State v. McBride , 27 Neb. Ct. App. 219 ( 2019 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    05/14/2019 09:06 AM CDT
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    STATE v. McBRIDE
    Cite as 
    27 Neb. App. 219
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Heather M. McBride, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed May 7, 2019.     No. A-18-797.
    1. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Sentences within statutory limits will be
    disturbed by an appellate court only if the sentence complained of was
    an abuse of judicial discretion.
    2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
    presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
    3. Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. When a district court, sitting
    as an intermediate appellate court, enters an order that affects a substan-
    tial right, that order is final for purposes of appeal if its judgment can be
    executed without any further action by the district court.
    4. Courts: Final Orders: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A district
    court order affirming, reversing, or remanding an order or judgment of
    the county court is itself a final order that an appellate court has jurisdic-
    tion to review.
    5. Pleas: Sentences: Restitution. The failure to inform a defendant of the
    possibility of restitution renders the entry of a plea of guilty involuntary
    and unintelligent in that regard and consequently prevents the imposi-
    tion of an order of restitution.
    6. Pleas: Proof. While in order for a defendant to enter a voluntary and
    intelligent plea of guilty, he or she must know the penalty for the crime
    to which he or she is pleading, and although it is preferable that such
    knowledge be imparted by the judge accepting the plea, it is nonetheless
    possible to prove the defendant’s knowledge by other means.
    7. Criminal Law: Restitution: Damages. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2280
    (Reissue 2016) vests trial courts with the authority to order restitu-
    tion for actual damages sustained by the victim of a crime for which a
    defend­ant is convicted.
    8. ____: ____: ____. Pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2281
     (Reissue
    2016), before restitution can be properly ordered, the trial court must
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    STATE v. McBRIDE
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    27 Neb. App. 219
    consider: (1) whether restitution should be ordered, (2) the amount of
    actual damages sustained by the victim of a crime, and (3) the amount
    of restitution a criminal defendant is capable of paying.
    9.    Sentences: Restitution. When a court orders restitution to a crime
    victim under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2280
     (Reissue 2016), restitution is
    a criminal penalty imposed as punishment and is part of the criminal
    sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
    10.    Sentences. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjec-
    tive judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the
    defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances
    surrounding the defendant’s life.
    11.    Sentences: Restitution. After the sentencing court determines that a
    conviction warrants restitution, it then becomes the sentencing court’s
    factfinding responsibility to determine the victim’s actual damages and
    the defendant’s ability to pay.
    12.    ____: ____. Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2281
     (Reissue 2016), the sen-
    tencing court may hold a hearing at the time of sentencing to determine
    the amount of restitution.
    13.    Sentences: Restitution: Evidence. Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2281
    (Reissue 2016), the sentencing court’s determination of restitution shall
    be based on the actual damages sustained by the victim and shall be sup-
    ported by evidence which shall become a part of the court record.
    Appeal from the District Court for Madison County, M ark
    A. Johnson, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
    for Madison County, Ross A. Stoffer, Judge. Judgment of
    District Court affirmed.
    Ronald E. Temple, of Fitzgerald, Vetter, Temple & Bartell,
    for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Kimberly A.
    Klein for appellee.
    R iedmann, Bishop, and Welch, Judges.
    R iedmann, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Heather M. McBride pled guilty in the county court for
    Madison County to an amended charge of attempted for­
    gery. She was sentenced to 90 days in jail and ordered to pay
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    restitution. She appealed to the district court, which affirmed
    the jail term and the county court’s determination of the
    amount of restitution, but vacated the restitution order and
    remanded the matter to the county court for a determination
    of McBride’s ability to pay. McBride appeals to this court.
    We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s order and
    therefore affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    McBride and her sister, Danica AllAround, purchased a
    2009 GMC Acadia in December 2016 for $13,144. Both of
    their names appeared on the bill of sale and title to the vehi-
    cle. In May 2017, McBride had someone forge AllAround’s
    signature on the title, and McBride sold the vehicle for
    $6,500. McBride retained all of the proceeds of the sale, and
    AllAround was not reimbursed for any portion of the pur-
    chase price.
    As a result of these events, McBride was originally charged
    with three felony counts. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the
    State, she pled guilty to an amended charge of attempted sec-
    ond degree forgery, a Class I misdemeanor. At the outset of the
    plea hearing, McBride’s counsel indicated to the county court
    that the parties had reached an agreement whereby McBride
    would plead guilty to the amended charge and “the parties will
    ask the [c]ourt to set the matter for a restitution hearing and
    sentencing thereafter.” After advising McBride of her rights
    and ascertaining her understanding, the court accepted her plea
    and found her guilty. The court then clarified with McBride’s
    counsel his request to have the matter set for a restitution hear-
    ing, and counsel confirmed his request.
    The restitution hearing was held immediately prior to sen-
    tencing. A copy of the bill of sale for the purchase of the
    vehicle, a copy of AllAround’s bank statement showing that
    she paid the purchase price, and a copy of the vehicle’s title
    depicting AllAround’s forged signature were all received into
    evidence at the restitution hearing.
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    STATE v. McBRIDE
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    AllAround testified that she paid all of the $13,144 for the
    vehicle and that McBride did not pay any portion of the pur-
    chase price. Thus, she was seeking restitution from McBride
    in the amount of the purchase price. She admitted that she did
    not have an opinion as to the value of the vehicle at the time
    McBride sold it.
    McBride also testified and admitted that she thought
    $3,300, approximately half of the price for which she sold the
    vehicle, was a fair amount of restitution. McBride was asked
    whether she contributed any money toward the purchase of
    the vehicle, and she responded, “I choose not to say anything
    right now.”
    After hearing the evidence, the county court found that the
    evidence showed that the vehicle was purchased for $13,144
    and that although the names of both AllAround and McBride
    were on the title to the vehicle, there was no evidence that
    McBride put any money toward the purchase price. Therefore,
    because the evidence before the court established that only
    AllAround paid the entire amount, the court ordered McBride
    to pay restitution in the amount of $13,144. McBride was also
    sentenced to 90 days in jail.
    McBride appealed to the district court for Madison County.
    She assigned that the county court erred in ordering restitu-
    tion and imposing an excessive sentence. The district court
    affirmed the jail sentence and the amount of actual damages.
    However, it vacated the restitution order and remanded the
    matter for further determination as to McBride’s ability to pay
    restitution and as to the timeframe in which she is able to pay.
    McBride now appeals to this court.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    McBride couches her assigned errors as those committed
    by the trial court; however, because she is appealing from the
    order on appeal by the district court, we restate her assigned
    errors as follows: The district court erred in finding that
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    (1) she was properly advised of the possibility of an order of
    restitution, (2) the circumstances warranted an order of res-
    titution, and (3) the State sufficiently proved the amount of
    actual damages.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Sentences within statutory limits will be disturbed by
    an appellate court only if the sentence complained of was an
    abuse of judicial discretion. State v. Ramirez, 
    285 Neb. 203
    ,
    
    825 N.W.2d 801
     (2013). An abuse of discretion takes place
    when the sentencing court’s reasons or rulings are clearly
    untenable and unfairly deprive a litigant of a substantial right
    and a just result. 
    Id.
    ANALYSIS
    At the outset, we note that the State asserts that although
    the district court remanded portions of the restitution order for
    further determination by the county court, this court has juris-
    diction over the appeal. We agree.
    [2-4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
    it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it. State v. Coble, 
    299 Neb. 434
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 646
     (2018). When a district court, sitting as
    an intermediate appellate court, enters an order that affects a
    substantial right, that order is final for purposes of appeal if
    its judgment can be executed without any further action by
    the district court. Barrios v. Commissioner of Labor, 
    25 Neb. App. 835
    , 
    914 N.W.2d 468
     (2018). Where the district court
    reverses a judgment in favor of a party, and remands the mat-
    ter for further proceedings, that party’s substantial right has
    been affected. 
    Id.
     Further, a district court order affirming,
    reversing, or remanding an order or judgment of the county
    court is itself a final order that an appellate court has jurisdic-
    tion to review. State v. Coble, 
    supra.
     Having found that this
    court has jurisdiction over this matter, we now turn to the
    assigned errors.
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    Advisement of Possibility
    of Restitution.
    McBride argues that the district court erred in finding that
    restitution was appropriate because she was never advised of
    the possibility of an order of restitution. We disagree.
    [5,6] The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the failure
    to inform a defendant of the possibility of restitution renders
    the entry of a plea of guilty involuntary and unintelligent in
    that regard and consequently prevents the imposition of an
    order of restitution. See State v. War Bonnett, 
    229 Neb. 681
    ,
    
    428 N.W.2d 508
     (1988). However, the court has also held
    that while in order for a defendant to enter a voluntary and
    intelligent plea of guilty, he or she must know the penalty
    for the crime to which he or she is pleading, and although it
    is preferable that such knowledge be imparted by the judge
    accepting the plea, it is nonetheless possible to prove the
    defendant’s knowledge by other means. State v. Fischer,
    
    220 Neb. 664
    , 
    371 N.W.2d 316
     (1985). In State v. Mentzer,
    
    233 Neb. 843
    , 
    448 N.W.2d 409
     (1989), the Supreme Court
    upheld a restitution order where the defendant, through his
    attorney, advised the court at sentencing that he was will-
    ing to make any restitution that would be ordered, thereby
    establishing that he was aware that an order of restitution was
    a possibility.
    Likewise here, McBride was not informed at arraignment
    or at the time she entered her plea that restitution was a pos-
    sible penalty for her crime. However, at the outset of the plea
    hearing, McBride, through her attorney, informed the county
    court that the parties would be asking the court to set the mat-
    ter for a restitution hearing. Thus, prior to the time she entered
    her plea, McBride was aware that the court could order her to
    pay restitution. The record therefore establishes that McBride
    was aware of the possibility of restitution prior to entering
    her plea, and thus, her plea was not entered involuntarily
    or unintelligently.
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    Circumstances Warranting
    Order of Restitution.
    McBride argues that the circumstances of the present case
    do not warrant an order of restitution. She claims that the
    dispute between her and AllAround should be handled as a
    civil matter rather than in the context of the criminal pro-
    ceedings. We find no abuse of discretion in the decision to
    order restitution.
    [7,8] 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2280
     (Reissue 2016) vests trial
    courts with the authority to order restitution for actual dam-
    ages sustained by the victim of a crime for which a defendant
    is convicted. State v. Ramirez, 
    285 Neb. 203
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 801
    (2013). Pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2281
     (Reissue 2016),
    before restitution can be properly ordered, the trial court must
    consider: (1) whether restitution should be ordered, (2) the
    amount of actual damages sustained by the victim of a crime,
    and (3) the amount of restitution a criminal defendant is capa-
    ble of paying. State v. Holecek, 
    260 Neb. 976
    , 
    621 N.W.2d 100
     (2000). The question here falls under the first consider-
    ation: whether restitution should be ordered. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2282
     (Reissue 2016) provides:
    In determining restitution, if the offense results in
    damage, destruction, or loss of property, the court may
    require: (1) Return of the property to the victim, if pos-
    sible; (2) payment of the reasonable value of repairing
    the property, including property returned by the defend­
    ant; or (3) payment of the reasonable replacement value
    of the property, if return or repair is impossible, impracti-
    cal, or inadequate. If the offense results in bodily injury,
    the court may require payment of necessary medical care,
    including, but not limited to, physical or psychological
    treatment and therapy, and payment for income lost due
    to such bodily injury. If the offense results in the death of
    the victim, the court may require payment to be made to
    the estate of the victim for the cost of any medical care
    prior to death and for funeral and burial expenses.
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    The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated, “Under § 29-2282,
    restitution is warranted ‘[i]f the offense results in bodily
    injury.’” State v. Ramirez, 285 Neb. at 208, 825 N.W.2d at 806
    (emphasis supplied). Thus, we interpret § 29-2282 to also war-
    rant restitution where, as here, “the offense results in damage,
    destruction, or loss of property.”
    The evidence in the present case established that as a result
    of McBride’s forging AllAround’s signature on the vehicle’s
    title and selling the vehicle, AllAround lost property to which
    she was entitled. We understand McBride’s argument that
    because her name was also on the title, she may have been
    entitled to at least a portion of the value of the vehicle.
    However, she argues, without authority, that determination of
    any monetary damages is better left to a civil proceeding rather
    than handled in the context of this criminal proceeding.
    [9,10] When a court orders restitution to a crime victim
    under § 29-2280, restitution is a criminal penalty imposed
    as punishment and is part of the criminal sentence imposed
    by the sentencing court. State v. Clapper, 
    273 Neb. 750
    , 
    732 N.W.2d 657
     (2007). Imposing a sentence within statutory
    limits is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.
    State v. King, 
    19 Neb. App. 410
    , 
    807 N.W.2d 192
     (2011). In
    imposing a sentence, the sentencing court is not limited to
    any mathematically applied set of factors. 
    Id.
     The appropriate-
    ness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and
    includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s
    demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances sur-
    rounding the defendant’s life. 
    Id.
    At sentencing in the instant case, the county court noted
    that McBride knew the title was forged and therefore was
    aware that she was doing something illegal. The court also
    observed that McBride herself could have elected to handle
    the matter with AllAround via a civil proceeding, but instead,
    she chose to circumvent the process and take matters into her
    own hands by selling the vehicle unlawfully and retaining all
    of the proceeds. The court therefore concluded that an order
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    of restitution was appropriate in this case. Based on the record
    before us, including the court’s rationale, we cannot find that
    that decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.
    Actual Damages.
    McBride asserts that the order of restitution was an abuse
    of discretion because the State failed to prove the amount of
    actual damages sustained as a result of the crime. We find no
    merit to this argument.
    [11-13] After the sentencing court determines that a con-
    viction warrants restitution, it then becomes the sentencing
    court’s factfinding responsibility to determine the victim’s
    actual damages and the defendant’s ability to pay. State v.
    Ramirez, 
    285 Neb. 203
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 801
     (2013). Under
    § 29-2281, the sentencing court may hold a hearing at the
    time of sentencing to determine the amount of restitution. Id.
    The sentencing court’s determination of “restitution shall be
    based on the actual damages sustained by the victim and shall
    be supported by evidence which shall become a part of the
    court record.” § 29-2281. To be relied upon by the sentencing
    court, the evidence must be sworn and corroborated. State v.
    Ramirez, supra.
    In relevant part, § 29-2282 provides that in determining
    restitution, if the offense results in loss of property, the court
    may require payment of the “reasonable replacement value” of
    the property.
    McBride argues, without authority, that the court’s failure
    to consider depreciation when determining the actual dam-
    ages for restitution purposes was an abuse of discretion. We
    note that the restitution statutes refer to “actual damages” and
    “reasonable replacement value” but do not specifically refer
    to depreciation or market value. See §§ 29-2281 and 29-2282.
    Nor do the statutes address the manner in which actual dam-
    ages are to be calculated other than the amount of restitution
    must be supported by evidence which shall become part of the
    court record. See § 29-2281.
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    At the restitution hearing, AllAround testified that she paid
    $13,144 for the vehicle and that McBride contributed nothing
    toward the purchase price. A copy of the bill of sale and evi-
    dence that AllAround paid the purchase price were received
    into evidence.
    The vehicle at issue here was a 2009 GMC Acadia, pur-
    chased in December 2016 and sold in May 2017. The district
    court, in reviewing the trial court’s order, found no abuse of
    discretion, the “actual damages being based upon a recent
    purchase price of the 2009 GMC.” We do not find such a
    determination to be an abuse of the court’s discretion, either.
    And the undisputed evidence before the court proved that
    AllAround paid the entire cost of the vehicle and had not been
    reimbursed. Therefore, we find that the district court did not
    abuse its discretion in affirming the county court’s valuation of
    $13,144 and ordering restitution in that amount.
    CONCLUSION
    Finding no merit to the arguments raised on appeal, we
    affirm the district court’s order.
    A ffirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-18-797

Citation Numbers: 27 Neb. Ct. App. 219

Filed Date: 5/7/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/14/2019