Shahrokhi v. Dist. Ct. (Burrow) ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ALI SHAHROKHI, No. 84189
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FILED
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
DAWN THRONE, DISTRICT JUDGE, APR 2 9 2022
Respondents, ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK Of SUPREME COURT
and BY
DEPWYCL=" 3-
KIZZY BURROW,
Real Party in Interest.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION
This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenges a district court order declaring petitioner a vexatious litigant.
Having considered the petition and supporting documents, we are not
persuaded that our extraordinary and discretionary intervention is
warranted for two reasons. See NRS 34.160; NRS 34.320; Pan v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004); Smith v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853
(1991).
First, petitioner has an adequate legal remedy because he may
challenge the vexatious litigant order in an appeal from final judgment. See
Peck v. Crouser, 129 Nev. 120, 123-24, 295 P.3d 586, 587-88 (2013) (noting
that this court has "reviewed the propriety of interlocutory vexatious
litigant orders challenged in the context of an appeal from a final judgment,"
while holding that postjudgrnent vexatious litigant orders may only be
challenged by a petition for writ relief). Generally, we will not entertain
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mandamus or prohibition when the petitioner has another adequate
remedy. NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330.
Second, even if appellate review of the vexatious litigant order
on appeal from a final judgment would not be sufficient to protect
petitioner's access to the court, we further conclude that petitioner has not
met his burden to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is warranted. See
Pan, 120 Nev. at 228, 88 P.3d at 844. Insofar as petitioner argues for
prohibition, he relies in part on a motion for an emergency stay that was
filed in separate, consolidated appeals and was denied. Cf. Shahrokhi v.
Burrow, Docket Nos. 81978, 82245 (Order Denying Stay, January 19, 2022).
Insofar as petitioner argues that the district judge improperly relied on
“
extr ajudiciar sources when noting petitioner's other filings in federal court
and Nevada appellate courts, the district court is not barred from
acknowledging such filings, and petitioner further has proffered no
authority suggesting that doing so deprives the district court of jurisdiction.
See Jordan v. State ex rel. Depit of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev.
44, 61, 110 P.3d 30, 43 (2005) (directing district courts to consider filings in
other cases cautiously, in order to avoid interfering with the work of other
judges in other actions), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v.
City of North Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008).
We further conclude that mandamus relief is not warranted
because petitioner has not shown that the district court manifestly abused
its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. See Walker v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 678, 680, 476 P.3d 1194, 1196 (2020); Jordan,
121 Nev. at 60, 110 P.3d at 42 (setting forth vexatious litigant order
standards). Specifically, the district court created an adequate record in
setting forth petitioner's numerous, frivolous filings and explaining that
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petitioner abused the legal system by repeatedly filing meritless suits,
motions, and other documents. See Jordan, 121 Nev. at 60-61, 110 P.3d at
43. Next, the district court found that petitioner's filings were intended to
harass, to cause unnecessary delay, and to increase the cost of litigation for
the real party in interest and lacked an arguable legal or factual basis. See
id. at 61, 110 P.3d at 43. And finally, its order was narrowly tailored to
petitioner's misconduct in requiring petitioner to seek leave before filing
any further pro se documents in this and one other related case pending
before the district court. See id.1
Accordingly, we
ORDER the petition DENIED.2
J. Sr.J.
Cadish
1-To the extent that petitioner frames the argument as seeking First
Amendment relief, he rests his claim on the same vexatious litigant
standards and has not shown relief is warranted. To the extent that he
rests a First Amendment claim on anti-SLAPP statutes, relief is not
warranted because those statutes do not shield against vexatious litigant
orders but rather provide "a procedural mechanism to dismiss meritless
lawsuit[s] that a party initiates primarily to chill a defendant's exercise of
his or her First Amendment free speech rights before incurring the costs of
litigation." Coker v. Sas.sone, 135 Nev. 8, 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748 (2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and conclude
that they do not warrant relief.
2The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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r
cc: Hon. Dawn Throne, District Judge, Family Court Division
Ali Shahrokhi
Kizzy Burrow
Eighth District Court Clerk
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