Buderus v. Buderus , 30 Neb. Ct. App. 589 ( 2022 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    02/08/2022 08:06 AM CST
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    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    30 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    BUDERUS v. BUDERUS
    Cite as 
    30 Neb. App. 589
    Becky Teresa Buderus, appellee, v.
    Patrick Scott Buderus, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 8, 2022.   No. A-21-260.
    1. Modification of Decree: Child Support: Appeal and Error.
    Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter entrusted to the discre-
    tion of the trial court, whose order is reviewed de novo on the record,
    and which will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion by the trial
    court. The same standard applies to the modification of child support.
    2. Modification of Decree: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. In an
    action for modification of a marital dissolution decree, the award of
    attorney fees is discretionary with the trial court, is reviewed de novo on
    the record, and will be affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
    3. Modification of Decree: Child Support: Proof. A party seeking to
    modify a child support order must show a material change of circum-
    stances which (1) occurred subsequent to the entry of the original decree
    or previous modification and (2) was not contemplated when the decree
    was entered.
    4. Modification of Decree: Child Support. A decree awarding child
    support will not be modified because of a change of circumstances
    which was in the contemplation of the parties at the time the original
    or preceding order was made, but only those anticipated changes which
    were specifically noted on the record at the time the previous order was
    entered will prevent modification.
    5. ____: ____. Among the factors to be considered in determining whether
    a material change of circumstances has occurred are changes in the
    financial position of the parent obligated to pay support, the needs of
    the children for whom support is paid, good or bad faith motive of the
    obligated parent in sustaining a reduction in income, and whether the
    change is temporary or permanent.
    6. Modification of Decree: Child Support: Res Judicata. In the absence
    of proof of new facts and circumstances arising since the time of the
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    BUDERUS v. BUDERUS
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    original decree, an allowance of child support therein will be deemed
    res judicata.
    7.    Attorney Fees. Attorney fees and expenses may be recovered only
    where provided for by statute or when a recognized and accepted uni-
    form course of procedure has been to allow recovery of attorney fees.
    8.    ____. Customarily, attorney fees are awarded only to prevailing parties
    or assessed against those who file frivolous suits.
    9.    Divorce: Attorney Fees. A uniform course of procedure exists in
    Nebraska for the award of attorney fees in dissolution cases.
    10.    Judgments: Attorney Fees. Silence of a judgment on the issue of attor-
    ney fees must be construed as a denial of the request.
    Appeal from the District Court for Dixon County: Bryan
    C. Meismer, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
    Logan J. Hoyt and Thomas B. Donner, of Donner Law
    Offices, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
    Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Welch, Judges.
    Pirtle, Chief Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Patrick Scott Buderus appeals from an order of the district
    court for Dixon County, Nebraska, increasing his child support
    obligation from $300 per month to $591 per month and modi-
    fying the procedure by which the parties settle disputes related
    to daycare expenses. For the reasons that follow, we conclude
    the district court abused its discretion in modifying an existing
    child support order absent proof of a material change in cir-
    cumstances. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order
    and remand the cause with instructions to dismiss the com-
    plaint for modification.
    BACKGROUND
    Patrick and Becky Teresa Buderus were married in April
    2009 in Wayne County, Nebraska. Patrick and Becky had one
    child together, who was born in 2012. Thereafter, in October
    2012, Becky filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage.
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    Patrick and Becky then negotiated and agreed to a “Stipulation
    and Property Settlement Agreement” addressing all pertinent
    issues related to the dissolution of marriage, as well as cus-
    tody and child support for the minor child. The district court
    approved the agreement and incorporated it into a final decree
    of dissolution entered in February 2014. Except to the extent
    that it was modified by the court’s final order on modifica-
    tion of child support, there is no dispute that the 2014 decree
    remained “in full force and effect” throughout the life of
    this case.
    The 2014 decree awarded the parties joint legal custody
    of the minor child and awarded primary physical custody to
    Becky, subject to Patrick’s reasonable parenting time as set
    forth in a separate parenting plan. Importantly for purposes
    of this appeal, the decree settled a factual dispute as to the
    proper computation of Patrick’s income for purposes of cal-
    culating child support. Attached to the decree was exhibit A,
    which calculated Patrick’s income using his average monthly
    income over a 3-year period from 2010 to 2012. Specifically,
    Patrick’s income was computed by combining his net farm
    profit reported on his schedule F tax form with an “add[-]back
    of depreciation,” resulting in a total 3-year income of $57,274
    and an average monthly income of $1,590.94. Applying
    this amount to worksheet 1 of the Nebraska Child Support
    Guidelines yielded a monthly obligation of $312 for Patrick,
    and application of Neb. Ct. R. § 4-218 (rev. 2013) adjusted that
    monthly obligation to $288.
    With these calculations in mind, the parties stipulated that
    Patrick be ordered to pay child support in the amount of $250
    per month from March 2014 to August 2015 and $300 per
    month thereafter. The agreement provided that these amounts
    were “based upon the income of the parties as [s]et forth on
    the ‘Summary of 2010, 2011 and 2012 Tax Returns’ attached to
    said Exhibit ‘A’.” The parties further stipulated that “good cause
    exists to deviate from the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines
    to provide child support in the amount set forth herein.”
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    BUDERUS v. BUDERUS
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    In addition to child support, the agreement also stipulated
    that each party pay an equal share of “work related day care
    expenses.” The agreement included a detailed procedure which
    was to be followed “[i]n the event the parties are unable to
    agree on the amount and/or terms for payment of such work
    related day care expenses.” First, “within 90 days of the date
    of incurring work related day care expenses, the party who
    incurred such day care expenses shall file a statement with the
    Clerk of the District Court showing all work related day care
    expenses paid together with supporting documentation.” The
    same party “shall concurrently deliver a copy thereof by United
    States first class mail postage prepaid to the other party.” Then,
    “[w]ithin 30 days of such filing, the other party shall pay . . .
    or, shall file with the Clerk of the District Court an objection
    to such work related day care expenses and shall” serve a copy
    of such objection to the other party in the same manner as
    above. If the party who incurred daycare expenses fails to file
    a claim within 90 days, “it shall be conclusively presumed that
    no such work related day care expenses were incurred prior to
    such time period.”
    In October 2019, the State filed a motion to intervene “for
    the purpose of allowing the State [to] enforce the child support
    order in this matter.” The court granted the State’s motion, and
    the State filed a complaint for modification of child support.
    The complaint alleged that modification was justified on the
    grounds that Patrick’s child support obligation varied “by more
    than the percentage amount or other criteria established by
    Supreme Court rule.” The State ultimately requested the 2014
    decree “be modified so as to increase [Patrick’s] child support
    obligation.”
    In August 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss its own
    complaint on the grounds that Patrick “has provided addi-
    tional financial information which, if accepted without objec-
    tion and/or found to be true, would not support modification
    of [Patrick’s] child support order.” On the same day, Becky
    filed an objection to the State’s motion, requesting that the
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    court allow her to prosecute the State’s complaint as opposed
    to filing a new complaint for modification in her own behalf.
    The court sustained Becky’s objection and allowed her to move
    forward on the State’s complaint for modification.
    Thereafter, Patrick filed an answer and counterclaim to the
    complaint, requesting that the complaint be dismissed and
    seeking a downward modification of child support. However,
    in his brief on appeal, Patrick admits that he “did not argue for
    or produce evidence supporting a downward modification at
    trial.” Brief for appellant at 8. Patrick also requested that he be
    awarded attorney fees from the date the court allowed Becky
    to prosecute the action, arguing further litigation was unneces-
    sary at that point because this case could be resolved through a
    “simple application of the child support guideline rules.”
    A trial on the complaint for modification of child support
    was held in February 2021, wherein Patrick and Becky were
    the only witnesses to testify. The central dispute was the proper
    computation of Patrick’s income for purposes of calculating
    child support. The parties generally agreed, and the evidence
    confirmed, that Patrick received approximately $3,000 per
    month in “custom hire” income from Plum Creek Dairy, along
    with variable amounts of income arising out of Patrick’s farm-
    ing operation raising and selling livestock.
    Patrick’s counsel argued that if Patrick’s monthly income is
    computed in the same manner as in the 2014 decree, then his
    income is substantially the same as it was in 2014. In support
    of this contention, Patrick submitted exhibit 117, which is a
    summary of Patrick’s tax returns from 2017 to 2019. Therein,
    like in the 2014 decree, Patrick’s income was computed by
    combining his net farm profit reported on schedule F with an
    add-back of depreciation, resulting in a total 3-year income
    of $56,426 and an average monthly income of $1,599.17.
    Application of this amount to worksheet 1 of the child sup-
    port guidelines yielded a monthly obligation of $325 for
    Patrick, and application of § 4-218 of the child support guide-
    lines adjusted that monthly obligation to $318. This is $18
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    higher than Patrick’s stipulated obligation and $30 higher than
    Patrick’s adjusted obligation as it was calculated in 2014.
    Becky’s counsel, on the other hand, argued, “[I]t’s quite
    apparent that [Patrick’s] income went up substantially from
    2014 . . . . His uncontroverted testimony today is he gets
    two payments of $1,500 per month. That is double what
    he was making then.” Accordingly, in her proposed child
    support calculation, Becky listed Patrick’s monthly income
    as $3,000, resulting in the requested monthly obligation of
    $508. However, Becky testified that in 2014, Patrick received
    roughly “[t]he same amount as he’s claiming now” in compen-
    sation from Plum Creek Dairy. Indeed, Patrick’s tax returns
    from 2015 to 2019 indicate that he was at all times receiving
    approximately $3,000 per month, which he reported as custom
    hire income on schedule F. Thus, there is apparently no dis-
    pute as to Patrick’s gross monthly income in connection with
    his duties at Plum Creek Dairy. Rather, the dispute pertains to
    the propriety of computing Patrick’s monthly income using his
    net farm profit as reported on schedule F, which accounts for
    Patrick’s additional income from livestock sales and deducts
    Patrick’s reported farm expenses.
    Patrick testified that at the time of trial, he raised around 50
    head of beef cattle on the 7 acres where he lived and owned 25
    to 30 dairy cows and “then about that many calves” at Plum
    Creek Dairy. Patrick admitted that his livestock operation had
    expanded since 2014, at which time he raised only three beef
    cows on the 7 acres and owned only nine dairy cows. Patrick
    clarified that although he owned a number of dairy cows, the
    livestock he owned generated income only when they were
    sold, and that he did not generate income from milk produc-
    tion at Plum Creek Dairy. Patrick further testified that his
    schedule F income would include any proceeds from livestock
    sales in a given year. Indeed, Patrick’s tax returns indicate
    he earned between $3,000 and $12,500 per year from sales
    of livestock.
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    Becky expressed skepticism as to the propriety of Patrick’s
    reporting his income on schedule F, accusing Patrick of doing
    so to avoid paying taxes and child support. Becky repeatedly
    characterized Patrick’s farming operation as a “hobby farm,”
    emphasizing her belief that Patrick “claims to be a ‘farmer’
    so that this Court will allow him to deduct depreciation from
    his hobby farm.” However, Patrick testified that his tax returns
    were correct to the best of his knowledge and were at all times
    prepared by his professional accountant. Moreover, Patrick
    testified that his income had been reported in the same manner
    since prior to the 2014 decree.
    In addition to modifying child support, Becky requested
    a modification to the language in the 2014 decree regarding
    payment of daycare expenses. Specifically, Becky requested
    that the court “delete the provision that I have to mail receipts
    to [Patrick], file copies with the Clerk of the District Court
    and try to get [Patrick] to agree with the amount that he has
    to pay.” Becky testified that Patrick had made only a single
    $100 contribution to daycare expenses in the 7 years since the
    divorce. In September 2020, Becky filed an affidavit in support
    of the present modification, in which she attested to the day-
    care expenses she incurred and attached receipts to that effect.
    However, there is no indication that Becky ever attempted to
    utilize the procedure set forth in the 2014 decree prior to the
    modification proceedings in this case. Becky testified that at
    some point in the past, she “sent text messages with the receipt
    of daycare, and it really hasn’t changed”; however, Patrick
    testified that he received “[o]ne text” in the 7 years since
    the divorce.
    In March 2021, the court entered an “Order on Modification
    of Child Support” noting that Patrick “alleges that a recalcu-
    lation of child support is improper because his income has
    not changed since the 2014 Order.” The court added, “[I]t is
    not lost on this Court that the income dispute of the parties
    in 2021 is basically the same as the income dispute in 2015
    [sic] (computation of [Patrick’s] income), and that in 2015
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    [sic] the parties negotiated and agreed to the current obliga-
    tion.” (Emphasis in original.) Rather than identifying a mate-
    rial change in circumstances justifying modification, the court
    reasoned as follows:
    The Court feels that it has the equitable power and duty
    to come to a decision that is fair to all involved including
    the minor child of the parties. For that reason, the Court
    finds that a recalculation of child support is warranted in
    this case and [that] the application for a modification of
    child support shall be granted.
    The court acknowledged that Patrick’s 2018 and 2019 tax
    returns “outline income from Livestock . . . as well as income
    (approximately $36,000.00 each year) from ‘custom hire.’”
    Ultimately, the court concluded that “equity will be best served
    by calculating [Patrick’s] income by deducting standard taxes
    from his ‘custom hire’ income, instead of just looking at Line 7
    (Adjusted Gross Income) of his tax returns.”
    Having decided to abandon the method of computing
    Patrick’s monthly income which was negotiated and agreed
    to in 2014, the court turned to recalculating child support.
    However, the court did not rely on exhibit 104, which was the
    child support worksheet Becky offered at trial listing Patrick’s
    monthly income of $3,000. Rather, the court resorted to a prior
    child support worksheet attached to exhibit 100, which identi-
    fied a monthly income of $2,835 for both Patrick and Becky.
    The court determined that this latter worksheet “closely approx-
    imates the Court-Determined income of the parties . . . and
    calculates a child support obligation of $591.00 for [Patrick],
    which shall be the new amount Ordered by the Court.”
    With regard to Becky’s request to modify “the childcare
    language,” the court ordered that Patrick and Becky “divide the
    work or school related daycare and transport expenses equally.”
    The court then established a simplified procedure under which
    Becky “is Ordered to provide receipts for actual expenses at
    least every 90 days, and [Patrick] is Ordered to remit pay-
    ment for his one-half share within 30 days of receiving the
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    receipts.” The court added that “[a]ny provision of the prior
    Court’s Order not specifically altered by this Order shall
    remain in full force and effect.” Patrick now appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Patrick assigns that the district court erred in (1) modify-
    ing the decree of dissolution of marriage when there was no
    material change in circumstances and (2) failing to rule upon
    Patrick’s request for attorney fees and failing to order attor-
    ney fees.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter entrusted
    to the discretion of the trial court, whose order is reviewed
    de novo on the record, and which will be affirmed absent an
    abuse of discretion by the trial court. Garza v. Garza, 
    288 Neb. 213
    , 
    846 N.W.2d 626
     (2014). The same standard applies to the
    modification of child support. 
    Id.
    [2] In an action for modification of a marital dissolution
    decree, the award of attorney fees is discretionary with the trial
    court, is reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed
    in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
    ANALYSIS
    [3-6] A party seeking to modify a child support order must
    show a material change of circumstances which (1) occurred
    subsequent to the entry of the original decree or previous
    modification and (2) was not contemplated when the decree
    was entered. Incontro v. Jacobs, 
    277 Neb. 275
    , 
    761 N.W.2d 551
     (2009). A decree awarding child support will not be modi-
    fied because of a change of circumstances which was in the
    contemplation of the parties at the time the original or preced-
    ing order was made, but only those anticipated changes which
    were specifically noted on the record at the time the previous
    order was entered will prevent modification. 
    Id.
     Among the
    factors to be considered in determining whether a material
    change of circumstances has occurred are changes in the
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    financial position of the parent obligated to pay support, the
    needs of the children for whom support is paid, good or bad
    faith motive of the obligated parent in sustaining a reduction
    in income, and whether the change is temporary or permanent.
    Rauch v. Rauch, 
    256 Neb. 257
    , 
    590 N.W.2d 170
     (1999). In the
    absence of proof of new facts and circumstances arising since
    the time of the original decree, an allowance of child support
    therein will be deemed res judicata. 
    Id.
    Upward Modification of Child Support.
    Under the 2014 decree, Patrick and Becky agreed to com-
    pute Patrick’s monthly income using the method set forth in
    exhibit A attached to the decree. This stipulated computation
    combined Patrick’s net farm profit reported on schedule F over
    a 3-year period, added back the amount of reported depre-
    ciation for each year, and then calculated an average monthly
    income from the total. Under this method of computation,
    Patrick’s average monthly income was $1,590.94 in 2014.
    Application of this amount to worksheet 1 from the child sup-
    port guidelines yielded a monthly child support obligation of
    $288 for Patrick. However, the parties stipulated that good
    cause existed to deviate from the child support guidelines,
    and they agreed to a compromised child support obligation of
    $250 per month for roughly the first year and $300 per month
    thereafter. Thus, at the time of trial on the complaint for modi-
    fication of child support, Patrick’s child support obligation was
    $300 per month.
    The complaint for modification of child support in this case
    alleged that modification was justified on the grounds that
    Patrick’s child support obligation varied “by more than the
    percentage amount or other criteria established by Supreme
    Court rule.” Under Neb. Ct. R. § 4-217, there is a rebuttable
    presumption of a material change in circumstances when an
    application of the child support guidelines would result “in
    a variation by 10 percent or more, but not less than $25,
    upward or downward, of the current child support obliga-
    tion.” Accordingly, in this case, there would be a rebuttable
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    presumption of a material change in circumstances if applica-
    tion of the child support guidelines would result in a variation
    of $30 or more in Patrick’s child support obligation.
    As shown in exhibit 117, using the method of computation
    set forth in the 2014 decree, Patrick’s average monthly income
    was $1,599.17 at the time of trial. Application of this amount
    to worksheet 1 from the child support guidelines yielded a
    monthly contribution of $318 for Patrick—only $18 more than
    his then-current child support obligation of $300 per month.
    Accordingly, the evidence does not demonstrate a material
    change in circumstances under § 4-217. Rather, the record
    makes clear that Patrick’s monthly income, when computed
    according to the stipulated method of computation set forth in
    the 2014 decree, remained more or less the same.
    However, the court decided to abandon the stipulated
    method of computing Patrick’s income, and instead, it applied a
    “Court-Determined” monthly income of $2,835, which yielded
    a monthly child support obligation of $591. Although it is not
    entirely clear how the court arrived at a monthly income of
    $2,835, the court ostensibly computed Patrick’s monthly income
    by “deducting standard taxes from his ‘custom hire’ income,
    instead of just looking at Line 7 (Adjusted Gross Income) of
    his tax returns.” We know that Patrick’s custom hire income
    was $36,000 in 2019. To arrive at $2,835 per month, the court
    apparently calculated “standard taxes” at a total of $165 per
    month, or $1,980 per year. Not only is the court order vague as
    to how it arrived at these amounts, but the court’s computation
    neglects to account for Patrick’s income from livestock sales
    and his reported farm expenses. In addition to the $36,000 in
    custom hire income, Patrick’s 2019 schedule F also includes
    $12,446 in income from livestock sales and $32,152 in total
    farm expenses, yielding a net farm profit of $16,294.
    In 2014, the parties stipulated that Patrick’s monthly income
    for purposes of calculating child support would be derived
    from a 3-year average of his net farm profit from schedule F
    with an add-back of depreciation. The record simply fails to
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    demonstrate a material change in circumstances justifying a
    modification in the stipulated method of computing Patrick’s
    monthly income. When the stipulated method of computation
    is applied to the most recent 3 years of Patrick’s tax returns,
    the result is a variation of less than $25 from his then-current
    obligation of $300 per month.
    Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the district
    court to abandon the stipulated method of computation and
    modify Patrick’s child support obligation without identifying a
    material change in circumstances justifying such modifications.
    Thus, we reverse the district court’s upward modification of
    Patrick’s child support obligation.
    Resolution of Disputes Regarding
    Daycare Expenses.
    Similar to the court’s modification of child support, the court
    did not identify any material change in circumstances justify-
    ing a modification of the stipulated procedure for resolving dis-
    putes related to daycare expenses. While the evidence indicated
    that Patrick has failed to contribute his share of daycare expenses
    under the 2014 decree, there was no indication that Patrick’s
    failure in this regard constituted a material change in circum-
    stances which was not contemplated by the parties at the time
    of the 2014 decree. Rather, the 2014 decree included a detailed
    procedure to follow in the event of such a dispute. Far from
    indicating a material change in circumstances, this evidences
    an explicit contemplation of future disputes regarding daycare
    expenses. Accordingly, the procedure set forth in the 2014
    decree, if employed, was capable of resolving these disputes
    without the court’s modification, and it was an abuse of discre-
    tion for the court to modify the 2014 decree absent a material
    change in circumstances not contemplated at the time.
    Attorney Fees.
    [7-9] Patrick also assigns that the district court erred in
    failing to rule upon his request for attorney fees and failing
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    to award attorney fees. Attorney fees and expenses may be
    recovered only where provided for by statute or when a rec-
    ognized and accepted uniform course of procedure has been
    to allow recovery of attorney fees. Garza v. Garza, 
    288 Neb. 213
    , 
    846 N.W.2d 626
     (2014). Customarily, attorney fees are
    awarded only to prevailing parties or assessed against those
    who file frivolous suits. 
    Id.
     A uniform course of procedure
    exists in Nebraska for the award of attorney fees in dissolution
    cases. 
    Id.
    [10] Although the pleadings do not include a request for
    attorney fees, Patrick made such a request at trial prior to the
    court’s taking the matter under advisement. However, the court’s
    final order is silent on the issue of attorney fees. Accordingly,
    Patrick emphasizes that the court’s “failure to even address the
    matter requires some consideration by this Court.” Brief for
    appellant at 20. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
    held that silence of a judgment on the issue of attorney fees
    must be construed as a denial of the request. Murray v. Stine,
    
    291 Neb. 125
    , 
    864 N.W.2d 386
     (2015). See Olson v. Palagi,
    
    266 Neb. 377
    , 
    665 N.W.2d 582
     (2003).
    In light of this authority, we construe the court’s silence as a
    denial of Patrick’s request for attorney fees. Thus, the question
    before us is whether it was an abuse of discretion for the court
    to deny Patrick’s request for attorney fees, and we find that it
    was not. Although we disagree with the court’s decision on the
    issue of modification, under the court’s ruling, Patrick was not
    the prevailing party. As such, it was not an abuse of discretion
    for the court to deny Patrick’s request for attorney fees.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude the district court abused its discretion in modi-
    fying the 2014 decree without identifying any material change
    in circumstances justifying such modifications. Accordingly,
    we reverse the district court’s order and remand the cause with
    instructions to dismiss the complaint for modification.
    Reversed and remanded with instructions.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-21-260

Citation Numbers: 30 Neb. Ct. App. 589

Filed Date: 2/8/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/8/2022