In Re: Discipline Of James J. Jimmerson ( 2022 )


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  •                              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF                          No. 83255
    JAMES J. JIMMERSON, BAR NO. 264.
    FIL3 7-10
    JAN 2 8 20
    OLE
    ORDER OF PUBLIC REPRIMAND BY                  EF DEPUTY CLEW
    This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary
    Board hearing panel's recommendation to publicly reprimand James J.
    Jimmerson for violating RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property) by making five
    transfers from his trust account to his business account and a personal
    account. Jimmerson made three of the transfers before clients paid bills for
    earned fees, one transfer from a client's retainer before earning the fee, but
    with that client's permission, and one transfer through a clerical error.
    The State Bar does not contest the panel's conclusions as to
    Jimmerson's violation of RPC 1.15, his mental state, or potential injury to
    clients, but it argues that the recommended discipline is too lenient. In that
    regard, the State Bar asserts that two of the mitigating factors found by the
    panel (absence of dishonest or selfish motive and personal or emotional
    problems) are not supported and that, regardless of the other mitigating
    factors, discipline short of a suspension is not proper in a case involving
    misappropriation of client funds. Jimmerson does not contest the RPC 1.15
    violation but asserts that the weight of mitigating circumstances, his
    mental state, and the level of harm, which all factor into a discipline
    determination, support the panel's recommendation.
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    As to the RPC 1.15 violation, we conclude that clear and
    convincing evidence supports the panel's findings.      In re Discipline of
    Drakulich, 
    111 Nev. 1556
    , 1566, 
    908 P.2d 709
    , 715 (1995) (recognizing the
    State Bar's burden of proof in a disciplinary matter). As to the discipline,
    Jimmerson violated a duty owed to his clients (safekeeping client funds),
    and the record supports the panel's conclusion that he should have known
    not to make four of the transfers, given that he acknowledged that he did
    not verify whether his clients had actually paid their bills before making
    three of the transfers and that he made the fourth transfer before earning
    the fee, albeit with the client's permission. The record likewise supports
    that Jimmerson made a clerical error and thus acted negligently as to the
    fifth transaction. The panel found and the record supports that no actual
    injury occurred but the transfers from the trust account had the potential
    to injure clients.'
    Suspension generally applies as a baseline sanction for
    Jimmerson's misconduct. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
    Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, Standard
    4.12 (Am. Bar Asen 2017) (providing that suspension is appropriate when
    a lawyer should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and
    causes potential injury to clients). But based on the evidence supporting
    the weight of mitigating circumstances (free and full disclosure to the
    disciplinary authority and cooperative attitude in the proceedings; personal
    1The  record supports the panel's finding that potential injury was
    remote here because (1) the clients subsequently paid their bills, some
    within days of Jimmerson's withdrawals from his trust account, (2) he
    earned the retainer fee that the client consented to Jimmerson using shortly
    after he withdrew it from his trust account, and (3) he immediately
    corrected the clerical-error transfer upon discovering it.
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    or emotional problems2; remorse; timely good faith effort to rectify the
    consequences of the misconduct; and the remoteness of Jimmerson's prior
    discipline offense, which occurred in 1994) compared to the two aggravating
    circumstances (substantial experience in the practice of law and prior
    disciplinary offense), we conclude that a public reprimand is sufficient.3
    SCR 105(3)(b) (providing that a de novo standard of review applies to legal
    conclusions and recommended discipline and a deferential standard applies
    to findings of fact); In re Discipline of Schaefer, 
    117 Nev. 496
    , 515, 
    25 P.3d 191
    , 204 (2001) (observing that the hearing paners disciplinary
    2 Contrary to the State Bar's argument, the testimony supports the
    panel's finding that personal or emotional problems apply as a mitigating
    factor here.
    3We   need not address the State Bar's argument regarding the panel's
    finding that Jimmerson's misconduct was additionally mitigated by absence
    of a selfish motive because under these circumstances, we conclude that
    even without that mitigating factor, the panel appropriately found that the
    circumstances here weigh in favor of a public reprimand, which sufficiently
    serves the purpose of attorney discipline. State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne,
    
    104 Nev. 115
    , 213, 
    756 P.2d 464
    , 527-28 (1988) (stating that the purpose of
    attorney discipline is to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system).
    Also, to the extent the State Bar argues that suspension should apply
    as a hard and fast minimum threshold discipline for any violation that fits
    under Standard 4.12, we decline to adopt such a rule. The Standards and
    our caselaw support that discipline is partly determined by considering the
    extent of potential or actual harm caused by the misconduct and
    circumstances that may mitigate or aggravate it. In re Discipline of Lerner,
    
    124 Nev. 1232
    , 1246, 
    197 P.3d 1067
    , 1077 (2008); Standards for Imposing
    Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 3.0 (listing factors to be considered, including
    the potential or actual injury and the existence of aggravating or mitigating
    factors); Standard 4.1 (stating that the recommended levels of discipline are
    generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client
    CC
    property" and apply "[a]bsent aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
    upon application of the factors set out in 3.0).
    3
    recommendation is persuasive); see In re Discipline of Lerner, 
    124 Nev. 1232
    , 1246, 
    197 P.3d 1067
    , 1077 (2008) (setting forth the four factors used
    in determining whether the panel's recommended discipline is appropriate:
    "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury
    caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or
    mitigating factore).
    Accordingly, we hereby publicly reprimand attorney James J.
    Jimmerson for violating RPC 1.15. Additionally, Jimmerson shall pay the
    costs of the disciplinary proceedings, including $1,500 under SCR 120(3)
    within 30 days from the date of this order if he has not already done so. The
    State Bar shall comply with SCR 121.1.
    It is so ORDERED.
    Hardesty
    j
    Ale4C.4-.0
    Stiglich                                   Herndon
    cc:   Chair, Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board
    Bailey Kennedy
    Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada
    Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada
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