Chaparro (Osbaldo) v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                 that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief.
    See Hargrove v. State, 
    100 Nev. 498
    , 502, 
    686 P.2d 222
    , 225 (1984).
    Ineffective assistance of trial counsel
    First, Chaparro contends that the district court erred in
    denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
    an instruction on the lesser-included offense of open and gross lewdness.
    We disagree. Open or gross lewdness is not a lesser-included offense of
    battery with intent to commit sexual assault because the elements of open
    or gross lewdness are not entirely included within the elements of battery
    with intent to commit sexual assault.         See Wilson v. State, 
    121 Nev. 345
    ,
    359, 
    114 P.3d 285
    , 294-95 (2005) ("The test ultimately resolves itself on
    whether the provisions of each of the different statutes require the proof of
    a fact that the other does not."). Open and gross lewdness involves the
    intent to commit a sexual act that could be observed by another and would
    be offensive to observers. NRS 201.210; Berry v, State, 
    125 Nev. 265
    , 280-
    82, 
    212 P.3d 1085
    , 1095-97 (2009), abrobated on other grounds by State v.
    Casteneda, 
    126 Nev. 478
    , 
    245 P.3d 550
     (2010). Battery with intent to
    commit sexual assault prohibits the willful use of force or violence upon
    the person of another with the intent to commit nonconsensual sexual
    penetration.     See NRS 200.400(1)(a); NRS 200.366(1). While it penalizes
    violent contact aimed at sexual assault, the offense does not require a
    sexual act or that such an act be observed by another. Therefore,
    Chaparro could not demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient
    for failing to request the instruction and the district court did not err in
    denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
    Second, Chaparro contends that counsel was ineffective for
    failing to present testimony from several witnesses who could have
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    confirmed, consistent with his statement to police, where Chaparro walked
    after the alleged battery. We disagree. The victim testified that Chaparro
    attacked her as she was leaving the Nugget Casino human resources
    office. Her testimony was corroborated by her injuries and records that
    showed Chaparro was at the Nugget as well. Chaparro also admitted to
    police that he was with the victim in the parking lot, shoved her, and got
    on top of her. Considering this evidence, Chaparro could not demonstrate
    a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been
    different had counsel sought to introduce testimony that would have
    corroborated Chaparro's statement in such a minor detail. Therefore, the
    district court did not err in denying this claim without conducting an
    evidentiary hearing.
    Third, Chaparro contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to object to repeated instances of prosecutorial misconduct. We
    disagree. Although counsel failed to object to the comments at trial,
    Chaparro's appellate counsel challenged the comments on appeal.            See
    Chaparro v. State, Docket No. 59907 (Order of Affirmance, November 15,
    2012). While we evaluated the merits of the claims under the plain error
    standard of review, we concluded that, as the jury was properly instructed
    on the definition of reasonable doubt, any error was harmless. See 
    id.
     As
    the State's comments did not result in any prejudice, see Riley v. State, 
    110 Nev. 638
    , 646, 
    878 P.2d 272
    , 278 (1994) (noting petitioner bears the
    burden of establishing prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to object or
    argue issues of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal), Chaparro failed to
    demonstrate that the district court erred in denying this claim without
    conducting an evidentiary hearing
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    Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
    First, Chaparro argues that the district court erred in denying
    his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
    jury instructions defining "willful." We disagree. While the district court
    refused to give Chaparro's proposed instructions, the given instructions
    adequately covered the subject matter of the proposed instructions.       See
    Earl u. State, 
    111 Nev. 1304
    , 1308, 
    904 P.2d 1029
    , 1031 (1995) (providing
    that district court may refuse instructions where proffered instructions
    are substantially covered by given instructions). Therefore, the district
    court did not err in denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary
    hearing.
    Second, Chaparro argues that appellate counsel was
    ineffective for failing to argue that the district court plainly erred in
    failing to instruct on open and gross lewdness. As open or gross lewdness
    is not a lesser included offense of battery with intent to commit sexual
    assault, Chaparro failed to demonstrate that appellate counsel's
    performance was deficient for not raising this argument on appeal.        See
    Ennis v. State, 
    122 Nev. 694
    , 706, 
    137 P.3d 1095
    , 1103 (2006) (stating that
    counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a futile objection).
    Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim without
    conducting an evidentiary hearing.
    Third, Chaparro contends that appellate counsel was
    ineffective for failing to challenge his sentence as a violation of the
    prohibition against cruel and Unusual punishment. We conclude that
    Chaparro failed to demonstrate that his counsel was deficient or that he
    was prejudiced. "A sentence within the statutory limits is not 'cruel and
    unusual punishment" where the statute itself is constitutional, and the
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    sentence is not so unreasonably disproportionate to the crime as to shock
    the conscience.    Blume v. State,   
    112 Nev. 472
    , 475, 
    915 P.2d 282
    , 284
    (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 
    95 Nev. 433
    , 435, 
    596 P.2d 220
    , 221-22
    (1979)). NRS 200.400 provides for a sentence of life with the possibility of
    parole after two years for battery with intent to commit sexual assault
    where substantial bodily harm does not result. NRS 200.400(4)(b). The
    evidence in the record showed that Chaparro grabbed the victim by the
    back of the head and shoved her into her car. He then pinned her down,
    thrust his hand down her shirt, and groped her breast. Chaparro's
    statements to the victim during the battery revealed his intent to sexually
    assault her. Considering this evidence, Chaparro failed to demonstrate
    that his counsel could have successfully argued that his sentence was
    unreasonably disproportionate to the crime. Therefore, the district court
    did not err in denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary
    hearing.
    Having considered Chaparro's contentions and concluding that
    no relief is warranted,' we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Gibbons
    1 Chaparro  also contends that the cumulative effect of counsel's
    errors entitles him to relief. We conclude that no relief is warranted on
    this claim.
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    cc:   Hon. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge
    Karla K. Butko
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Washoe County District Attorney
    Washoe District Court Clerk
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