Chase County v. City of Imperial ( 2018 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    08/14/2018 09:08 AM CDT
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    CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL
    Cite as 
    26 Neb. Ct. App. 219
    Chase County, a political subdivision of the
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v. City of
    Imperial, a political subdivision of
    the State of Nebraska, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed August 14, 2018.   No. A-17-813.
    1.	 Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm
    a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admit-
    ted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
    or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and
    that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    2.	 Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The interpretation
    of statutes and regulations presents questions of law, in connection with
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent con-
    clusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
    3.	 Declaratory Judgments: Statutes. An action for a declaratory judg-
    ment is an appropriate remedy to determine the validity, construction, or
    interpretation of a statute.
    4.	 Declaratory Judgments. The general rule is that an action for declara-
    tory judgment does not lie where another equally serviceable remedy
    is available.
    5.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain
    and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
    pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
    direct, and unambiguous.
    6.	 Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. In discerning the
    meaning of a statute, an appellate court must determine and give effect
    to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the
    entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popu-
    lar sense.
    7.	 Statutes. If the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute
    are the end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning.
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    CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL
    Cite as 
    26 Neb. Ct. App. 219
    8.	 Arrests: Health Care Providers: Costs. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 47-703(2) (Cum. Supp. 2016), the costs of medical services are
    chargeable to the agency responsible for operation of the correctional
    facility where the recipient is lodged in all cases where medical services
    were not necessitated by injuries or wounds suffered during the course
    of apprehension or arrest.
    9.	 Statutes. If the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute
    are the end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning.
    10.	 Arrests: Health Care Providers: Costs. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 47-701
    and 47-702 (Reissue 2010) apply to the costs of medical services for
    any person in need of such services at the time such person is arrested,
    detained, taken into custody, or incarcerated, and their application is not
    limited to only those arrestees who are ultimately lodged into a correc-
    tional facility.
    11.	 Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning
    into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
    a statute.
    Appeal from the District Court for Chase County: David
    W. Urbom, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
    proceedings.
    Joshua J. Wendell, of McQuillan & Wendell, P.C., L.L.O.,
    for appellant.
    Arlan G. Wine, Chase County Attorney, for appellee.
    Andre R. Barry and Nathan D. Clark, of Cline, Williams,
    Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for amicus curiae League
    of Nebraska Municipalities.
    Pirtle, R iedmann, and Bishop, Judges.
    R iedmann, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    The City of Imperial (the City) appeals from an order of the
    district court for Chase County, which entered summary judg-
    ment in favor of Chase County (the County). For the reasons
    that follow, we reverse the district court’s order and remand the
    cause for further proceedings.
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    CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL
    Cite as 
    26 Neb. Ct. App. 219
    BACKGROUND
    On the evening of December 24, 2016, a police officer who
    worked for the City arrested an individual for disturbing the
    peace and transported him to the Chase County jail, a correc-
    tional facility operated by the County. Upon arrival at the jail,
    the arrestee was intoxicated, uncooperative, and belligerent.
    The jail employees began the booking process. Based on the
    arrestee’s intoxicated condition, noncompliance, and refusal
    to answer medical questions, a jail employee asked the police
    officer to take the arrestee to a hospital for medical clearance.
    The arrestee was evaluated at the hospital, and after receiving
    medical clearance, he was returned to the jail. He was much
    more cooperative at that point, the booking process was com-
    pleted, and he was lodged into the jail.
    The hospital presented a medical bill for the arrestee’s
    medical evaluation in the amount of $436 to each party for
    payment. Each party denied payment, claiming the other party
    was responsible for payment of the bill. As a result of the dis-
    agreement, the County filed a complaint in the Chase County
    District Court seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether the
    County or the City was responsible for payment of the medi-
    cal bill.
    The County filed a motion for summary judgment. After
    holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the
    motion and found that the City was responsible for payment of
    the medical bill. The City appeals.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    The City assigns, summarized, that the district court erred in
    granting the County’s motion for summary judgment.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant of
    summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
    or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
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    CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL
    Cite as 
    26 Neb. Ct. App. 219
    matter of law. Sulu v. Magana, 
    293 Neb. 148
    , 
    879 N.W.2d 674
    (2016).
    [2] The interpretation of statutes and regulations presents
    questions of law, in connection with which an appellate court
    has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irre-
    spective of the decision made by the court below. Bridgeport
    Ethanol v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 
    284 Neb. 291
    , 
    818 N.W.2d 600
    (2012).
    ANALYSIS
    The parties agree that either the County or the City is the
    party responsible for payment of the medical bill at issue.
    They also agree that the matter is governed by Neb. Rev. Stat.
    §§ 47-701 to 47-703 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2016). We
    therefore provide no comment on whether the medical bill
    at issue is for “medical services” as that term is defined in
    § 47-701.
    [3,4] We note that the relief sought in the County’s com-
    plaint was a declaration that the City was responsible to pay
    the medical bill, rather than a request that the district court
    interpret and apply the applicable statutes. In fact, the County’s
    complaint does not specifically reference the statutes at issue
    here. An action for a declaratory judgment is an appropriate
    remedy to determine the validity, construction, or interpreta-
    tion of a statute. Mullendore v. School Dist. No. 1, 
    223 Neb. 28
    , 
    388 N.W.2d 93
    (1986). But the general rule is that an
    action for declaratory judgment does not lie where another
    equally serviceable remedy is available. Carlson v. Carlson,
    
    299 Neb. 526
    , 
    909 N.W.2d 351
    (2018). In this case, however,
    neither party has challenged the availability of declaratory
    relief nor alleged that a more serviceable remedy is available.
    We therefore assume, without deciding, that it was proper for
    the district court to entertain the parties’ request for declaratory
    relief. See 
    id. The City
    argues that the district court erred in conclud-
    ing that the City was responsible for paying the medical
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    CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL
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    bill, rather than holding the County responsible for payment.
    We agree.
    [5-7] A determination of which governmental agency is
    responsible for payment requires statutory interpretation. Thus,
    we begin by recalling basic principles of statutory interpreta-
    tion. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary
    meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation
    to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
    direct, and unambiguous. Bridgeport Ethanol v. Nebraska Dept.
    of 
    Rev., supra
    . In discerning the meaning of a statute, we must
    determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the
    Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the stat-
    ute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. 
    Id. If the
    language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are
    the end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning. 
    Id. We now
    turn to the applicable statutes themselves. Section
    47-701(1) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision
    of law, sections 47-701 to 47-705 shall govern responsibility
    for payment of the costs of medical services for any person
    ill, wounded, injured, or otherwise in need of such services at
    the time such person is arrested, detained, taken into custody,
    or incarcerated.”
    Section 47-702 places primary responsibility for payment
    of the costs of medical services “provided to individuals who
    are arrested, detained, taken into custody, or incarcerated” with
    the recipients of such services if they have insurance coverage
    available to them.
    Section 47-703(1) states that upon a showing that reimburse-
    ment from the sources enumerated in § 47-702 is not available,
    in whole or in part, the costs of medical services shall be paid
    by the appropriate governmental agency.
    The County and the City agree that reimbursement from the
    sources listed in § 47-702 is not available in the instant case,
    and thus, the costs of the medical services are to be paid by the
    appropriate governmental agency. They disagree, however, on
    which governmental agency is responsible.
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    CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL
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    26 Neb. Ct. App. 219
    According to § 47-703(2):
    In the case of medical services necessitated by injuries
    or wounds suffered during the course of apprehension or
    arrest, the appropriate governmental agency chargeable
    for the costs of medical services shall be the apprehend-
    ing or arresting agency and not the agency responsible
    for operation of the institution or facility in which the
    recipient of the services is lodged. In all other cases, the
    appropriate governmental agency shall be the agency
    responsible for operation of the institution or facility
    in which the recipient of the services is lodged, except
    that when the agency is holding the individual solely
    for another jurisdiction, the agency may, by contract or
    otherwise, seek reimbursement from the other jurisdic-
    tion for the costs of the medical services provided to the
    individual being held for that jurisdiction.
    It is undisputed that the arrestee in the present case did not
    require medical services because of an injury or wound suf-
    fered during the course of his arrest. Therefore, the first por-
    tion of § 47-703(2) does not apply here.
    [8] The remainder of § 47-703(2) indicates that it applies
    “[i]n all other cases” or, in other words, in all cases where
    there was no injury or wound suffered during the course of
    apprehension or arrest. Stated another way, the costs of medi-
    cal services are chargeable to the agency responsible for opera-
    tion of the correctional facility where the recipient is lodged
    in all cases where medical services were not necessitated by
    injuries or wounds suffered during the course of apprehension
    or arrest.
    The County argues that its payment responsibility arises
    only once the recipient of services has been lodged into the
    facility, meaning after the booking process has been com-
    pleted and the arrestee becomes an inmate. In support of its
    argument, the County cites to the Nebraska jail standards,
    see Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 83-4,124 to 83-4,134 (Reissue 2014
    & Cum. Supp. 2016), which it claims prohibits a jailer from
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    accepting a prisoner until booking procedures have been com-
    pleted. The district court agreed with the County, interpret-
    ing § 47-703(2) to find that the point at which the payment
    obligation transferred from the arresting agency to the facility
    receiving the prisoner rested on the term “lodged.” The court
    went on to conclude that a person is not “lodged” in jail until
    such person has been accepted by the facility after the person
    and arresting officer have complied with all requirements for
    acceptance, including any medical examination of the arrestee.
    The district court therefore determined that because the medi-
    cal services in the instant case were rendered before the book-
    ing process was complete, the City was responsible for the
    medical costs.
    [9] We disagree with the County and the district court. The
    language of § 47-703(2) is clear and unambiguous. If the lan-
    guage of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the end
    of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning, and we are there-
    fore precluded from looking beyond the words of the statute to
    construe its meaning. See Stewart v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev.,
    
    294 Neb. 1010
    , 
    885 N.W.2d 723
    (2016). Thus, consideration
    of and reference to the Nebraska jail standards is unnecessary
    and prohibited.
    [10] Sections 47-701 and 47-702 apply to the costs of
    medical services for any person in need of such services at
    the time such person is arrested, detained, taken into cus-
    tody, or incarcerated, and their application is not limited to
    only those arrestees who are ultimately lodged into a correc-
    tional facility.
    [11] Additionally, we do not read § 47-703(2) to require
    lodging the arrestee into the facility as a condition precedent to
    holding the County responsible for medical costs. Considering
    the plain language of § 47-703(2) as a whole, determination of
    the appropriate governmental agency responsible for the pay-
    ment of medical costs falls under two categories: If the medical
    services were required because of an injury or wound suffered
    during the course of the arrest, then the arresting agency bears
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    the responsibility of the costs. In all other cases where medical
    services were necessary, the agency responsible for operation
    of the correctional facility where the individual is lodged must
    pay the costs. Accepting the County’s argument would require
    us to read out of the statute the words “[i]n all other cases” and
    create a third category of circumstances. It is not within the
    province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is
    not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute.
    Stewart v. Nebraska Dept. of 
    Rev., supra
    .
    Furthermore, application of the County’s argument would
    allow the County to circumvent payment for medical services
    for any person who is arrested, detained, or taken into cus-
    tody by requiring medical services for that individual prior to
    completing the booking process. Section 47-703 clarifies pay-
    ment responsibility and imposes responsibility on the arrest-
    ing agency only when the need for services is necessitated
    by injuries or wounds suffered in the course of apprehension
    or arrest. To interpret the statute in any other manner would
    require us to treat the phrase “[i]n all other cases” as super-
    fluous. We view the phrase “facility in which the recipient of
    the services is lodged” to describe the governmental agency
    that operates the facility rather than to limit its responsibility
    for payment.
    Consequently, we conclude that the district court erred in
    determining that the City was responsible for the medical
    costs. We therefore reverse the district court’s order entering
    summary judgment in favor of the County and, there being no
    competing summary judgment motion from the City, remand
    the cause for further proceedings.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court’s order is reversed, and the cause is
    remanded for further proceedings.
    R eversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-17-813.

Judges: Pirtle, Riedmann, Bishop

Filed Date: 8/14/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024