In re Interest of Ezra C. , 25 Neb. Ct. App. 588 ( 2018 )


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    03/13/2018 08:12 AM CDT
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    IN RE INTEREST OF EZRA C.
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 588
    In   re I nterest of    Ezra C.,     a child
    under   18   years of age.
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Stephanie K. and
    K enneth K., appellees, and Nebraska Department
    of H ealth and Human Services, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 6, 2018.    No. A-17-699.
    1.	 Judgments: Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a
    factual dispute presents a question of law.
    2.	 Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juve-
    nile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions indepen-
    dently of the juvenile court’s findings.
    3.	 Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (Reissue 2016), there are three types of final orders which may be
    reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects a substantial right and
    which determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order
    affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3)
    an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an
    action after judgment is rendered.
    4.	 Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A proceeding before a juvenile
    court is a special proceeding for appellate purposes.
    5.	 Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Numerous factors determine when an
    order affects a substantial right for purposes of appeal. Broadly, these
    factors relate to the importance of the right and the importance of the
    effect on the right by the order at issue.
    6.	 Final Orders. Whether the effect of an order is substantial depends on
    whether it affects with finality the rights of the parties in the subject
    matter.
    7.	 Juvenile Courts: Minors. The State’s right in juvenile proceedings is
    derived from its parens patriae interest, and it is pursuant to that interest
    that the State has enacted the Nebraska Juvenile Code.
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    IN RE INTEREST OF EZRA C.
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 588
    8.	 ____: ____. The State’s right is especially prominent in juvenile adju-
    dications, because the purpose of the adjudication phase of a juvenile
    proceeding is to protect the interests of the child.
    9.	 ____: ____. Once a child is adjudicated, the State’s interest in protecting
    the child becomes greater and more necessary.
    10.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court
    is without jurisdiction on appeal when a juvenile court’s order does not
    constitute an adjudicative or dispositive action in the proceedings as no
    substantial right has been affected.
    11.	 Juvenile Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. An order in juvenile
    proceedings denying a motion for a psychosexual evaluation is not a
    final, appealable order, because it does not involve a substantial right of
    the State.
    12.	 Juvenile Courts: Child Custody: Appeal and Error. Allowing an
    interlocutory appeal promotes significant delay in the juvenile proceed-
    ings and the ultimate resolution of custody.
    13.	 Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Generally, delaying juvenile pro-
    ceedings to grant interlocutory appeals is antagonistic to the child’s
    best interests.
    Appeal from the County Court for Cheyenne County: Paul
    G. Wess, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
    Neleigh N. Boyer, Special Assistant Attorney General, of
    Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, for
    appellant.
    No appearance for appellees.
    Pirtle, Bishop, and A rterburn, Judges.
    A rterburn, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services
    (DHHS) appeals an order of the county court for Cheyenne
    County, sitting as a juvenile court, overruling DHHS’ motion to
    require Kenneth K., the child’s stepfather, to undergo a psycho-
    sexual evaluation. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss
    this appeal due to a lack of jurisdiction.
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    IN RE INTEREST OF EZRA C.
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 588
    BACKGROUND
    On April 22, 2016, a juvenile petition and supporting affi-
    davit were filed with the county court for Cheyenne County
    alleging that Ezra C., born in 2014, was a child within the
    meaning of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (3)(a) (Supp. 2015) and
    also filed was a “Motion for Ex Parte Order of Temporary
    Custody.” That same day, the county court entered a tempo-
    rary order placing Ezra in the custody of DHHS for out-of-
    home placement.
    On May 25, 2016, an amended petition was filed alleging
    that Ezra was a child within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a)
    for the reason that he is in a situation injurious to his health
    or morals. Stephanie K., who is Ezra’s mother, and Kenneth
    each entered no contest pleas to the amended petition on May
    25. The county court found Ezra to be adjudicated within the
    meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) that same day.
    On July 21, 2016, the guardian ad litem filed a motion for
    a sex offender risk assessment, requesting that the court order
    both Stephanie and Kenneth to participate in a sex offender
    risk assessment. The county court held a dispositional hear-
    ing, as well as a hearing on the motion for a sex offender
    risk assessment, on July 27. During the dispositional phase
    of the hearing, the court ordered that custody of Ezra was to
    continue with DHHS with physical placement in his foster
    home. The county court ordered that Kenneth complete a sex
    offender risk assessment. A review hearing was scheduled on
    September 14, but was continued because the sex offender
    risk assessment was not completed by Kenneth. The county
    court held a review hearing on September 22. The court
    entered an order after the review hearing which rescinded its
    previous order requiring Kenneth to complete a sex offender
    risk assessment.
    It is apparent from the totality of the record, though we do
    not have the specific orders before us, that Ezra was reunified
    with Stephanie and Kenneth sometime between December 14,
    2016, and January 19, 2017. There is no record of DHHS’
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    appealing the order of reunification. The record demonstrates
    that the State, through the deputy county attorney, filed on
    March 30 a motion to schedule a hearing to terminate the
    juvenile court’s jurisdiction. That hearing was held on April 6.
    The county court denied the motion on the date of the hear-
    ing. DHHS filed a motion on April 17 requesting that Kenneth
    be required to complete a sex offender risk assessment. The
    county court denied the motion on April 26. An amended
    motion for an evaluation was filed by DHHS on May 16,
    requesting the county court to order Kenneth to participate in a
    psychosexual evaluation.
    The county court held a hearing on the motion on May 24,
    2017. Testimony from two psychologists, as well as a letter
    from a third, was received by the county court. Additionally,
    caseworkers from DHHS testified during the hearing.
    Generally, the testimony centered on past allegations regard-
    ing sexual misconduct by Kenneth. The testimony established
    that a safety plan was in place at the home. After argument, the
    county court iterated that even if the psychosexual evaluation
    were performed, the proceedings would be in a substantially
    similar circumstance as if the psychosexual evaluation had
    not been performed. The county court took the matter under
    advisement and entered a written order on June 5 denying
    DHHS’ amended motion for an evaluation. DHHS appeals that
    order here.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    DHHS argues the county court erred in denying its motion
    for a psychosexual evaluation.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual
    dispute presents a question of law. In re Interest of LeVanta
    S., 
    295 Neb. 151
    , 
    887 N.W.2d 502
     (2016). An appellate court
    reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its
    conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings. 
    Id.
    When the evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court
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    may give weight to the fact that the lower court observed
    the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the
    other. 
    Id.
    ANALYSIS
    DHHS argues that the county court erred in denying its
    motion for a psychosexual evaluation of Ezra’s stepfather,
    Kenneth. DHHS argues that this order is a final, appealable
    order as it substantially affects their ability to litigate the case
    as guardian of the child. It asserts that based on the Nebraska
    Juvenile Code and the State’s parens patriae interest in the
    proceedings, the county court abused its discretion in denying
    the motion.
    The jurisprudence regarding this area of the law is not well-
    developed. However, based on the established case law, we are
    able to determine that the order denying a motion for a psy-
    chosexual evaluation is not a final, appealable order. The order
    does not involve a substantial right of the State. The order does
    not involve a dispositional issue in the proceedings. Finally, the
    order does not involve placement, permanent or otherwise, of
    the juvenile. Therefore, we determine that the appeal must be
    dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
    [3,4] Our jurisdiction to review the county court’s June 5,
    2017, order denying the motion for psychosexual evaluation
    depends on whether it is a final order. Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Reissue 2016), there are three types of final orders
    which may be reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects a
    substantial right and which determines the action and prevents
    a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made
    during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a sub-
    stantial right made on summary application in an action after
    judgment is rendered. In re Interest of Noah B. et al., 
    295 Neb. 764
    , 
    891 N.W.2d 109
     (2017). The first and third categories of
    final orders are not implicated here. But a proceeding before a
    juvenile court is a special proceeding for appellate purposes,
    so we must determine whether the order dismissing the State’s
    supplemental petition affected a substantial right. See 
    id.
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    [5,6] Numerous factors determine when an order affects a
    substantial right for purposes of appeal. Broadly, these factors
    relate to the importance of the right and the importance of the
    effect on the right by the order at issue. 
    Id.
     It is not enough
    that the right itself be substantial; the effect of the order on
    that right must also be substantial. 
    Id.
     Whether the effect of an
    order is substantial depends on whether it affects with finality
    the rights of the parties in the subject matter. 
    Id.
     See Deines v.
    Essex Corp., 
    293 Neb. 577
    , 
    879 N.W.2d 30
     (2016).
    The term “substantial right” has been defined in various
    ways. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court has stated
    that a substantial right is an essential legal right, not a mere
    technical right. In re Interest of Karlie D., 
    283 Neb. 581
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 214
     (2012). A substantial right is affected if an order
    affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing
    a claim or defense that was available to the appellant prior to
    the order from which the appeal is taken. 
    Id.
     But the applica-
    tion of these definitions in juvenile cases, where the best inter-
    ests of the child are the primary concern, has not always been
    clear. Most of the cases dealing with the finality of juvenile
    court orders involve the substantial right of a parent. See, e.g.,
    In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 
    265 Neb. 150
    , 
    655 N.W.2d 672
     (2003); In re Guardianship of Rebecca B. et al., 
    260 Neb. 922
    , 
    621 N.W.2d 289
     (2000). Here, it is the substantial right of
    the State, if any, which is at issue. For purposes of this analy-
    sis, DHHS and the State are one and the same because DHHS
    is a state agency.
    [7,8] The substantial right of a parent in juvenile proceed-
    ings is a parent’s fundamental, constitutional right to raise
    his or her child. In re Interest of Karlie D., supra. See In re
    Interest of Anthony G., 
    255 Neb. 442
    , 
    586 N.W.2d 427
     (1998).
    The State’s right in juvenile proceedings is derived from its
    parens patriae interest, and it is pursuant to that interest that the
    State has enacted the Nebraska Juvenile Code. In re Interest
    of Noah B. et al., supra. See In re Interest of R.G., 
    238 Neb. 405
    , 
    470 N.W.2d 780
     (1991), disapproved on other grounds,
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    O’Connor v. Kaufman, 
    255 Neb. 120
    , 
    582 N.W.2d 350
     (1998).
    This right is especially prominent in juvenile adjudications,
    because the purpose of the adjudication phase of a juvenile
    proceeding is to protect the interests of the child. In re Interest
    of Noah B. et al., supra.
    [9] In In re Interest of Karlie D., supra, the Supreme Court
    observed that the purpose of the adjudication phase of a juve-
    nile proceeding is to protect the interests of the child. This
    same purpose forms the foundation for the State’s parens
    patriae interest; thus, once the child is adjudicated, the State’s
    interest in protecting the child becomes greater and more nec-
    essary. The court held that once a juvenile has been adjudi-
    cated under § 43-247(3), and the court has granted DHHS, and
    thus the State, custody of the child, the State has the right to
    recommend where the child should live. See In re Interest of
    Karlie D., supra. The child in In re Interest of Karlie D. had
    been adjudicated and placed in DHHS’ custody. The order at
    issue denied DHHS’ recommended placement and ended the
    dispositional phase of the proceeding. The court concluded
    that the order permanently moving the child to live with her
    grandmother affected an existing right of the State and was
    appealable. See id. See, also, In re Interest of Joseph S., 
    21 Neb. App. 706
    , 
    842 N.W.2d 209
     (2014) (finding appeal by
    State of order denying petition to terminate parental rights was
    final, appealable order), reversed on other grounds 
    288 Neb. 463
    , 
    849 N.W.2d 468
     (2014); In re Interest of Tanisha P. et
    al., 
    9 Neb. App. 344
    , 
    611 N.W.2d 418
     (2000) (finding dispo-
    sitional order changing child’s placement was final order for
    purposes of appeal).
    [10] In In re Interest of Jassenia H., 
    291 Neb. 107
    , 
    864 N.W.2d 242
     (2015), the Supreme Court found that a juvenile
    court’s order determining that the federal and state Indian
    Child Welfare Acts were applicable to the juvenile proceed-
    ings was not a final, appealable order. In In re Interest of
    Jassenia H., the guardian ad litem, on behalf of the juvenile,
    filed the appeal of the order claiming that this finding affected
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    a substantial right of the child. However, the Supreme Court
    found that the juvenile court’s finding did not constitute an
    adjudicative or dispositive action in the proceedings. 
    Id.
     As a
    result, the court determined that it was without jurisdiction on
    appeal as no substantial right had been affected. 
    Id.
    Here, Ezra had been adjudicated before the motion for a
    psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, Ezra was under DHHS’
    custody at the time of the order. However, Ezra had been
    reunified with Stephanie and Kenneth at least 5 months prior
    to DHHS’ motion. DHHS did not appeal the placement order.
    DHHS drafted a safety plan, which was in place at the time
    of its motion. The fact that the county court denied its motion
    does not preclude DHHS from filing a similar motion in the
    future, especially if new evidence arises.
    [11-13] Based on the precedent available to us, we find that
    an order in juvenile proceedings denying a motion for psycho-
    sexual evaluation is not a final, appealable order, because it
    does not involve a substantial right of the State. The outcome
    of the motion was not adjudicative or dispositional. The motion
    does not involve placement of the child. It is more akin to the
    procedural motions that the Supreme Court has determined
    were not final orders. It is also worth noting that allowing an
    interlocutory appeal promotes significant delay in the juve-
    nile proceedings and the ultimate resolution of custody. In
    re Interest of Marcella B. & Juan S., 
    18 Neb. App. 153
    , 
    775 N.W.2d 470
     (2009). Generally, delaying juvenile proceedings
    to grant interlocutory appeals is antagonistic to the child’s best
    interests. 
    Id.
     Therefore, we find that we lack jurisdiction and
    must dismiss the appeal before us.
    CONCLUSION
    We find that the county court’s order denying DHHS’ motion
    for psychosexual evaluation was not a final order and must dis-
    miss the appeal due to a lack of jurisdiction.
    A ppeal dismissed.