Floyd (Zane) v. Dist. Ct. (State) ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ZANE MICHAEL FLOYD, No. 83225
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; FILED
AND THE HONORABLE MICHAEL
VILLANI, DISTRICT JUDGE, FEB 2 4 2022
Respondents, ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERIC 3 sppmAE COURT
and BY -
DEPUTY CLERK
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Real Party in Interest.
ORDER DENYING PETITION
This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenges the district court's order identifying Ely State Prison as the place
where petitioner Zane Floyd will be executed.
"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, or to control a manifest abuse or an arbitrary or capricious exercise
of discretion." Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175
P.3d 906, 907-08 (2008) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and alterations
omitted); see also NRS 34.160. The petition presents a pure legal issue. And
it does not appear that Floyd has another adequate remedy to challenge the
district court's designation of Ely State Prison as the place of execution. We
therefore elect to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Floyd's
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petition for a writ of mandamus.' See Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
136 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 476 P.3d 1194 (2020).
Floyd contends that the plain language and legislative history
of NRS 176.355(3) require executions take place only at the Nevada State
Prison in Carson City. We review questions of statutory interpretation de
novo, beginning with the text of the statutes. Gathrite v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 135 Nev. 405, 408, 451. P.3d 891, 894 (2019). NRS 176.355
addresses various aspects of an execution, including how and where the
sentence is carried out. Subsection 3 provides that "Nhe execution must
take place at the state prison." Based on the plain language of that statute,
we disagree with Floyd's position. See State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249
P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011) C[W]hen a statute is clear on its face, a court can
not go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
First, "state prison" is not capitalized in NRS 176.355(3), thus
indicating the Legislature used it as a non-specific, or common, noun. See
Briggs & Stratton Power Prod. Grp., LLC v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 796
N.W.2d 234, 238 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2011) ("[A] proper noun is a noun that
designates a particular being or thing, and is usually capitalized in English.
When a noun is not capitalized in an English sentence, the reference is to a
non-specific noun. . . When a noun is capitalized in an English sentence, it
refers to a specific noun." (internal quotation marks, footnote, and
'Floyd alternatively seeks a writ of prohibition. However, "[a] writ of
prohibition . . . will not issue if the court sought to be restrained had
jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter under consideration.
Goicoechea v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 287, 289, 607 P.2d 1140,
1141 (1980). As the district court had jurisdiction over Floyd's case, a writ
of prohibition is not appropriate.
2
alterations omitted)); see also Baez v. Disabled Am_ Veterans Serv. Found.,
119 F. Supp. 490, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (providing that "[p]roper nouns and
proper adjectives are capitalize& and a "proper name or noun" means "[a]
name distinguishing some individual person . . . place . . . or thing" as
"opposed to [a] common noun," which is "[a] noun or name denoting any one
of a class [or] . . denoting a class or aggregate (citing the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary) (emphasis added)). As a common noun, the term denotes any
one of the state prisons and not a specific prison as posited by Floyd.
Second, we recognize that the use of a definite article (the) can
limit the scope of the noun following it. See Poole v. Nev. Auto Dealership
Inv., LLC, 135 Nev. 280, 291 n.5, 449 P.3d 479, 488 n.5 (Ct. App. 2019).
However, given that there was more than one state prison when the statute
was enacted (as Floyd concedes in his petition) and that the statute does not
say "the Nevada State Prison," context does not dictate a specific state
prison where executions must take place. See Wyers u. Am. Med. Response
Nw., Inc., 377 P.3d 570, 578 (Or. 2016) (recognizing that "the use of the
definite article is not always, so to speak, definitive and that "[i]ts use in
context may reveal an intention to encompass less categorically specific
referents").
Lastly, Floyd's interpretation is unreasonable because it would
frustrate the purpose of NRS 176.355—to establish a procedure for carrying
out a death sentence. See Sparks v. State, 121 Nev. 107, 110-11, 110 P.3d
486, 488 (2005) ("Where legislative intent can be clearly discerned from the
plain language of the statute, it is the duty of this court to give effect to that
intent and to effectuate, rather than nullify, the legislative purpose."); see
also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
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Legal Texts 63 ("A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather
than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored.").
Having considered Floyd's argument and concluded it is
without merit, we
ORDER the petition DENIED.
86j111541.7erga'
' • •
Parraguirre
Al4C: J.
Hardesty Stiglich
Cadish Silver
gekki (59 ,J , J.
Pickering Herndon
cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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