In re Interest of Trinity F. ( 2023 )

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
(Memorandum Web Opinion)
IN RE INTEREST OF TRINITY F.
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
IN RE INTEREST OF TRINITY F., A CHILD UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE.
STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
V.
CHARLES F., APPELLANT.
Filed March 14, 2023. No. A-22-624.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County: CHAD M. BROWN, Judge.
Affirmed.
Beau Finley, of Law Offices of Beau Finley, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Daniel Gubler, Deputy Douglas County Attorney, for appellee.
PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and WELCH, Judges.
MOORE, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Charles F. appeals from the order of the separate juvenile court of Douglas County,
terminating his parental rights to his minor child. The court found that termination of Charles’
parental rights was proper under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(2), (4), (6), and (7) (Reissue 2016) and
that termination of his parental rights was in his child’s best interests. Following our de novo
review of the record, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shuree S. is the mother and Charles is the father of Trinity F., born in September 2012.
Shuree is also the mother of another minor child, who has a father other than Charles. The
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) received an intake in
-1-
February 2019, concerning the physical neglect of the children by Shuree. This intake was
determined to be unfounded. The Department received another intake on April 4, concerning the
children’s physical neglect by Shuree and involving domestic violence between Shuree and
Charles. At that point, the children were residing with Shuree, Charles was living separately, and
the other father was incarcerated. The second intake led to the removal of the children from
Shuree’s residence and their placement in the Department’s custody on April 5. The children have
remained in out-of-home placements since that time. Shuree’s parental rights to Trinity were
terminated during the course of these proceedings. The status of proceedings with respect to
Shuree, the other father, and the other minor child are not clear from the record. Shuree and the
other father are not involved in the present appeal, and we reference them and the other minor
child only as necessary.
On April 5, 2019, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court, alleging that Trinity was a
minor child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016) and lacked proper
parental care due to the fault or habits of Charles. Specifically, the State alleged that Trinity was
at risk for harm because Charles engaged in domestic violence in her presence; had failed to
provide proper parental care, support, and/or supervision for her; and had failed to provide her
with safe, stable housing. The State also filed an ex parte motion for immediate custody of Trinity,
with placement to exclude Charles’ home, which the juvenile court granted.
On June 3, 2019, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Trinity as a child within
the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a). Based on Charles’ admission, the court found as true the allegation
that Trinity was at risk for harm because Charles had failed to provide her with proper parental
care, support, and/or supervision. The other counts of the petition were dismissed. The court
ordered Charles to: (1) have agency-supervised visitation with Trinity, (2) complete a batterers’
intervention class, (3) maintain safe and stable housing, (4) maintain a stable and legal source of
income, (5) complete a parenting class, (6) complete a full-scale psychological evaluation, and (7)
prepare a budget. Similar orders were entered following subsequent review and permanency
planning hearings, with the added requirements that Charles participate in family support services,
communicate with all case professionals, and sign all releases of information. He was also ordered
to participate in relinquishment counseling, complete a chemical dependency evaluation, and
submit to random urinalysis testing.
On February 5, 2021, the State filed a motion seeking termination of Charles’ parental
rights. Following a hearing on May 20, the juvenile court entered an order granting the State’s
motion to dismiss the termination motion; Charles was making progress on his case plan
requirements at that point.
On January 27, 2022, the State filed another motion seeking termination of Charles’
parental rights. The State alleged termination was proper pursuant to § 43-292 (2), (4), (6), and (7)
and that termination of Charles’ parental rights was in Trinity’s best interests. With respect to
§ 43-292(6), the State alleged that Charles had failed to fully and consistently participate in
visitation, successfully complete a batterers’ class and a parenting class, complete a full-scale
psychological evaluation and an updated chemical dependency evaluation, complete a budget,
consistently submit to random drug testing, consistently abstain from alcohol and/or other
controlled substances, and that despite the services offered, he had failed to correct the conditions
leading to Trinity’s removal.
-2-
A termination hearing was held before the juvenile court on June 22 and 24, 2022. The
State presented testimony from Trinity’s grandmother (her current foster mother), a visitation
worker and a visitation supervisor, a Department supervisor, and a drug testing supervisor. Charles
testified in his own behalf. The court received various documentary exhibits into evidence.
During this case, Charles was incarcerated from October 2019 to January 2021 following
his felony conviction for welfare fraud (buying and selling of “SNAP benefits”). Charles was
previously incarcerated for about a year and a half between 2014 and 2015 for receiving stolen
property, and he has served time in jail on multiple occasions “going back years.”
Charles has had multiple medical issues during this case. In February 2019, he was shot
while driving. One bullet struck his face and a second bullet entered his lower back. He was
hospitalized between February 4 and April 1 and underwent six surgeries. For some period, he
“had a trach placed due to breathing issues,” and he underwent physical therapy. Four days after
his release from the hospital for the shooting, Charles was stabbed by Shuree (part of the domestic
violence incident that led to the children’s removal). And, Charles suffered injuries in two different
vehicle accidents, the first in May 2021 and the second in July. In May, Charles was the passenger
in a vehicle that was struck from behind, and he sustained a broken leg and broken foot. He also
aggravated the back injury he sustained during the shooting. He was hospitalized for one day. In
July, he was driving, when the brakes on his vehicle failed. He jumped out after failing to maneuver
the vehicle to a stop, and the vehicle rolled over his foot, breaking it. He was prescribed pain
medication following the shooting, but after overusing those medications, he has used “edibles”
and “cannabis oil” as alternatives to relieve his symptoms of ongoing chronic pain.
Jacob Streittmatter, a Department case manager and supervisor, testified about Charles’
compliance with the juvenile court’s orders, indicating that the conditions that led to Trinity’s
removal have not been corrected. Streittmatter was the case manager for the family from June 2019
until the case was transferred to another case manager in December 2021. Streittmatter supervised
the other manager for 7 months before the case was transferred back to him. Streittmatter noted
Charles’ inconsistent progress in completing his case plan following his release from incarceration
in January 2021 that led the State to file the first motion for termination of Charles’ parental rights
in May and then the dismissal of that motion, after which Charles again stopped making progress.
Streittmatter testified further that between January and May, Charles made “good progress.”
Charles was participating in visitation, engaging with case management on a weekly basis, was
completing his parenting class, and generally seemed motivated to work on his case plan. His level
of participation changed, however, around the time of his vehicle accident in May 2021.
Streittmatter testified about Charles’ communications with him and the case manager
Streittmatter supervised. That individual had contact with Charles by phone call and text message
once a month. During the times Streittmatter was the case manager again, he tried to maintain
contact with Charles three times a month, also by phone call and text. While Charles was
incarcerated, however, Streittmatter sent him letters. Charles did not respond until 1 or 2 months
prior to his release, at which time he contacted Streittmatter about setting up services. After
Charles’ release, Streittmatter had some difficulty contacting Charles because he would not let
Streittmatter know when his phone number had changed.
Charles did not successfully complete the requirement of his case plan to abstain from
drugs and alcohol, which was monitored through urinalysis testing. Charles told Streittmatter that
-3-
he was using cannabis oils for his medical conditions. When Charles did test, the test was positive
for THC. Charles never provided verification that he was only using cannabis oil and not
marijuana. Charles’ failure to complete this requirement concerned Streittmatter and impacted his
opinion about Charles’ fitness because Charles “hasn’t shown . . . that he can have negative drug
UA screens,” so he “could be under the influence if he’s caring for his child.”
Further testimony about Charles’ compliance with drug testing was provided by Sarah
Valentine, a supervisor with the drug testing provider for Charles (between July and October 2021
and again between March and May 2022). She testified that Charles only completed two of the 33
drug tests offered to him. Charles completed those two tests in August 2021. She noted only two
documented conflicts during the periods her employer provided service to Charles, once when
Charles was positive for COVID-19 and the other when he had a conflict with one of the workers
over the phone. Charles was discharged unsuccessfully by the provider in October 2021 and again
in May 2022. The provider generally discharges clients after 30 consecutive days of not testing or
no contact. According to Valentine, the provider continued offering its service to Charles longer
than normal because “[c]ase management insisted that we had correct contact information and that
the client wanted to participate in drug testing.” The provider uses an intake form at the first
face-to-face contact that informs clients they are responsible to contact the provider with any
updates to their phone number and that if their phone is “out of service . . . it would benefit them
greatly to call [the provider] daily to see if they are on the drug testing list.” An intake form was
completed for Charles, and he initialed by the line indicating his responsibility to contact the
provider with any new phone numbers. The referrals for Charles both “had phone numbers
attached.” Because the provider had no contact with Charles from March to May 2022, Valentine
agreed that she could not be sure whether the contact number for that period was correct.
As to the court-ordered evaluations and classes, Charles completed a chemical dependency
evaluation, a co-occurring evaluation, and a parenting class. He did not complete a full-scale
psychological evaluation or a batterers’ intervention class. Streittmatter testified that the
court-ordered batterers’ intervention class is usually a 26-week program and different from the
domestic violence class completed by Charles. Streittmatter was concerned about Charles’ failure
to complete these requirements, especially in light of the domestic violence that led to Trinity’s
removal.
Charles has had housing throughout this case. He lived with a relative upon his release
from incarceration and subsequently obtained his own residence in the fall of 2021. As to income,
he “collects disability.” Although Streittmatter did not have concerns about Charles’ income,
Charles never provided him with proof of how much income he was receiving each month.
Because Charles never completed a family budget, as ordered, Streittmatter was unable to
determine whether he actually had enough income to support a child. Streittmatter was unaware
of Charles having any issues with transportation.
Streittmatter and several other witnesses testified about Charles’ failure to comply with the
supervised visitation requirement of his case plan. During this case, a total of six agencies provided
visitation services to Charles, and he was discharged by the first agency due his incarceration and
by the remaining agencies due to his lack of participation. Charles’ participation was inconsistent
prior to his incarceration. When Streittmatter spoke with Charles about visitation in the summer
of 2021, Charles told him that he was injured and could not participate due to his injuries, although
-4-
he never provided any formal verification as to his injuries. Streittmatter did observe Charles to be
“in a cast” when they met. Streittmatter offered Charles the opportunity to participate in
videoconference visits, and he did so on a few occasions. The last time Charles had a visitation
with Trinity was October 2021. Charles’ failure to complete the supervised visitation requirement
of the case plan and progress beyond supervised visits concerned Streittmatter because he was
unable “to gauge how [Charles] parents.”
Samantha Ryan was assigned to supervise visitations between Charles and Trinity in
December 2021. Ryan contacted Charles, and they “coordinated [their] schedules” for visits to
occur every Wednesday and Sunday from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. with the first visit set for December 29.
On that date, Ryan picked Trinity up and brought her to the location for the visit. After waiting 15
minutes for Charles, Ryan returned Trinity to her foster placement. Ryan testified that she had
contacted Charles to let him know they were waiting for him at the visitation center. He responded
by text message, saying “that no one reached out to him and that the days that [she] had did not
work.” Since Charles missed the first visit, Ryan’s supervisor “put him on a confirmation,”
meaning that he had to confirm visits prior to them happening. Ryan testified that they “continued
our Wednesdays and Sundays because that’s what was agreed upon,” and she indicated that she
informed Charles of the need to confirm visits. The second visit was set for January 2, 2022, but
it did not occur because Charles never responded to the text message Ryan sent him to confirm
prior to the visit. According to Ryan, Charles requested a new visitation worker on the case because
he wanted visits to occur on a different schedule (2 weekend visits). Ryan’s supervisor discharged
Charles after he failed to confirm prior to the third visit, which was set for January 5. Ryan was
unaware of any medical circumstances that might have affected Charles’s schedule, but she
testified that if she had been aware of any such circumstances, she would have been able to
accommodate them.
Charles Robinson, employed by another one of the visitation service providers, was
assigned to supervise visits between Charles and Trinity on March 23, 2022. Supervised visits
between Charles and Trinity were supposed to occur twice a week for 2 hours each time. During
the period Robinson was assigned to the case, he contacted Charles “[e]ight times” or “[a]t least
twice a week,” but he did not succeed in scheduling any visits. According to Robinson, there was
“something that was always going on, some type of obstacle that was interfering with [Charles]
doing the visitation,” so they “just never [were] able to coordinate anything.” Robinson testified
that he was willing to accommodate Charles’ schedule, except for Sundays when Robinson
attended church. Robinson was unaware of any medical issues with which Charles might have
been dealing. He testified that if he had known of any appointments for medical conditions, he
would have worked around them and would have accommodated any medical needs Charles might
have had during visits. On April 13, Robinson sent a text message to inform Charles that the
referral for visitation services would be “terminated temporarily,” that he could contact Robinson’s
supervisor for more information about the termination, and that “if anything changed,” he could
submit a new referral and Robinson’s agency would work with him. Robinson did not have a
record of any response from Charles to this message, and Robinson did not know whether Charles
ever contacted Robinson’s supervisor to reestablish visitation services. Due to Charles’ lack of
participation and inadequate communication, he was unsuccessfully discharged as Robinson’s
client on April 27 when the referral terminated.
-5-
Trinity’s foster mother, her maternal grandmother (the grandmother), provided further
testimony about visitation and Charles’ interaction with Trinity since her placement with the
grandmother in May 2020. Since that time, Charles has only had two in-person supervised visits
with Trinity, which occurred in the summer of 2021. The grandmother testified about the
cancellation of numerous scheduled visits that have occurred while Trinity has been in her care,
with the most recent cancellation being 3 or 4 months prior to trial. According to the grandmother,
Trinity initially would become upset or confused when visits were cancelled, but now she does
not. Trinity has successfully completed therapy while in the grandmother’s care. The grandmother
testified that Charles sometimes contacts her directly wanting to visit Trinity, but the grandmother
has not allowed unsupervised visits.
Although Charles has not provided the grandmother with any money for Trinity’s care, he
did purchase a cell phone for Trinity and pays the bill on the phone. The grandmother estimated
that Charles calls Trinity on that phone “maybe once a week.” Charles will sometimes contact the
grandmother and ask if there is anything Trinity needs. Charles provided a Christmas gift of
clothing for Trinity in 2021 and also provides clothing items “[m]aybe every other month”. The
grandmother testified that Charles turned Trinity’s phone off approximately 2 weeks prior to trial
after the grandmother told him that visits needed to be supervised; he had turned the cell phone
back on by the time of trial.
The grandmother testified that Trinity needs love, guidance, and support from a parent for
long-term success and that she is not receiving those things from Charles. The grandmother
testified further that Trinity needs a father who visits her more than she needs clothes and gifts.
Streittmatter opined that termination of Charles’ parental rights was in Trinity’s best
interests based on the length of time Trinity had been in out-of-home placement, Charles’
inconsistency in visitation, despite the provision of alternative methods of visitation such as Zoom,
his failure to participate in drug testing and show negative test results, and Trinity’s need for
stability and consistency.
After the State rested, Charles testified in his own behalf. He testified to the regular care
he helped provide for Trinity from her birth and prior to the start of this case.
Charles also testified about his various medical issues and his incarceration during this
case. After being shot in February 2019, he was prescribed promethazine-codeine, oxycodone, and
hydrocodone. He testified that he continues to have ongoing chronic pain and breathing issues
related to his injuries from the shooting, as well as problems with his jaw function.
According to Charles, after being charged with welfare fraud in June 2019, he bonded out
and violated his bond by going to South Dakota to visit his grandfather, who was ill. He was
arrested again in October (on a warrant for the bond violation) after returning to Nebraska and was
then incarcerated until January 2021. He testified that he was unable to complete any classes
related to this case while incarcerated because of restrictions in programming at the prison related
to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Charles testified about his steps to comply with the court orders in this case upon his release
from prison. He discussed the case plan requirements with Streittmatter, and he testified about
getting his finances “back in order,” signing up for a parenting and a domestic violence class,
attending visits with Trinity, and obtaining a chemical dependency evaluation (done through
-6-
probation). Charles felt his progress on the case plan was “[g]ood” until his vehicle accidents in
May and July 2021.
According to Charles, he became “addicted to” and “co-dependent on” the pain medication
he had been prescribed following the shooting. He then began using “marijuana edibles” and “THC
edibles,” as an alternative way to manage his pain, which resulted in him failing a drug test for his
probation officer. After that, he began “taking the THC oils.” He testified that, while he has smoked
marijuana in the past, he no longer does so because of breathing issues. He testified to applying
cannabis oil to various parts of his body for pain relief for his injuries from the shooting and the
vehicle accidents, and he acknowledged that its use is illegal in Nebraska. Charles acknowledged
only completing two drug tests, which were positive for THC, and not completing any further drug
tests for the juvenile court case. Charles was asked when his last use of “marijuana” had been, and
he responded that it had been 2 days prior to his testimony. Later in his testimony, Charles
confirmed that “cannabis oil” was the only “THC-related product” he was currently using. He
acknowledged “smelling like marijuana” when he entered the courtroom, stating that his brother
had been smoking marijuana in the car in which Charles was a passenger prior to trial. He denied
associating with people who do drugs other than marijuana.
With respect to other components of his case plan, Charles testified about completing both
a parenting class and a domestic violence class (which he thought was the same thing as a batterers’
intervention class). He also completed a co-occurring evaluation, and he thought he had completed
all necessary evaluations for the court at that point. Charles acknowledged he did not complete the
outpatient therapy recommended following his co-occurring evaluation or a full-scale
psychological evaluation. Charles testified about having difficulty with transportation (he was not
supposed to drive while taking some of his prescribed medications and because of a citation related
to the second vehicle accident). However, he admitted that he did continue to drive, including
driving to meet with Streittmatter. He acknowledged never having completed a budget.
With respect to visitation, Charles acknowledged being discharged by six service providers
during this case. He claimed to have last seen Trinity for an unsupervised visit at a birthday party
in June 2022. He agreed that the court order only allows for supervised visits. He also
acknowledged his lack of consistency in visits has been harmful to Trinity.
On July 27, 2022, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Charles’ parental rights.
The court found clear and convincing evidence that termination was proper pursuant to § 43-292
(2), (4), (6), and (7) and that termination of Charles’ parental rights was in Trinity’s best interests.
With respect to § 43-292(6), the court found clear and convincing evidence as to all allegations
except for the allegations with respect to Charles’ failure to complete a parenting class and an
updated chemical dependency evaluation (which the State dismissed) and his failure to complete
a full-scale psychological evaluation (for which the court found insufficient evidence).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Charles asserts that the juvenile court erred in (1) finding that his minor child came within
the meaning of § 43-292(2), (4), (6), and (7) and (2) determining that termination of his parental
rights was in his child’s best interests.
-7-
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions
independently of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Elijahking F., 313 Neb. 60, 982
N.W.2d 516 (2022). When the evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court may give weight
to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over
the other. Id.ANALYSIS
Statutory Grounds.
Charles asserts that the juvenile court erred in finding that his minor child came within the
meaning of § 43-292(2), (4), (6), and (7). Upon our de novo review, we find that the State presented
clear and convincing evidence to support termination of Charles’ parental rights under § 43-292(7).
Proof of one statutory ground is needed for termination, and the record clearly shows that statutory
grounds for termination of his parental rights exist under § 43-292(7).
Section 43-292(7) provides grounds for termination when “[t]he juvenile has been in an
out-of-home placement for fifteen or more months of the most recent twenty-two months.” Section
43-292(7) operates mechanically and, unlike the other subsections of the statute, does not require
the State to adduce evidence of any specific fault on the part of a parent. In re Interest of Mateo L.
et al., 309 Neb. 565, 961 N.W.2d 516 (2021).
Trinity was removed from the care of her mother and placed in the Department’s custody
on April 8, 2019, and has been in out-of-home placement continuously since that time. A motion
to terminate Charles’ parental rights was filed on January 27, 2022, at which time Trinity had been
in out-of-home placement for 33 months, and by the start of the termination hearing on June 22,
2022, she had been in out-of-home placement for 38 months. Our de novo review of the record
clearly and convincingly shows that grounds for termination of Charles’ parental rights under
§ 43-292(7) were proven by sufficient evidence.
The juvenile court also found sufficient evidence to support termination under § 43-292(2),
(4), and (6), but we do not need to consider whether termination of Charles’ parental rights was
proper pursuant to those subsections since § 43-292 provides 11 separate conditions, any one of
which can serve as the basis for the termination of parental rights when coupled with evidence that
termination is in the best interests of the child. See In re Interest of Elizabeth S., 282 Neb. 1015,
809 N.W.2d 495 (2012). However, we will consider evidence relevant to § 43-292(2), (4), and (6)
in our analysis of best interests. Generally, when termination of parental rights is sought, the
evidence adduced to prove the statutory grounds for termination will also be highly relevant to the
best interests of the juvenile, as it would show abandonment, neglect, unfitness, or abuse. In re
Interest of J’Endlessly F. et al., 26 Neb. App. 497, 920 N.W.2d 858 (2018).
Best Interests and Unfitness.
Charles asserts that the juvenile court erred in determining that termination of his parental
rights was in his child’s best interests. Charles argues that the court failed to account for the
significant progress he made in completing components of his case plan in light of his “incredibly
-8-
difficult health situation.” Brief for appellant at 15. He argues that he should have been given
additional time to continue his attempt at reunification.
In addition to proving a statutory ground, the State must show that termination is in the
best interests of the child. In re Interest of Noah C., 306 Neb. 359, 945 N.W.2d 143 (2020). A
parent’s right to raise his or her child is constitutionally protected; so before a court may terminate
parental rights, the State must also show that the parent is unfit. Id. There is a rebuttable
presumption that the best interests of a child are served by having a relationship with his or her
parent. Id. Based on the idea that fit parents act in the best interests of their children, this
presumption is overcome only when the State has proved that the parent is unfit. Id. The term
“unfitness” is not expressly used in § 43–292, but the concept is generally encompassed by the
fault and neglect subsections of that statute, and also through a determination of the child’s best
interests. In re Interest of Jahon S., 291 Neb. 97, 864 N.W.2d 228 (2015). In the context of the
constitutionally protected relationship between a parent and a child, parental unfitness means a
personal deficiency or incapacity which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a
reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which has caused, or probably will result in,
detriment to a child’s well-being. In re Interest of Leyton C. & Landyn C., 307 Neb. 529, 949
N.W.2d 773 (2020). The best interests and parental unfitness analyses in the context of a
termination of parental rights case require separate, fact-intensive inquiries, but each examines
essentially the same underlying facts. In re Interest of Mateo L. et al., 309 Neb. 565, 961 N.W.2d
516 (2021).
The evidence shows that Charles initially made progress toward completing his case plan
following his release from prison in January 2021. This progress led the State to dismiss its first
motion to terminate Charles’ parental rights. Charles has completed some of the requirements of
his case plan. He has completed a parenting class, a chemical dependency evaluation, and a
co-occurring evaluation. He also completed a domestic violence course, confusing it with the
required batterers’ intervention course. He has provided some financial support for Trinity in the
form of a cell phone for which he pays the bills and some clothing.
Charles has failed to comply with other components of the case plan, including visitation,
drug testing, obtaining a full-scale psychological evaluation, and following the recommendations
from the co-occurring evaluation. Charles acknowledged that his inconsistency in visitation has
been harmful to Trinity. He testified that he did not comply with the drug testing requirement
because he knew he would test positive, but such compliance, despite his stated use of cannabis
oil and edibles for pain relief, would have revealed whether he was using other illegal substances.
His communication with case professionals has been lacking; several witnesses testified to being
unaware of whether Charles might have scheduling conflicts or need certain accommodations due
to his medical issues.
While we are sympathetic to the personal difficulties Charles has faced during the course
of this case, he clearly has not placed himself in a position to have Trinity returned to his care.
Children cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care or be made to await uncertain parental
maturity. In re Interest of Alec S., 294 Neb. 784, 884 N.W.2d 701 (2016). We conclude that the
State showed by clear and convincing evidence that Charles was unfit and that termination of his
parental rights was in his child’s best interests.
-9-
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Charles’
parental rights to his minor child.
AFFIRMED.
- 10 -