Loeffler v. Loeffler ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/14/2022 09:06 AM CDT
    - 93 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    Lawrence E. Loeffler and Patricia K. Loeffler,
    appellants and cross-appellees, v.
    Robert J. Loeffler, appellee
    and cross-appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed June 14, 2022.    No. A-21-546.
    1. Actions: Trusts: Equity: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Actions to
    declare a resulting trust are in equity. In an appeal in an equity action,
    it is the duty of an appellate court to try issues of fact de novo upon the
    record and to reach an independent conclusion thereon without reference
    to the findings of the district court.
    2. Trusts: Property: Title: Equity: Proof. A court, sitting in equity, will
    not impose a constructive trust and constitute an individual as a trustee
    of the legal title for property unless it be shown, by clear and convinc-
    ing evidence, that the individual, as a potential constructive trustee, had
    obtained title to property by fraud, misrepresentation, or an abuse of an
    influential or confidential relationship.
    3. Trusts: Conveyances: Presumptions: Intent: Words and Phrases. A
    resulting trust is one raised by implication of law and presumed always
    to have been contemplated by the parties; the intention of the resulting
    trust is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed
    in deed or instrument of conveyance.
    4. Trusts: Property: Consideration. Where a transfer of property is made
    to one person and the purchase price or consideration is paid by another
    person, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person who made the pay-
    ment or provided consideration.
    5. Trusts: Proof. A resulting trust will not be declared upon doubtful and
    uncertain grounds; and the burden is upon the one claiming the exis-
    tence of the trust to establish the facts upon which it is based by clear
    and satisfactory evidence.
    - 94 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    6. Trusts: Words and Phrases. Where the alleged trust relationship is
    just as consistent with that of a gift or loan, courts will not ordinarily
    impress a resulting trust.
    7. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
    analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy
    before it.
    Appeal from the District Court for Boone County: Rachel
    A. Daugherty, Judge. Affirmed.
    David A. Domina, of Domina Law Group, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellants.
    Jennifer D. Tricker and Spencer R. Murphy, of Baird Holm,
    L.L.P., for appellee.
    Riedmann and Welch, Judges.
    Riedmann, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Lawrence E. Loeffler (Larry) and Patricia K. Loeffler appeal
    the order of the district court for Boone County which denied
    their claim for quiet title, partition, constructive trust, conver-
    sion, and accounting. Robert J. Loeffler cross-appeals. For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s decision.
    BACKGROUND
    Larry and Patricia, the appellants, filed a complaint on
    February 1, 2019, alleging that Larry and Robert formed a
    land purchasing joint venture in 1999 in order to purchase the
    family farm from their mother. According to the complaint,
    Larry’s name was not included on purchase documents or the
    mortgage so that Robert would be in the best position to buy
    Larry’s interest in the event of Larry’s death, without Robert’s
    having to do business with Patricia. Regardless, the farm
    would be owned by Larry and Robert as tenants in common,
    each owning a one-half interest. Larry and Patricia asserted
    that Robert held their portion of the land in a constructive
    trust and sought an order from the court directing him to
    - 95 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    convey their portion to them, quieting title in their names, and
    thereafter partitioning the land.
    Robert filed an answer, asserting that he was the sole owner
    of the farm and that Larry had no ownership interest in the
    property. He also asserted various affirmative defenses, includ-
    ing the statute of frauds. Trial was held on February 9, 2021,
    and the following evidence was adduced.
    Undisputed Evidence.
    Walter Loeffler and Lenore Loeffler had five children; in
    birth order, they are Marcine Jacobson, Larry, Robert, Marla
    Loeffler, and Mark Loeffler. The land in dispute is farmland
    located in Boone County, Nebraska. It has been in the Loeffler
    family since 1886. Walter predeceased Lenore, leaving her as
    the sole owner of the farm. Sometime after Walter died, Lenore
    expressed a desire to sell the land.
    Lenore sold the farm in 1999, and Robert’s name was on
    all the closing documents. Lenore retained a life estate, con-
    tinuing to live on the farm until approximately 2010. Both
    prior to and after the sale, the farmland was leased to a tenant
    who paid cash rent. In 2012, Robert began farming approxi-
    mately 70 acres of the farm, and the other half became part
    of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve
    Program (CRP).
    Robert maintained a ledger in which he kept track of farm-
    ing expenses. According to the ledger, in years that the farm
    operated at a deficit, from approximately 1999 through 2011,
    Larry paid half of the operating deficit and Robert paid the
    other half. In years there was a profit, Robert wrote “I owe” in
    the ledger.
    Other undisputed facts include that Larry and Patricia were
    married at the time Lenore sold the land in 1999, although they
    did eventually divorce in 2006. Lenore passed away in 2013.
    Robert’s Version of Events.
    According to Robert, he purchased the farm from his
    mother, Lenore, in 1999, with the intent to pass it on to his
    - 96 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    son. Larry did not offer to purchase the farm with Robert, nor
    would Robert have accepted such an offer. The farm’s pur-
    chase price was $134,000, with a $10,000 downpayment paid
    by Robert. He described a document written by Lenore prior
    to her passing that stated, “‘Bob bought. Signed papers July
    31st, 1999.’”
    Since 1999, Robert has managed the farm. He was the one
    who dealt with the farm tenants and negotiated the agreements
    with them. He also has been the one responsible for upkeep
    on the farm, including fixing fences, placing tin on the roof of
    the house, jacking up the foundation, adding a stair rail on the
    house stairs, removing trees, mowing the grass, and removing
    the snow. Larry did not help with any of this. Robert was also
    the one responsible for making all payments on the land, which
    included paying the mortgage, insurance, and taxes.
    Regarding the deficit payments received from Larry, Robert
    stated that those payments were loans. According to Robert,
    prior to selling the farm, Lenore asked Robert if his two
    brothers, Larry and Mark, would be willing to loan Robert
    money if the farm operated at a deficit. Mark declined to loan
    Robert the money because Mark had just bought an acreage.
    Larry, however, agreed that he would loan Robert one half of
    each year’s deficit. Larry agreed to this because he could get
    better interest from Robert than he could at the bank and he
    did not want Patricia to know he had that money. No interest
    rate was agreed to by Larry and Robert, nor was a promissory
    note signed, but the agreement was to pay back 100 percent
    of the loans with a reasonable interest rate. The loan became
    due once the farm was paid for in full; the farm was paid off
    in 2020.
    Robert maintained a ledger for three reasons: to show prof-
    its and losses, for tax purposes, and to track how much
    Larry had loaned him. Robert started the ledger in September
    1999, and the final year accounted for was 2015. The first
    page indicates “Pd 10,000 down - July - 1999.” The ledger
    tracked loan payments, taxes, insurance, rental income from
    - 97 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    the tenant, farm repair receipts, et cetera. After calculating
    expenses and income, Robert determined what the deficit or
    profit would be for the year. For example, in 2000, the farm
    operated at a deficit of approximately $4,361. Larry loaned
    him $2,200 to help pay expenses on the farm, including the
    mortgage. Robert was responsible for the ledger, and he kept it
    at his house. In the ledger, Robert used words such as “Larry
    paid,” “Larry owes,” “[a]piece,” and “I owe” regarding how
    much each brother would be responsible for that year.
    Regarding the CRP, Robert testified he got the idea to enroll
    in the program after attending a party. Robert sat across the
    table from the manager of the office that “control[s] the CRP
    and . . . grasses.” The manager explained the benefits of the
    CRP, and she invited Robert to the office to fill out paper-
    work and see the price per acre that Robert could get under
    the program. After filling out the paperwork, the price per
    acre was $134. To comply with the CRP, Robert had to sow
    the land with specific seeds, and Larry helped procure those
    seeds through his lawn care business connections. According
    to the ledger, Robert repaid Larry $5,125 for purchased CRP
    seed. Robert rented the equipment necessary to plant the seed
    and proceeded to do so. It was necessary for Robert, instead
    of the previous tenant, to start farming the other section of
    land because otherwise half of the CRP proceeds would go to
    that tenant.
    The first time Robert became aware that Larry was claiming
    an ownership interest in the farm was in 2014 when Robert
    was advised by the CRP office staff that Larry had called,
    demanding that his name be added to the CRP contract. That
    began a series of conversations between Larry and Robert in
    which Robert tried to repay the loan. When that failed, Robert
    made some settlement offers in order to avoid litigation.
    Larry’s Version of Events.
    According to Larry, he purchased the farm with Robert as
    co-owners. Robert had requested the farm be in his name,
    - 98 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    so Robert signed the closing statement, the promissory note,
    and the mortgage and he received the deed. Larry was pres-
    ent at the closing. Larry paid half of the downpayment, but
    was unable to state in his deposition how he paid the $5,000;
    however, at trial, he testified that he recalled paying $5,000 in
    cash to Robert days after the closing. Robert never asked Larry
    to loan him money, nor did he discuss an interest rate, repay-
    ment terms, repayment date, or any particulars of a loan. In
    contrast, in 2006, Larry loaned between $28,000 and $30,000
    at 6 percent interest to Lenore, with the remaining balance paid
    by Lenore’s estate upon her death.
    Larry testified that he performed maintenance work on the
    farm and house, repairing the foundation on the barn, rebuild-
    ing the cellar door, cleaning up trees on the property, screwing
    down the tin roof on the barn, fixing the roof on the house, and
    laying linoleum in the kitchen. Sometimes this work was done
    with Robert, and sometimes Larry completed it by himself.
    Both prior to and after the 1999 sale, Larry stored personal
    property in the barn.
    Larry determined that the rent paid by the cash tenant was
    low and that the farm could make more money by participating
    in the CRP. Larry “did the foot work” on the CRP to identify
    the requirements to participate in the program. Larry’s hand-
    writing is throughout exhibit 29, a series of documents involv-
    ing enrollment in the CRP, even though Robert is the one who
    signed the documents. Larry purchased approximately $5,000
    worth of seed to comply with the requirements of the CRP, and
    he was paid back by the farm. Half of the farm was placed in
    the CRP, and half was farmed by Robert by agreement between
    the brothers. Robert agreed to pay the same rent as the CRP
    allowed per acre, resulting in the farm paying for itself.
    When the farm started making money, Larry stated, “I
    asked to get — to be paid back for it for what the extra money
    that was coming in, and [Robert] always had a reason. He
    didn’t have his checkbook with him.” The first time Larry
    heard of a loan versus a partnership was when he received
    - 99 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    a letter from Robert’s attorney offering to pay him $20,000 for
    the money he had loaned Robert.
    The brothers engaged in a series of email communication
    in 2016, in which they discussed the price of the farm for
    purposes of one of them “buying the other one out.” Despite
    Larry’s claim of ownership, when he took out a mortgage on
    an acreage in 2013, he did not list the farm as an asset in his
    application materials, nor did he include it as owned property
    during his divorce proceedings in 2006.
    Marla’s Testimony.
    The only other witness to testify was Marla, called by
    Robert’s attorney. She testified that after their father, Walter,
    passed away, Robert helped manage the farm and house. She
    referred to him as “Mom’s right-hand man.” According to
    Marla, around the time that Robert purchased the farm, Larry
    told her that he was loaning money to Robert. She was uncer-
    tain of the amount, but stated Larry’s reason for doing so was
    because he could get better interest from Robert and he did
    not want Patricia to know he had that money. The better inter-
    est rate was the same reason that Larry loaned Lenore money
    while she was alive. The first time Marla heard Larry claim
    ownership in the farm was in 2015.
    District Court Decision.
    Following the trial, the district court issued an order finding
    that Larry and Patricia “failed to prove by clear and convinc-
    ing evidence that [Robert] obtained the title to the property
    by fraud, misrepresentation, or an abuse of an influential or
    confidential relationship.” The district court, therefore, denied
    Larry and Patricia’s request for the imposition of a construc-
    tive trust.
    The court further noted in its order that Larry and Patricia
    argued in their written closing argument that the parties
    intended to create a resulting trust. It rejected this argu-
    ment, stating that “[a]s to the allegation of a resulting trust,
    even if the [c]ourt were to accept Larry’s version of events,
    - 100 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    the evidence is that the brothers had an oral agreement to
    transfer property. Under the circumstances, this oral agree-
    ment does not withstand the statute of frauds.” Based on the
    district court’s findings that no trust, constructive or resulting,
    should be imposed and that Larry and Patricia have no owner-
    ship interest in the farm, the remaining causes of action were
    denied. Larry and Patricia timely appealed.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The appellants assign that the district court erred in (1) fail-
    ing to recognize that fraud at the outset is not required to prove
    a resulting trust and failing to find that a resulting trust was
    proved, (2) disregarding Patricia’s interrogatory answer testi-
    mony without a basis to do so, (3) dismissing the complaint,
    and (4) failing to award rents and profits to the appellants.
    Robert cross-appeals, assigning that the district court erred in
    failing to dismiss the case because the allegations in the com-
    plaint are time barred by the statute of limitations.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Actions to declare a resulting trust are in equity. Malousek
    v. Meyer, 
    309 Neb. 803
    , 
    962 N.W.2d 676
     (2021). In an appeal
    in an equity action, it is the duty of this court to try issues of
    fact de novo upon the record and to reach an independent con-
    clusion thereon without reference to the findings of the district
    court. 
    Id.
    ANALYSIS
    Oral Contract for Land and Resulting Trust.
    The appellants assign that the district court erred in failing
    to recognize that fraud at the outset is not required to prove a
    resulting trust and in failing to find a resulting trust was proved.
    In their complaint, the appellants proceeded under a theory
    of constructive trusts. However, following trial, but before
    written closing arguments were due, the Nebraska Supreme
    Court released Dreesen Enters. v. Dreesen, 
    308 Neb. 433
    , 
    954 N.W.2d 874
     (2021).
    - 101 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    [2] In Dreesen Enters. v. Dreesen, 
    supra,
     the Supreme Court
    held that a court, sitting in equity, will not impose a construc-
    tive trust and constitute an individual as a trustee of the legal
    title for property unless it be shown, by clear and convincing
    evidence, that the individual, as a potential constructive trustee,
    had obtained title to property by fraud, misrepresentation, or an
    abuse of an influential or confidential relationship. Because the
    movant in Dreesen Enters. knew that the property would not
    be titled in her name and voiced no objection, she was unable
    to meet her burden of proof and the court refused to impose a
    constructive trust.
    Apparently recognizing the obstacle that the Dreesen Enters.
    opinion posed, the appellants argued in their written closing
    argument that a resulting trust was formed. The district court’s
    order addressed constructive trusts, resulting trusts, and oral
    contracts for land. The district court found that the appellants
    failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Robert
    obtained the title to the property by fraud, misrepresentation,
    or an abuse of an influential or confidential relationship. Thus,
    a constructive trust was not formed.
    As to the allegations of a resulting trust, the district court
    found that even if it accepted Larry’s version of the events, the
    evidence established an oral agreement to transfer the prop-
    erty, which would be precluded by the statute of frauds. To
    the extent that the district court viewed the statute of frauds
    as a bar to a resulting trust, we disagree with its analysis. See
    Reetz v. Olson, 
    146 Neb. 621
    , 
    20 N.W.2d 687
     (1945) (resulting
    trusts are exempt from statute of frauds). However, in our de
    novo review of the record, we determine that Larry failed to
    establish the existence of a resulting trust by clear and convinc-
    ing evidence.
    As an initial matter, we find that the appellants have aban-
    doned their claim regarding constructive trusts, and we do
    not address the district court’s order in regard to this claim.
    Additionally, we find no merit in the appellants’ assertion
    that the district court required fraud at the outset to prove
    - 102 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    a resulting trust. The district court’s discussion of fraud is
    clearly relating to its analysis of constructive trusts and is an
    accurate application of Dreesen Enters. v. Dreesen, 
    supra.
     We
    now turn to the issue of a resulting trust.
    [3-6] A resulting trust is one raised by implication of law
    and presumed always to have been contemplated by the par-
    ties; the intention of the resulting trust is to be found in the
    nature of their transaction, but not expressed in deed or instru-
    ment of conveyance. Malousek v. Meyer, 
    309 Neb. 803
    , 
    962 N.W.2d 676
     (2021). Where a transfer of property is made to
    one person and the purchase price or consideration was paid
    by another person, a resulting trust arises in favor of the per-
    son who made the payment or provided consideration. 
    Id.
     The
    court will impose a resulting trust when the circumstances sur-
    rounding a conveyance make it clear that the parties intended
    such a result. 
    Id.
     A resulting trust will not be declared upon
    doubtful and uncertain grounds; and the burden is upon the
    one claiming the existence of the trust to establish the facts
    upon which it is based by clear and satisfactory evidence.
    Biggerstaff v. Ostrand, 
    199 Neb. 808
    , 
    261 N.W.2d 750
     (1978).
    Where the alleged trust relationship is just as consistent with
    that of a gift or loan, courts will not ordinarily impress a
    resulting trust. 
    Id.
    In Malousek v. Meyer, 
    supra,
     the trial court found that an
    estate’s special administrator had not met his burden of show-
    ing a resulting trust for a boat. On appeal, the Supreme Court
    reversed, recognizing its duty to try issues of fact de novo to
    reach a conclusion independent of that of the trial court. The
    evidence was undisputed that the decedent had paid for the
    boat, that she had another person sign the purchase agree-
    ment, and that she had a third person sign the title. The trial
    court found that the special administrator failed to establish
    the elements of a resulting trust and had not rebutted the pre-
    sumption that it was a gift to the title owner. On appeal, the
    Supreme Court explained that the decedent titled the boat in
    the name of another for reasons that benefited her and that she
    - 103 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    paid all the major expenses associated with boat ownership.
    
    Id.
     Consequently, the court determined that the title owner
    held the boat in a resulting trust for the decedent’s estate.
    Conversely, here, the appellants failed to prove by clear
    and satisfactory evidence that Larry and Robert intended to
    ­create a resulting trust. Unlike Malousek v. Meyer, 
    supra,
     Larry
    produced no evidence that having the land titled in Robert’s
    name was beneficial to Larry. Rather, Larry testified that he
    and Robert decided they would put the farm in Robert’s name
    “as [Robert] requested” and that they would “move forward
    from there.” Larry later explained that Robert did not want to
    have to deal with Patricia in the event something happened to
    Larry. Furthermore, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence
    that Larry paid half of the downpayment. Robert contends that
    Larry did not pay any of the downpayment, and the ledger does
    not reflect any part of the downpayment being made by Larry.
    Larry testified in his deposition that he paid half of the down-
    payment, but he could not remember if it was paid by cash or
    check; however, at trial, he testified that he remembered pro-
    ducing cash.
    Larry relies heavily upon the notations Robert made in his
    ledger to prove that each brother paid half of the funds neces-
    sary to buy the farm; however, equal contributions also support
    Robert’s position that Larry agreed to loan him half of each
    year’s deficit and the ledger was a method of keeping track of
    this amount. Keeping in mind that the intention of the result-
    ing trust is to be found in the nature of the transaction, we find
    the nature of this transaction does not support a finding that a
    resulting trust was intended. See, e.g., Malousek v. Meyer, 
    309 Neb. 803
    , 
    962 N.W.2d 676
     (2021) (resulting trust found where
    decedent had boat titled in name of another for purposes bene­
    ficial to decedent and decedent continued to pay costs associ-
    ated with boat); Reetz v. Olson, 
    146 Neb. 621
    , 
    20 N.W.2d 687
    (1945) (resulting trust found in favor of person paying cost of
    school lease where lease was put in name of another because
    payor was ineligible to bid on lease).
    - 104 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    Resulting trusts arise most frequently in situations in which
    one party pays the consideration for a purchase and title is
    taken in the name of another. Reetz v. Olson, supra. Here,
    however, there is no dispute that Robert paid consideration
    for the purchase of the land and title was taken in his name.
    The question is whether Larry’s financial contributions were
    intended to be an investment or a loan. The burden was on
    Larry to produce clear and satisfactory evidence that a result-
    ing trust was intended. Putting aside the conflicting testimony
    of Larry and Robert, our de novo review of the record does
    not provide clear and satisfactory evidence that the parties
    intended a resulting trust. The alleged reason for placing the
    property in Robert’s name, Robert’s management of the farm,
    Larry’s failure to include his ownership interest as an asset on
    subsequent financial documentation, and Marla’s testimony all
    cast doubt on whether Larry and Robert intended to create a
    resulting trust. Consequently, Larry failed to produce clear and
    satisfactory evidence that a resulting trust was created. The dis-
    trict court did not err in denying the appellants’ claim, although
    we reach that determination on a basis other than relied upon
    by the district court. See Doe v. Board of Regents, 
    283 Neb. 303
    , 
    809 N.W.2d 263
     (2012) (appellate court will affirm lower
    court’s ruling that reaches correct result, albeit based on differ-
    ent reasoning).
    Patricia’s Interrogatory Answers.
    The appellants assign that the district court erred when it
    disregarded Patricia’s interrogatory answers without a basis
    to do so. The district court’s order states, “Patricia . . . neither
    appeared at trial nor testified. Written discovery signed by
    Patricia was offered and received as Exhibit 11, but the Court
    has no ability to judge Patricia’s credibility by these documents
    and gives them little to no weight.”
    The appellants argue that State ex rel. Wagner v. Amwest
    Surety Ins. Co., 
    274 Neb. 121
    , 
    738 N.W.2d 813
     (2007), sup-
    ports their assertion that “[o]n de novo review, an appellate
    - 105 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    court appraises the credibility of affidavit evidence in the light
    of other evidence but does not disregard it because it was not
    given as live testimony.” Brief for appellants at 25. Our reading
    of State ex rel. Wagner, however, supports the district court’s
    decision to give little to no weight to this evidence.
    In State ex rel. Wagner, the court determined that the affida-
    vit in question was not credible and was “simply too lacking
    in specificity and foundation” and untimely to contradict the
    other evidence. 
    274 Neb. at 130
    , 738 N.W.2d at 820. Although
    Patricia’s interrogatory answers were not untimely, they do
    lack in specificity and foundation to weigh equally to the
    live, cross-examined testimony of Larry, Robert, and Marla.
    Patricia, a named party to the case, was not present at trial and
    did not testify. The answers to the interrogatories did not iden-
    tify the foundation upon which Patricia’s answers were made.
    And if, in fact, the purpose of omitting Larry’s name on the
    deed was to preclude Patricia from having any interest in the
    land, we find it curious that she would have firsthand knowl-
    edge of the transaction. Furthermore, the discovery responses
    offered only self-serving affirmations of evidence already pre-
    sented at trial by Larry; therefore, even if any error was com-
    mitted, it was harmless. We find no merit in the appellants’
    assigned error.
    Remaining Assignments of Error
    and Cross-Appeal.
    The appellants assign that the district court erred when it
    dismissed their complaint. The assignment references and reit-
    erates arguments addressed under the previous two sections.
    For the reason set forth above, we reject this argument.
    The appellants assign that the district court erred in failing
    to award rents and profits to them. Based upon our determina-
    tion that the appellants do not have an ownership interest in the
    farm, they are not entitled to its rents and profits.
    [7] Based on our disposition of the above assignments of
    error, we need not address the error raised on cross-appeal.
    - 106 -
    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    31 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER
    Cite as 
    31 Neb. App. 93
    An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis
    that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy
    before it. Doty v. West Gate Bank, 
    292 Neb. 787
    , 
    874 N.W.2d 839
     (2016).
    CONCLUSION
    The appellants failed to prove their claim for a resulting
    trust by clear and satisfactory evidence. We therefore affirm the
    district court’s order, albeit for a different reason.
    Affirmed.
    Moore, Judge, participating on briefs.