Fast Ball Sports v. Metropolitan Entertainment ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                            CASES DETERMINED
    IN THE
    NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS
    Fast Ball Sports, LLC, appellant and cross-appellee,
    v. M etropolitan Entertainment & Convention
    Authority, appellee and cross-appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed July 2, 2013.     No. A-12-425.
    1.	 Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admis-
    sible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to
    any material facts, or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    2.	 Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
    appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
    whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences deducible from the evidence.
    3.	 Contracts. A claim that the parties created an enforceable contract generally
    presents an action at law.
    4.	 Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews questions of law
    independently of the conclusion reached by the lower court.
    5.	 Breach of Contract: Proof. To recover for breach of contract, a plaintiff must
    prove that a defendant made a promise, breached the promise, and caused the
    plaintiff damage and that any conditions precedent were satisfied.
    6.	 Contracts: Proof. To establish an express contract, a party must prove a definite
    proposal and an unconditional and absolute acceptance of that proposal.
    7.	 Contracts: Words and Phrases. An absolute proposal or offer is an expression
    of willingness to enter into an agreement with another, made in such a way that
    the other party is justified in believing that its acceptance is invited and will
    result in a contract.
    8.	 Contracts. A communication intended only as preliminary negotiation or an
    expression of willingness to negotiate is not an offer.
    9.	 ____. When a party subjects a contract to board approval, there is no contract or
    offer until the board approves.
    10.	 Contracts: Waiver. In Nebraska, under the prevention doctrine, if a party pre-
    vents the occurrence of a condition necessary for the other party to perform an
    oral or written agreement, a court may waive the condition.
    11.	 Contracts. The prevention doctrine does not apply to a condition precedent for
    the formation of a contract.
    (1)
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    2	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    12.	 Fraud. The elements of fraud are (1) that a representation was made; (2) that the
    representation was false; (3) that when made, the representation was known to be
    false or made recklessly without knowledge of its truth and as a positive asser-
    tion; (4) that it was made with the intention that the plaintiff should rely upon it;
    (5) that the plaintiff reasonably did so rely; and (6) that he or she suffered dam-
    age as a result.
    13.	 ____. Fraud cannot ordinarily be predicated on unfulfilled promises or statements
    as to future events.
    14.	 Contracts: Fraud: Evidence. If there is no signed contract, a party seeking to
    overcome the statute of frauds must proffer a writing, signed by the opposing
    party, detailing the terms and conditions of their promises. The writing can be any
    written evidence of an oral contract so long as the writing contains the essential
    terms of the contract.
    15.	 ____: ____: ____. The written evidence necessary to overcome the statute of
    frauds does not need to be contained in a single document or communication,
    but if the terms of the contract can be collected from the correspondence of the
    parties, it will be a sufficient memorandum within the meaning of the statute
    of frauds.
    16.	 Contracts: Estoppel. Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a court may
    enforce a promise made by a party if (1) that party should reasonably expect
    its promise to induce another party’s action or forbearance, (2) its promise does
    induce action or forbearance, and (3) the only way to avoid injustice is to enforce
    the promise.
    17.	 Contracts: Fraud: Estoppel. Promissory estoppel is not an exception to the
    statute of frauds; nor can it be used to circumvent the statute of frauds.
    18.	 ____: ____: ____. Only where a party to a written contract within the statute
    of frauds induces another to waive some provision upon which he is entitled to
    insist and thereby change his position to his disadvantage because of that party’s
    inducement will the inducing party be estopped to claim that such oral modifica-
    tion is invalid because not in writing.
    19.	 Equity: Contracts: Fraud: Partial Performance. A court will enforce in equity
    an oral contract partly performed, even if the contract falls within the statute
    of frauds.
    20.	 Contracts: Fraud: Partial Performance. The justification of the partial per-
    formance exception to the statute of frauds is that partial performance is good
    evidence for believing an agreement exists.
    21.	 Contracts: Fraud. Ordinary business preparations are not sufficient to remove
    an alleged contract from the statute of frauds.
    22.	 Contracts: Partial Performance. Preliminary acts or mere preparations to act do
    not constitute partial performance.
    23.	 Trial: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination
    of a request for sanctions for abuse of discretion.
    24.	 Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge,
    within the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects to act or refrains
    from acting, but the selected option results in a decision which is untenable and
    unfairly deprives a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters submit-
    ted for disposition through a judicial system.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	3
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Leigh
    Ann R etelsdorf, Judge. Affirmed.
    Jason M. Bruno, of Sherrets, Bruno & Vogt, L.L.C., for
    appellant.
    Mark C. Laughlin and Ryan M. Sewell, of Fraser Stryker,
    P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
    Sievers and Riedmann, Judges.
    Riedmann, Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Fast Ball Sports, LLC (FBS), appeals an order of the dis-
    trict court for Douglas County denying it summary judgment
    and granting summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan
    Entertainment & Convention Authority (MECA). MECA cross-
    appeals the trial court’s denial of dismissal of the suit as a
    sanction. The trial court found that MECA and FBS did not
    form a contract and that FBS was not entitled to remedies
    under theories of promissory estoppel or fraud. We agree. We
    further determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    in denying the requested sanction and affirm its ruling.
    II. BACKGROUND
    FBS is a corporation that sought to acquire a professional
    baseball franchise to play baseball in Omaha, Nebraska, at TD
    Ameritrade Park. MECA is a nonprofit group that manages and
    operates TD Ameritrade Park.
    MECA and FBS began negotiating in August 2009 with
    the help of a consulting group, the Pierce Group, which acted
    as a “go between.” In November, Roger Dixon, MECA’s
    chief executive officer, prepared and sent a cover letter and
    attached “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) to the
    Pierce Group and to FBS’ chief executive officer. The cover
    letter explained that the MOU provides “principal terms”
    that would be used to prepare a “definitive Lease” if agreed
    to by both parties. The cover letter stated that any lease
    agreement must be “submitted for approval to the MECA
    Board and thereafter mutually executed.” Both parties agreed
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    4	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    that the letter and the MOU provided the framework for
    the negotiations.
    The parties did not have contact again until May 2010, when
    FBS requested to meet with Dixon to continue negotiations.
    Dixon responded that MECA was involved in negotiations with
    another group and would resume discussions with FBS if those
    other negotiations failed.
    In August 2010, MECA and FBS resumed discussions. At
    that time, Dixon advised FBS in writing that MECA would
    make one last attempt at negotiating a lease, but that it needed
    more information about the individuals in FBS’ ownership
    group and FBS’ available financial resources.
    On August 19, 2010, MECA’s chief financial officer, Lea
    French, prepared a draft lease, which the parties revised on two
    occasions. On September 17, MECA’s attorney e-mailed FBS’
    attorney asking for additional information about the “Northern
    League” to provide to MECA’s board of directors (MECA
    Board) in his confidential report. In his e-mail, he mentioned
    he would be attending a MECA Board meeting that evening
    but did not yet have all the information he needed to provide
    to the MECA Board.
    On September 20, 2010, French e-mailed a revised draft
    lease dated September 17, 2010, to MECA and FBS repre­
    sentatives. As with the previous drafts, she labeled the docu-
    ment as a “[d]raft” and included blue editing marks. In her
    e-mail, she identified the draft lease as a “redline” version. The
    draft lease stated that MECA would lease the TD Ameritrade
    Park stadium to FBS for a term of approximately 5 years for
    the purpose of “presenting Northern League baseball games.”
    It also contained a strict compliance clause.
    Also on September 20, 2010, at the Pierce Group’s request,
    French wrote a letter to the commissioner of the Northern
    League to help FBS obtain a franchise. The letter states:
    [MECA] has reached agreement with [FBS] on the major
    terms of a lease agreement to play Northern League base-
    ball at the TD Ameritrade Park Omaha stadium. [FBS]
    was provided with a draft agreement and MECA has not
    received any material comments to that draft. MECA
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	5
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    plans to have the final agreement approved at the October
    14, 2010 meeting of the MECA Board . . . .
    We ask that you swiftly formalize your approval and
    issuance of a franchise to [FBS] so that we may finalize
    the lease agreement.
    French sent copies of the letter to MECA and FBS repre-
    sentatives. In response, the Northern League awarded FBS a
    franchise, and FBS paid a franchise fee of $200,000 and an
    application fee of $10,000 and committed to paying a total
    of $1,010,000.
    During the fall of 2010, Dixon learned from outside sources
    that FBS’ management had changed, and based upon infor-
    mation from outside sources, he became concerned about the
    Northern League’s future viability. As a result, Dixon decided
    not to present the proposed lease agreement to the MECA
    Board and no lease agreement was ever signed by both par-
    ties. The Northern League ceased operations in 2010, and one
    Northern League team joined the North American Baseball
    League. While many of the teams in the Northern League
    were located in the Midwest, the teams in the North American
    Baseball League were located much farther away from Omaha,
    in places such as Hawaii and Canada.
    In December 2010, the chairman of the MECA Board
    advised FBS in writing that the MECA Board would not
    consider FBS’ proposal. His reasoning was that FBS had rep-
    resented in September that the Northern League was a solid
    eight-team league, but that within a few days of that repre-
    sentation, MECA learned from other sources that this was no
    longer the case.
    The parties dispute whether or not certain oral statements
    were made during the course of negotiations. In particular,
    FBS asserts that during the negotiations, MECA represented
    that the parties had a “done deal,” that Dixon had authority to
    bind MECA to a lease agreement, that the MECA Board would
    approve any agreement presented to it by Dixon, and that if
    FBS obtained an independent baseball franchise, the lease
    would be signed and approved no later than October 14, 2010.
    MECA denies making such representations.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    6	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    In February 2011, FBS filed a complaint in the district court
    for Douglas County. FBS attached a purported copy of the
    September 17, 2010, lease agreement to its complaint. This
    attachment, however, was not the copy of the lease MECA sent
    FBS. The version attached to the complaint did not contain the
    blue editing marks or the word “draft” in the upper right-hand
    corner. Furthermore, it was initialed and signed by FBS repre-
    sentative Nick Grammas.
    MECA moved for sanctions, including that the trial court
    dismiss the case with prejudice because FBS intentionally mis-
    led the trial court by attaching an altered and executed version
    of the draft lease. At the hearing, FBS admitted that it altered
    the lease, but argued that it did not intend to mislead the trial
    court, offering its admission at the hearing as proof. The trial
    court denied MECA’s motion for sanctions.
    Pursuant to rulings on motions to dismiss, FBS amended its
    complaint twice. In the second amended complaint, FBS sought
    remedies based on theories of breach of contract, fraud, and
    promissory estoppel. Both parties subsequently filed motions
    for summary judgment.
    The court granted MECA’s motion for summary judg-
    ment and denied that of FBS. The court found no valid con-
    tract existed between the parties. It explained that the MECA
    Board’s approval was a condition precedent to the formation of
    a valid contract and that the evidence did not show the MECA
    Board approved the contract. The court further found that the
    statute of frauds barred consideration of any oral statements
    made between the parties, and it denied FBS’ fraud and prom-
    issory estoppel claims.
    This timely appeal followed.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    FBS assigns that the trial court erred in (1) denying its
    motion for summary judgment and (2) granting MECA’s
    motion for summary judgment. MECA assigns on cross-appeal
    that the trial court erred in denying its request for dismissal of
    the suit as a sanction.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	7
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admis-
    sible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is no
    genuine issue as to any material facts, or as to the ultimate
    inferences that may be drawn from those facts, and that the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Mortgage Express v. Tudor Ins. Co., 
    278 Neb. 449
    , 
    771 N.W.2d 137
     (2009).
    [2] In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court
    views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
    against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party
    the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the
    evidence. Wise v. Omaha Public Schools, 
    271 Neb. 635
    , 
    714 N.W.2d 19
     (2006).
    [3,4] A claim that the parties created an enforceable contract
    generally presents an action at law. City of Scottsbluff v. Waste
    Connections of Neb., 
    282 Neb. 848
    , 
    809 N.W.2d 725
     (2011).
    An appellate court reviews questions of law independently of
    the conclusion reached by the lower court. See 
    id.
    V. ANALYSIS
    1. FBS Motion for
    Summary Judgment
    FBS argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion
    for summary judgment. FBS moved for summary judgment on
    theories of breach of contract, fraud, and promissory estoppel.
    The trial court found that FBS was not entitled to summary
    judgment on any of its claims. We agree.
    (a) Breach of Contract Claims
    FBS contends that MECA and FBS entered into a legally
    enforceable lease agreement because Dixon and FBS agreed
    to all material terms and the MECA Board’s approval was
    not required. Because MECA and FBS did not form a con-
    tract, the trial court correctly denied FBS relief for its first
    three claims.
    [5,6] To recover for breach of contract, a plaintiff must
    prove that a defendant made a promise, breached the promise,
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    8	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    and caused the plaintiff damage and that any conditions pre­
    cedent were satisfied. See Phipps v. Skyview Farms, 
    259 Neb. 492
    , 
    610 N.W.2d 723
     (2000). A contract may be express,
    implied, written, or oral. To establish an express contract, a
    party must prove a “definite proposal and an unconditional
    and absolute acceptance” of that proposal. Viking Broadcasting
    Corp. v. Snell Publishing Co., 
    243 Neb. 92
    , 97, 
    497 N.W.2d 383
    , 386 (1993).
    (i) Legally Enforceable Contract
    [7-9] To find an express contract, we must find writings
    that prove there was an absolute proposal and unconditional
    acceptance. An absolute proposal or offer is an expression
    of willingness to enter into an agreement with another, made
    in such a way that the other party is justified in believing
    that its acceptance is invited and will result in a contract.
    The offeror is the master of the offer. See Keller v. Bones,
    
    260 Neb. 202
    , 
    615 N.W.2d 883
     (2000). A communication
    intended only as preliminary negotiation or an expression
    of willingness to negotiate is not an offer. See Restatement
    (Second) of Contracts § 26 (1981). When a party subjects a
    contract to board approval, there is no contract or offer until
    the board approves. See, Pluhacek v. Nebraska Lutheran
    Outdoor Ministries, 
    227 Neb. 778
    , 
    420 N.W.2d 286
     (1988);
    Restatement (Second), supra.
    In this case, MECA advised FBS at the outset of negotia-
    tions in the MOU and its cover letter that any lease must be
    approved by the MECA Board before being executed. Both
    parties agreed that the letter and the MOU provided the frame-
    work for the negotiations. The parties do not dispute that the
    MECA Board never approved the September 17, 2010, draft
    lease or any other lease.
    In Pluhacek, 
    supra,
     the Nebraska Supreme Court found that
    an agreement which contained a provision which subjected
    acceptance to full board approval did not constitute a contract
    without board approval, even though it was fully executed.
    In the present action, the draft lease contains less evidence of
    a contract than the executed agreement in Pluhacek because
    MECA did not execute the draft lease. Because the MECA
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	9
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    Board never approved the lease agreement, the parties never
    entered into a binding agreement.
    (ii) Doctrine of Prevention
    FBS argues that lack of the MECA Board’s approval cannot
    be used to defeat the finding of an express contract because
    MECA waived the condition under the doctrine of prevention
    when it failed to present the lease to the board. This argument
    misapplies the prevention doctrine.
    [10,11] In Nebraska, under the prevention doctrine, if a
    party prevents the occurrence of a condition necessary for the
    other party to perform an oral or written agreement, a court
    may waive the condition. But the prevention doctrine does not
    apply to a condition precedent for the formation of a contract.
    See D & S Realty v. Markel Ins. Co., 
    284 Neb. 1
    , 
    816 N.W.2d 1
    (2012) (wherein court cites to 13 Samuel Williston, A Treatise
    on the Law of Contracts § 39:1 at 509 (Richard A. Lord ed.,
    4th ed. 2000), which explains that prevention doctrine applies
    “where parties capable of contracting have deliberately entered
    into a written contract by which there is created a condition
    precedent to a right to performance”).
    In this case, the condition precedent of the MECA Board’s
    approval was a step required to form an agreement between
    the parties rather than a condition to performance in an already
    existing contract. Because the parties did not have an agree-
    ment, Dixon was not obligated to present the potential agree-
    ment to the MECA Board and did not waive the condition
    by choosing not to do so. See 168th and Dodge, LP v. Rave
    Reviews Cinemas, LLC, 
    501 F.3d 945
     (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
    that where terms are subject to board approval, board is free to
    withhold consent or refuse to consider terms negotiated by its
    officers). In December 2010, the MECA Board rejected FBS’
    offer to present the potential agreement based on the informa-
    tion it had received from Dixon regarding the instability of
    FBS and the Northern League. The MECA Board was within
    its rights to do so.
    FBS argues that the failure to present the proposal con-
    stituted a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
    FBS, however, did not produce any evidence suggesting that
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    10	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    MECA did not negotiate in good faith. See Harmon Cable
    Communications v. Scope Cable Television, 
    237 Neb. 871
    , 
    468 N.W.2d 350
     (1991). The only evidence produced showed that
    Dixon had concerns about FBS’ ownership, its financial stabil-
    ity, and the long-term viability of the Northern League. For
    that reason, Dixon decided not to present the draft lease to the
    MECA Board. FBS’ argument that MECA breached the duty
    of good faith and fair dealing is without merit.
    (b) Fraud
    In the alternative, FBS argues that it is entitled to summary
    judgment because MECA made false misrepresentations upon
    which FBS relied. FBS claims that MECA fraudulently rep-
    resented that the two parties agreed on the terms of a lease,
    that MECA would honor the lease, and that MECA would
    enter into a lease agreement with FBS if FBS acquired a
    professional baseball franchise. FBS argues that its reliance
    on these fraudulent statements caused it to suffer damages.
    We disagree.
    [12] The elements of fraud are
    (1) that a representation was made; (2) that the represen-
    tation was false; (3) that when made, the representation
    was known to be false or made recklessly without knowl-
    edge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that it
    was made with the intention that the plaintiff should rely
    upon it; (5) that the plaintiff reasonably did so rely; and
    (6) that he or she suffered damage as a result.
    Nebraska Nutrients v. Shepherd, 
    261 Neb. 723
    , 747, 
    626 N.W.2d 472
    , 495 (2001), abrogated on other grounds, Sutton v.
    Killham, 
    285 Neb. 1
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 188
     (2013).
    [13] A fraudulent statement relates to a “‘present or pre­
    existing fact.’” Linch v. Carlson, 
    156 Neb. 308
    , 316, 
    56 N.W.2d 101
    , 105 (1952). Fraud “‘cannot ordinarily be pred-
    icated on unfulfilled promises, or statements as to future
    events.’” 
    Id.
    The MECA representatives deny having made the represen-
    tations that FBS attributes to them; however, on review of a
    summary judgment, an appellate court reviews the evidence
    in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	11
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    was entered. We therefore address FBS’ claim of fraud as
    though the alleged statements were made.
    FBS contends that MECA represented to it that (1) MECA
    would enter into a lease agreement if FBS obtained a profes-
    sional baseball franchise; (2) the parties had reached an agree-
    ment on all material terms; (3) MECA intended to honor the
    lease agreement beginning in 2011; (4) the lease agreement
    would be presented to the MECA Board for approval at its
    October 14, 2010, meeting; and (5) MECA and FBS “had
    a deal.”
    The second of the foregoing contentions is not a fraudulent
    statement. MECA does not deny that it had reached an agree-
    ment with FBS on all material terms; however, this does not
    create a binding agreement, because of the condition precedent
    of board approval as discussed above. The first, third, and
    fourth contentions are statements of unfulfilled promises or
    future events and therefore are not subject to a finding of fraud.
    As to the fifth contention, we find FBS could not have reason-
    ably relied upon it for two reasons. First, MECA made known
    to FBS from the outset of negotiations that board approval was
    necessary. FBS does not allege that MECA ever represented
    to it that the lease was board approved or that board approval
    was not necessary. Grammas conceded that he could not have
    reasonably relied upon Dixon’s “we ha[ve] a deal” statement
    when Grammas stated in his deposition that although as a
    businessman, he may believe someone’s statement “‘You got
    a deal,’” to have a legally enforceable agreement, “you got
    to see the paper.” In 168th and Dodge, LP v. Rave Reviews
    Cinemas, LLC, 
    501 F.3d 945
    , 957 (8th Cir. 2007), the court,
    applying Nebraska law, held that sophisticated business entities
    could not reasonably rely upon a statement that an agreement
    was a “‘done deal’” without execution of the required writ-
    ten agreement. Therefore, we find that the trial court properly
    rejected FBS’ claim of fraud.
    Furthermore, the statute of frauds prevents an oral agree-
    ment in these circumstances. FBS claims the parties agreed
    to a minimum 5-year lease of the TD Ameritrade Park sta-
    dium. Nebraska’s statute of frauds states: “Every contract
    for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    12	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    sale of any lands, shall be void unless the contract or some
    note or memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the
    party whom the lease or sale is to be made.” 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-105
     (Reissue 2008).
    [14,15] If there is no signed contract, a party seeking to
    overcome the statute of frauds must proffer a writing, signed
    by the opposing party, detailing the terms and conditions of
    their promises. Hansen v. Hill, 
    215 Neb. 573
    , 
    340 N.W.2d 8
    (1983). The writing can be any written evidence of an oral
    contract so long as the writing contains the essential terms
    of the contract. See David v. Tucker, 
    196 Neb. 575
    , 
    244 N.W.2d 197
     (1976). The written evidence does not need to
    be contained in a single document or communication, but
    “[i]f the terms of the contract can be collected from the cor-
    respondence of the parties . . . it will be a sufficient memo-
    randum within the meaning of the statute of frauds.” Collyer
    v. Davis, 
    72 Neb. 887
    , 893, 
    101 N.W. 1001
    , 1003 (1904).
    Accord Fowler Elevator Co. v. Cottrell, 
    38 Neb. 512
    , 
    57 N.W. 19
     (1893).
    In this case, there is no memorandum or writing that meets
    the requirements of the statute of frauds. The cover letter to
    the MOU specifically stated that the MOU was nonbinding
    and subject to the MECA Board’s approval. The September 17,
    2010, draft lease identifies itself as a draft, contains blue edit-
    ing marks, and is not signed by MECA.
    As pointed out by FBS, both parties were represented by
    legal counsel throughout the negotiations. Furthermore, the par-
    ties were sophisticated businesspersons. Sophisticated business
    entities are charged with knowledge of the statute of frauds
    and cannot reasonably rely on oral statements. See 168th and
    Dodge, LP v. Rave Reviews Cinemas, LLC, 
    501 F.3d 945
     (8th
    Cir. 2007). In 168th and Dodge, LP, the Eighth Circuit, inter-
    preting Nebraska law, found as a matter of law that because
    one party should have known that a lease for an interest in real
    estate must be in writing, it could not have reasonably relied on
    the other party’s oral statement that the lease agreement was a
    “‘done deal.’” 
    501 F.3d at 957
    .
    We therefore find that the trial court was correct in denying
    summary judgment on FBS’ fraudulent representation claim.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	13
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    (c) Promissory Estoppel
    FBS argues that in the alternative to breach of contract, it is
    entitled to damages on grounds of promissory estoppel because
    MECA induced it to suffer damages. FBS relies upon French’s
    September 20, 2010, letter to the commissioner of the Northern
    League in which she requests issuance of a franchise to FBS. It
    claims that as a result of the letter, the Northern League issued
    a franchise to FBS which cost FBS $210,000 and a future com-
    mitment of $800,000. It claims on appeal that it was entitled to
    summary judgment for reimbursement of the $210,000 it paid
    for the franchise. We disagree.
    [16] Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a court may
    enforce a promise made by a party if (1) that party should
    reasonably expect its promise to induce another party’s action
    or forbearance, (2) its promise does induce action or forbear-
    ance, and (3) the only way to avoid injustice is to enforce the
    promise. See Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 
    235 Neb. 738
    , 
    457 N.W.2d 793
     (1990).
    To succeed under its promissory estoppel claim, FBS must
    prove that it paid $210,000 as a result of a promise made by
    MECA. FBS relies heavily upon French’s September 20, 2010,
    letter to the commissioner of the Northern League which states
    that “MECA plans to have the final agreement approved at the
    October 14, 2010 meeting of the MECA Board.” The letter
    contains no promise that the MECA Board will approve the
    lease, a condition precedent to any binding contract between
    the parties. Even considering the oral statements attributed
    to the individual MECA employees, none of those statements
    indicated that the MECA Board’s approval was received or had
    become unnecessary. Since no promise was made regarding
    board approval, we find that FBS failed to prove the threshold
    element of promissory estoppel.
    Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to prove that
    French should have reasonably expected FBS to make an
    immediate payment for the franchise. She testified in her
    deposition that she did not know a franchise fee was required.
    Dixon testified that he assumed FBS would have to pay a
    franchise fee, but there is nothing to indicate when that fee
    was due. Of the $210,000 that FBS claims as damages, the
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    14	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    record indicates that $10,000 was a nonrefundable applica-
    tion fee which FBS paid prior to the date of French’s letter;
    therefore, French’s letter could not have induced this pay-
    ment. The evidence further reveals a draft in the amount of
    $198,000 dated September 16, 2010 (4 days prior to French’s
    letter), which Grammas identified as a copy of the check paid
    to the Northern League for the franchise. The record indicates
    that a franchise agreement was entered into on September
    29 and that FBS immediately paid a deposit of $200,000.
    There is no evidence that anyone from MECA should have
    reasonably expected FBS to make such a payment prior
    to the MECA Board’s approving the lease, because board
    approval was a condition precedent from the outset of the par-
    ties’ negotiations.
    [17,18] In addition, as stated above, the statute of frauds is
    applicable to the alleged agreement because it involves a lease
    greater than 1 year. Promissory estoppel is not an exception to
    the statute of frauds. See Farmland Service Coop, Inc. v. Klein,
    
    196 Neb. 538
    , 
    244 N.W.2d 86
     (1976). Only
    [w]here a party to a written contract within the stat-
    ute of frauds induces another to waive some provision
    upon which he is entitled to insist and thereby change
    his position to his disadvantage because of that party’s
    inducement [will] the inducing party . . . be estopped to
    claim that such oral modification is invalid because not
    in writing.
    See 
    id. at 543
    , 244 N.W.2d at 89-90. Promissory estoppel
    cannot be used to circumvent the statute of frauds. Rosnick,
    
    supra.
    FBS seeks alternative damages based on MECA’s alleged
    failure to fulfill an obligation that is covered by the statute of
    frauds by artfully pleading promissory estoppel. Because the
    statute of frauds applies, we find that the trial court properly
    denied FBS’ promissory estoppel claim.
    2. MECA’s Motion for
    Summary Judgment
    FBS alleges that the trial court should not have granted
    MECA’s motion for summary judgment. FBS argues that the
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	15
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    statute of frauds is inapplicable because the parties set forth
    their initial agreement in writing, FBS partially performed
    under the agreement, and the statute of frauds does not apply
    to claims of fraud and promissory estoppel.
    Our discussion above regarding the insufficiency of the
    writings upon which FBS relies and its claims of fraud and
    promissory estoppel adequately addresses FBS’ argument as
    to these claims, and we find that the trial court did not err
    in its determination that the statute of frauds was applicable
    on these bases. Therefore, we will address only FBS’ claim
    that partial performance removes this case from the statute
    of frauds.
    [19] A court will enforce in equity an oral contract partly
    performed, even if the contract falls within the statute of
    frauds. See Campbell v. Kewanee Finance Co., 
    133 Neb. 887
    ,
    
    277 N.W. 593
     (1938).
    [20-22] The justification of the partial performance excep-
    tion to the statute of frauds is that partial performance is
    good evidence for believing an agreement exists. Howard O.
    Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts § 7:36 (2012). Ordinary
    business preparations, however, are not sufficient to remove
    an alleged contract from the statute of frauds. Id. Preliminary
    acts or mere preparations to act do not constitute partial per-
    formance. F.D.I.C. v. Altholtz, 
    4 F. Supp. 2d 80
     (D. Conn.
    1998). See Heine v. Fleischer, 
    184 Neb. 379
    , 
    167 N.W.2d 572
     (1969).
    In Heine, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that paying
    the entire consideration for the purchase of realty was not
    sufficient partial performance to prevent application of the
    statute of frauds. Similarly, in 168th and Dodge, LP v. Rave
    Reviews Cinemas, LLC, 
    501 F.3d 945
     (8th Cir. 2007), the
    court found that plaintiffs who spent approximately $600,000
    to purchase additional land and remove a gasline to ensure
    the land was ready for the impending lease agreement had not
    partially performed the contract.
    In this case, FBS argues that it partially performed the
    contract by taking steps to hire staff, develop a marketing
    scheme, and acquire a baseball franchise. FBS alleges that it
    spent $210,000 acquiring a franchise and other sums to pay
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    16	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    the salaries of staff hired to work on promoting the baseball
    team. But FBS did not actually perform any part of the contract
    through these actions.
    These actions were similar to the actions of the plaintiffs
    in 168th and Dodge, LP, 
    supra,
     in that while the actions were
    substantial, they were necessary before the plaintiffs could
    begin performing the contract. In this case, FBS needed to
    acquire a franchise and create a marketing plan before it could
    play professional baseball in the TD Ameritrade Park stadium,
    which was the purpose of the proposed lease. Preparations do
    not constitute sufficient performance to remove the contract
    from the statute of frauds.
    Because the parties had no express contract and the statute
    of frauds applies to FBS’ claims of fraud and promissory estop-
    pel, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judg-
    ment in favor of MECA.
    3. Denial of Dismissal
    as Sanction
    MECA cross-appeals the trial court’s denial of sanctions
    against FBS. MECA argues that the trial court should have
    used its inherent power to sanction FBS by dismissing its com-
    plaint because FBS materially altered evidence and attached it
    to its original complaint in a misleading way.
    The record reveals that FBS attached to its original com-
    plaint an altered piece of documentary evidence purporting to
    be a lease to which the parties agreed. We note that counsel
    for FBS concedes he removed language indicating this was a
    draft, added the signature of FBS, and added initials of FBS’
    representative on each page. MECA moved for sanctions,
    including requesting that the trial court dismiss FBS’ complaint
    with prejudice or stay discovery until the altered lease was
    explained. FBS filed a motion to strike MECA’s motion for
    sanctions claiming that “[t]here has been absolutely no tamper-
    ing, misrepresentations, or underhandedness of any kind and
    [MECA’s] Motion is a red hearing [sic] intended to mislead the
    Court.” Despite this accusation, FBS admitted to the alterations
    set forth above of “the removal of ‘draft’ from the upper right
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	17
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    hand corner, the signature of [FBS], and the initials of [FBS’]
    representative on each page.”
    At the hearing on the motion for sanctions, FBS’ counsel
    confessed that one of his colleagues or FBS itself altered the
    document he attached to the complaint. However, he stated that
    the act was not “dishonest.” The court addressed the serious-
    ness of counsel’s actions in the following exchange:
    THE COURT: The problem that I have is in paragraph
    13 of the complaint, it says the agreement was memo-
    rialized in writing within a stadium lease agreement
    prepared by MECCA [sic] and its attorneys. In that case
    that is an agreement and is something that they sent to
    you. Then you say a copy of the stadium lease agreement
    signed by FBS is attached there to [sic] as Exhibit A,
    inferring Exhibit A is the same item as the stadium lease
    agreement allegedly sent. If you wanted to modify if [sic]
    and say sent [sic] a copy of the stadium lease agreement
    signed by FBS is attached to Exhibit A, wouldn’t that
    solve it?
    [Counsel for FBS]: It would solve it.
    THE COURT: You don’t think that’s misleading?
    [Counsel for FBS]: I don’t think so.
    ....
    [Counsel for FBS]: We weren’t trying to be misleading.
    THE COURT: But it is. I don’t think there’s any
    question.
    FBS’ counsel then orally moved to file an amended com-
    plaint without the altered document attached. The trial court
    denied sanctions and granted leave to file the amended
    complaint.
    In addition, FBS’ counsel also confesses to sending a let-
    ter via e-mail to Omaha’s mayor encouraging him to persuade
    MECA to honor the purported lease agreement. In support,
    counsel attached a copy of the complaint containing the lease
    with the deletions and alterations confessed above. Counsel
    represented to the mayor that the attached lease was a “true and
    correct” copy of the lease.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    18	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    [23] We review a trial court’s determination of a request
    for sanctions for abuse of discretion. See Paro v. Farm &
    Ranch Fertilizer, 
    243 Neb. 390
    , 
    499 N.W.2d 535
     (1993). We
    note that typically, a request for sanctions arises under Neb.
    Ct. R. Disc. § 6-337 for violation of a court order involving
    discovery. In the present case, MECA requested sanctions for
    violation of the very foundation upon which the practice of
    law is built—integrity. While our court rules do not contain a
    specific provision imposing sanctions upon one who violates
    his duties as an officer of the court, such violation is no less
    sanctionable than violation of a discovery rule, and the courts
    have inherent power to impose such sanctions. In the past, this
    level of misconduct may have subjected the offender to the old
    English common law rule requiring attorneys who deceived
    the court to be imprisoned for a day and a year. See, West. 1, 3
    Edw. I, ch. 29 (1275); Alex B. Long, Attorney Deceit Statutes:
    Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions
    and Treble Damages, 
    44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 413
     (2010). But,
    we review a trial court’s order on sanctions for an abuse of
    discretion, and we find that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying MECA’s requested sanction of dismissal
    with prejudice.
    [24] A judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge,
    within the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects
    to act or refrains from acting, but the selected option results in
    a decision which is untenable and unfairly deprives a litigant
    of a substantial right or a just result in matters submitted for
    disposition through a judicial system. Cole v. Isherwood, 
    271 Neb. 684
    , 
    716 N.W.2d 36
     (2006). Applying this definition,
    we find that although the granting of such a sanction would
    have been within the trial court’s discretion, its refusal to do
    so was not untenable; nor did it deprive MECA of a substan-
    tial right or just result. FBS omitted the altered lease when it
    filed its amended complaint, removing the false impression
    that MECA had provided a final copy for FBS’ consideration.
    The case then proceeded without the false representation that
    MECA had submitted a final lease to FBS for consideration.
    Therefore, MECA was not deprived of a substantial right or
    just result. We further note that dismissing FBS’ complaint
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    FAST BALL SPORTS v. METROPOLITAN ENTERTAINMENT	19
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 1
    would have punished the client rather than its attorney, and
    the record contains no indication that FBS was aware of its
    counsel’s actions.
    This is not to say that we condone counsel’s actions or that
    we adhere to a principle of “no harm, no foul” in a situation
    such as this. To the contrary, we find FBS’ counsel’s conduct
    highly offensive for an officer of the court. But our standard
    of review dictates this outcome, and it is not the function of
    an appellate court to become investigators and truth finders
    on issues not before it. Any potential discipline is not within
    our realm, but, rather, within that of the Counsel of Discipline,
    if appropriate. See, e.g., State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v.
    Riskowski, 
    272 Neb. 781
    , 
    724 N.W.2d 813
     (2006); State ex
    rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Mills, 
    267 Neb. 57
    , 
    671 N.W.2d 765
    (2003). Thus, our finding of no abuse of discretion by the trial
    court in denying the particular sanction sought should not be
    taken for anything more than exactly that.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to FBS, and
    giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
    the evidence, we find that the trial court did not err in denying
    FBS’ motion for summary judgment or in granting MECA’s
    motion for summary judgment. While we do not condone the
    actions of FBS’ counsel, we do not find that the trial court
    abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss FBS’ complaint
    with prejudice. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order in
    all respects.
    Affirmed.
    Irwin, Judge, participating via the Internet.