State v. Khalil ( 2018 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    01/30/2018 09:12 AM CST
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    STATE v. KHALIL
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. Ct. App. 449
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    A li E. K halil, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed January 16, 2018.   No. A-17-085.
    1.	 Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress:
    Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
    suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment or
    the safeguards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v.
    Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966), an
    appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding histori-
    cal facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear
    error. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment or
    Fifth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court
    reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.
    2.	 Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Probable Cause. A traffic viola-
    tion, no matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of
    a vehicle.
    3.	 Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs.
    Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a law enforcement officer may con-
    duct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
    that justified the traffic stop. This investigation may include asking
    the driver for an operator’s license and registration, requesting that
    the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about the purpose
    and destination of his or her travel. Also, the officer may run a com-
    puter check to determine whether the vehicle involved in the stop has
    been stolen and whether there are any outstanding warrants for any of
    its occupants.
    4.	 ____: ____: ____. An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the
    justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into some-
    thing other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not meas­
    urably extend the duration of the stop.
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    5.	 Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs:
    Probable Cause. To expand the scope of a traffic stop and continue to
    detain the motorist, an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspi-
    cion that a person in the vehicle is involved in criminal activity beyond
    that which initially justified the interference.
    6.	 Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. Reasonable suspicion entails
    some minimal level of objective justification for detention, something
    more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch, but less than the level
    of suspicion required for probable cause.
    7.	 Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause. Whether a police offi-
    cer has a reasonable suspicion based on sufficient articulable facts
    depends on the totality of the circumstances.
    8.	 Probable Cause. Reasonable suspicion exists on a case-by-case basis.
    9.	 ____. Factors that would independently be consistent with innocent
    activities may nonetheless amount to reasonable suspicion when consid-
    ered collectively.
    10.	 Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs:
    Probable Cause. An officer’s suspicion of criminal activity may reason-
    ably grow over the course of a traffic stop as the circumstances unfold
    and more suspicious facts are uncovered.
    11.	 Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Probable Cause. In determin-
    ing whether a continued detention of a defendant following a stop for a
    traffic violation is reasonable, a court considers both the length of the
    continued detention and the investigative methods employed.
    12.	 Miranda Rights. The safeguards provided by Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966), come into play when-
    ever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
    functional equivalent.
    13.	____. Miranda warnings are required only when there has been such a
    restriction on one’s freedom as to render one in custody.
    14.	 Miranda Rights: Arrests: Words and Phrases. A person is in custody
    for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 16 L.
    Ed. 2d 694 (1966), when there is a formal arrest or a restraint on his or
    her freedom of movement to the degree associated with such an arrest.
    15.	 Miranda Rights: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles. Persons tempo-
    rarily detained pursuant to an investigatory traffic stop are not in cus-
    tody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    ,
    
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966).
    16.	 Miranda Rights: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops:
    Motor Vehicles. When a person is detained pursuant to a traffic stop,
    there must be some further action or treatment by the police to render
    the driver in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings.
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    17.	 Miranda Rights: Self-Incrimination: Right to Counsel. The Miranda
    safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected
    to either express questioning or its functional equivalent, and the safe-
    guards include advisements of the right to remain silent and the right to
    have an attorney present at questioning.
    18.	 ____: ____: ____. Under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966), if the suspect in custody indicates that
    he or she wishes to remain silent or that he or she wants an attorney, the
    interrogation must cease.
    19.	 Miranda Rights: Right to Counsel. In order to require cessation of
    custodial interrogation, the subject’s invocation of the right to counsel
    must be unambiguous and unequivocal.
    Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County:
    A ndrew R. Jacobsen, Judge. Affirmed.
    Steven B. Muslin, of Muslin & Sandberg, and Thomas J.
    Olsen, of Olsen Law Offices, for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
    for appellee.
    Pirtle, R iedmann, and A rterburn, Judges.
    R iedmann, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Ali E. Khalil was convicted of delivery or possession with
    intent to deliver marijuana following the discovery of 128
    pounds of marijuana in his vehicle during a traffic stop. On
    appeal, he claims that his motion to suppress should have been
    granted because of violations of his rights under the Fourth
    and Fifth Amendments. We find no merit to the arguments
    raised on appeal and therefore affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    The events giving rise to this case, and the issues raised on
    appeal, are substantially intermingled with those in a compan-
    ion case filed today in State v. Abu-Serieh, post p. 462, ___
    N.W.2d ___ (2018). Khalil and Issa Abu-Serieh were driving
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    separate rental vehicles but traveling together on Interstate 80
    when the relevant events occurred.
    On January 25, 2015, Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff
    Jason Henkel was patrolling Interstate 80 near mile marker
    397 when he observed a Nissan Altima that was following a
    semi-truck too closely. He observed another vehicle, a Ford
    Edge, following the Nissan too closely and believed the Nissan
    and Ford were traveling together based on “their driving hab-
    its.” Henkel called for Deputy Sheriff Jason Mayo to assist
    him. Henkel performed a traffic stop on the Nissan, and Mayo
    stopped the Ford.
    The driver of the Nissan, later identified as Khalil, pro-
    vided his driver’s license and a vehicle rental agreement when
    requested. While at the window of the Nissan, Henkel noticed
    a faint odor of what he believed to be raw marijuana, but he
    could not confirm it at that point due to strong winds. Henkel
    asked Khalil to accompany him to Henkel’s patrol car in order
    to talk with him while Henkel prepared the warning ticket for
    following too closely. Khalil did so and sat in the front passen-
    ger seat. He was not in handcuffs and was not under arrest, but
    was detained for the traffic violation.
    Henkel made general conversation with Khalil while prepar-
    ing the warning ticket by asking questions about his travels.
    Khalil said that he had attended a convention in Salt Lake
    City, Utah, for the trucking company he owns and was try-
    ing to obtain additional business. Khalil said that he lives in
    the Chicago, Illinois, area. Henkel asked if Khalil was trav-
    eling with the driver of the Ford, and Khalil said yes, the
    driver of the Ford, Abu-Serieh, was his friend. Throughout
    the time Henkel and Khalil sat in Henkel’s patrol car, Henkel
    exchanged communication with Mayo via the mobile data
    terminal in each of their patrol cars. Mayo told Henkel that
    Abu-Serieh said he was not traveling with Khalil. Khalil
    and Abu-Serieh provided additional inconsistent informa-
    tion, with Abu-Serieh reporting that he had attended a bach-
    elor party in California and was returning home to Chicago,
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    while Khalil stated that Abu-Serieh lived in the Salt Lake
    City area.
    After issuing the warning ticket to Khalil, Henkel asked if
    there were any guns, bombs, cocaine, heroin, or marijuana in
    the vehicle, and Khalil said no. Henkel then asked Khalil for
    permission to search the vehicle because he suspected that
    there was criminal activity afoot, and Khalil responded that
    “he wanted to be on his way.” Henkel was suspicious based
    on several factors: the odor of raw marijuana coming from the
    vehicle, which he was unable to confirm; the business attire
    hanging in the window of the Nissan and a suitcase in the
    back seat; the vehicle had a “lived-in look,” and it appeared
    that Khalil had slept in the vehicle; Khalil exhibited signs of
    nervousness, including shaking and trembling hands, labored
    breathing, and “a pulse [visible] in his stomach”; and the
    numerous air fresheners in the front and back of the Nissan. In
    addition, Khalil was driving a rental vehicle and traveling with
    a companion who drove a separate vehicle, but both vehicles
    were rented in Khalil’s name, and when questioned, Khalil and
    the other driver provided inconsistent information.
    Less than 3 minutes after issuing the warning ticket to
    Khalil, Henkel deployed his drug dog, which was in his patrol
    car, and the canine alerted and indicated to the odor of nar-
    cotics coming from the Nissan. Upon searching the vehicle,
    Henkel discovered 128 pounds of marijuana in the trunk.
    While at the scene of the traffic stop, Henkel handcuffed Khalil
    and read him his Miranda warnings. Henkel asked Khalil if he
    would be interested in participating in a controlled delivery of
    the marijuana, and Khalil indicated that “he’d have to talk to
    his attorney first.” Henkel asked whether Khalil was requesting
    an attorney at that point, and Khalil responded that it “depends
    on the questions you ask me.” Throughout further questioning
    later at the jail, Khalil admitted that he was receiving $7,000
    to deliver the marijuana.
    Khalil was ultimately charged with delivery or posses-
    sion with intent to deliver marijuana. Prior to trial, he filed a
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    motion to suppress the statements he made and the results of
    the search of the Nissan. A suppression hearing was held, and
    the testimony revealed the information detailed above. The
    district court subsequently announced its findings from the
    bench. The court determined that there was probable cause for
    the traffic stop based on the traffic violation of following too
    closely. The court additionally found that Henkel had reason-
    able suspicion to detain Khalil in order to conduct a canine
    sniff and had probable cause to search the Nissan based on the
    alert and indication of the canine. Finally, the court concluded
    that Khalil did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel
    and that therefore, his statements were admissible. The motion
    to suppress was therefore denied.
    Thereafter, a stipulated bench trial was held. The evidence
    presented consisted of the video recordings of the traffic stops
    from Henkel’s patrol car and Mayo’s patrol car, law enforce-
    ment reports, and the transcript of the suppression hearing.
    The court ultimately found Khalil guilty of delivery or with
    possession with intent to deliver marijuana. He was sen-
    tenced to 18 to 36 months’ incarceration. He now appeals to
    this court.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Khalil assigns, summarized, that the district court erred in
    denying his motion to suppress.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
    press based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment
    or the safeguards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d
    694 (1966), we apply a two-part standard of review. See,
    State v. Bauldwin, 
    283 Neb. 678
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 267
    (2012); State
    v. Nelson, 
    282 Neb. 767
    , 
    807 N.W.2d 769
    (2011). Regarding
    historical facts, we review the trial court’s findings for clear
    error. State v. Bauldwin, supra; State v. 
    Nelson, supra
    . But
    whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment or
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    Fifth Amendment protections is a question of law that we
    review independently of the trial court’s determination. State v.
    Bauldwin, supra; State v. 
    Nelson, supra
    .
    ANALYSIS
    Khalil argues that the district court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress because of perceived violations of his
    rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
    Fourth Amendment.
    Khalil first argues that his motion to suppress should have
    been granted because his Fourth Amendment rights were vio-
    lated when Henkel impermissibly extended the scope of the
    traffic stop beyond what was reasonable to issue the warning
    for the traffic violation.
    [2] At the outset, we note that in his brief, despite several
    arguments to the contrary, Khalil acknowledges that the “evi-
    dence is unrebutted that the traffic stop was properly initiated
    by Deputy Henkel.” Brief for appellant at 27. We agree. A
    traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates probable cause
    to stop the driver of a vehicle. State v. 
    Nelson, supra
    . Here,
    Henkel explained how he determined that Khalil’s vehicle was
    following another vehicle too closely in violation of Neb. Rev.
    Stat. § 60-6,140(1) (Reissue 2010). The fact that Khalil com-
    mitted a traffic violation is not challenged on appeal, and thus,
    the initial stop of the Nissan was justified.
    Khalil claims that any questions Henkel posed to him dur-
    ing the stop before the warning ticket was issued that were
    unrelated to the traffic violation “create[d] an unwarranted
    and nonconsensual expansion of the seizure from a routine
    traffic stop to a drug investigation.” Brief for appellant at 31.
    We disagree.
    [3,4] Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a law enforce-
    ment officer may conduct an investigation reasonably related
    in scope to the circumstances that justified the traffic stop.
    State v. 
    Nelson, supra
    . This investigation may include ask-
    ing the driver for an operator’s license and registration,
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    requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the
    driver about the purpose and destination of his or her travel.
    
    Id. Also, the
    officer may run a computer check to determine
    whether the vehicle involved in the stop has been stolen and
    whether there are any outstanding warrants for any of its
    occupants. 
    Id. An officer’s
    inquiries into matters unrelated to
    the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encoun-
    ter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as
    those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
    stop. Arizona v. Johnson, 
    555 U.S. 323
    , 
    129 S. Ct. 781
    , 
    172 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (2009).
    In the present case, the amount of time that elapsed between
    the time Henkel initiated the traffic stop of the Nissan until the
    time he issued the warning ticket was a total of approximately
    10 minutes. While Khalil was seated in the passenger seat of
    the patrol car, Henkel asked him a variety of questions, such as
    where he had been, where he lived, and where he was going.
    During this time, Henkel was also communicating with Mayo,
    and the deputies were exchanging the information provided to
    them by Khalil and Abu-Serieh, discovering discrepancies in
    their responses. Khalil references this communication between
    deputies in his brief, but he provides no authority to support
    a finding that doing so was improper or unconstitutional, par-
    ticularly when the exchange of communication did not extend
    the traffic stop beyond the length of time necessary to issue
    the warning ticket. Given the total length of time it took for
    Henkel to process Khalil’s information and issue the warning
    ticket, approximately 10 minutes, we conclude that any ques-
    tioning did not measurably extend the duration of the stop and
    was therefore permissible.
    Khalil also argues that Henkel impermissibly extended the
    length of the traffic stop in order to conduct a canine sniff
    of the vehicle after issuing the warning ticket to him. We do
    not agree.
    [5-10] To expand the scope of a traffic stop and continue
    to detain the motorist, an officer must have a reasonable,
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    articulable suspicion that a person in the vehicle is involved
    in criminal activity beyond that which initially justified the
    interference. See State v. Nelson, 
    282 Neb. 767
    , 
    807 N.W.2d 769
    (2011). Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level
    of objective justification for detention, something more than
    an inchoate and unparticularized hunch, but less than the
    level of suspicion required for probable cause. 
    Id. Whether a
    police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on sufficient
    articulable facts depends on the totality of the circumstances.
    
    Id. Reasonable suspicion
    exists on a case-by-case basis. 
    Id. Factors that
    would independently be consistent with innocent
    activities may nonetheless amount to reasonable suspicion
    when considered collectively. 
    Id. An officer’s
    suspicion of
    criminal activity may reasonably grow over the course of a
    traffic stop as the circumstances unfold and more suspicious
    facts are uncovered. U.S. v. Murillo-Salgado, 
    854 F.3d 407
    (8th Cir. 2017).
    In this case, Henkel suspected that there was criminal activ-
    ity afoot based on several factors: the odor of raw marijuana
    coming from the vehicle, which he was unable to confirm;
    the business attire hanging in the window of the vehicle and
    a suitcase in the back seat; the “lived-in look” of the vehicle;
    Khalil’s nervousness; and the numerous air fresheners in the
    vehicle. In addition, Khalil was driving a rental vehicle and
    traveling with a companion who drove a separate vehicle,
    and when questioned, Khalil and the other driver provided
    inconsistent information, with the other driver denying that he
    was even traveling with Khalil. Given the totality of the cir-
    cumstances, Henkel had a reasonable suspicion to expand the
    scope of the traffic stop and continue to detain Khalil in order
    to perform a canine sniff of the vehicle.
    [11] Khalil takes issue with Henkel’s testimony that “as
    an interdiction officer, it was always his intention to deploy
    his dog.” Brief for appellant at 33. Regardless of Henkel’s
    thought process or motivation for doing so, we find that he
    had reasonable, articulable suspicion supporting extending
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    the stop in order to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle. As
    such, this argument lacks merit. Having determined that rea-
    sonable suspicion existed to support continued detention, the
    next question is whether the detention was reasonable in the
    context of an investigatory stop. See State v. Voichahoske, 
    271 Neb. 64
    , 
    709 N.W.2d 659
    (2006). We consider both the length
    of the continued detention and the investigative methods
    employed. 
    Id. Henkel had
    the canine with him in his vehicle, and the
    amount of time that elapsed from the time he issued the
    warning to Khalil until the time the canine was deployed
    was less than 3 minutes. In State v. 
    Voichahoske, supra
    , the
    Supreme Court found that a 15-minute period of time from
    the conclusion of the traffic stop until arrival of a drug dog
    was not unreasonable. And the Supreme Court has previously
    determined that nearly an hour delay between the request of a
    canine unit and its arrival was not unreasonable. See State v.
    Howard, 
    282 Neb. 352
    , 
    803 N.W.2d 450
    (2011). The record
    in the instant case shows no lack of diligence on Henkel’s
    part nor any unreasonable delay. And because a canine sniff
    is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, using the drug
    dog during a lawful detention did not violate any consti-
    tutionally protected right. See State v. 
    Voichahoske, supra
    .
    Accordingly, the length and method of detention in the present
    case were reasonable.
    We note that Khalil relies upon Rodriguez v. United States,
    ___ U.S. ___, 
    135 S. Ct. 1609
    , 
    191 L. Ed. 2d 492
    (2015),
    when arguing that the traffic stop was impermissibly extended.
    Khalil acknowledges, however, that the question in Rodriguez
    was whether police may extend “an otherwise-completed traf-
    fic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct
    a dog sniff.” Brief for appellant at 34. Thus, because we
    found that reasonable suspicion existed to allow Henkel to
    extend the stop, Rodriguez would not change the outcome of
    our decision.
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    Finding no merit to any of Khalil’s arguments with respect
    to the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the district court
    properly denied his motion to suppress on those grounds.
    Fifth Amendment.
    Khalil argues that Henkel’s question to him of whether he
    had any drugs “created a hazard of incrimination” and that
    he was compelled to answer the question or be penalized for
    asserting his right to refuse to answer. Brief for appellant at 40.
    He therefore concludes that Henkel was required to read him
    his Miranda rights prior to posing the question. Khalil also
    argues that he later invoked his right to counsel, but Henkel
    continued to question him in violation of his Fifth Amendment
    rights. We disagree.
    [12-14] We reject Khalil’s argument that Henkel was
    required to read him his Miranda rights because Khalil
    was not in custody. The safeguards provided by Miranda
    v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966), come into play whenever a person in custody is sub-
    jected to either express questioning or its functional equiva-
    lent. State v. Landis, 
    281 Neb. 139
    , 
    794 N.W.2d 151
    (2011).
    Miranda warnings are required only when there has been such
    a restriction on one’s freedom as to render one in custody. 
    Id. A person
    is in custody for purposes of Miranda when there is
    a formal arrest or a restraint on his or her freedom of move-
    ment to the degree associated with such an arrest. See State v.
    
    Landis, supra
    .
    [15,16] Persons temporarily detained pursuant to an investi-
    gatory traffic stop are not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
    State v. 
    Landis, supra
    . When a person is detained pursuant to
    a traffic stop, there must be some further action or treatment
    by the police to render the driver in custody and entitled to
    Miranda warnings. 
    Id. In State
    v. Landis, the Supreme Court
    observed that the defendant’s presence in the trooper’s cruiser
    did not raise the interaction to the extent analogous to an
    arrest, because there was no indication that the trooper used
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    force or threats to get the defendant to enter the cruiser or to
    remain there.
    Likewise here, Khalil was temporarily detained pursuant to
    a traffic stop and voluntarily entered Henkel’s patrol car while
    Henkel prepared the warning ticket. Thus, some further action
    or treatment by the deputy that would raise Khalil’s detention
    to an extent analogous to an arrest was required. Because there
    was none, Khalil was not “in custody,” and thus, Miranda
    warnings were not required before he could be questioned.
    Having determined that Khalil was not in custody for Miranda
    purposes, we need not address whether he was subjected to
    an interrogation during that time. Accordingly, any statements
    he made to Henkel while seated in the patrol car were not
    obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and were
    admissible. As such, the motion to suppress was properly
    denied on these grounds.
    Khalil further asserts that he invoked his right to counsel
    and that Henkel unconstitutionally continued to question him
    after he had done so.
    [17,18] The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a set of prophy-
    lactic measures to protect suspects from modern custodial
    interrogation techniques. Miranda v. 
    Arizona, supra
    . See, also,
    State v. DeJong, 
    287 Neb. 864
    , 
    845 N.W.2d 858
    (2014). The
    Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in cus-
    tody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
    equivalent. State v. 
    DeJong, supra
    . The safeguards include the
    familiar Miranda advisements of the right to remain silent and
    the right to have an attorney present at questioning. 
    Id. If the
    suspect in custody indicates that he or she wishes to remain
    silent or that he or she wants an attorney, the interrogation
    must cease. 
    Id. [19] In
    order to require cessation of custodial interroga-
    tion, the subject’s invocation of the right to counsel must be
    unambiguous and unequivocal. State v. Goodwin, 
    278 Neb. 945
    , 
    774 N.W.2d 733
    (2009). “Statements such as ‘“[m]aybe
    I should talk to a lawyer”’ or ‘“I probably should have an
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    attorney”’ do not meet this standard.” 
    Id. at 959,
    774 N.W.2d
    at 744-45.
    In the case at hand, Khalil never unambiguously and
    unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. When discussing
    whether Khalil would be interested in assisting law enforce-
    ment by participating in a controlled delivery of marijuana,
    Khalil remarked that “he’d have to talk to his attorney first.”
    Henkel then asked whether Khalil was requesting an attorney
    at that point, and Khalil responded that it “depends on the
    questions you ask me.” We cannot find that this language
    constitutes an unambiguous and unequivocal request for coun-
    sel, particularly when Khalil’s reference to speaking with his
    attorney was made in the context of agreeing to participate in
    a controlled delivery rather than discussing specifics about the
    events of this case. Therefore, law enforcement’s continued
    questioning of Khalil did not violate his Fifth Amendment
    rights and the district court did not err in denying the motion
    to suppress.
    CONCLUSION
    Having found no merit to Khalil’s arguments with respect
    to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, we find no error in the
    district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We therefore
    affirm his conviction and sentence.
    A ffirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-17-085

Filed Date: 1/16/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/30/2018