Johnson (Andre) v. State ( 2014 )

 because the officer had not read Johnson his Miranda rights, conducted a
Terry3 pat-down, asked him to stand by the police car as they talked, and
would not have allowed Johnson to leave if Johnson had tried to leave. The
privilege against self-incrimination provides that statements made by a
suspect during custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial unless the
police have provided a Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 479 (1966); State v. Taylor, 114 Nev. 1071, 1081, 968 P.2d 315,
323 (1998). This court considers the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether a custodial interrogation has taken place, including
the interrogation site, the presence of objective indicia of an arrest, and
the length and form of the questioning. Taylor, 114 Nev. at 1081-82, 968
P.2d at 323. When police officers only ask on-scene questions about the
facts and circumstances of a crime or other fact-finding matters, an
individual is not in custody for Miranda purposes. Id. at 1082, 968 P.2d at
323. We conclude that the totality of the circumstances show that
Johnson was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made his
statements. As in Taylor, at the time the statements were made, the
questioning police officer did not handcuff or restrain Johnson, draw his
weapon, or inform Johnson that he was not free to leave, while Johnson
voluntarily answered the officer's questions, made a voluntary statement,
and did not ask to leave. See id. at 1083-84, 968 P.2d at 323-24. Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress
Johnson's statements.
Johnson argues that prospective juror no. 58 should have been
removed for cause because she stated that she had been a "battered
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968).
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spouse" and qualified her response that she would separate this
experience from her role as a juror. The trial court has broad discretion in
ruling on for-cause challenges during jury selection because it is better
situated to assess a prospective juror's demeanor than a reviewing court.
Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 67, 17 P.3d 397, 406 (2001); see Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985). The trial court's determination that a
juror is fair and impartial will be upheld if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 853, 866-67, 944 P.2d 762, 771 (1997).
The record shows that prospective juror no. 58 stated that she believed she
could be impartial and could base her decision on the evidence, understood
that her history was distinct from the facts here, and had recently
administered a domestic-violence situation at work, demonstrating her
ability to take an impartial stance on similar issues. Noting the broad
discretion afforded the district court, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the district court's determination and that the district
court accordingly did not abuse its discretion. See Leonard, 117 Nev. at
67, 17 P.3d at 406.
Having considered Johnson's contentions and concluded that
they are without merit, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
Gibbon
, J.
Pickering Saitta
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cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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