State v. Fernando , 32 Neb. Ct. App. 289 ( 2023 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    09/26/2023 08:09 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
    32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
    STATE V. FERNANDO
    Cite as 
    32 Neb. App. 289
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Shawna J. Fernando, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed September 26, 2023.   No. A-22-896.
    1. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
    conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence
    is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the
    same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence,
    pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such mat-
    ters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an appellate
    court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essen-
    tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Criminal Law: Minors: Intent. There is no requirement under Nebraska
    law that the defendant be physically present when the child abuse
    occurs, or that the defendant be the only person present, so long as he or
    she knowingly, intentionally, or negligently permits the child abuse.
    3. Criminal Law: Intent: Words and Phrases. In the context of a crimi-
    nal statute, that which is done willfully or purposefully rather than acci-
    dentally or involuntarily is done intentionally; being a state of mind, the
    intent operative at the time of an action may be inferred from the words
    and acts of an accused and from the facts and circumstances surrounding
    the conduct.
    4. Appeal and Error. Plain error may be found on appeal when an error
    unasserted or uncomplained of at trial is plainly evident from the
    record, affects a litigant’s substantial right, and, if uncorrected, would
    result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judi-
    cial process.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Todd
    O. Engleman, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
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    STATE V. FERNANDO
    Cite as 
    32 Neb. App. 289
    James K. McGough, of McGoughLaw, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellant.
    Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Jordan Osborne
    for appellee.
    Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Moore and Riedmann, Judges.
    Riedmann, Judge.
    INTRODUCTION
    This is Shawna J. Fernando’s direct appeal from her convic-
    tions of two counts of intentional child abuse and one count
    of accessory to first degree sexual assault of a child following
    a bench trial in Douglas County District Court. On appeal,
    Fernando assigns that the evidence was insufficient to convict
    her of the crimes charged. Following our review, we affirm
    Fernando’s convictions. However, because the district court
    committed plain error in sentencing Fernando to a term of post-
    release supervision, we modify the sentencing order.
    BACKGROUND
    Fernando is the mother of the victim, who was born in
    2006. Fernando had six other children and was married to
    Pedro Fernando Flores, although at the time of trial, she was
    in the process of divorcing him; Flores was born in 1989.
    Prior to March 2021, Fernando stayed home with her children
    while Flores worked and provided financial support to the
    family. Flores was not the victim’s biological father, but he
    came into her life when she was very young and she called
    him “‘Dad.’”
    The victim was 15 years old at the time she testified at
    trial. According to the victim, when she was in fifth grade and
    11 years old, Flores entered her bedroom while she was sleep-
    ing and put his penis in her vagina. The next day, the victim
    told Fernando that Flores “had sex” with her, and Fernando
    left the room to speak with Flores. The victim could not
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    STATE V. FERNANDO
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    32 Neb. App. 289
    understand what the two were saying, although it sounded as
    though they were yelling.
    After the victim told Fernando what had happened, Flores
    continued to live with the victim and continued to sexually
    penetrate her. When the victim was in sixth grade, the family
    moved to another apartment, and Flores continued to assault
    the victim in the same manner; the victim did not tell her
    mother that Flores was continuing to do so. At some point later
    in her sixth grade year, when the victim was 12 years old, she
    and her family moved into a house in Omaha, Nebraska, where
    Flores continued the sexual assaults. By this time, the victim
    had begun menstruating, although she could not remember
    exactly how old she was when it first occurred.
    The victim testified that when she was in sixth grade,
    toward the end of the school year, Fernando asked her if she
    had gotten her period that month and she told her she had not.
    Shortly thereafter, Fernando had the victim do a home preg-
    nancy test, which was positive. Fernando inquired who the
    father was, and the victim told her that it was Flores. Fernando
    called Flores on the phone, he came home, and Fernando and
    Flores spoke on the back porch of the home, but the victim did
    not remember what was said.
    A couple of days later, Fernando called an abortion clinic
    and handed the phone to the victim, who made an appointment.
    Fernando, along with her sister, took the victim to the abortion
    clinic and instructed the victim to say that the father of her
    unborn child was “a boy from school.” At the clinic, the victim
    filled out the necessary paperwork herself, as required by staff,
    despite not understanding all the questions or words on the
    form. Fernando signed a release of liability form at the clinic,
    as well as a notarized parental consent form.
    According to the victim, she took a pill at the clinic and
    was given a prescription for another pill to take the next day.
    The next day was a Sunday, and Fernando and the rest of
    the family went to church while she was left home alone to
    take the remainder of the medication. The abortion caused
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    her to have painful cramps. When the family returned home,
    Fernando checked on her but left the house again, and Flores
    comforted her and gave her some pain medication.
    After the abortion, Flores continued to reside with the family
    and continued to sexually penetrate the victim. At Fernando’s
    suggestion, the victim began using birth control pills. At some
    point, Fernando had the victim take a second pregnancy test
    because her period was late, but the results were negative.
    At that time, the victim again told Fernando what Flores was
    doing to her. After the second pregnancy test, Flores continued
    to reside with the victim and sexually assault her.
    Contrary to the victim’s trial testimony that she told
    Fernando on three different occasions what Flores was doing,
    defense counsel impeached her several times with her prior
    statements in which she claimed to have told her mother on
    only two occasions. This included statements made during
    her child advocacy center interview, trial testimony during a
    juvenile court proceeding, deposition testimony in a criminal
    proceeding against Flores, and deposition testimony in the cur-
    rent case.
    The victim testified that prior to the abortion, she would
    track her period using an application on her phone. She would
    tell Fernando when she needed feminine hygiene products.
    Fernando would also track the victim’s periods and would ask
    the victim about them.
    In January 2021, the victim told a friend what had been
    happening, and this led to the police coming to the family’s
    home. This was close in time to the last instance of sexual pen-
    etration. When the police first arrived, Fernando retrieved the
    victim from her room, told her why the police were there, and
    instructed the victim to tell the police it was not true.
    According to the investigating officers, the victim was ner-
    vous to speak with them because Fernando and Flores were
    present. At the suggestion of one of the officers, the victim
    spoke privately with an officer in his cruiser. When they
    returned to the house, Fernando did not attempt to comfort the
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    victim despite her being obviously distressed. It was agreed
    that Flores would leave the home and spend the night else-
    where. When Flores left, Fernando hugged him.
    The victim was to go to a child advocacy center the next
    day, and according to the victim, Fernando told her to say that
    “it was all a lie” and that if she did not say it was a lie, the
    children would go into foster care. The next day, Fernando
    and her sister took the victim to the child advocacy center for
    an interview.
    According to an investigator assigned to the case, Fernando
    was also interviewed that day. After Fernando was taken into
    custody and her phone was confiscated, Flores attempted to
    call Fernando’s phone. The investigator asked Fernando if
    she would be willing to call or text Flores to determine his
    whereabouts, but she declined. Pursuant to a search warrant
    for the phone’s content, investigators discovered period track-
    ers on her phone, as well as an attempt by Fernando to call
    Flores shortly after the police had left the residence the previ-
    ous night.
    Fernando testified that she tracked the victim’s period
    because she needed to know when to buy hygiene products,
    because the victim would have “accidents” when she first
    started menstruating. Fernando explained that the family had
    a tight budget and that she needed to make sure to have
    money for the items. She said she had asked the victim to
    keep track of her own periods, but the victim would some-
    times forget.
    Fernando stated that when she discovered the victim was
    pregnant, the victim would not tell her who the father was.
    Fernando claimed she asked the victim over the course of the
    week about it, and eventually asked if it was a certain boy
    from the church they attended, and the victim said that it was.
    Fernando said it was the victim’s decision to have an abor-
    tion. She also testified that the abortion clinic recommended
    that the victim start birth control because it would be good
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    STATE V. FERNANDO
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    for her hormones; that is why the victim was started on birth
    control after the abortion.
    Fernando claimed the first time she was aware of the
    allegations of sexual assault by Flores was when the police
    came to the home on January 31, 2021. She stated that some-
    time after Thanksgiving 2020, the victim told her that Flores
    had “smacked [the victim’s] butt” and the victim felt it was
    inappropriate. Fernando claimed she spoke with Flores, who
    denied it. She stated that shortly thereafter, she convinced
    Flores to go to Mexico to visit family, which he did, and he
    returned a week or so before police came to the home.
    Fernando admitted that she knew the family of the boy she
    claimed the victim said was the father of her unborn child,
    but that she did not speak with the family. According to
    Fernando, “[the victim] just didn’t want everyone to know, it
    was [the victim’s] business. It was her [sic] for her to tell.”
    Fernando said she told the victim she would not tell anyone
    it was the boy’s unborn child and that the victim expressed
    “[a] little bit” of concern about Fernando’s contacting the
    boy’s family.
    Following the review of written closing arguments, the dis-
    trict court found the victim to be “very credible,” and Fernando
    to be less so. It found Fernando guilty of two counts of inten-
    tional child abuse, each a Class IIIA felony, and one count of
    accessory to a felony, a Class IIA felony. For each convic-
    tion of intentional child abuse, Fernando received a sentence
    of 2 to 3 years’ imprisonment, with 12 months’ post-release
    supervision. For her conviction of accessory to first degree
    sexual assault of a child, she received a sentence of 10 to 14
    years’ imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to be served
    concurrently, and Fernando was given credit for 2 days’ time
    served. Fernando appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Fernando assigns that there was insufficient evidence to
    convict her of intentional child abuse when there was no
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    STATE V. FERNANDO
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    32 Neb. App. 289
    evidence that she intentionally placed the victim in a situa-
    tion to be sexually abused. She also assigns that there was
    insufficient evidence to support the conviction of accessory
    to first degree sexual assault of a child, because there was no
    evidence to determine the father of the unborn child and the
    evidence demonstrated that the victim decided to proceed with
    the abortion.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of
    the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circum-
    stantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An
    appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
    on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such
    matters are for the finder of fact. State v. Thelen, 
    305 Neb. 334
    ,
    
    940 N.W.2d 259
     (2020). The relevant question for an appellate
    court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
    sonable doubt. 
    Id.
    ANALYSIS
    Intentional Child Abuse.
    Fernando was charged with two counts of intentional child
    abuse. To be found guilty, the State was required to prove
    that Fernando knowingly and intentionally caused or permit-
    ted the victim to be placed in a situation that endangered her
    life or physical or mental health or to be placed in a situation
    to be sexually abused as defined in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319
    ,
    § 28-319.01, or § 28-320.01 (Reissue 2016). See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707
     (Cum. Supp. 2022). Section 28-319.01 pro-
    vides that a person commits first degree sexual assault of a
    child if a person at least 19 years of age subjects a person
    under 12 years of age to sexual penetration, or if a person 25
    years of age or older subjects a person at least 12 years of
    age, but less than 16 years of age, to sexual penetration.
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    STATE V. FERNANDO
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    Here, the State presented evidence from which a rational
    trier of fact could conclude that Fernando knew that the vic-
    tim was being sexually assaulted by Flores and permitted the
    victim to be placed in that situation. The victim testified that
    when she was 11 years old, Flores subjected her to sexual
    penetration, and that he continued to do this when she was
    age 12 and older. Flores was always over the age of 25 when
    the assaults occurred. The victim told Fernando about Flores’
    actions after the first assault, when she became pregnant, and
    after she took a second pregnancy test; however, Fernando did
    nothing, thereby permitting the victim to be placed in a situa-
    tion in which the sexual assaults continued for years.
    Fernando paraphrases § 28-707(e) as follows: “A person
    commits child abuse if he or she knowingly, intentionally, or
    negligently causes or permits a minor child to be placed in
    a situation to be sexually abused.” Brief for appellant at 13
    (emphasis omitted). She argues that viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed
    that she disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk by
    not removing the victim or her husband from the home. She
    asserts that this shows she acted recklessly with respect to the
    potential harm against the victim, which “is the very defini-
    tion of negligent child abuse described in § 28-707(9).” Brief
    for appellant at 14 (emphasis in original). She concludes that
    inaction may constitute negligence or recklessness but does not
    constitute an intentional act because “[i]naction is not an overt,
    intentional act that places someone in a dangerous position
    they otherwise would not have found themselves in.” Id.
    We find Fernando’s rationale flawed. If her inaction can
    be the basis for a finding of negligent child abuse, as she
    admits it can, it necessarily follows that it can be a basis for
    a finding of intentional child abuse. Action, or lack thereof,
    is not what differentiates intentional child abuse from neg-
    ligent child abuse. The proscribed conduct for each offense
    is exactly the same; it is the actor’s state of mind which dif-
    ferentiates the offenses. State v. Blair, 
    272 Neb. 951
    , 726
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    N.W.2d 185 (2007). If the abuse is committed knowingly and
    intentionally, it is a felony; if committed negligently, it is a
    misdemeanor. 
    Id.
    [2] Section 28-707 applies to persons who either “cause”
    or “permit” a minor child to be placed in a situation to be
    sexually abused. By its very nature, the statute governs both
    action and inaction. No overt act is required when one per-
    mits a child to be placed in a situation to be sexually abused;
    rather, one can permit it to happen by failing to take action to
    prevent it. As explained by the New Mexico Supreme Court,
    “‘causing’ and ‘permitting’ child abuse are distinct theories,
    one premised upon active abuse (causing), the other upon
    ‘the passive act of allowing the abuse to occur’ (permitting).”
    State v. Nichols, 2016 NMSC 001, ¶ 32, 
    363 P.3d 1187
    , 1192
    (2015). As it relates to child abuse, the Nebraska Supreme
    Court has stated:
    [U]nder Nebraska law, one can commit child abuse if he
    or she “knowingly, intentionally, or negligently causes or
    permits a minor child” to be abused in one of the ways
    prohibited under § 28-707(1). (Emphasis supplied.) There
    is no requirement under Nebraska law that the defendant
    be physically present when the child abuse occurs, or that
    the defendant be the only person present, so long as he or
    she knowingly, intentionally, or negligently permits the
    child abuse.
    State v. Olbricht, 
    294 Neb. 974
    , 984, 
    885 N.W.2d 699
    , 707
    (2016) (emphasis in original).
    [3] Based upon the evidence presented, a rational trier
    of fact could find that Fernando was made aware of Flores’
    actions on three occasions, yet she permitted the victim to be
    placed in a situation to be continually sexually assaulted.
    In the context of a criminal statute, that which is done
    willfully or purposefully rather than accidentally or
    involuntarily is done intentionally; being a state of mind,
    the intent operative at the time of an action may be
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    inferred from the words and acts of an accused and from
    the facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct.
    State v. Meyer, 
    236 Neb. 253
    , 255, 
    460 N.W.2d 656
    , 658
    (1990).
    Fernando made an intentional decision to keep the victim
    and her assailant under the same roof. There was nothing acci-
    dental or involuntary involved. The district court did not err
    in finding Fernando guilty of intentional child abuse, and we
    reject her argument to the contrary.
    Accessory to First Degree Sexual Assault of Child.
    Fernando argues that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
    port the conviction of accessory to first degree sexual assault
    of a child and that there was no evidence to determine the
    father of the unborn child. To convict Fernando of the charge,
    the State was required to prove that Fernando, with intent to
    interfere with, hinder, delay, or prevent the discovery, appre-
    hension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another
    person for the offense of first degree sexual assault of a child,
    did harbor or conceal a felon, or provide or aid in avoid-
    ing the discovery or apprehension of the felon, or conceal or
    destroy evidence of the crime, tamper with a witness, inform­
    ant, document or other source of information, regardless of
    its admissibility into evidence. See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-204
    (Reissue 2016).
    Here, there was evidence that Fernando, upon learning that
    her 12-year-old daughter was pregnant by Flores, had the vic-
    tim undergo an abortion and told the victim to tell people that
    the father of the unborn child was a boy from school. After
    the police were made aware of the abuse, Fernando told the
    victim to tell the police and interviewers at the child advocacy
    center that “it was all a lie.” It can be inferred from the cir-
    cumstances surrounding the situation that Fernando’s actions
    were taken with the intent to prevent the discovery of the
    crime and the prosecution of Flores. This was sufficient for
    the district court to find Fernando guilty of accessory to first
    degree sexual assault of a child.
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    Fernando argues the victim made the decision to terminate
    the pregnancy, that the clinic ultimately and independently
    administered and prescribed the medication, and that when
    coupled with the lack of any evidence to prove that Flores was
    the father and that Fernando took any action knowing that fact,
    there was insufficient evidence to support the accessory con-
    viction. We disagree.
    The victim testified she told Fernando that Flores was the
    father of her unborn child and that it was Fernando’s idea
    for the victim to get an abortion. The victim testified that
    Fernando told her to tell other people that the father of her
    unborn child was a boy from her school. Years later, Fernando
    told the victim to tell police and the staff at the child advocacy
    center that “it was all a lie.” Although Fernando claimed at
    trial that the victim told her the father was a boy from church,
    Fernando did not attempt to contact the boy’s family or take
    any action to follow up on her belief that her 12-year-old
    daughter was pregnant by another child. The district court spe-
    cifically stated that it found Fernando to be less credible than
    the victim. We do not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
    on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. See
    State v. Thelen, 
    305 Neb. 334
    , 
    940 N.W.2d 259
     (2020).
    The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of
    accessory to first degree sexual assault of a child. This assign-
    ment of error fails.
    Plain Error in Sentencing.
    [4] The State directs our attention to a matter of potential
    plain error in the imposition of Fernando’s sentences. Plain
    error may be found on appeal when an error unasserted or
    uncomplained of at trial is plainly evident from the record,
    affects a litigant’s substantial right, and, if uncorrected, would
    result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the
    judicial process. State v. Guzman, 
    305 Neb. 376
    , 
    940 N.W.2d 552
     (2020).
    Fernando was convicted of two Class IIIA felonies. A
    Class IIIA felony is punishable by a maximum sentence of
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    3 years’ imprisonment and 18 months’ post-release supervi-
    sion, a $10,000 fine, or both, with no minimum sentence of
    imprisonment required, although if imprisonment is imposed,
    a minimum of 9 months’ post-release supervision is required.
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105
     (Cum. Supp. 2022). However, if
    a person is sentenced to imprisonment for a Class IIIA felony
    and is sentenced concurrently or consecutively to imprison-
    ment for a Class IIA felony, that person shall not be subject to
    post-release supervision. See § 28-105(6).
    Fernando was sentenced for her convictions of Class IIIA
    felonies concurrently to her conviction of a Class IIA felony.
    Thus, she should not have been sentenced to a term of post-
    release supervision. We strike that portion of the sentencing
    order imposing a term of post-release supervision and the cor-
    responding order for post-release supervision.
    CONCLUSION
    We find the evidence was sufficient to support the convic-
    tions of intentional child abuse and accessory to first degree
    sexual assault of a child. We modify the sentencing order to
    strike the portion that ordered Fernando to serve a term of
    post-release supervision and the corresponding order for post-
    release supervision. We affirm the order of the district court in
    all other respects.
    Affirmed as modified.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-22-896

Citation Numbers: 32 Neb. Ct. App. 289

Filed Date: 9/26/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/26/2023