State v. Newman ( 2013 )


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  •             Decisions     of the     Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	29
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    compensation court, the evidence in the record supports a
    finding that she suffered a cumulative, repetitive trauma injury
    in January 2011.
    [11] Although we need not address this argument in order to
    resolve this case, we do note that this issue was not assigned
    as error in Hadfield’s brief. Errors argued but not assigned will
    not be considered on appeal. Sheperd v. Chambers, 
    281 Neb. 57
    , 
    794 N.W.2d 678
     (2011).
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the compensation court’s order of dis-
    missal did not comply with rule 11(A), because it failed to
    clearly address whether it had considered Hadfield’s injuries
    under a cumulative, repetitive trauma theory. Therefore, we
    reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the compensa-
    tion court with directions to consider this matter under a cumu-
    lative, repetitive trauma theory.
    R eversed and remanded with directions.
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Stewart O. Newman, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed July 16, 2013.    Nos. A-12-404, A-12-405.
    1.	 Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress. In reviewing
    a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the
    Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review.
    Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for
    clear error. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protec-
    tions is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the
    trial court’s determination.
    2.	 Constitutional Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure. For the
    protections of the Fourth Amendment to apply, a seizure must have occurred. A
    seizure requires either a police officer’s application of physical force to a suspect
    or a suspect’s submission to an officer’s show of authority.
    3.	 Search and Seizure. Determinations as to whether a person has been seized are
    questions of fact.
    4.	 Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. A seizure in the Fourth Amendment
    context occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident,
    a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    30	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    5.	 Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure. In addition to situations
    where an officer directly tells the suspect that he or she is not free to go, circum-
    stances indicative of a seizure may include the threatening presence of several
    officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
    citizen’s person, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compli-
    ance with the officer’s request might be compelled.
    6.	 ____: ____. The question of whether a person’s consent to accompany law
    enforcement officials was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress
    or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of the
    circumstances.
    7.	 ____: ____. A request to accompany law enforcement to a police station for ques-
    tioning does not carry an implication of obligation so awesome for a suspect that
    it renders his actions involuntary.
    8.	 Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Waiver. Both the U.S. and Nebraska
    Constitutions guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei-
    zures. That right may be waived by consent.
    9.	 Warrantless Searches: Proof. When the prosecution seeks to justify a war-
    rantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that the
    consent was given by the defendant, but may show that the permission to search
    was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other
    sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.
    10.	 Warrantless Searches: Police Officers and Sheriffs. A warrantless search is
    valid when based upon consent of a third party whom the police, at the time
    of the search, reasonably believed possessed authority to consent to a search of
    the premises, even if it is later demonstrated that the individual did not possess
    such authority.
    11.	 Speedy Trial. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
     (Cum. Supp. 2012) provides that, in
    general, a defendant must be brought to trial within 6 months after the filing of
    the information, unless the 6 months are extended by any period to be excluded
    in computing the time for trial.
    12.	 ____. If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for
    trial, as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to an absolute
    discharge from the offense charged.
    13.	 Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. As a general rule, a trial
    court’s determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy
    trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
    clearly erroneous.
    14.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpre-
    tation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent
    conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
    15.	 Indictments and Informations: Speedy Trial. When determining the impact the
    filing of an amended information has on speedy trial considerations, it is impor-
    tant to determine whether the amendment charges the same or a totally different
    crime, and if it does not change the nature of the charge, then the time continues
    to run against the State for purposes of the speedy trial act.
    Decisions     of the    Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	31
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    16.	 Indictments and Informations. An amended information which charges a differ-
    ent crime, without charging the original crime(s), constitutes an abandonment of
    the first information and acts as a dismissal of the same.
    17.	 Sexual Assault: Words and Phrases. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319.01
     (Cum. Supp.
    2012) provides, in relevant part, that a person commits sexual assault of a child
    in the first degree when he or she subjects another person under 12 years of age
    to sexual penetration and the actor is at least 19 years of age or older.
    18.	 ____: ____. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318
    (6) (Reissue 2008) defines sexual penetra-
    tion as meaning sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning, cunnilingus, fellatio,
    anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the actor’s or
    victim’s body or any object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal
    openings of the victim’s body which can be reasonably construed as being for
    nonmedical or nonhealth purposes.
    19.	 Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a sufficiency of the
    evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination
    thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in
    the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such
    matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an appellate court is
    whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
    any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    20.	 Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sen-
    tence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the
    trial court.
    21.	 Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial
    court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its
    action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence.
    22.	 Sentences. In imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the
    defend­ nt’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and
    a
    cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct,
    and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8)
    the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.
    23.	 ____. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judg-
    ment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s
    demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
    defendant’s life.
    Appeals from the District Court for Douglas County: J.
    Patrick Mullen, Judge. Affirmed.
    Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
    Jeanine E. Tlustos for appellant.
    Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust for
    appellee.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    32	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    Inbody, Chief Judge, and Irwin and Moore, Judges.
    Irwin, Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Stewart O. Newman appeals his convictions and sentences
    on one count of first degree sexual assault of a child and six
    counts of visual depiction of child pornography. On appeal,
    Newman challenges rulings of the district court for Douglas
    County overruling two motions to suppress, overruling a
    motion to discharge, finding sufficient evidence to support
    the sexual assault conviction, and imposing sentences. We
    find Newman’s assertions on appeal to be meritless, and
    we affirm.
    II. BACKGROUND
    This case involves allegations of first degree sexual assault
    of a child and visual depiction of child pornography involv-
    ing one young girl, who was born in March 1999 and was
    approximately 10 years of age at the time of the events giv-
    ing rise to these criminal charges. To protect her anonymity,
    we will simply refer to her as “Jane” (as in “Jane Doe”)
    throughout this opinion. In addition, inasmuch as the factual
    background of this case is graphic, our explanations of the
    testimony will be only as detailed as necessary to explain
    the underlying legal analysis that results in affirmance of
    Newman’s convictions.
    In February 2010, Jane sent her mother a text message
    indicating that Newman had been “trying to have sex with
    [her].” Jane’s mother called the 911 emergency dispatch serv­
    ice and reported the allegations and then took Jane to “Project
    Harmony,” where she was interviewed by a member of the
    Omaha Police Department’s special victims/child sexual assault
    unit. After Jane’s interview with law enforcement, Newman
    was arrested. Sometime later, Newman’s wife contacted law
    enforcement about suspecting that there was child pornography
    on a laptop computer in Newman’s home, and a search of that
    laptop revealed a variety of suspected pornographic images of
    children, including photographs of Jane.
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	33
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    1. Jane’s Testimony and Interview
    Jane testified at trial, recounting the history of Newman’s
    conduct toward her. Jane testified that Newman began speak-
    ing with her about sex when she was approximately 6 years
    of age. She testified that when she was approximately 7 or
    8 years of age, she observed Newman looking at pornog­
    raphy on a computer and Newman began showing her por-
    nographic images. She testified that when she was 6 years
    of age, Newman began touching her “private parts” with his
    hands, and that when she was approximately 8 years of age,
    he touched her “private” with his “private.” She testified that
    he also would sometimes “touch [her] private” with his mouth
    and “lick [her] private.”
    Jane testified that there were occasions where Newman and
    Jane would both be unclothed and Newman would rub his
    penis on her vagina, rubbing it “back and forth.” She testi-
    fied that Newman rubbed his penis “inside the folds” of her
    vagina and that he would then instruct her to lie on her stom-
    ach. She testified that after she lay on her stomach, Newman
    would rub his “front area” on her “bottom,” with his penis
    “on top of [her] hole area,” and that eventually “white stuff”
    would come out of Newman’s penis, which she could feel on
    her back.
    Jane testified that she was approximately 8 years of age
    when Newman first showed her what came out of his penis.
    She testified that Newman had told her her “opening” was too
    small for his penis to go inside of and that nothing ever went
    inside the “hole” of her vagina or the “hole” of her “butt area.”
    She testified, however, that when Newman would lick her
    vaginal area, she could feel the “folds” of her vagina “com-
    ing apart.”
    Jane also testified that in September 2009, when she was
    10 years of age, Newman took photographs of her without any
    clothes on. She testified that Newman “posed” her in certain
    positions in the photographs. At trial, six photographs were
    received into evidence and the parties stipulated that the photo-
    graphs were of Jane. These photographs depict Jane, including
    her genitalia, and Newman’s penis is depicted in more than one
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    of the photographs. In one of the photographs, Jane’s hand is
    holding Newman’s penis and pointing it at her vagina.
    Det. Robert Butler testified that he interviewed Jane at
    Project Harmony in February 2010. Detective Butler testified
    that Jane had described to him that Newman had “separat[ed]”
    the labia of her vagina with his tongue and with his penis.
    He testified Jane had indicated that Newman put his tongue
    “inside of her” and that although Newman’s licking of her
    vagina was sometimes on the “outside,” it was “most[ly]” on
    the “inside.”
    2. Newman’s Statements and Testimony
    On or about February 12, 2010, after Jane reported Newman’s
    conduct to her mother and Jane was interviewed at Project
    Harmony, Omaha law enforcement officers made contact with
    Newman at his home. Two detectives in plain clothes and two
    uniformed officers made contact with Newman. The detectives
    advised Newman that they wanted to conduct a formal inter-
    view with him at the police station, and Newman agreed to
    accompany them. Newman was then transported to the police
    station in an unmarked vehicle. According to one of the detec-
    tives, Newman never expressed any reluctance to accompany-
    ing them.
    At the police station, Newman was advised of his rights
    from a standard rights advisory form and was interviewed. The
    interview lasted approximately 2 hours and was recorded, with
    both audio and video. During the interview, Newman never
    indicated that he wanted to stop the interview and never asked
    to speak with an attorney.
    During the interview, Newman initially denied that any
    sexual assault had occurred. Eventually, however, he acknowl-
    edged the conduct and indicated that it had “snowballed”
    from touching to instances of oral sex. During the interview,
    Newman indicated that on at least one occasion, Jane had put
    her mouth on his penis.
    At trial, Newman testified in his own behalf. Although he
    acknowledged that he had made statements during the inter-
    view about Jane’s placing his penis in her mouth, he denied
    that such conduct ever occurred. He testified that he showed
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
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    Jane what a “blow job” was by showing her a video on the
    computer. He also denied ever placing his mouth on Jane’s
    vaginal area.
    Newman acknowledged that he had watched pornography
    with Jane and had shown her pornography on a computer.
    He testified that Jane had heard about sex from other girls
    and asked him questions about it, and he testified that he
    thought he could “curb [her] curiosity” by watching pornog­
    raphy with her. He testified that the “wors[t]” the conduct ever
    got between him and Jane was “showing each other” and “a
    little bit of touching” and “some rubbing.” He testified that he
    did not know what had been in his mind to make him remove
    his pants while looking at pornography with Jane.
    Newman testified that he “only ejaculated on [Jane] once,”
    in 2009. He testified that he rubbed his penis on her “bottom”
    while looking at pornography with her, and he acknowledged
    that Jane may have rubbed her hands on his penis to make
    it erect.
    Newman testified that there were approximately six instances
    of some contact in 2009, that he “probably” rubbed his penis
    on Jane five of those times, and that he ejaculated on one occa-
    sion. He testified that this conduct occurred with clothes on,
    and described that he would stand between Jane’s spread legs
    while rubbing back and forth. He testified that initially, he was
    trying “to educate” Jane.
    Newman acknowledged that he had posed Jane and taken
    pictures of her in the nude. He acknowledged that one of the
    photographs received into evidence depicted his erect penis
    with Jane’s hand around it. He testified that the photographs
    were taken on the same occasion when he ejaculated. Newman
    testified that Jane “wanted” the photographs taken.
    Although Newman testified that he had shown pornog-
    raphy to Jane, that he had viewed pornography with Jane,
    that he and Jane had become naked in each other’s presence
    and had engaged in “showing each other” and “a little bit of
    touching” and “some rubbing,” that Jane had rubbed his penis
    on at least one occasion, that he had ejaculated after rubbing
    his penis against Jane’s bottom, and that he had posed Jane
    and taken a number of pictures of her nude genitalia and a
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    36	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    photograph of her hand around his penis, Newman denied
    that any penetration ever occurred during any of the instances
    with Jane.
    3. Laptop Computer
    Approximately 1 week after Newman was arrested, his wife
    (now his ex-wife) contacted law enforcement officers because,
    while she was using a laptop computer in their house, she dis-
    covered “inappropriate” Web sites in the computer’s browser
    history. During a hearing on a motion to suppress, she testified
    that the Web sites had names that included such words as “little
    models” and “incest.” She testified that she observed a picture
    (which she did not describe) and “shut it down real quick”
    before calling law enforcement.
    Newman’s wife testified that she and Newman shared
    expenses, had combined financial accounts, and usually made
    joint decisions regarding purchases. She testified that the two
    had purchased two computers with a joint tax refund and that
    although one of the computers was primarily used by her and
    one primarily used by Newman, she had access to both com-
    puters and had business files on the computer primarily used
    by Newman that she accessed frequently. She testified that the
    computer was owned jointly and that she gave law enforcement
    permission to search the computer.
    Newman’s wife testified that on the occasion on which she
    discovered the questionable content that caused her to con-
    tact law enforcement, she was not required to log onto the
    computer because it was already “booted up” and was on the
    kitchen counter in the house.
    Newman’s wife testified that both computers had, at one
    time, required the same password for logging on, because
    both she and Newman used both computers. She testified that
    Newman had changed the password on the subject computer
    in November or December 2009, because the couple had a
    teenage girl staying with them and Newman had wanted to
    keep her from being able to access the Internet through the
    computer. Newman’s wife testified that she did not recall
    whether Newman had told her the new password; she was
    never actually asked whether she knew the password, but
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	37
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    21 Neb. App. 29
    she testified that she knew typical words that Newman used
    as passwords.
    One of the detectives involved in the investigation of the
    case testified that Newman’s wife contacted law enforcement
    approximately 1 week after Newman’s arrest and indicated
    that she had found child pornography on a computer primarily
    used by Newman. The detective testified that he understood
    she had access to the computer and that law enforcement
    obtained her permission to search the computer. He testified
    that he believed the computer was password protected, but that
    Newman’s wife provided law enforcement with the password.
    He testified that he believed the password was written on a slip
    of paper found inside the laptop computer’s case.
    After the computer was booked into property, a forensics
    analysis was performed. The law enforcement officer who per-
    formed the analysis testified that he believed the other officer
    provided him with the password for the computer, but that he
    did not need the password because he was able to use a foren-
    sics software program to view files on the computer without
    use of the password. He later testified at trial that he did not
    have the password for the computer.
    The officer who performed the forensics analysis testi-
    fied that he found evidence of child pornography on the
    computer and that law enforcement then decided to obtain a
    search warrant to make a full analysis of the computer. After
    a search warrant was obtained, 11 images of Jane and more
    than 90 images of other children were located. He testified
    that many of the images of other children were consistent
    with images in a Nebraska State Patrol repository of known
    child pornography and were downloaded to the computer
    through a peer-to-peer program called LimeWire. The offi-
    cer who performed the forensics analysis also testified that
    he found information on the computer concerning numerous
    Web sites catering to people looking for images of young
    children and teenagers.
    4. P rocedural Background
    On February 17, 2010, Newman was charged by informa-
    tion with first degree sexual assault of Jane. On March 1,
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    Newman was charged by information with six counts of visual
    depiction of child pornography.
    (a) Suppression
    Prior to trial, Newman sought to suppress evidence obtained
    from the search of the laptop computer. Newman also sought
    to suppress statements made during his February 12, 2010,
    interview.
    On February 28, 2011, the district court denied Newman’s
    motion to suppress evidence obtained from the computer. The
    court found that the computer was jointly purchased and owned
    by Newman and his wife, that his wife had mutual access to
    and use of the computer, and that she gave the password to
    law enforcement. The court also found that law enforcement
    was reasonable in believing Newman’s wife had authority to
    provide consent for a search of the computer and that Newman
    had waived any privacy interest in the computer when he left it
    logged on in a common area of the house.
    On June 15, 2011, the district court denied Newman’s
    motion to suppress statements. The court found that Newman
    had voluntarily accompanied law enforcement to the police
    station and had been properly advised of his rights before he
    made incriminating statements.
    (b) Discharge
    On July 29, 2010, Newman waived his right to speedy trial
    concerning the then-pending first degree sexual assault of
    a child charge and the six visual depiction of child pornog­
    raphy charges.
    In May 2011, a second amended information was filed con-
    cerning the child pornography charges. In the second amended
    information, Newman was charged with 10 counts of visual
    depiction of child pornography and 10 counts of possession of
    child pornography. In January 2012, Newman filed a motion
    for discharge concerning the child pornography charges, alleg-
    ing that more than 6 months had elapsed since the filing of the
    second amended information.
    In response to Newman’s motion to discharge, the State
    filed a motion to dismiss the 14 additional charges which were
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
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    21 Neb. App. 29
    included in the second amended information. The court granted
    this motion, leaving Newman again charged with six counts of
    visual depiction of child pornography. The district court denied
    the motion to discharge, finding that after the State dismissed
    the additional charges, Newman remained in exactly the same
    position as he had been in when he waived his right to speedy
    trial in July 2010.
    (c) Verdict and Sentencing
    Newman waived his right to jury trial. After a trial to the
    bench, the district court found Newman guilty of one count of
    first degree sexual assault of a child and guilty of six counts
    of visual depiction of child pornography. The court sentenced
    Newman to a term of 45 to 70 years’ imprisonment on the
    sexual assault conviction. The court sentenced Newman to con-
    current sentences of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment on each of the
    child pornography convictions. The court ordered the concur-
    rent child pornography sentences to be served consecutively to
    the sexual assault sentence. In addition, Newman was required
    to comply with Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act. This
    appeal followed.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    On appeal, Newman challenges the district court’s denial
    of each of his motions to suppress, the court’s denial of his
    motion to discharge, the sufficiency of the evidence to support
    the sexual assault conviction, and the sentences imposed by the
    district court.
    IV. ANALYSIS
    1. Motions to Suppress
    [1] Newman challenges the district court’s denial of his
    motions to suppress statements he made to law enforcement
    investigating the claim of sexual assault and to suppress evi-
    dence of child pornography obtained from law enforcement’s
    search of a laptop computer. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling
    on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the
    Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part stan-
    dard of review. State v. Casillas, 
    279 Neb. 820
    , 782 N.W.2d
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    40	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    882 (2010); State v. Hedgcock, 
    277 Neb. 805
    , 
    765 N.W.2d 469
    (2009). Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews
    the trial court’s findings for clear error. 
    Id.
     But whether those
    facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a
    question of law that an appellate court reviews independently
    of the trial court’s determination. 
    Id.
     We find no merit to
    either assertion.
    (a) Statements
    Newman first asserts that the district court erred in deny-
    ing his motion to suppress statements made during his initial
    interview with law enforcement. His argument is premised on
    an assertion that law enforcement effected an unlawful arrest
    of him at his home and that the entire subsequent interview
    at the police station was fruit of the poisonous tree. We agree
    with the district court that the circumstances demonstrate
    that Newman made a voluntary statement, after being fully
    advised of his rights, and we find no merit to this assertion
    of error.
    [2,3] It is axiomatic that for the protections of the Fourth
    Amendment to apply, a seizure must have occurred. State v.
    Hedgcock, 
    supra.
     A seizure requires either a police officer’s
    application of physical force to a suspect or a suspect’s submis-
    sion to an officer’s show of authority. 
    Id.
     Determinations as to
    whether a person has been seized are questions of fact. State v.
    Bronson, 
    242 Neb. 931
    , 
    496 N.W.2d 882
     (1993).
    [4,5] A seizure in the Fourth Amendment context occurs only
    if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
    reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not
    free to leave. State v. Casillas, 
    supra;
     State v. Hedgcock, 
    supra.
    In addition to situations where the officer directly tells the sus-
    pect that he or she is not free to go, circumstances indicative
    of a seizure may include the threatening presence of several
    officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
    touching of the citizen’s person, or the use of language or tone
    of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request
    might be compelled. State v. Hedgcock, 
    supra.
    [6] The question of whether a person’s consent to accom-
    pany law enforcement officials was in fact voluntary or was
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
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    21 Neb. App. 29
    the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to
    be determined by the totality of the circumstances. State v.
    Bronson, 
    supra.
    In State v. Victor, 
    235 Neb. 770
    , 
    457 N.W.2d 431
     (1990),
    the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of
    statements made after the defendant accompanied law enforce-
    ment to the police station. In that case, the defendant was
    suspected of being involved in a homicide and, while driving
    his automobile, was stopped by a police cruiser accompanied
    by an unmarked police vehicle. The defendant was asked to
    accompany law enforcement to the police station. The defend­
    ant asked whether he could leave his vehicle where it was
    parked, was cooperative and agreed to accompany law enforce-
    ment, and was transported in an unmarked police car. He was
    not handcuffed.
    [7] The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the record
    “clearly demonstrate[d] that [the defendant] voluntarily coop-
    erated with the police.” 
    Id. at 782
    , 
    457 N.W.2d at 440
    . The
    court concluded that given the totality of the circumstances,
    the trial court was not clearly wrong in concluding that no
    unlawful seizure had occurred when law enforcement stopped
    the defendant, asked him to accompany them to the police sta-
    tion, and transported him to the police station for an interview.
    State v. Victor, 
    supra.
     The court specifically rejected the asser-
    tion that a request to accompany law enforcement “to a police
    station for questioning carries an implication of obligation so
    awesome for a suspect that it renders his actions involuntary.”
    
    Id. at 782
    , 
    457 N.W.2d at 441
    .
    Similarly, in State v. Bronson, 
    242 Neb. at 935
    , 
    496 N.W.2d at 887
    , police officers made contact with the defendant at his
    house, explained that they wanted to “‘talk to him at Central
    Police Headquarters,’” and transported him to the police station
    for an interview. The defendant “was not threatened, coerced, or
    promised anything, was not told he was under arrest, was not
    handcuffed, and rode in the back seat of [an] unmarked police
    car with the two officers in the front.” 
    Id.
     The defendant was
    described as “calm and cooperative.” 
    Id.
    In that case, the Nebraska Supreme Court again held that
    the defendant had voluntarily accompanied law enforcement
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    42	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    to the police station. State v. Bronson, 
    242 Neb. 931
    , 
    496 N.W.2d 882
     (1993). The court held that despite the fact that
    the defendant was interrogated in privacy and in unfamil-
    iar surroundings, considered from a totality of the circum-
    stances, the situation did not rise to the level of a custodial
    seizure. 
    Id.
    The facts of the present case are substantially similar. One
    of the detectives involved in the investigation testified that
    he, another detective, and two uniformed officers went to
    Newman’s house and made contact with him. The detective
    testified that Newman “actually may have come out prior to
    [their] knocking on [the door],” but that he could not recall
    exactly. He testified they advised Newman that his name had
    come up in an investigation and that they wanted to conduct a
    formal interview at the police station. Newman “was receptive
    and he agreed to accompany” the officers. Newman was then
    transported in an unmarked vehicle with the two plainclothes
    detectives. The detective also testified that he did not believe
    Newman was handcuffed (and later testified Newman was
    not in handcuffs when he arrived in the interview room at
    the police station) and that Newman was not advised he was
    under arrest. He testified that Newman never became reluctant
    or indicated that he was unwilling to accompany law enforce-
    ment. Once in the interview room, Newman was advised of
    his rights from a standard rights advisory form before making
    any statements.
    There is no indication in the record that any law enforce-
    ment officer displayed a weapon, physically touched Newman,
    or otherwise took action to suggest that Newman was com-
    pelled to accompany them. There is no indication that any law
    enforcement officers took any action to suggest that Newman
    was threatened or coerced into accompanying them. Rather,
    the totality of the circumstances indicates that Newman was
    asked to accompany law enforcement and that he willingly and
    voluntarily did so.
    As in State v. Bronson, 
    supra,
     and State v. Victor, 
    235 Neb. 770
    , 
    457 N.W.2d 431
     (1990), the totality of the circumstances
    in this case indicates that Newman voluntarily accompanied
    law enforcement to the police station and was not unlawfully
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	43
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    seized at his home. As such, we find no merit to Newman’s
    assertion that the district court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress statements.
    (b) Search of Laptop
    Newman next asserts that the district court erred in denying
    his motion to suppress evidence of child pornography found on
    a laptop computer. His argument is premised on an assertion
    that his wife lacked authority to grant consent for a search of
    the laptop and that she did not know the password to access the
    laptop. We find that the district court did not err in finding that
    his wife had authority to consent to the search, and we reject
    this assertion of error.
    [8-10] The Nebraska Supreme Court recently addressed
    the issue of shared authority to consent to a search in State
    v. Reinpold, 
    284 Neb. 950
    , 
    824 N.W.2d 713
     (2013). Both the
    U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions guarantee the right to be free
    from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Reinpold,
    supra. That right may be waived by consent. Id., citing State
    v. Konfrst, 
    251 Neb. 214
    , 
    556 N.W.2d 250
     (1996). When the
    prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of
    voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that the consent
    was given by the defendant, but may show that the permis-
    sion to search was obtained from a third party who possessed
    common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
    premises or effects sought to be inspected. 
    Id.
     Furthermore,
    a warrantless search is valid when based upon consent of a
    third party whom the police, at the time of the search, reason-
    ably believed possessed authority to consent to a search of the
    premises, even if it is later demonstrated that the individual did
    not possess such authority. 
    Id.
    In State v. Reinpold, supra, the defendant rented one of six
    apartments located in a single dwelling owned by his parents.
    At the time, the dwelling was also occupied by the defend­
    ant’s grandparents and uncle. The defendant, his grandpar-
    ents, and his uncle were the only occupants of the dwelling,
    and all used the basement of the dwelling for storage. Both
    the defendant and his uncle stored property in the northeast
    corner of the basement. The defendant subsequently moved
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    44	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    from the dwelling, but left belongings in the basement stor-
    age area.
    After the defendant had moved from the dwelling, his
    grandparents located a laptop computer in his former apart-
    ment and, while examining it, discovered images of suspected
    child pornography. When the defendant’s uncle contacted him
    about the laptop computer, the defendant denied owning it. The
    defendant subsequently went to the dwelling to retrieve the
    laptop computer, and its location was unknown to the date of
    the Supreme Court’s opinion.
    During a subsequent investigation, law enforcement was
    informed about the images that had been viewed on the laptop
    computer and the defendant’s grandparents and uncle informed
    law enforcement that the defendant had stored several com-
    puter hard drives in the basement of the dwelling. They
    led the investigating officer to the northeast corner of the
    basement, where three hard drives were located and seized.
    Subsequent searches of the hard drives revealed suspected
    child pornography.
    In State v. Reinpold, supra, the Nebraska Supreme Court
    held that the district court was not clearly wrong in finding
    that the defendant’s grandparents and uncle had actual and/
    or apparent authority to consent to a search of the northeast
    corner of the basement area. The evidence demonstrated that
    the defendant’s grandparents and uncle had unfettered access
    to the basement and that the defendant’s uncle stored items in
    the northeast corner of the basement. There was no evidence
    adduced to demonstrate that the investigating officer had any
    information to suggest that the defendant had exclusive use
    of the northeast corner of the basement. Thus, the Supreme
    Court rejected the defendant’s assertion that the search was
    performed without valid consent.
    Similarly, the evidence in the present case indicates that
    Newman’s wife had actual and/or apparent authority to consent
    to a search of the laptop computer. Newman’s wife testified
    that the laptop computer was owned jointly and that there was
    business information located on it that she “used frequently.”
    She testified that the parties shared expenses, had combined
    checking accounts, and usually made joint decisions about
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	45
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    purchases. She testified that the laptop computer was pur-
    chased by the parties with a joint tax refund. She testified that
    they purchased two laptop computers at the same time, that the
    one in question was primarily used by Newman, and that both
    parties had access to the laptop computers.
    Newman’s wife testified that when she discovered the ques-
    tionable content on the laptop computer in question, it had
    been located on the kitchen counter and it was “already booted
    up,” so she did not need to enter a password to use it. She
    testified that Newman had changed the password for access-
    ing the computer in November or December 2009 to prevent
    a teenager who had been staying with them from being able
    to access the Internet. She testified that she could not recall
    whether Newman had told her the new password, but that
    they “[t]ypically . . . used similar” passwords and that she was
    aware of other passwords that Newman utilized. She was never
    asked whether she knew the password or whether she provided
    the password to law enforcement.
    One of the detectives testified that Newman’s wife con-
    tacted law enforcement about having found possible child
    pornography on the laptop computer. He testified that she
    indicated she had found the possible child pornography “on a
    computer primarily used by” Newman and that it was decided
    law enforcement could seize the laptop computer because it
    was joint property. He testified that law enforcement obtained
    permission from Newman’s wife to search the laptop computer
    and that she signed a standard consent-to-search form. He
    testified that his understanding was that Newman’s wife had
    access to the laptop computer.
    We conclude that the district court was not clearly errone-
    ous in finding that Newman’s wife had actual and/or appar-
    ent authority to consent to a search of the laptop computer.
    Newman’s assertion of error is without merit.
    2. Motion to Discharge
    Newman next challenges the district court’s denial of his
    motion to discharge the child pornography charges brought
    against him. His argument is premised on an assertion that
    the filing of a second amended information resulted in
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    46	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    charges different from those previously charged and to which
    he had waived speedy trial protections and that more than 6
    months passed before he was brought to trial on the charges
    in the second amended information. We find no merit to
    Newman’s assertion.
    [11,12] As Newman correctly notes on appeal, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
     (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012) provides
    that, in general, a defendant must be brought to trial within 6
    months after the filing of the information, unless the 6 months
    are extended by any period to be excluded in computing the
    time for trial. See State v. Florea, 
    20 Neb. App. 185
    , 
    820 N.W.2d 649
     (2012). If a defendant is not brought to trial before
    the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded peri-
    ods, he or she shall be entitled to an absolute discharge from
    the offense charged. 
    Id.
    [13,14] As a general rule, a trial court’s determination as to
    whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds
    is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
    clearly erroneous. 
    Id.
     To the extent an appeal calls for statutory
    interpretation or presents questions of law, an appellate court
    must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the deter-
    mination made by the court below. 
    Id.
    [15,16] In State v. French, 
    262 Neb. 664
    , 
    633 N.W.2d 908
    (2001), the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the State’s fil-
    ing of an amended information and such filing’s impact on
    speedy trial considerations. The court concluded that “[i]t is
    important to determine whether the amendment charges the
    same crime or a totally different crime” and held that “[i]f the
    amendment to the . . . information does not change the nature
    of the charge, then obviously the time continues to run against
    the State for purposes of the speedy trial act.” 
    Id. at 670
    , 
    633 N.W.2d at 914
    . An amended information which charges a dif-
    ferent crime, without charging the original crime(s), constitutes
    an abandonment of the first information and acts as a dismissal
    of the same. See 
    id.
    In the present case, the initial information charging Newman
    with child pornography alleged that he had committed six
    counts of visual depiction of child pornography between
    February 13 and 24, 2010. With respect to those charges,
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	47
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    Newman specifically waived his right to speedy trial. The
    second amended information included 10 counts of visual
    depiction of child pornography and 10 counts of posses-
    sion of child pornography. Certainly, the amended information
    charged additional crimes for which a new speedy trial clock
    would begin and for which Newman’s prior waiver of speedy
    trial would not be effective.
    However, at the hearing on Newman’s motion to discharge,
    the State dismissed the 14 additional charges alleged in the sec-
    ond amended information. Thus, the State elected to proceed
    with prosecution of Newman only on the original six counts of
    visual depiction of child pornography with which he had been
    charged in the original information, and for which he had spe-
    cifically waived his right to speedy trial.
    The district court found that upon the State’s dismissal of
    the additional charges in the second amended information,
    Newman remained in the same position as he had been at
    the time he waived his right to speedy trial: charged with six
    counts of visual depiction of child pornography. We find no
    error in this ruling, and we find no merit to Newman’s asser-
    tion that the court erred in denying his motion for discharge of
    the child pornography charges.
    3. Sufficiency of Evidence
    Newman next asserts that the district court erred in finding
    sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for first degree
    sexual assault of a child. His argument is premised on an
    assertion that the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
    demonstrate that penetration occurred. Newman’s assertions on
    appeal amount to challenges to the credibility of the victim,
    and there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. As
    such, we find no merit to this assertion of error.
    [17] 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319.01
     (Reissue 2008 & Cum.
    Supp. 2012) provides, in relevant part, that a person commits
    sexual assault of a child in the first degree when “he or she
    subjects another person under twelve years of age to sexual
    penetration and the actor is at least nineteen years of age or
    older.” There is no issue in this case concerning the ages of
    Newman or the victim. Newman was born in 1971 and was
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    48	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    37 or 38 years of age during the relevant time period; the
    victim was born in 1999 and was 10 years of age during the
    relevant time period. Newman’s assertions on appeal con-
    cern only the sufficiency of the evidence concerning “sexual
    penetration.”
    [18] 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318
    (6) (Reissue 2008) defines
    sexual penetration as meaning
    sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning, cunnilingus,
    fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight,
    of any part of the actor’s or victim’s body or any object
    manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal openings
    of the victim’s body which can be reasonably construed
    as being for nonmedical or nonhealth purposes.
    Section 28-318(6) also indicates that “[s]exual penetration shall
    not require emission of semen.”
    [19] In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
    whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combina-
    tion thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does
    not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility
    of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for
    the finder of fact. State v. Watson, 
    285 Neb. 497
    , 
    827 N.W.2d 507
     (2013). The relevant question for an appellate court is
    whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
    able to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt. 
    Id.
    In this case, the victim (Jane) testified about Newman’s
    conduct. She testified that Newman began touching her private
    parts when she was approximately 6 years of age and that the
    conduct ended when she was 10 years of age. She testified
    that Newman “rubbed on” her by putting “his privates on [her]
    front private.” She testified that Newman’s touching of her
    happened “[t]oo many times to count.”
    Jane testified that when she was approximately 6 years of
    age, Newman primarily “touch[ed] [her] private parts with
    his hands” and that, although “usually [her clothes] were
    on, . . . sometimes they were off.” She testified that when
    she was 7 or 8 years of age, Newman began showing her
    pornography and began touching “his private parts on [her]
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	49
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    private parts.” She testified that Newman would sometimes
    touch her private parts with his mouth and that he would
    “lick [her] private.”
    Jane testified about Newman’s touching of his private parts
    to her private parts. She described that both she and Newman
    would have their clothes off and that Newman would rub his
    penis on her vagina. She specifically testified that Newman
    would rub “inside the folds of [her] vagina.” She testified that
    “like halfway through he’d tell [her] to get on [her] stomach”
    and that he would then rub “his front area on [her] bottom.”
    She testified that Newman would rub his penis on the “inside
    just on top of the hole area” of “[her] butt.” She testified that
    “a white stuff came out, and then he’d just wipe the white stuff
    off with like a sock or a towel.” She testified that Newman
    ejaculated “[o]nto [her] back area.”
    Jane also testified that when Newman would lick her vagina,
    she remembered “like the folds coming apart.”
    On cross-examination, Jane agreed that she had told law
    enforcement during her interview at Project Harmony that
    nothing ever went inside “the hole” of her vagina or her anus.
    She also acknowledged that if there were differences in her
    memory of what happened between her testimony at trial and
    statements she made during the Project Harmony interview,
    her memory at the time of the Project Harmony interview was
    probably more accurate. She denied that her story of what
    had happened had changed, however. On redirect examina-
    tion, she again testified that she remembered that she could
    feel that Newman was rubbing his penis inside the folds of
    her vagina.
    Detective Butler, who conducted the interview of Jane at
    Project Harmony, was asked whether Jane described “any
    penetration” by Newman with his penis or hands, and he
    responded “no.” Detective Butler testified, however, that his
    supplemental report referenced Newman’s “penetrating [Jane’s]
    vaginal area with his tongue, separating the labia minor[a] and
    the majora, and also rubbing her vaginal area with his penis,
    separating the labia minor[a] and the majora and rubbing his
    penis inside her butt, but not inside the hole.” He testified that
    he did not go over the legal definition of “penetration” with
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    50	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    Jane. Detective Butler was asked whether Jane indicated that
    Newman put his tongue “inside of her” and “[u]p into the hole”
    and “in the hole,” and he responded, “Yes. She said that she
    could feel it inside of her.”
    Newman testified in his own behalf. During his testimony,
    he acknowledged that the videotape of his initial interview
    with law enforcement revealed that he had made statements
    to law enforcement indicating that Jane had put her mouth on
    his penis, but he denied that it ever happened. He also denied
    ever putting his mouth on Jane’s vagina. He acknowledged
    occasions between him and Jane of “showing each other” and
    occasions of “a little bit of touching” and “a little bit of some
    rubbing.” He testified that Jane “might have rubbed her hands
    on [his penis] a couple of times” to help him get erect. He
    acknowledged ejaculating onto Jane on one occasion.
    Newman’s argument on appeal is that the above evidence is
    not sufficient to sustain a factual finding that there was sexual
    penetration. He argues that during her initial interview, Jane
    indicated there had been no penetration, and that she acknowl-
    edged at trial that her memory would have been more accurate
    at the time of the initial interview than at trial. According to
    Newman, the only evidence of penetration was statements of
    Jane made more recently and “[i]t is likely that these later
    statements were not as accurate as the statements that [Jane]
    made during the initial interview at Project Harmony.” Brief
    for appellant at 28.
    We find no merit to Newman’s assertion of error. As
    recounted above, Detective Butler’s report of the initial inter-
    view of Jane indicated that she had described Newman’s
    separating the labia of her vagina with both his tongue and
    his penis and that she described Newman’s placing his tongue
    “inside of her.” Jane testified at trial that Newman licked
    her and rubbed his penis “inside the folds” of her vagina.
    Newman himself acknowledged having made statements to
    law enforcement indicating that Jane placed her mouth on his
    penis, although he denied at trial that any such conduct hap-
    pened. Newman’s argument on appeal is entirely an assertion
    that the testimony of Jane and Detective Butler should not be
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	51
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    found credible; credibility is not an issue we resolve on appel-
    late review.
    There was clearly sufficient evidence from which a rational
    trier of fact could find that there was “any intrusion, however
    slight, of any part of [Newman’s] body . . . into the genital or
    anal openings of [Jane’s] body which can be reasonably con-
    strued as being for nonmedical or nonhealth purposes.” See
    § 28-318(6). Newman’s assertion that there was insufficient
    evidence to sustain a conviction for first degree sexual assault
    of a child is meritless.
    4. Excessive Sentences
    Newman’s final assertion of error is that the district
    court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences.
    Newman’s argument on appeal is not that the sentences imposed
    were outside of the relevant statutory limits, but, rather, that
    the court should have given more consideration to mitigating
    factors and imposed less harsh sentences. We find no abuse
    of discretion.
    [20,21] The standard for reviewing an excessive sentence
    claim is well established. State v. Wills, 
    285 Neb. 260
    , 
    826 N.W.2d 581
     (2013). An appellate court will not disturb a sen-
    tence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of
    discretion by the trial court. 
    Id.
     An abuse of discretion occurs
    when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are
    untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against jus-
    tice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 
    Id.
    [22,23] In imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should
    consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education
    and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past
    criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6)
    motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the
    offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the com-
    mission of the crime. 
    Id.
     The appropriateness of a sentence is
    necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing
    judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude
    and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s
    life. 
    Id.
    Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    52	21 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS
    We have recounted in a fair amount of detail throughout this
    opinion what the evidence in this case demonstrated: Newman,
    while 37 or 38 years of age, engaged in a pattern of sexual
    conduct with a child, beginning when she was 6 years of age
    and continuing until she reported it at 10 years of age. The
    evidence indicates that the conduct included touching, lick-
    ing, and rubbing of genitals and ejaculation on more than one
    occasion. Newman was convicted of first degree sexual assault
    of a child and six counts of visual depiction of child pornog­
    raphy related to photographs he took of the 10-year-old victim.
    Those photographs depict the child in the nude, posed, with
    her breasts and genitals exposed, and include an image of the
    child’s hand gripping Newman’s erect penis.
    At trial, Newman did not dispute that he had engaged in
    this inappropriate conduct, except to assert that there had
    never been penetration. He attempted to explain his behavior
    by indicating that the child in this case had asked questions
    about sex and that he thought these actions would “curb
    [her] curiosity” and “educate” her. Newman acknowledged
    that he took photographs of Jane that included “posing” of
    her, but testified that the 10-year-old child wanted the photo-
    graphs taken.
    At sentencing, the sentencing court in this case described
    Newman’s conduct as grooming of this victim. The court
    concluded that Newman had not shown any remorse or under-
    standing of the “psychic pain” that he had caused the vic-
    tim. The court found that Newman is a predator and a threat
    to vulnerable children and noted that he not only sexually
    assaulted this young child, but also photographed her, evidenc-
    ing his enjoyment.
    The court sentenced Newman to a term of 45 to 70 years’
    imprisonment for the first degree sexual assault of a child
    conviction, to be served consecutively with six concurrent
    sentences of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment on each of the
    visual depiction of child pornography convictions. These sen-
    tences were all within the statutory limits, and the sentences
    on the child pornography convictions were near the low end
    of the sentencing range. In light of the nature of the offenses
    and the circumstances of this case, there was no abuse of
    Decisions   of the  Nebraska Court of Appeals
    STATE v. NEWMAN	53
    Cite as 
    21 Neb. App. 29
    discretion by the sentencing court. This assertion of error
    is meritless.
    V. CONCLUSION
    We find no merit to Newman’s assertions of error. The dis-
    trict court did not err in denying his motions to suppress or his
    motion for discharge. There was sufficient evidence to sustain
    the convictions. The sentences imposed were not excessive.
    As such, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-12-404, A-12-405

Filed Date: 7/16/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021