State v. Kresha ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    03/06/2018 01:13 AM CST
    - 543 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Patrick K resha, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 13, 2018.   No. A-17-525.
    1.	 Statutes: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation pre­
    sents a question of law. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate
    court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of the
    conclusion reached by the trial court.
    2.	 Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb sen-
    tences that are within statutory limits, unless the district court abused
    its discretion in establishing the sentences.
    3.	 Convicted Sex Offender: Sentences. Any sex offender convicted of
    a registrable offense under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4003
     (Reissue 2016)
    punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and convicted of an
    aggravated offense shall register on the sex offender registry for life.
    4.	 Convicted Sex Offender. An aggravated offense for purposes of the
    Sex Offender Registration Act means any registrable offense under
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4003
     (Reissue 2016) which involves the direct
    genital touching of (1) a victim age 13 years or older without the
    consent of the victim, (2) a victim under the age of 13 years, or (3) a
    victim who the sex offender knew or should have known was mentally
    or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his or
    her conduct.
    5.	 Convicted Sex Offender: Words and Phrases. The definitions of
    sexual conduct under Nebraska law and federal law make a distinction
    between the direct touching of a victim’s private parts and the touching
    of the clothing covering the victim’s private parts.
    6.	 ____: ____. The term “direct genital touching” for purposes of finding
    an aggravated offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act requires
    evidence that the actor touched the victim’s genitals under the vic-
    tim’s clothing.
    - 544 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    7.	 Sentences. When imposing a sentence, the sentencing judge should
    consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and expe-
    rience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or
    record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as
    well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the violence involved in the
    commission of the offense. The sentencing court is not limited to any
    mathematically applied set of factors.
    8.	 ____. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective
    judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defend­
    ant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances sur-
    rounding the defendant’s life.
    Appeal from the District Court for Polk County: R achel A.
    Daugherty, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
    Timothy P. Matas for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Siobhan E.
    Duffy for appellee.
    Pirtle, R iedmann, and A rterburn, Judges.
    R iedmann, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Patrick Kresha appeals his plea-based convictions of two
    counts of third degree sexual assault of a child and two
    counts of third degree sexual assault. He claims that the
    district court erred in imposing excessive sentences and in
    determining that he was subject to lifetime registration under
    Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4001
     to 29-4014 (Reissue 2016). We conclude that
    the court erred in finding that Kresha committed an aggra-
    vated offense for purposes of SORA and therefore modify the
    sentencing order to require that he instead register as a sex
    offender for 25 years. We otherwise affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Kresha pled no contest to an amended information charg-
    ing him with two counts of third degree sexual assault of a
    - 545 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    child and two counts of third degree sexual assault. According
    to the factual basis provided by the State at the plea hearing,
    on or about August 17, 2010, and May 18, 2011, Kresha, who
    was born in 1962, went into the bedroom of M.K., who was
    born in 1998, while M.K. was sleeping and touched her geni-
    talia for the purpose of his own sexual gratification. Similarly,
    between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2012, Kresha
    touched the breast and buttocks of J.G., who was born in
    1998, for the purpose of his own sexual gratification. In addi-
    tion, between January 1, 2010, and May 6, 2013, Kresha sub-
    jected E.S., who was born in 1996, and A.G., who was born in
    1995, to sexual contact without their consent. All of the events
    occurred in Polk County, Nebraska.
    The district court accepted Kresha’s pleas and found him
    guilty. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprison-
    ment of 5 to 5 years, 5 to 5 years, 1 to 1 year, and 1 to 1
    year. At the sentencing hearing, the court also determined that
    Kresha had committed an “aggravated offense” as defined in
    SORA and that he would therefore be required to register on
    Nebraska’s sex offender registry for life. Kresha now appeals
    to this court.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Kresha assigns, restated and renumbered, that the district
    court erred (1) in determining that his offenses were aggra-
    vated offenses for purposes of the lifetime registration require-
    ment of SORA and (2) in imposing excessive sentences that
    constituted an abuse of discretion.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. When
    reviewing questions of law, an appellate court has an obliga-
    tion to resolve the questions independently of the conclusion
    reached by the trial court. State v. Hamilton, 
    277 Neb. 593
    , 
    763 N.W.2d 731
     (2009).
    [2] An appellate court will not disturb sentences that are
    within statutory limits, unless the district court abused its
    - 546 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    discretion in establishing the sentences. State v. Dominguez,
    
    290 Neb. 477
    , 
    860 N.W.2d 732
     (2015).
    ANALYSIS
    Aggravated Offense Under SORA.
    [3,4] Pertinent to this case, any sex offender convicted of
    a registrable offense under § 29-4003 punishable by impris-
    onment for more than 1 year and convicted of an aggravated
    offense shall register on the sex offender registry for life. See
    § 29-4005(1)(b)(iii). For purposes of SORA and as relevant to
    this case, the term “aggravated offense” means any registrable
    offense under § 29-4003 which involves the “direct genital
    touching” of (1) a victim age 13 years or older without the
    consent of the victim, (2) a victim under the age of 13 years,
    or (3) a victim who the sex offender knew or should have
    known was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or
    appraising the nature of his or her conduct. § 29-4001.01(1).
    The registrable offenses under § 29-4003 include third degree
    sexual assault of a child, but SORA does not define “direct
    genital touching.”
    Kresha asserts that “direct genital touching” requires the
    touching of the victim’s genitals under the clothing. He argues
    that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding of
    any touching which occurred under the clothing and that there-
    fore, the court erred in finding that the offense was an aggra-
    vated offense subject to lifetime registration. The State agrees
    that there is no evidence of genital touching under the clothing
    regarding the two counts of third degree sexual assault of a
    child; thus, the State concedes that the court erred in finding
    the offenses to be aggravated.
    [5] We agree with the parties that “direct genital touching” is
    not defined under Nebraska law. The term “sexual contact” is
    defined under Nebraska law and provides in part:
    Sexual contact means the intentional touching of the vic-
    tim’s sexual or intimate parts or the intentional touching
    of the victim’s clothing covering the immediate area of
    - 547 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    the victim’s sexual or intimate parts. Sexual contact shall
    also mean the touching by the victim of the actor’s sexual
    or intimate parts or the clothing covering the immediate
    area of the actor’s sexual or intimate parts when such
    touching is intentionally caused by the actor.
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318
    (5) (Reissue 2016). Similarly, the
    term “sexual contact” is defined under federal law as “the
    intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing,
    of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks
    of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
    degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2246
    (3) (2012). Thus, these definitions make a
    distinction between the direct touching of a victim’s private
    parts and the touching of the clothing covering the victim’s
    private parts.
    [6] Likewise, the term “sexual act” is defined under fed-
    eral law to include “the intentional touching, not through
    the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not
    attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humili-
    ate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
    of any person.” § 2246(2)(D). And this definition has been
    summarized as “the direct touching of genitals with certain
    sexual or abusive intents.” U.S. v. White, 
    782 F.3d 1118
    , 1137
    (10th Cir. 2015). See, also, U.S. v. Jennings, 
    496 F.3d 344
    (4th Cir. 2007) (direct touching under definition of sexual
    act in § 2246(2) means touching of victim’s unclothed pri-
    vate parts). We also note that the federal law’s definition
    of “sexually explicit conduct” makes a distinction between
    direct touching and touching through clothing. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3509
    (a)(9)(A) (2012). Based on the foregoing, we conclude
    that the term “direct genital touching” for purposes of find-
    ing an aggravated offense under SORA requires evidence
    that the actor touched the victim’s genitals under the vic-
    tim’s clothing.
    For purposes of lifetime registration under SORA, the
    defend­ ant must have been convicted of a crime that is a
    - 548 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    registrable offense and punishable by more than 1 year in
    prison. Thus, in the present case, only the convictions for third
    degree sexual assault of a child could constitute aggravated
    offenses. We concur with the parties that there is no evidence
    in the record of direct genital touching.
    The record establishes that Kresha touched J.G.’s breasts
    and buttocks, which does not constitute genital touching,
    and that he touched M.K.’s vaginal area over her clothing.
    Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of
    direct genital touching for purposes of an aggravated offense
    under SORA. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding
    that Kresha was required to register for life. Instead, he is
    required to register for 25 years. See § 29-4005. We therefore
    modify the sentencing order to require that Kresha register for
    25 years rather than life.
    Excessive Sentences.
    Kresha also asserts that the sentences imposed by the dis-
    trict court are excessive and constitute an abuse of discretion.
    We disagree.
    Third degree sexual assault of a child is a Class IIIA felony.
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-320.01
     (Reissue 2016). At the time of
    Kresha’s offenses, this offense was punishable by a maxi-
    mum of 5 years’ imprisonment. See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105
    (Reissue 2008). Third degree sexual assault is a Class I misde-
    meanor, which carries a punishment of up to 1 year’s impris-
    onment. See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-320
     and 28-106 (Reissue
    2008). Thus, Kresha’s sentences fall within the statutory limits.
    Nevertheless, he argues that they are excessive because the
    district court relied heavily on the nature and circumstances
    of the offenses when there were other factors that should have
    mitigated his sentences.
    An appellate court will not disturb sentences that are within
    statutory limits, unless the district court abused its discretion
    in establishing the sentences. State v. Dominguez, 
    290 Neb. 477
    , 
    860 N.W.2d 732
     (2015).
    - 549 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    [7,8] When imposing a sentence, the sentencing judge
    should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3)
    education and experience, (4) social and cultural background,
    (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and
    (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the
    offense and (8) the violence involved in the commission of the
    offense. 
    Id.
     The sentencing court is not limited to any math-
    ematically applied set of factors. 
    Id.
     The appropriateness of a
    sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the
    sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor
    and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding
    the defendant’s life. 
    Id.
    At the sentencing hearing, the court made clear that it
    considered the required factors as well as the information
    contained in the presentence investigation report. We recog-
    nize that there were mitigating factors present here, including
    Kresha’s lack of a significant criminal history, his employment
    record and ties to the community, and the lack of violence in
    the offenses. However, as the district court emphasized, the
    circumstances of the offenses support a more significant sen-
    tence. Kresha victimized four teenage girls, one of whom was
    his own daughter. There were letters in the presentence inves-
    tigation report from each victim detailing the impact Kresha’s
    actions have had on their lives, and two of the victims spoke
    at sentencing.
    The court emphasized the effect Kresha has had on all
    of his victims, and most importantly, his own daughter with
    whom he violated the core of the parent-child relationship. The
    court opined that had the victims not reported his actions, he
    would have continued to victimize young women. The court
    explained its responsibility to look out for the welfare of those
    who cannot look out for themselves, which, in this case, is
    Kresha’s own daughter and her teenage friends. It therefore
    found that probation was not appropriate. Similarly, the pro-
    bation officer who conducted the presentence investigation
    opined that probation was not appropriate and recommended
    - 550 -
    Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets
    25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports
    STATE v. KRESHA
    Cite as 
    25 Neb. App. 543
    a sentence of incarceration, because Kresha took advantage of
    his daughter’s friends for his own sexual gratification. Based
    on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district
    court abused its discretion in the sentences imposed.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the district court erred in finding evidence
    in the record of direct genital touching for purposes of life-
    time registration pursuant to SORA. We therefore modify the
    sentencing order to require that Kresha register for 25 years.
    Finding that Kresha’s sentences are not excessive, we other-
    wise affirm his convictions and sentences.
    A ffirmed as modified.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-17-525

Filed Date: 2/13/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/6/2018