In re Interest of Maykala P. ( 2014 )


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  •                          IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
    IN RE INTEREST OF MAYKALA P.
    NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
    AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
    IN RE INTEREST OF MAYKALA P., A CHILD UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE.
    STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
    V.
    PAUL P., APPELLANT.
    Filed November 10, 2014.     No. A-14-264.
    Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County: DOUGLAS F. JOHNSON,
    Judge. Affirmed.
    D.A. Drouillard, of Drouillard Law, P.C., for appellant.
    Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Erin Hurley for appellee.
    Mallory N. Hughes, of Dornan, Lustgarten & Troia, P.C., L.L.O., guardian ad litem.
    IRWIN, INBODY, and PIRTLE, Judges.
    PIRTLE, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    Paul P. appeals from two orders of the separate juvenile court of Douglas County. The
    first order denied Paul’s request to have his daughter, Maykala P., placed in his care and held
    that she was to remain in the temporary custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and
    Human Services (Department). The second order continued Maykala’s detention with the
    Department pending adjudication. Paul contends that the juvenile court erred in its application of
    the parental preference doctrine, thereby denying placement of Maykala with him, and in
    continuing detention of Maykala pending adjudication. Based on the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
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    BACKGROUND
    On July 24, 2013, the State filed a petition alleging that Maykala came within the
    meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008) due to the faults and habits of her
    mother. Maykala was removed from her mother’s care and placed in the custody of the
    Department. On November 19, Paul filed a complaint to intervene as the biological father of
    Maykala. In the complaint, he sought placement of Maykala in his home during the pendency of
    the case. A hearing was held and there was no objection to the complaint to intervene, but
    Maykala’s mother and her guardian ad litem (GAL) objected to Maykala’s being placed with
    Paul. Paul’s counsel clarified that he was not asking that Maykala be placed with Paul that day,
    but, rather, he was asking the court to order a plan to transition Maykala from her current
    placement into Paul’s home.
    On January 24, 2014, following the hearing, the juvenile court granted Paul leave to
    intervene. The court noted in its order that Maykala’s mother and GAL objected to placement of
    Maykala with Paul, but said nothing further about placement.
    On February 19, 2014, the Department filed a notice for change of placement for
    Maykala to place her in the same foster home as her younger half sister. On February 21, Paul
    filed an objection to the change of placement and a motion to stay, requesting that Maykala be
    placed in his home and not in a new foster placement as proposed by the Department.
    A hearing was held on March 10, 2014, on Paul’s objection to the change of placement
    and motion to stay. Paul argued at the hearing that he was seeking placement of Maykala with
    him. The State, the GAL, and Maykala’s mother all objected to having Maykala placed with
    Paul.
    Megan Kenealy, a family permanency specialist with Nebraska Families Collaborative
    (NFC) and Maykala’s caseworker since August 2013, was called to testify by the State. She
    testified that she met Paul for the first time in July 2013, but her contact with him since that time
    had been very limited. Kenealy testified that she arranged for visitation between Maykala and
    Paul, which initially occurred three times per week and was supervised. Kenealy testified that
    prior to her setting up the visits, Paul had not had contact with Maykala for a least 1 year.
    Kenealy stated that 2 months prior to the March 10, 2014, hearing, Paul’s supervised visits were
    reduced to two times per week in part because of concerns Maykala expressed about the visits to
    Kenealy and her therapist, Amanda Gurock. Kenealy stated that Maykala’s concerns were also
    documented in the visitation reports. The concerns regarding visitation included the following:
    Paul’s arguing with Maykala at visits, which required redirection by the visitation worker on
    multiple occasions; Paul’s using profanity or cursing during visits; and Paul’s failing to attend all
    visits and arriving late to visits. One of the issues Paul argued with Maykala about is whether she
    was going to live with him in the future, and on at least one occasion, Maykala told Paul she did
    not want to live with him and Paul continued to argue with her about her placement. Kenealy
    testified that Maykala has told her that she does not want to live with Paul and that she had
    negative memories of him being abusive to her mother. She specifically recalled that at her third
    birthday party, there was an altercation between Paul and her mother during which Paul spit in
    her mother’s face and was verbally aggressive toward her mother. Maykala did not report any
    other specific instances of domestic abuse to Kenealy.
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    Kenealy testified that she received a letter from Gurock recommending that Paul’s visits
    with Maykala be changed from supervised to therapeutic based on concerns expressed by
    Maykala during therapy, which included feeling uncomfortable during visits with Paul and not
    wanting to live with Paul.
    Kenealy testified that Paul was living with his parents so NFC ran a background check on
    them, which revealed that Paul’s mother was on the “central registry” based on several intakes in
    the past for child abuse and neglect. Kenealy testified that NFC has a policy that it does not
    recommend placement in a home where someone who lives there is listed on the central registry.
    Kenealy testified that since Maykala could not be placed in Paul’s current home, she offered Paul
    assistance in finding alternate housing. However, Paul refused her offer to work with a
    subsidized housing program through the State and indicated he wanted to continue living with
    his parents. Paul was also provided access to a program to assist with finding employment, as
    well as a family support worker to assist with housing, both of which he declined.
    Kenealy testified that she believed there was a lack of bond between Maykala and Paul.
    She expressed this concern to Paul, and he denied needing any outside help. Kenealy also
    specifically recommended family therapy to Paul so he could work on his relationship with
    Maykala, but Paul did not agree to it at that time and said he would think about it.
    Kenealy testified that other than attending supervised visits, Paul had not shown any
    initiative to utilize services recommended and made available to him. Kenealy testified that in
    her opinion Maykala would be at risk for harm if she were placed with Paul.
    In an order dated March 11, 2014, the juvenile court denied Paul’s objection to change of
    placement and his motion to stay. The court found that Maykala would remain in the temporary
    custody of the Department with placement to exclude Paul’s home because it would be contrary
    to Maykala’s best interests to be placed in Paul’s home.
    On March 11, 2014, the State filed a third supplemental petition alleging that Maykala
    came within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) due to the faults or habits of Paul. The State also
    filed a motion for immediate temporary custody for the Department to maintain custody of
    Maykala for appropriate placement to exclude Paul’s home, which the court granted.
    A protective custody hearing in regard to the third supplemental petition was held on
    March 13, 2014. The State offered and the court received into evidence an affidavit of Kenealy
    and an affidavit of Gurock. The court also took judicial notice of the court’s March 11 order
    denying Paul’s objection to the change of placement and motion to stay.
    Following the protective custody hearing, the court entered an order on March 14, 2014,
    finding that there was probable cause that Maykala came within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) in
    regard to Paul. It further found that reasonable efforts were provided to Paul on a voluntary basis
    to finalize permanency and/or return Maykala to the parental home, but it would be contrary to
    Maykala’s health and safety to be returned to Paul’s home, and that it is in the best interests of
    Maykala to remain in the temporary custody of the Department with placement to exclude Paul’s
    home.
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    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Paul assigns that the juvenile court erred in (1) its application of the parental preference
    doctrine, thereby denying placement of Maykala with him during the pendency of this case, and
    (2) continuing detention of Maykala pending adjudication.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its
    conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Nicole M., 
    287 Neb. 685
    , 
    844 N.W.2d 65
    (2014). When the evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court may
    give weight to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of
    the facts over the other. 
    Id. ANALYSIS Paul
    first assigns that the juvenile court erred in its application of the parental preference
    doctrine to the facts of this case and, consequently, in denying placement of Maykala with him
    during the pendency of this case. He specifically contends that the evidence presented at the
    March 10, 2014, hearing on his objection to the change of placement and motion to stay was
    insufficient to prove that Paul is an unfit parent.
    The parental preference principle establishes a rebuttable presumption that the best
    interests of a child are served by reuniting the child with his or her parent. In re Guardianship of
    Elizabeth H., 
    17 Neb. Ct. App. 752
    , 
    771 N.W.2d 185
    (2009). The principle provides that a parent
    has a natural right to the custody of his or her child which trumps the interest of strangers to the
    parent-child relationship and the preferences of the child. 
    Id. Courts may
    not properly deprive a
    parent of the custody of a minor child unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit to
    perform the duties imposed by the relationship or has forfeited that right. In re Interest of Lakota
    Z. & Jacob H., 
    282 Neb. 584
    , 
    804 N.W.2d 174
    (2011). Parental unfitness means a personal
    deficiency or incapacity which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a
    reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which has caused, or probably will result in,
    detriment to a child’s well-being. 
    Id. We conclude
    that the evidence presented at the March 10, 2014, hearing was sufficient to
    overcome the presumption that it was in Maykala’s best interests to be placed with Paul. Kenealy
    testified that she initially met Paul in July 2013, after Maykala was removed from her mother’s
    care. After Kenealy’s initial meeting with Paul, her contact with him was very limited. In July,
    Kenealy helped Paul establish visits with Maykala. Prior to those visits being set up, Paul had not
    seen Maykala for at least 1 year. The visits that Kenealy helped arrange were supervised due to
    the lack of contact between Paul and Maykala in the past, and occurred three times per week.
    Kenealy testified that about 2 months before the hearing at issue, Paul’s visits were decreased to
    two visits per week based on concerns noted in visitation reports and concerns expressed by
    Maykala to both Kenealy and Gurock. The concerns included Paul’s arguing with Maykala,
    which required redirection by the visitation worker, as well as Paul’s using profanity or cursing
    during visits. Paul argued with Maykala about whether she would live with him. On at least one
    occasion, Maykala told Paul that she did not want to live with him and he continued to argue
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    with Maykala about her placement. Paul also arrived late to several visits and failed to attend
    some visits.
    Maykala also remembers at least one altercation between Paul and her mother, which
    occurred at her third birthday party. She recalled that Paul spat in her mother’s face and was
    verbally aggressive toward her mother.
    Based on the concerns revealed by Maykala in therapy, Gurock wrote a letter to Kenealy
    requesting that visits between Paul and Maykala become therapeutic, rather than supervised.
    There was also evidence that Maykala could not be placed with Paul at the time because
    he was living with his parents and his mother was on the central registry due to past intakes of
    child abuse and neglect. Kenealy testified that she offered Paul assistance in finding alternate
    housing. However, Paul refused to work with a subsidized housing program through the State.
    Paul was also offered access to a program to assist with finding employment, as well as a family
    support worker to assist with housing, both of which he declined. The evidence at the hearing
    further showed that Paul did not accept services offered by Kenealy to help establish a bond with
    Maykala, as he did not believe he needed any help. Kenealy testified that based on the above
    concerns, Maykala would be at risk for harm if she were placed with Paul.
    Paul’s actions and inactions as discussed above are relevant to his fitness as a parent and
    whether or not it would be in Maykala’s best interests to be placed with him. Based on our de
    novo review and considering the totality of the evidence presented, there was sufficient evidence
    to rebut the presumption under the parental preference doctrine that Paul was a fit and proper
    parent at the time. The juvenile court properly concluded following the March 10, 2014, hearing
    that placing Maykala with Paul would be contrary to her best interests, and it did not err in
    failing to place Maykala with Paul.
    Paul next assigns that the juvenile court erred in continuing detention of Maykala outside
    of his home pending adjudication. This assignment of error is based on the court’s March 14,
    2014, order entered after the protective custody hearing. The court found that reasonable efforts
    were provided to Paul on a voluntary basis to finalize permanency and/or return Maykala to the
    parental home and that it would be contrary to Maykala’s health and safety to be returned to the
    parental home. The court further found that it was in Maykala’s best interests to remain in the
    temporary custody of the Department with placement to exclude Paul’s home.
    Continued detention pending adjudication is not permitted under the Nebraska Juvenile
    Code unless the State can establish by a preponderance of the evidence at an adversarial hearing
    that such detention is necessary for the welfare of the juvenile. In re Interest of Anthony G., 
    255 Neb. 442
    , 
    586 N.W.2d 427
    (1998). At a detention hearing, the State must prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the custody of a juvenile should remain in the Department
    pending adjudication. In re Interest of Cherita W., 
    4 Neb. Ct. App. 287
    , 
    541 N.W.2d 677
    (1996);
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-254 (Supp. 2013). The State is not required to establish a specific harm or
    risk to the juvenile; it is enough if the evidence establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the conduct or circumstances of the parent or custodian are such that it is contrary to the
    juvenile’s welfare to remain in, or return to, the parental or custodial home. In re Interest of
    Joshua M. et al., 
    251 Neb. 614
    , 
    558 N.W.2d 548
    (1997). Pursuant to § 43-254, if a juvenile has
    been removed pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-248(2) (Supp. 2013), the juvenile court may enter
    an order continuing detention or placement upon a written determination that continuation of the
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    juvenile in his or her home would be contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of such juvenile
    and that reasonable efforts were made to preserve and reunify the family if required under Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 43-283.01(1) through (4) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
    In regard to reasonable efforts, the juvenile court found that such efforts included family
    time, therapy for Maykala, a background check on Paul’s residence, an NFC investigation and
    interviews, assistance with income and housing, parenting classes, a bonding assessment, and
    family therapy. The evidence presented at the protective custody hearing supports the court’s
    finding that these reasonable efforts were made to reunify Paul and Maykala. Kenealy stated in
    her affidavit that she offered to help Paul find alternate housing after she informed him that
    Maykala could not be placed in the same home as his mother, whom Paul was living with.
    Despite knowing that placement would not occur if he lived in the same home as his mother,
    Paul indicated to Kenealy that he wanted to continue living with his parents and did not intend
    on moving. Kenealy’s affidavit also states that she offered Paul the services of a family support
    worker to assist him with finding employment and housing, but Paul refused to work with a
    family support worker. Kenealy’s affidavit also states that she recommended parenting classes,
    which Paul said he did not need. Kenealy stated that Gurock had recommended a bonding
    assessment, which Paul did not feel was necessary. Kenealy also offered to get Paul involved in
    family therapy and told him it was recommended by NFC and Gurock. He initially refused, and
    then stated he would consider it; however, as of March 7, 2014, he had not agreed to take part in
    family therapy. The evidence presented at the protective custody hearing was sufficient to
    demonstrate that reasonable efforts were made to preserve and reunify the family.
    Paul also argues that the evidence at the protective custody hearing does not support the
    juvenile court’s finding that placement of Maykala with him would be contrary to her health and
    safety. Based on our de novo review, we find that the evidence at the protective custody hearing
    was sufficient to support this finding. Most notably, the evidence showed that Paul does not have
    appropriate housing for Maykala. As previously discussed, Paul lives with his parents and his
    mother is not approved to live in the same house with Maykala. In addition, Paul had a limited
    relationship, if any, with Maykala before this case was initiated. Kenealy’s affidavit states that
    according to Maykala’s mother, Paul did not see Maykala between March 2010 and October
    2012. Maykala was only 6 years old at the time of the protective custody hearing.
    Further, the affidavits of Kenealy and Gurock set out the concerns at visits, including
    Paul’s arguing with Maykala and swearing or making inappropriate statements. The evidence
    also showed that Maykala has memories of Paul’s abusing her mother.
    The evidence showed by a preponderance of the evidence that continued detention of
    Maykala was necessary for her health, safety, and welfare, and that reasonable efforts had been
    made by the State to reunify and preserve the family as required by § 43-283.01. The juvenile
    court did not err in continuing Maykala’s detention with the Department pending adjudication.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the juvenile court did not err in applying the parental preference
    doctrine, thereby denying placement of Maykala with Paul in its March 11, 2014, order. We
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    further conclude that the juvenile court did not err in continuing Maykala’s detention with the
    Department pending adjudication in its March 14, 2014, order.
    AFFIRMED.
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