus the county court
    was correct in holding that the Claimants could not assert the
    claim against the estate of Berniece. If, however, the claim
    was that the distribution to Berniece failed to conform with
    Orville’s will, the limitations of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-24
    ,120
    (Reissue 2016) would apply. Filsinger I. After we reviewed
    the Formal Petition and the Formal Order in Orville’s estate,
    we held that the petition and order in Orville’s estate were
    a proceeding settling the accounts of a personal representa-
    tive which would bar the claim from the Claimants under
    § 30-24,120. Filsinger I. We found that there was no question
    that the court entered a final order for complete settlement in
    connection with that distribution. Id. We also determined that
    the claim was previously adjudicated under the Formal Order
    because the Personal Representative requested the court to
    approve the final settlement and direct that the distribution of
    remaining assets of the estate be made to the distributees in
    the amount and manner set forth in the attached schedule of
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    distribution. 
    Id.
     Under that order, Berniece, by virtue of joint
    tenancy ownership and transfer and assignment of the promis-
    sory note of the Andersons, would receive at least $1 million
    as directed. 
    Id.
     In the Formal Order, the county court found
    and determined that the Personal Representative of Orville’s
    estate was authorized and directed to distribute assets to the
    distributees in the amount and manner set forth in the schedule
    of distribution. 
    Id.
     We held that because that specific issue was
    adjudicated in connection with the Personal Representative’s
    petition for formal settlement, the Claimants’ direct claim
    against the distributee of Orville’s estate is barred by the
    terms of § 30-24,120. Filsinger I. Finally, we found that the
    Claimants’ arguments that the fraud provisions of § 30-24,120
    applied were not borne out by the language of the claim filed
    in Berniece’s estate. Filsinger I. Since the pleading did not
    suggest fraud in the manner in which the distributions were
    made, the county court did not err in failing to find that the
    action was based on fraud. Id.
    The Claimants filed the present claim against the Personal
    Representative of Orville’s estate on May 24, 2017. The
    Claimants alleged that the Personal Representative breached
    his fiduciary duty to the estate and the beneficiaries of the
    estate by not disclosing the details of the estate distribution.
    Other details of distribution were alleged to have been fraud­
    ulently concealed. The Claimants alleged that they received
    neither a notice of the hearing held on February 13, 2014,
    nor the schedule of distribution. They also alleged that the
    Personal Representative knew that the Claimants did not have
    specific or detailed knowledge of the schedule of distribution
    because no accounting, no final report, and no information
    had been given to them. They further alleged that the Personal
    Representative disclosed some information but did not dis-
    close all the information, informing the Claimants about only
    a $25,000 note with respect to Berniece’s distributions. The
    Claimants also alleged that the Personal Representative had
    a fiduciary duty to speak to the Claimants but deliberately
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    remained silent, which they allege to be equivalent to a false
    representation. The Claimants asserted that they were damaged
    in that they reasonably relied on the Personal Representative’s
    assurances that proper distribution under the postnuptial agree-
    ment was occurring.
    The Claimants further asserted that the Formal Petition, the
    final accounting, and the schedule of distribution were not
    found within the case file for Orville’s estate. In a proceed-
    ing in Berniece’s estate that occurred on January 28, 2016, it
    was discovered that these documents could not be properly
    located within the court file. However, in that hearing, the
    clerk reported that the documents did appear on the online
    electronic court filing system. During the hearing for summary
    judgment, the Claimants argued that the Formal Petition, the
    final accounting, and the schedule of distribution were never
    in the court file. However, the Claimants did not argue that the
    Formal Order was not in the court file. They did allege that
    they did not receive these documents until the deposition of the
    Personal Representative.
    At the hearing, Marvin, one of the Claimants, asserted that
    he never received notice of the hearing or any of the infor-
    mation that the Personal Representative stated that he mailed
    to Marvin. A transcript of his earlier testimony adduced in a
    hearing on the claim made in Berniece’s estate was received
    wherein Marvin testified that he does not subscribe to the
    Sidney Sun Telegraph, the newspaper that published the notice
    for the hearings. However, he verified his address, which was
    the same as the one included by the Personal Representative in
    the affidavit of mailing notice. Marvin’s address was also cor-
    rectly listed on the application for informal probate.
    Finally, the Claimants alleged that no final accounting was
    filed and that the last inventory that was filed was completed
    in 2010. The Claimants then alleged that the Formal Order
    on complete settlement filed by the court did not disclose
    the irregularities that the Claimants previously asserted. They
    also claimed that the Formal Order made findings inconsistent
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    with what was in the online electronic court file. They asserted
    that the initial basis for their concerns was a postnuptial agree-
    ment that stated that Berniece would receive $1 million. They
    also stated that Berniece confirmed this agreement by execut-
    ing a disclaimer and renunciation. The Claimants then stated
    that Berniece acquired, took, claimed, and held onto property
    that exceeded $1 million by $200,000.
    The court stayed all proceedings in Orville’s estate while the
    claim in Berniece’s estate was being decided on appeal. After
    we issued our mandate in Filsinger I, proceedings in the pres-
    ent case resumed.
    The Personal Representative denied the claim that the
    Claimants made against him. The Personal Representative
    stated that the claim was filed only after the county court
    issued an order in Berniece’s estate holding that the claim
    of excessive distribution was filed in the wrong estate. The
    Personal Representative then asserted that the claim was time
    barred under the following statutes: 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2485
    and 30-24,119 (Reissue 2016). On December 4, 2019, the
    Personal Representative filed an amended motion for summary
    judgment. The Personal Representative requested the court to
    grant summary judgment in his favor and deny all claims filed
    by the Claimants.
    On April 28, 2020, the county court entered its order grant-
    ing the Personal Representative’s motion for summary judg-
    ment. The court determined that any claim by the Claimants
    failed. First, the court denied the claim pursuant to § 30-24,120
    because the claim was not timely filed and had been previously
    adjudicated at the time of the closing of the estate on February
    13, 2014. The court determined that there was no evidence to
    support the allegations of fraud or fraudulent concealment that
    would toll the time for filing the claim. The court also denied
    the claim pursuant to § 30-24,119 because it was not timely
    filed. The court, again, determined that the claim was barred
    because it had been adjudicated at the hearing on February
    13, 2014, which had closed the estate. The court further
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    determined that there was no evidence of fraud, misrepresenta-
    tion, or inadequate disclosure that would toll the time for fil-
    ing a claim under that statute. The court also determined that
    the claim would be barred under § 30-2485 because it was not
    timely filed. The court granted the motion for summary judg-
    ment and dismissed the Claimants’ claim against the Personal
    Representative. The Claimants appeal from that order.
    On cross-appeal, the Personal Representative contends that
    the county court erred by refusing to approve his applica-
    tion to pay attorney fees with respect to fees incurred relative
    to the claims made against Berniece’s estate. The Personal
    Representative filed an application to pay fees and costs on
    December 21, 2016, for work completed through October 31.
    On May 16, 2017, the court denied the application because
    the Formal Order for complete settlement after the informal
    testate proceedings was filed on February 13, 2014, and no
    further filings were made until the application for fees and
    response in opposition were filed at the end of 2016. The court
    further found that the estate was closed and that the deposition
    of the Personal Representative was sought in a separate case.
    On July 14, 2017, the Personal Representative filed a renewed
    application to pay fees and costs for work done through June
    30, defending his actions in Orville’s estate, including for the
    work for the deposition in proceedings involved in Berniece’s
    estate and other costs that were previously denied. The court
    held a hearing on July 21 regarding the motion for leave to file
    additional evidence on the issue of attorney fees and costs. The
    court denied this motion on July 26, explaining that because
    the Personal Representative was released from his duties of
    personal representative 1 year after the Formal Order of settle-
    ment was entered and no further claims were made in the estate
    during that time, no further attorney fees were warranted. The
    Personal Representative appeals these decisions.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    [1] The Claimants assign that the county court erred by
    granting the Personal Representative’s motion for summary
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    judgment as a matter of law. The Claimants specifically allege
    the county court erred by (1) finding that their claim was
    barred under §§ 30-2485 and 30-24,119; (2) failing to find
    that the Personal Representative violated 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2464
     (Reissue 2016); (3) failing to find that the Personal
    Representative violated 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2473
     (Reissue
    2016); and (4) failing to find that the Personal Representative
    committed inadequate disclosure, fraud, or misrepresentation in
    his administration of Orville’s estate. We note that although the
    Claimants allege that the county court erred by finding their
    claim was barred under § 30-2485, they concede in their brief
    that they have never asserted or claimed that their claim was
    pursued under that statute, so we need not address this assign-
    ment of error. Further, we note that the Claimants’ assignments
    of error as to the Personal Representative’s alleged violations
    of §§ 30-2464 and 30-2473 are not contained in their claim.
    Therefore, we will not separately address them. An appellate
    court does not consider an argument or legal theory raised for
    the first time on appeal. Junker v. Carlson, 
    300 Neb. 423
    , 
    915 N.W.2d 542
     (2018). However, to the extent that the require-
    ments of those statutes are relevant to our analysis, we will
    consider them.
    On cross-appeal, the Personal Representative alleges that
    the county court erred in denying his application and renewed
    application to pay fees and costs filed on December 21, 2016,
    and on July 14, 2017.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [2,3] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant
    of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. Sutton v. Killham, 
    285 Neb. 1
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 188
    (2013). In reviewing a lower court’s grant of summary judg-
    ment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    party against whom the judgment was granted, giving that
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    party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
    the evidence. Lauer v. Golden Living Center, 
    28 Neb. App. 729
    , 
    947 N.W.2d 883
     (2020).
    [4] Which statute of limitations applies is a question of law
    that an appellate court must decide independently of the con-
    clusion reached by the trial court. Andres v. McNeil Co., 
    270 Neb. 733
    , 
    707 N.W.2d 777
     (2005).
    [5,6] An appellate court reviews probate cases for error
    appearing on the record made in the county court. In re
    Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.F., 
    307 Neb. 452
    , 
    949 N.W.2d 496
     (2020). When reviewing a judgment for errors
    appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision
    conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
    is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 
    Id.
    ANALYSIS
    The Claimants’ assignments of error assert, for various
    reasons, that the county court erred in granting the Personal
    Representative’s motion for summary judgment. As we will
    discuss below, the county court did not err in determining that
    their claim was barred under § 30-24,119. We also find no
    error in the county court’s conclusion that the Claimants failed
    to produce evidence of fraud or fraudulent concealment that
    would toll the time for filing a claim.
    Timeliness of Claim Under § 30-24,119
    [7-9] In their claim, the Claimants alleged that the Personal
    Representative breached his fiduciary duty. It has long been
    the law of this state that the personal representative of an
    estate is a fiduciary as it relates to the beneficiaries of the
    estate. Anderson v. Lamme, 
    174 Neb. 398
    , 
    118 N.W.2d 339
    (1962). As a fiduciary, the personal representative is required
    to make a full disclosure of all facts within his or her knowl-
    edge that are material for the beneficiaries to know so that they
    can protect their interest. 
    Id.
     The Nebraska Probate Code, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2201
     et seq. (Reissue 2016), explains that a
    personal representative is a fiduciary of the estate. As such, the
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    personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute
    the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any
    probated and effective will and the Nebraska Probate Code
    as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best
    interests of the estate. § 30-2464(a). If the personal represent­
    ative of an estate exercises his or her power improperly and
    damages the estate or causes a loss as a result of the breach
    of fiduciary duty, then the personal representative is liable to
    interested persons in the estate. § 30-2473.
    [10] A devisee or claimant may proceed against a personal
    representative for breach of fiduciary duty under § 30-24,119.
    See Mach v. Schmer, 
    4 Neb. App. 819
    , 
    550 N.W.2d 385
     (1996).
    However, if devisees or claimants proceed under § 30-24,119,
    they must proceed within the limitations set forth in the statute.
    Section 30-24,119 provides:
    Unless previously barred by adjudication and except as
    provided in the closing statement, the rights of successors
    and of creditors whose claims have not otherwise been
    barred against the personal representative for breach of
    fiduciary duty are barred unless a proceeding to assert the
    same is commenced within six months after the filing of
    the closing statement. The rights barred by reason of the
    filing of the closing statement do not include rights to
    recover from a personal representative for fraud, misrep-
    resentation, or inadequate disclosure related to the settle-
    ment of the decedent’s estate.
    [11,12] Under the plain language of this statute, the claim-
    ant must bring the action for breach of fiduciary duty within
    6 months of the closing statement’s being filed. See Mach v.
    Schmer, 
    supra.
     The statutory time bar found within § 30-24,119
    does not apply if the plaintiff is seeking to recover from a
    personal representative for fraud, misrepresentation, or inad-
    equate disclosure related to the settlement of the decedent’s
    estate. Id.
    The county court determined that the Claimants’ claim
    was time barred pursuant to § 30-24,119 because the claim
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    was filed more than 6 months after the closing statement was
    filed and because there was no evidence of fraud, misrepre-
    sentation, or inadequate disclosure that would toll the time
    for filing a claim under the statute. The county court also
    found that the Claimants’ claim was barred because it had
    been adjudicated at the hearing on February 13, 2014, when
    the estate was closed. Although the Personal Representative
    focuses much of his brief on appeal on whether the claim was
    previously adjudicated, we focus instead on the time limita-
    tion with respect to the closing statement. In so doing, we
    recognize that § 30-24,119 could be read in a manner similar
    to our finding as to § 30-24,120. As such, although there are
    some differences between the language of the two statutes,
    we could consider whether the prior adjudication bars the
    Claimants’ claim. However, it is not necessary to make that
    determination here, since in this case, it is clear that the claim
    of the Claimants herein was not filed within the time limits
    prescribed by § 30-24,119.
    [13,14] First, we must determine whether a closing state-
    ment was filed. The Nebraska Probate Code does not specifi-
    cally define the term “closing statement.” In interpreting the
    various sections of the Nebraska Probate Code, this court may
    examine the comments to the Uniform Probate Code. In re
    Estate of Fuchs, 
    297 Neb. 667
    , 
    900 N.W.2d 896
     (2017). Under
    a specific section of the Uniform Probate Code, which is the
    basis for 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-24
    ,117 (Reissue 2016), the com-
    ment states that a closing statement is an affirmation by the
    personal representative that he or she believes the affairs of
    the estate to be completed. See Unif. Probate Code § 3-1003,
    8 (part II) U.L.A. 470 (2013). In addition, the requirements
    for a closing statement are listed in § 30-24,117 as part of the
    Nebraska Probate Code. Section 30-24,117 provides that a
    personal representative may close an estate by a verified state-
    ment as long as the personal representative is not prohibited by
    order of the court and the estate is not being administered in a
    supervised administration proceeding. This verified statement
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    must be filed more than 5 months after the date of the original
    appointment of the personal representative. 
    Id.
     The statement
    must state that the personal representative
    (1) published notice to creditors as provided by section
    30-2483 and that the first publication occurred more than
    four months prior to the date of the statement;
    (2) fully administered the estate of the decedent by
    making payment, settlement or other disposition of all
    claims which were presented, expenses of administration
    and estate, inheritance and other death taxes, except as
    specified in the statement, and that the assets of the estate
    have been distributed to the persons entitled. . . .
    (3) sent a copy thereof to all distributees of the estate
    and to all creditors or other claimants of whom he is
    aware whose claims are neither paid nor barred and has
    furnished a full account in writing of his administration to
    the distributees whose interests are affected thereby.
    § 30-24,117(a).
    The Personal Representative concedes that he did not file a
    document with the title “closing statement.” Nevertheless, it is
    clear from the record and the documents filed by the Personal
    Representative that he filed other, similar documents in which
    he affirmed that the affairs of the estate were completed.
    The Personal Representative filed a final report that was file
    stamped by the county court on January 10, 2014. In this final
    report, the Personal Representative attested that he, as personal
    representative, had received all income, payments, and receipts
    in Orville’s estate and had paid all costs, expenses, and dis-
    bursements. The Personal Representative stated that he had
    received payment with regard to a promissory note executed
    by a debtor and noted that the promissory note was secured
    by property. Attached to the final report was an accounting.
    The Personal Representative also filed a “Formal Petition
    for Complete Settlement After Informal Testate Proceeding”
    that was file stamped by the county court on January 10.
    The Formal Petition stated that the notice to creditors was
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    published in compliance with 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2483
    (Reissue 2016). On January 10, a hearing was scheduled by
    the court to be held on February 13. An affidavit of publication
    was submitted stating that notice was published in the Sidney
    Sun Telegraph for 3 consecutive weeks beginning on January
    15. An affidavit of mailing notice of complete settlement was
    filed on January 17, stating that a copy of the notice for the
    hearing on the Formal Petition, schedule of distribution, and
    final report was sent to the Claimants at the addresses pro-
    vided within the affidavit. On February 13, the court entered
    the Formal Order. In short, these documents established that
    the Personal Representative published and provided notice,
    fully administered the estate, and sent a copy to all distrib­
    utees of the estate and furnished a full account in writing of
    the administration. In addition, these documents demonstrate
    an affirmation by the Personal Representative that the affairs
    of the estate were completed. Thus, the documents filed by the
    Personal Representative are consistent with a closing statement
    as described by the statutory requirements.
    The Claimants allege that they never received the Formal
    Petition, the schedule of distribution, and the final report. The
    Claimants further allege that despite the date stamp on these
    documents, they were not actually placed within the court file
    at the time they were delivered to the court. While the docu-
    ments were file stamped as having been received on January
    10, 2014, it was found that the documents were not physically
    placed in the court file. We note, however, that at the hearing
    where this problem was discovered, the clerk indicated the
    documents did appear via computer. In any event, it is clear
    that on January 10, 2014, the court set hearing for February 13
    regarding the Formal Petition that it had received.
    [15] We recall that the controlling statutory language in
    § 30-24,119 requires the closing statement to be filed for
    the time barring of a claim against a personal representa-
    tive to begin. Statutory language is to be given its plain and
    ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to
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    interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words
    which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Dean v. State, 
    288 Neb. 530
    , 
    849 N.W.2d 138
     (2014). Thus, we are tasked with
    determining when the documents were filed. The word “file”
    is defined as “[t]o deliver a legal document to the court clerk
    or record custodian for placement into the official record.”
    Black’s Law Dictionary 745 (10th ed. 2014). This is consistent
    with our previous interpretation where the endorsement of the
    clerk with a file stamp or an endorsement of a typed date by
    the clerk’s signature determines the date of filing. See State v.
    Muse, 
    15 Neb. App. 13
    , 
    721 N.W.2d 661
     (2006) (explaining
    that endorsement date of clerk either by file stamp or by typed
    endorsement is what is controlling for purposes of speedy
    trial statute). In the present case, the Personal Representative
    delivered the papers to the court clerk for placement into the
    official record. The clerk date stamped these documents on
    January 10, 2014. After receiving these documents, the court
    scheduled a hearing on February 13. Thus, the closing state-
    ment was filed with the court on January 10. Because the clos-
    ing statement was filed in January 2014, the Claimants had 6
    months from that filing date, or until July 10, to file a claim
    against the Personal Representative for breach of his fiduciary
    duty. They failed to do so, as they did not file such a claim
    until May 2017. Therefore, the action was time barred under
    the terms of § 30-24,119 unless a material issue of fact exists
    as to fraud, misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure on the
    part of the Personal Representative.
    Inadequate Disclosure, Fraud,
    or Misrepresentation
    To avoid the time bar of § 30-24,119, the Claimants also
    assign and argue that the Personal Representative committed
    inadequate disclosure, fraud, or misrepresentation. The county
    court found “no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or inad-
    equate disclosure that would toll the time for filing a claim
    under this statute.” We find no error in this determination.
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    [16] Before addressing the merits of the arguments, we
    note the parties’ disagreement as to what statute of limitations
    should apply to the Claimants’ allegation. The Claimants argue
    that the general 4-year statute of limitations for actions not
    otherwise specified found in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-212
     (Reissue
    2016) should apply. The Personal Representative argues that
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2206
     (Reissue 2016) should apply. Section
    30-2206 requires that an action in a probate case based on
    fraud must be commenced within 2 years following the dis-
    covery of the fraud. The county court did not consider this
    issue. The county court simply found that no evidence of fraud,
    misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure existed that would
    toll the 6-month limitation provided for by § 30-24,119. We
    agree with the court’s conclusion. We find that none of the acts
    alleged by the Claimants constitute fraud, misrepresentation, or
    inadequate disclosure. Therefore, there is no basis for tolling
    the 6-month period of limitation found in § 30-24,119. If there
    is no basis for tolling, none of the argued statutes of limitation
    are applicable. The only applicable period is that provided for
    in § 30-24,119.
    The Claimants assert that the Personal Representative pro-
    vided inadequate disclosure with respect to the following: fail-
    ing to provide notice for the complete settlement of the estate,
    a schedule of distribution, an accounting, and a final report
    or information. The Claimants also assert that the Personal
    Representative made misrepresentations in that the Personal
    Representative had a duty to reveal all known material facts in
    the schedule of distribution and failed to do so. They further
    argue that the Personal Representative had a duty to speak to
    them about the administration of the estate and that his silence
    would amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation. Finally, they
    allege that the misfiling of the Formal Petition for complete
    settlement and associated documents supports their claim. We
    address these allegations in turn.
    [17] A personal representative may file a petition for an
    order of complete settlement. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-24
    ,115
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    (Reissue 2016). The petition may request the court to deter-
    mine testacy, consider the final account, approve an account-
    ing and distribution, construe any will or determine heirs,
    and adjudicate final settlement and distribution of the estate.
    § 30-24,115(a). After notice and hearing, the court may enter
    an order determining the persons entitled to distribution of
    the estate, approve settlements, approve distributions, and
    discharge the personal representative from further claim or
    demand of any interested person. Id. If a personal representa-
    tive files a petition for an order of complete settlement, he or
    she is required to give all interested persons notice, consistent
    with 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2220
     (Reissue 2016), the general
    notice provision of the probate code. See In re Estate of
    Wilson, 
    8 Neb. App. 467
    , 
    594 N.W.2d 695
     (1999) (explaining
    that general notice provision of probate code applies if notice
    of hearing on petition is required). The general notice provision
    requires the petitioner to mail a copy of the petition at least 14
    days before the time set for the hearing by certified, registered,
    or ordinary first-class mail and publish at least once a week for
    3 consecutive weeks a copy in a legal newspaper in the county
    where the hearing is to be held. § 30-2220(a).
    In the present case, there is no dispute as to whether the
    Personal Representative published the notice with a newspaper
    of general circulation. A copy of the notice was attached to the
    affidavit of mailing notice of complete settlement executed by
    the attorney for the Personal Representative and was filed on
    January 17, 2014. The affidavit also notes the first date of pub-
    lication. An affidavit of publication completed by the clerk of
    the Sidney Sun Telegraph was received in evidence establish-
    ing that the notice of hearing was published for 3 consecutive
    weeks, at least once per week, in Cheyenne County.
    There is a dispute as to whether all of the Claimants received
    the documents included in the affidavit of mailing notice. We
    note that on the face of the affidavit, counsel for the Personal
    Representative recites that he provided a copy of the notice
    of hearing by U.S. mail together with copies of the Formal
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    Petition for complete settlement after the informal testate pro-
    ceeding, schedule of distribution, and final report to the three
    Claimants at their last known addresses. An additional affidavit
    executed by counsel for the Personal Representative recites
    that none of the copies of the notice sent to the Claimants had
    been returned to his office.
    The Personal Representative urges us to follow the presump-
    tion found in Waite Lumber Co., Inc. v. Carpenter, 
    205 Neb. 860
    , 
    290 N.W.2d 655
     (1980). This presumption provides that
    a letter addressed, stamped, and mailed raises a presumption
    that the letter reached the addressee in the usual course of the
    mail. 
    Id.
     This presumption may be rebutted by any relevant
    evidence; however, positive testimony by the addressee that a
    letter was not received simply raises a question of fact to be
    decided by the trier of fact. 
    Id.
    Marvin submitted an affidavit and a transcript of testimony
    from a prior proceeding involving Berniece’s estate that he did
    not receive the notice of the hearing on the Formal Petition.
    He also stated that he did not receive the documents that were
    listed in the affidavit of mailing notice. However, Marvin did
    admit that his address listed on the affidavit of mailing was
    correct. There was no evidence presented by the Claimants
    that indicates that Krueger or Vegas failed to receive the notice
    of hearing or the other documents sent by counsel for the
    Personal Representative. The Claimants throughout these pro-
    ceedings at trial and on appeal have claimed only that Marvin
    failed to receive notice and that somehow, by virtue of this
    failure, Krueger and Vegas have maintained an ability to join
    his claim.
    The material issue, however, is not solely whether all three
    Claimants received the notice and accompanying documents.
    Section 30-2220 requires that the notice be mailed to the inter-
    ested parties and published. The record in this case is clear
    that both of these things happened and that the addresses they
    were mailed to were correct. The fact that there is no claim
    by Krueger or Vegas that the notice and attached documents
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    were not received corroborates Matoon’s affidavits. So while
    there may be some issue as to whether Marvin received the
    notice, his receipt of the notice is not a material issue of fact.
    Not all issues of fact preclude summary judgment, but only
    those that are material. In the summary judgment context, a
    fact is material only if it would affect the outcome of the case.
    Professional Mgmt. Midwest v. Lund Co., 
    284 Neb. 777
    , 
    826 N.W.2d 225
     (2012).
    The Personal Representative, through counsel, fulfilled his
    statutory duty as to the provision of proper notice. Had Marvin
    filed a claim in his name only, a better argument could be made
    that a material issue of fact exists. However, the claim filed
    was filed collectively by Marvin, Krueger, and Vegas, “herein
    called ‘heirs’ or ‘devisees,’” i.e., the Claimants. In their joint
    claim, they allege that none of them received notice. This
    assertion is not supported by any evidence. No affidavit was
    produced from any source stating that Krueger and Vegas did
    not receive notice. Moreover, there is no evidence to rebut the
    affidavits demonstrating that proper publication of the hearing
    was accomplished in the Sidney newspaper. Therefore, we can
    find no issue of material fact with regard to inadequate disclo-
    sure to the Claimants. This claim fails.
    Next, the Claimants assert that the Personal Representative
    misrepresented the distribution to Berniece in the documents
    filed. According to the schedule of distribution, Berniece was
    awarded a loan to the Andersons in the amount of $25,000. No
    other distribution was listed. In the petition for settlement, the
    Personal Representative notes that Berniece has received by
    virtue of joint tenancy ownership and transfer of and assign-
    ment of the Andersons’ promissory note at least $1 million as
    directed by Orville’s will. The Claimants seem to argue that
    because the assets received by Berniece by virtue of joint ten-
    ancy or transfer or payable on death provisions were not listed
    in the schedule of distribution, final accounting, or Formal
    Petition, misrepresentation occurred. We disagree. The purpose
    of the schedule of distribution and associated documents is
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    to present to the court what distributable assets existed in the
    estate and how they were distributed. It was not necessary to
    list real or personal property that passed to other individuals
    outside of the estate. Here, there is a reference to nonprobate
    property received by Berniece to the extent it was necessary
    to show that Orville’s wishes were honored with respect to
    Berniece’s receiving at least $1 million of value. However, it
    was not necessary for the Personal Representative to make an
    itemized list.
    We note that the original and amended inventories filed in
    2010 fully listed the real and personal property held in joint
    tenancy with Berniece and those items that were payable on
    death to Berniece. The value attributed to those items was
    initially nearly $1.8 million. It is clear from the correspond­
    ence between Krueger, Vegas, and counsel for the Personal
    Representative that at least those two individuals were well
    aware of how much value could go to Berniece and that it was
    the attorney’s position that she was entitled to receive property
    which was valued at more than $1 million. All of the Claimants
    subsequently became aware that Berniece was forfeiting her
    interest (based on joint tenancy) in the Sunol Property, which
    carried a value of nearly $600,000. In exchange, she asked for
    the Andersons’ promissory note valued at $25,000. Based on
    the totality of the foregoing knowledge held by the Claimants,
    we cannot find that any fraud, misrepresentation, or inad-
    equate disclosure was made in the filings of the Personal
    Representative leading to the final hearing.
    For similar reasons, we find no merit to the Claimants’
    argument that the Personal Representative failed to talk
    with them about the administration of the estate and that
    his silence amounts to fraudulent misrepresentation. No facts
    were adduced supporting this position. Conversely, the record
    reveals exchanges of correspondence relative to the value of
    property received by Berniece. This argument fails.
    Finally, the Claimants argue that fraud or inadequate dis-
    closure is apparent based on the misfiling or lack of filing of
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    the Formal Petition for complete settlement and associated
    documents that were filed on January 10, 2014. While our
    record is not totally clear, it appears that these documents were
    not placed into the correct physical file, but were properly file
    stamped and did appear electronically. While any confusion the
    misfiling caused is unfortunate, there is no evidence to suggest
    that the misfiling was a result of actions taken by the Personal
    Representative. As a result, there can be no fraud, misrepresen-
    tation, or inadequate disclosure attributed to him. Moreover,
    as noted above, the evidence shows that at minimum, two
    of the three Claimants received these documents in the mail.
    Therefore, this argument fails as well.
    Because all of the Claimants’ arguments fail, we cannot
    find that the county court erred in granting the Personal
    Representative’s motion for summary judgment. There was no
    fraud, misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure that would
    toll the time bar found within § 30-24,119.
    Summary Judgment
    [18] Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and
    evidence admitted at the hearing disclose that there is no gen-
    uine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate infer-
    ences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bayliss v.
    Clason, 
    26 Neb. App. 195
    , 
    918 N.W.2d 612
     (2018). A party
    moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that
    no genuine issue of material fact exists and must produce suf-
    ficient evidence to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law. 
    Id.
     When the parties’ evidence would sup-
    port reasonable, contrary inferences on the issue for which a
    movant seeks summary judgment, it is an inappropriate rem-
    edy. 
    Id.
     Where reasonable minds could draw different conclu-
    sions from the facts presented, a triable issue of material fact
    arises. 
    Id.
    Viewing and construing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Claimants and giving them the benefit of
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    all reasonable deductions from the evidence, we conclude
    that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning
    the closing statement being filed on January 10, 2014, and
    that the Claimants’ claim was filed more than 6 months after
    this filing. As discussed above, we conclude that there is no
    genuine issue of material fact in determining that there was
    no fraud, misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure perpe-
    trated by the Personal Representative. As such, the court did
    not err in granting the Personal Representative’s motion for
    summary judgment and finding that the claim was time barred
    under § 30-24,119.
    Cross-Appeal
    The Personal Representative has filed a cross-appeal alleg-
    ing that the county court erred by denying him attorney fees
    and costs in an order dated May 16, 2017. The Personal
    Representative also alleges that the county court erred in deny-
    ing his renewed application to pay fees and costs by virtue of
    an order dated July 26, 2017.
    [19,20] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
    it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it. In re Guardianship &
    Conservatorship of Forster, 
    22 Neb. App. 478
    , 
    856 N.W.2d 134
     (2014). An appellate court has jurisdiction over final
    orders that are appealed within 30 days from their entry. 
    Id.
    See, also, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912
     (Cum. Supp. 2020). The
    Personal Representative filed his cross-appeal on September
    28, 2020. Because the fee orders challenged in this appeal
    were issued more than 30 days prior to this appeal, we must
    determine whether they were final orders at the time they
    were entered. If so, we do not have jurisdiction to consider
    them now.
    [21,22] Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Cum. Supp.
    2020), an appellate court may review an order that affects a
    substantial right made during a special proceeding. A special
    proceeding entails civil statutory remedies not encompassed
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    in chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. In re Estate of
    Muncillo, 
    280 Neb. 669
    , 
    789 N.W.2d 37
     (2010). Proceedings
    under the Nebraska Probate Code are special proceedings
    under § 25-1902. In re Estate of Rose, 
    273 Neb. 490
    , 
    730 N.W.2d 391
     (2007). See, also, In re Estate of Muncillo, supra
    (stating that Nebraska law is clear that proceedings under
    Nebraska Probate Code are special proceedings). The requests
    for fees and the orders denying fees in this case were made
    pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2481
     (Reissue 2016), which is
    contained within the Nebraska Probate Code. Section 30-2481
    provides that a personal representative is entitled to receive
    reasonable attorney fees incurred in either defending or pros-
    ecuting a proceeding in good faith. The proceedings herein
    occurred under the Nebraska Probate Code and therefore con-
    stitute special proceedings.
    [23-26] Having determined that the fee orders were made
    in a special proceeding, we next must consider whether they
    affected a substantial right. A substantial right is an essential
    legal right, not a mere technical right. See In re Estate of
    Muncillo, supra. Substantial rights under § 25-1902 include
    those legal rights that a party is entitled to enforce or defend.
    In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Forster, supra. If a
    substantial right is affected, an order is directly appealable as
    a final order even though it does not terminate the action or
    constitute a final disposition of the case. Id. Fee orders in a
    probate case are made in a special proceeding; an order award-
    ing a personal representative fees affects a substantial right
    when it finally determines the personal representative’s claim
    for reasonable compensation under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2480
    (Reissue 2016). See In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of
    Forster, supra.
    We have previously determined that the fees for a tempo-
    rary guardian that are still ongoing are not appealable until
    the court enters its final order terminating the guardianship
    and conservatorship and discharging the guardian and con-
    servator from his or her duties. See id. In In re Guardianship
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    & Conservatorship of Forster, we determined that the orders
    awarding fees to the guardian and conservator did not finally
    determine the guardian and conservator’s claim for reasonable
    compensation. We relied on the reasoning of the Nebraska
    Supreme Court in In re Estate of Gsantner, 
    288 Neb. 222
    ,
    
    846 N.W.2d 646
     (2014). In In re Estate of Gsantner, the
    court determined that the fees to a personal representative
    were a final order because the order finally determined the
    personal representative’s claim for reasonable compensation.
    In that case, the personal representative was awarded a total
    of $25,000 while the estate had been partially distributed and
    the personal representative continued to serve as personal rep-
    resentative. The trial court did not state that the award was a
    partial fee; nor did it include any language that would indicate
    that the award was subject to later revision or augmentation.
    
    Id.
     The court noted that the personal representative’s award
    was made after a special evidentiary hearing was held on the
    issue of fees. 
    Id.
    With this reasoning in mind, we turn to the present case.
    The Formal Order for complete settlement was entered by the
    court in February 2014. The Personal Representative filed an
    application to pay fees and costs for work done relative to
    the Claimants’ claim in Berniece’s estate between October 31,
    2016, and the filing of the motion on December 21. The county
    court denied this request on May 16, 2017. Specifically, the
    county court found that the application to pay fees and costs
    was filed in the wrong estate and denied the application to pay
    fees and costs. There was no language in the order to indicate
    that the award was subject to a later revision.
    On July 14, 2017, the Personal Representative filed a
    renewed application to pay fees and costs for work done
    through June 30, defending his actions in both Orville’s estate
    and Berniece’s estate. The request in this motion included
    those fees which had been previously requested and denied on
    May 16 and those fees for additional work done through June
    30. The Personal Representative also filed a motion for leave
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    to file additional evidence on the issue of attorney fees and
    costs. The court held a hearing on July 21 regarding the motion
    for leave to file additional evidence on the issue of attorney
    fees and costs. This motion was denied on July 26. At the close
    of the hearing, the court reiterated that Orville’s estate had
    been closed at the request of the Personal Representative. The
    order gave no indication that it was subject to later revision. It
    appears to be fully dispositive of the Personal Representative’s
    motion at the time. Based on the reasoning in prior cases, we
    believe that both orders entered by the county court were fully
    dispositive of the Personal Representative’s requests for attor-
    ney fees. Therefore, each order constituted a final order. As
    such, any appeal had to occur within 30 days after each of the
    orders. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to hear the
    cross-appeal and it must be dismissed.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
    county court in granting the Personal Representative’s motion
    for summary judgment. We also dismiss the cross-appeal filed
    by the Personal Representative for lack of jurisdiction.
    Affirmed in part, and in part dismissed.