McKinnon (Ayden) v. Dist. Ct. (State) ( 2015 )

 ‘``a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," NRS
34.170, and "an appeal generally constitutes an adequate and speedy
remedy precluding writ relief," Cote H., 124 Nev. at 39, 175 P.3d at 908,
"this court may exercise its discretion to entertain a petition for
mandamus under circumstances of urgency or strong necessity, or when
an important issue of law needs clarification and sound judicial economy
and administration favor the granting of the petition," State v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 609, 614, 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002).
Despite the fact that petitioner Ayden McKinnon appears to
have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the form of an appeal, see
Shannon v. State, 105 Nev. 782, 791, 783 P.2d 942, 947 (1989) (allowing a
challenge as to jurisdiction to be raised on appeal), we consider
McKinnon's petition in the interest of sound judicial economy and
administration.
In his petition, McKinnon asks this court to order his case be
transferred to the juvenile court. He argues that the recently amended
NRS 62B.330(3)(a) mandates that the juvenile court has exclusive original
jurisdiction, that the recently amended NRS 62B.330(3)(a) applies because •
the first pleading in his case, the indictment, occurred after the amended
statute took effect on October 1, 2014, and that the district court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction.
The relevant facts are as follows. On September 18, 2014, the
State filed a criminal complaint against McKinnon, alleging four counts of
attempted murder with a deadly weapon and two counts of discharging a
firearm at or into an occupied structure. On September 19, 2014, the
State served its notice of intent to seek an indictment. McKinnon was
arraigned in the justice court, and a preliminary hearing was scheduled
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for October 10, 2014. A grand jury convened on October 2, 2014, and an
indictment was filed in the district court on October 3, 2014. Effective
October 1, 2014, NRS 62B.330(3)(a), which had excluded from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court all charges of murder or attempted
murder, was amended to exclude from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
only charges of murder or attempted murder that were committed by a
person 16 years of age or older. See 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 483, § 1, at 2901:
id. § 11, at 2905. McKinnon was 14 years old at all relevant times.
The issue of which version of NRS 62B.330(3)(a) controls is a
legal question; therefore, we review it de novo. See Paige v. State, 116
Nev. 206, 208, 995 P.2d 1020, 1021 (2000). In State v. Barren, we
concluded that juvenile court jurisdiction is determined on the date when
the State initiated the proceedings. 128 Nev. „ 279 P.3d 182, 187
(2012). While Barren did not define what constitutes the initiation of
proceedings, we are satisfied from the record that the State initiated
proceedings against McKinnon before October 1, 2014, when the amended
NRS 62B.330(3)(a) went into effect, and that the district court did not err
by denying McKinnon's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
"In Nevada, a criminal prosecution may be commenced by
criminal complaint, which results in the filing of an information if the
defendant is bound over for trial after a preliminary hearing, or by grand
jury indictment. NRS 173.015." Thompson v. State, 125 Nev. 807, 811,
221 P.3d 708, 711 (2009); see also Woerner v. Justice Court of Reno Twp.,
Washoe Cnty., 116 Nev. 518, 521, 526, 1 P.3d 377, 379, 382 (2000)
(discussing whether the district attorney acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when he reinitiated criminal proceedings by filing a criminal complaint).
Here the State filed a criminal complaint before October 1, 2014.
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Therefore, we conclude that the State initiated proceedings against
McKinnon before the amended NRS 62B.330(3)(a) took effect, and the
previous version of the statute controls.
To the extent that McKinnon asks this court to order that he
be transferred to a juvenile detention center, we note that NRS
62C.030(4)(a) allows for a child, during the pendency of a criminal
proceeding that involves an offense excluded from juvenile court
jurisdiction pursuant to NRS 62B.330, to "petition the juvenile court for
temporary placement in a facility for the detention of children." Because
McKinnon has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, as he may petition
the juvenile court for temporary placement in a juvenile detention center,
we decline to exercise original jurisdiction on this matter.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the petition DENIED.'
, J.
J. J.
Gibbons Pickering
cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
Mueller Hinds & Associates
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
'In light of this order, we deny as moot McKinnon's motion for stay
of proceedings in the district court.
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