Sharpe (Raymond) v. State ( 2014 )

 firearm by an ex-felon also resulted in a determination of guilt for all five
counts.'
On appeal, Sharpe argues that: (1) the district court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence of the nature of his prior felony
convictions in his trial on charges of ex-felon-in-possession of a firearm, (2)
the district court erred by denying his motion to consolidate five counts of
ex-felon-in-possession of a firearm on the ground that all of the firearms
were in one location and possessed at the same time, (3) the district court
erred by failing to intervene sua sponte to correct prosecutorial
misconduct, (4) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support
three of the ex-felon-in-possession counts, (5) the ex-felon-in-possession
convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because Sharpe had
already been tried on other offenses arising from the same incident and
involving at least one of the same weapons, and (6) cumulative error
warrants reversal. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction.
Evidence of Prior Felony Convictions
Sharpe argues that he was denied his federal constitutional
due process rights when the district court failed to redact the judgments of
conviction that were admitted to prove his ex-felons status.
To prove the offense of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon,
the State must show that the defendant was convicted of a felony and that
he possessed or exercised dominion and control over a firearm. NRS
202.360(1)(a); Woodall v. State, 97 Nev. 235, 236, 627 P.2d 402, 403 (1981).
'The parties are familiar with the facts, and we do not recount them
further except as necessary to our disposition.
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Both federal and Nevada courts have established that the
State "is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more
exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out
of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to
present it." Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1997); Edwards v.
State, 122 Nev. 378, 380-82, 132 P.3d 581, 583 (2006). However, this
court, recognizing certain exceptions to this rule, has acknowledged
limitations to a prosecutor's discretion. Edwards, 122 Nev. at 381, 132
P.3d at 583. A prosecutor's discretion to present his case is limited to
proving "the fact, instead of the nature, of a prior conviction where the
effectiveness of the prosecutor's case is not impaired, and unnecessary and
improper prejudice to the accused is avoided." Id. (quoting Sanders v.
State, 96 Nev. 341, 343, 609 P.2d 324, 326 (1980)). Thus, this court
concluded that when "a defendant is on trial for a single count of ex-felon-
in-possession of a firearm, . .. the probative value of introducing a
defendant's prior judgment of conviction solely to prove his ex-felon status
is likewise unduly prejudicial if the defendant offers to stipulate to that
status." Id. at 382, 132 P.3d at 584.
Here, Sharpe never stipulated to his status as an ex-felon,
even though the defense acknowledged in opening arguments that "[t]his
case is not about whether Mr. Sharpe is an ex-felon." Because of the lack
of stipulation, the State was required to prove Sharpe's ex-felon status at
trial. To prove that Sharpe was an ex-felon, the State sought to admit
certified judgments of conviction for Sharpe's prior felonies, and Sharpe's
counsel stated that Sharpe did not object. The district court, therefore,
admitted the exhibits, and the jury learned that Sharpe had previously
been convicted of several felonies, namely, assault with a deadly weapon,
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pimping, receiving stolen property, perjury, and unlawful sexual
intercourse. When the State referred to Sharpe's prior convictions in its
closing arguments, Sharpe again did not object.
This court has the discretion to review unpreserved issues for
plain error that affects a defendant's substantial rights. NRS 178.602.
However, "the burden is on the defendant to show actual prejudice or a
miscarriage of justice." Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95
(2003).
Sharpe was likely prejudiced by the admission of his prior
convictions, however, Sharpe's failure to stipulate to his status as an ex-
felon required the State to prove his status as an ex-felon by presenting
the certified judgments to show his prior convictions. Moreover, Sharpe
failed to object to the admission of the judgments of conviction without
redactions. Therefore, Sharpe was not denied his federal constitutional
due process rights when the district court failed to redact his judgments of
conviction that were admitted to prove his ex-felons status.
Consolidation of Ex-Felon-in-Possession of a Firearm Charges
Sharpe argues that his federal rights to due process and a fair
trial were violated because he should have been charged with only a single
offense. He contends that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has clear
law on this subject that is in accordance with the principles of multiplicity
recognized by this court. See United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165
(9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1991)
(applying federal law). He argues that because the firearms were all •
stored at the same location, only one criminal charge can be alleged. Id.
This court has yet to address the "unit-of-prosecution" issue as
it pertains to possession of firearms. See Hughes v. State, 116 Nev. 975, 12
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P.3d 948 (2000) (affirming a judgment of conviction that involved multiple
ex-felon-in-possession counts based on different guns in the defendant's
possession at the same time, but not considering the unit of prosecution).
"The unit of prosecution is the manner in which a criminal statute permits
the defendant's conduct to be divided into discrete acts for prosecuting
multiple offenses by establishing whether the conduct consists of one or
more violations of a single statutory provision." 1 Crim. L. Del § 68(d)(4)
(2014).
NRS 202.360(1) provides that
1. A person shall not own or have in his or her
possession or under his or her custody or control
any firearm if the person:
(a) Has been convicted of a felony in this or any
other state, or in any political subdivision
thereof, or of a felony in violation of the laws
of the United States of America, unless the
person has received a pardon and the
pardon does not restrict his or her right to
bear arms;
....
A person who violates the provisions of this
subsection is guilty of a category B felony and
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year
and a maximum term of not more than 6 years,
and may be further punished by a fine of not more
than $5,000.
"Firearm" is defined as including "any firearm that is loaded or unloaded
and operable or inoperable." NRS 202.360(3)(b).
This court reviews issues of statutory construction and any
constitutional overlay de novo. Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. , , 291
P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012). " [Diet ermining the appropriate unit of
prosecution presents an issue of statutory interpretation and substantive
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law." Id. at , 291 P.3d at 1283 (internal quotation omitted).
Understanding a statute's meaning starts with the statutory language,
and this court does not look beyond that language unless there is an
ambiguity. State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. , 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).
Statutes are interpreted as a whole with effect and meaning given to each
word. Blackburn v. State, 129 Nev. „ 294 P.3d 422, 426 (2013).
We conclude that nothing in the statutory language of NRS
202.360 suggests that the Legislature contemplated that one violation
would encompass all the firearms in the felon's possession. The statute
uses the singular language "any firearm" rather than the plural language
any "firearms." This language is plain and unambiguous: each firearm
the ex-felon possesses constitutes a separate violation of the statute.
Here, Sharpe possessed five distinct firearms. Therefore, this
Court affirms the five charges of felon-in-possession of a firearm because
each charge involved a different firearm.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Sharpe argues that the State violated his due process and fair
trial rights by committing multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
A party is generally required to object to prosecutorial
misconduct at trial because this then allows the district court to rule on
the issue, admonish the prosecutor, and/or instruct the jury. Valdez v.
State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008). "When an error has
not been preserved, this court employs plain-error review." Id. This court
will only overturn a conviction if "the misconduct is 'clearly demonstrated
to be substantial and prejudicial." Miller v. State, 121 Nev. 92, 99, 110
P.3d 53, 58 (2005) (quoting Sheriff v. Fullerton, 112 Nev. 1084, 1098, 924
P.2d 702, 711 (1996)).
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Allegations of domestic violence and officer safety
Sharpe contends that the prosecutor's references to alleged
domestic violence and officer safety were unnecessary because Sharpe had
already conceded that he was an ex-felon. He further contends that these
references prejudiced him because they served to heighten the jury's
perception of him as being a dangerous criminal who needed to be
incarcerated. Sharpe argues that the questioning was clearly designed to
improperly inflame the jury's passions, fears, and vulnerabilities in
violation of due process.
References to domestic violence
Sharpe takes issue with repeated references, through the
State's witnesses, to the fact that the original call to police dispatch was
for domestic violence.
Prior to trial and any references to domestic violence, the
State sought approval from the court to inform the jury that the officers
were responding to a domestic violence call. The defense acquiesced to the
request and the district court allowed the references. At trial, the State
then mentioned, through five witnesses, that the call to the police was for
a domestic violence incident. Because of his acquiescence and failure to
object, Sharpe must demonstrate that this was plain error. See NRS
178.602; Woodall, 97 Nev. at 236, 627 P.2d at 403. Because the reason for
the call was relevant to explaining the circumstances, and Sharpe failed to
demonstrate "actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice," these references
did not constitute plain error. Green v. State, 119 Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at
95.
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References to officer safety
Sharpe also takes issue with the prosecutor eliciting testimony
from Officer Powell about officer safety, the need for officer safety, and
methods by which officer safety was ensured as irrelevant and an attempt
to heighten the jury's perception of Sharpe as being dangerous.
When a person is accused of being an ex-felon-in-possession of
a firearm, the only evidence admissible at that person's trial is evidence
relevant to prove his status as an ex-felon and evidence that he possessed
the firearm at issue. NRS 202.360(1)(a); NRS 48.015; NRS 48.025. A
well-established caveat to that rule is that otherwise relevant evidence is
nevertheless inadmissible "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or
of misleading the jury." NRS 48.035(1). Additionally, under NRS
48.045(2),
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Here, Sharpe challenges Officer Powell's testimony concerning
how he met Sharpe and his subsequent search of the residence. Officer
Powell testified that he went to assist with the detainment of a suspect
who was not complying with officers' orders. He stated that
noncompliance is a safety issue. When Officer Powell arrived at the
location, he observed two officers giving verbal commands, telling the
suspect, who was standing in front of a vehicle facing the officers, to face
the vehicle so that they could take him into custody. Officer Powell stated
that he got out of his police vehicle, drew his taser, and pointed it at the
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suspect who then decided to comply with the requests to face the vehicle.
Officer Powell identified the suspect as Sharpe Once Sharpe was taken
into custody and was no longer a threat, Officer Powell went to the
residence to conduct a protective sweep to determine whether there was
anyone else inside the house. Inside, Officer Powell discovered an AR-15
semiautomatic assault rifle lying on the stairwell landing half way up the
stairs. He secured the gun while wearing gloves and moved it downstairs
by the back door for officer safety purposes. Ultimately, he found nobody
in the home. Officer Powell then determined that the scene was safe and
that he was no longer needed.
At no time did Sharpe object to any of this testimony.
Accordingly, this court's review is limited to assessing whether plain error
affected Sharpe's substantive rights. NRS 178.602. Sharpe bears the
burden "to show actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice." Green, 119
Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at 95.
Sharpe has failed to meet this burden. With the exception of
the references to noncompliance and the need to pull a taser, Officer
Powell's testimony simply explained how he secured the premises to
determine if anyone else was present, why he felt the need to secure the
firearms, and why he moved the assault rifle. This evidence was relevant
to whether Sharpe had constructive possession over the firearms and was
clearly admissible. We agree that the testimony about Sharpe's
noncompliance with the officers and the need to point a taser at him was
not relevant to whether Sharpe was an ex-felon-in-possession of a firearm.
It was also not admissible under NRS 48.045(2) to show "proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident." Instead, this testimony was impermissible
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leividence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith." NRS 48.045(2). But, in light of the evidence adduced at trial
that Sharpe was an ex-felon and in constructive possession of the
firearms, we conclude that Sharpe fails to show actual prejudice.
Elicitation of legal conclusions
Sharpe argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited legal
conclusions from police officers concerning papers found at the residence.
He contends that the officers' testimony constituted legal conclusions and
opinions improperly elicited to prove the only issue in dispute at the trial:
that he constructively possessed the firearms found in the residence.
This court reviews the district court's admission of opinion
testimony for abuse of discretion. Watson v. State, 94 Nev. 261, 264, 578
P.2d 753, 756 (1978). A lay witness's testimony "in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences" that are "Nationally
based on the perception of the witness" and "[h]elpful to a clear
understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a
fact in issue." NRS 50.265. And testimony is "not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." NRS 50.295.
Here, Sharpe takes issue with testimony provided by the
police. On the first day of Sharpe's trial, the prosecutor posed the
following questions, which Detective Mark Menzie answered:
did you seek to recover certain items
within the residence that would tend to establish a
possessory interest in the residence and or the
firearms?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that common to do?
A. Yes, it is.
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Q. And what types of items are we talking about?
A. Mail, photographs, addressed envelopes;
anything documenting a person that establishes
dominion control over a residence, or at least
shows possession, or residing at a certain
residence. That would be written.
Q. And did you find items tending to establish a
possessory interest?
A. I did.
Q. And whose name were those items in?
A. It would be Raymond Sharpe. And I also
discovered the alias Rashaad Shelton.
Similar testimony was elicited from Detective Aaron
Fink at trial:
Q. And were you also looking for paperwork in a
specific individual's name?
A. Yes.
Q. And who was that?
A. Raymond Sharpe
Q. Why specifically do you look for paperwork such
as these items depicted in these four photographs?
A. We refer to them as possessory items that links
[sic] a person to these items as possession; that
typically if they live in that home, they're going to
have their name on it and address; something
linking to the fact that they live there or they
belong with the property.
Q. And why is that important when you're
investigating firearms offenses?
A. Because it ties the people together. It ties them
-- if they do live there and have their name to that
residence, firearms are there, it's a good chance
that it belongs to them.
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During the next day of trial, the following testimony was
elicited from Detective Christopher Baughman:
Q. The search warrant that you obtained, the
second search warrant that was executed at that
residence, it authorized the search for firearms
and items tending to show a possessory interest in
the house; it that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And why do you search for items of
possessory interest?
A. Just to establish whose home it is; who has
possession of the home.
Q. And who has control over the property?
A. Yes.
Q. When you are searching for items tending to
show a possessory interest, what types of items
are you looking for?
A. Could be things like mail, bills, receipts, ID,
licenses.
Q. And why is it that you all look for those types of
items to establish control over that -- over the
property?
A. Well, because we don't know -- we need to know
whose property it is, depending on what we find
inside of it.
Q. Okay. So, is it your belief that people don't
leave important things like bills, bank statements,
things of that nature at a home they don't have
any control over?
A. Correct.
Q. While on scene, did you in fact recover several
items that you believed showed control over the
property?
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A. I did.
Q. And were those in the names of Raymond
Sharpe?
A. They were.
The statements made by the LVMPD detectives consisted of
lay witness testimony "in the form of opinions or inferences" that assisted
the jury by discussing the ultimate issue of possession and how
constructive possession may be established. NRS 50.265. These
statements did not cross the line into impermissibly telling the jury what
result to reach. United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d at 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, the elicited testimony was proper.
Reference to facts not in evidence
Sharpe argues that the prosecutor's reference during closing
argument rebuttal to a bloody towel was an impermissible reference to
facts not in evidence that constituted reversible prosecutorial misconduct.
During closing argument, the prosecution argued that "State's
Exhibit 11 . . is a towel with blood on it. Is it possible he wiped blood off
a gun? Absolutely." Defense counsel objected, stating that "this assumes
facts in evidence. There was no evidence that there were any blood -- any
towel." The prosecution replied that
I'm staring at State's Exhibit 11 with a towel -- I'm
sorry, apparent blood.
THE COURT: All right, right.
MS. DEMONTE: We'll call it that.
THE COURT: Okay. Go on.
This argument did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
"Counsel is allowed to argue any reasonable inferences from the evidence
the parties have presented at trial." Jain v. McFarland, 109 Nev. 465,
476, 851 P.2d 450, 457 (1993). As evidenced by the exchange, the
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inference drawn by the prosecution was supported by evidence that had
been admitted at trial. Accordingly, there was no error.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support three counts of ex-felon-in-possession-
of-a-firearm
The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Rose v. State,
123 Nev. 194, 202, 163 P.3d 408, 414 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).
In rendering its decision, the jury is tasked with "assess[ing] the weight of
the evidence and . . . credibility of witnesses." Id. at 202-03, 163 P. 3d at
414 (internal quotations omitted). A jury is also free to rely on both direct
and circumstantial evidence in returning its verdict. Wilkins v. State, 96
Nev. 367, 374, 609 P.2d 309, 313 (1980). This court has consistently "held
that circumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction." Deveroux v.
State, 96 Nev. 388, 391, 610 P.2d 722, 724 (1980).
Because Sharpe was only in actual possession of two of the
five firearms, the State was required to demonstrate constructive
possession of three of the firearms at issue here—the Ruger, the CZ, and
the AR-15
"This court has defined constructive possession as both the
power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control
over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons." Batin
v. State, 118 Nev. 61, 65-66, 38 P.3d 880, 883 (2002) (internal quotations
omitted). This requires more than a showing of mere access to the
property; . t requires evidence of dominion and control. Id. at 66, 38 P.3d
at 883-84; see also Palmer v. State, 112 Nev. 763, 769, 920 P.2d 112, 115
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(1996) (pointing out that in narcotics possession cases, "possession may be
imputed when the contraband is found in a location which is immediately
and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to [his] dominion and
control" and stating that this language is instructive on the issue of
possession of stolen property (internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly,
"[t]he accused has constructive possession only if she maintains control or
a right to control the contraband." Glispey v. Sheriff, Carson City, 89 Nev.
221, 223, 510 P.2d 623, 624 (1973). Dominion and control may be
evidenced "by circumstantial evidence and reasonably drawn inferences."
Kinsey v. Sheriff, Washoe Cnty., 87 Nev. 361, 363, 487 P.2d 340, 341
(1971).
We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that
Sharpe had a right to control the firearms charged in counts 14 (the
Ruger), 15 (the CZ), and 17 (the AR-15). The evidence in this case was not
limited to mere presence. See Konold v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 94 Nev. 289,
290, 579 P.2d 768, 769 (1978) (determining that a small amount of
marijuana found in a pipe located in a room where several persons were
present was insufficient by itself to establish constructive possession);
Glispey, 89 Nev. at 224, 510 P.2d at 624-25 (concluding that there was no
constructive possession of marijuana stashed in a paper towel receptacle
in a rest room when two other women accessed the rest room). The
surrounding circumstances support the reasonable inference that the
firearms were within Sharpe's dominion and control. See Palmer, 112
Nev. at 769, 920 P.2d at 115 (concluding that Palmer was in constructive
possession of the vehicle, despite not having the keys and no one having
seen him drive the vehicle, because a friend saw him inside the vehicle
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dismantling the convertible top and an officer saw him in and around the
vehicle removing parts).
Sharpe independently owned the residence where the firearms
were found. The State presented documentary evidence retrieved from the
residence indicating that Sharpe exercised dominion and control over the
premises. While Sharpe asserts that another individual, Alicia Grundy,
also lived in the residence with him, this was not established in the
record. 2 Moreover, Officer Kovacich heard arguing between a male and
a female inside the residence. Grundy identified the male voice as
belonging to Sharpe. Grundy repeatedly told Officer Kovacich that Sharpe
had a gun. She also explained that her face was bleeding because Sharpe
had pistol-whipped her with a handgun. Grundy later told Officer
Kovacich that Sharpe had four or five guns in the house.
Furthermore, none of the firearms or magazines contained a
DNA profile consistent with Grundy. However, DNA consistent with
Sharp was found on the Smith & Wesson. Sharpe's palm print was also
found on the Norinco.
As to the specific firearms at issue—the Ruger, the CZ, and
the AR-15—each had additional indicia of Sharpe's dominion and control.
First, the Ruger revolver was discovered inside a sock in a
suitcase located in the master bedroom, which was Sharpe's bedroom.
Beneath the Ruger was an envelope addressed to MO c/o R. Shelton at
8795 Gagnier, Las Vegas, Nevada, the residential address to which police
2 Thereis no requirement that dominion and control be exclusive.
See Maskaly v. State, 85 Nev. 111, 114, 450 P.2d 790, 792 (1969) ("Two or
more persons may have joint possession of a narcotic if jointly and
knowingly they have its dominion and control.").
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were originally dispatched for the domestic violence incident. Sharpe
owned AIO Motoring and operated under the known alias Rashaad
Shelton.
Second, the police found the CZ semiautomatic pistol in a
dresser draw next to a bed in the master bedroom. On the dresser, police
also found paperwork listing the names AIO Motoring and Rashaad.
And, third, the AR-15 semiautomatic assault rifle was
discovered lying on the stairwell landing. While police did not find any
DNA or fingerprint evidence on the firearm, it is notable that Sharpe
mistakenly attempted to load the Norinco rifle with the AR-15 rifle's
ammunition. This was evidenced by Sharpe's palm print being found on
the Norinco. This gives rise to the reasonable inference that because
Sharpe had dominion and control over the AR-15's ammunition, he had
dominion and control over the AR-15 as well.
This evidence was sufficient to establish that Sharpe, rather
than Grundy, possessed the firearms found by the police. See Deveroux v.
State, 96 Nev. at 391, 610 P.2d at 724 (stating that the jury may rely on
circumstantial evidence standing alone in returning its verdict).
Double Jeopardy Clause
Sharpe argues that the State violated his federal double
jeopardy right by requiring him to stand trial for possession of a firearm
by an ex-felon when the facts underlying the charge had been decided in
his earlier trial. He contends that the first trial established that he
possessed the guns that were found to have been used to commit the
crimes and that he was thus placed in jeopardy twice for the same acts.
This court reviews de novo issues of double jeopardy. Jackson
v. State, 128 Nev. 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012). "The Double
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Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: (1) a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same
offense." Id. at , 291 P.3d at 1278.
Here, Sharpe argues that possession of a firearm by an ex-
felon (NRS 202.360) is included in the charges for felony first-degree
kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily
harm (NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165); felony battery constituting
domestic violence with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial
bodily harm (NRS 200.481); and felony assault with a deadly weapon
(NRS 200.471). We disagree.
"To determine whether two statutes penalize the same
offence," this court "inquires whether each offense contains an element not
contained in the other; if not, they are the same offence and double
jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution."
Jackson, 128 Nev. at , 291 P.3d at 1278 (citing Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
Possession of a firearm by ex-felon requires (1) possession or
control of a firearm (2) by a person previously convicted of a felony. NRS
202.360(1)(a). The requirement that thefl person have been previously
convicted of a felony is an additional element of NRS 202.360 that is not
included in the other offences.
First-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon
resulting in substantial bodily harm requires, in pertinent part, a willful
seizure, confinement, or carrying away of another person to receive a
ransom or reward or to commit "sexual assault, extortion or robbery upon
or from the person, or for the purpose of. . . inflicting substantial bodily
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harm upon the person." NRS 200.310(1). Additionally, the kidnapped
person must "suffer substantial bodily harm during the act of kidnapping
or the subsequent detention." NRS 200.320(1). Lastly, the perpetrator
must use "a firearm or other deadly weapon." NRS 193.165(1).
Battery constituting domestic violence with use of a deadly
weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm requires a "willful and
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another . . with the
use of a deadly weapon. . . . [resulting in] [s]ubstantial bodily harm to the
victim results or the battery is committed by strangulation." NRS
200.481(1)(a), (2)(e)(2).
Assault with a deadly weapon requires "[u]nlawfully
attempting to use physical force against another person; or . . .
[i]ntentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of
immediate bodily harm. . . with the use of a deadly weapon or the present
ability to use a deadly weapon." NRS 200.471(1)(a),(2)(b).
Sharpe's conviction for ex-felon-in-possession of a firearm
required proof that he was an ex-felon at the time of possession. NRS
202.360(1)(a). This fact was not required to prove the kidnapping, battery,
or assault crimes. NRS 200.310(1); NRS 200.320(1); NRS 193.165(1); NRS
200.481(1)(a),(2)(e)(2); NRS 200.471(1)(a),(2)(b). Moreover, kidnapping,
battery, and assault each required proof of additional or different facts
than are required for ex-felon-in-possession of a firearm. The kidnapping
charge required proof that Sharpe abducted a person and required the
infliction of substantial bodily harm. NRS 200.310(1); NRS 200.320(1);
NRS 193.165(1). The battery charge required "willful and unlawful use of
force or violence" and that substantial bodily harm to the victim resulted.
NRS 200.481(1)(a),(2)(e)(2). The assault charge required proof that
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Sharpe either placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate
bodily harm or that he unlawfully attempted to use physical force against
the victim. NRS 200.471(1)(a),(2)(b). We therefore conclude that Sharpe's
convictions did not violate double jeopardy.
Cumulative error
Sharpe argues that his federal constitutional right to a fair
trial was violated by the cumulative effect of the numerous significant
errors that he claims occurred during his trial. He asserts that the issue
of culpability was not close given the insufficient evidence. Also, he
argues, the gravity and character of the errors were severe because they
occurred at each critical stage of the litigation. Lastly, he contends that
the crimeS of possession of firearms by an ex-felon is not serious. Sharpe
argues that because the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, the
verdicts would not have been the same in the absence of the multiple
errors. We disagree.
Cumulative error may deny a defendant a fair trial even if the
errors, standing alone, would be harmless. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172,
1195, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008). "When evaluating a claim of cumulative
error, we consider the following factors: (1) whether the issue of guilt is
close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the
crime charged." Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, a defendant
is not entitled to a perfect trial, merely a fair one. Ennis v. State, 91 Nev.
530, 533, 539 P.2d 114, 115 (1975).
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The only substantiated error at Sharpe's trial—the discussion
about Sharpe's noncompliance with the officers and the purported need to
point a taser at him—does not warrant reversal. Thus, Sharpe is not
entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
/ Xi J.
Hardesty
-111, List 1AS
M J.
Douglas
Cherry
ji\AX(P) J.
(
cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
Donald J. Green
Attorney GenerallCarson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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