Handicab, Llc v. Nevada Transportation Authority ( 2013 )

 The parties conducted discovery, which was contested by the
intervenors on the basis that HandiCab's requests were vague and overly
broad. The Taxicab Authority agreed. Before the scheduled hearing date,
and after the close of discovery, two of the intervenors brought motions for
summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issue of material fact existed
because HandiCab had only submitted evidence pertaining to the disabled
population when it was actually requesting medallions to serve everyone
in the Las Vegas area. Following oral argument, the Taxicab Authority
granted both motions for summary judgment, resulting in the denial of
HandiCab's application. HandiCab appealed the decision to respondent
Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA), which affirmed the Taxicab
Authority's decision. The district court denied HandiCab's petition for
judicial review. HandiCab now appeals.
HandiCab challenges the Taxicab Authority's denial of its
application to operate a taxicab company. We review the order denying
HandiCab's petition for judicial review "in the same manner as the district
court: Tor clear error or abuse of discretion." UMC Physicians' Bargaining
Unit v. Nevada Serv. Emp. Union, 124 Nev. 84, 88, 178 P.3d 709, 712
(2008) (footnote omitted) (quoting Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr. v. Mend itto,
121 Nev. 278, 283, 112 P.3d 1093, 1097 (2005)). "We will defer to an
administrative body's interpretations of its governing statutes or
regulations only if the interpretation is within the language of the
statute." Id. at 89, 178 P.3d at 712. We review the agency's decision to
determine whether it was arbitrary or capricious, and thus, based on an
abuse of discretion. NRS 233B.135(3)(0; State Tax Comm'n v. Am. Home
Shield of Nevada, Inc., 127 Nev. „ 254 P.3d 601, 603 (2011).
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The Taxicab Authority's interpretation of NRS 706.8827 was sound and its
conclusion that HandiCab failed to carry its evidentiary burden was not
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion
Before a certificate of public convenience and necessity may
issue, the Taxicab Authority must consider five factors under NRS
706.8827(2): (a) the applicant's fitness, (b) legislative policy, (c) the impact
on existing cab companies, (d) whether existing taxi companies will not
meet the needs of the territory, and (e) benefit to the public and taxicab
business in the territory. The Taxicab Authority concluded that HandiCab
did not establish any genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a
need existed for 40 new medallions that the current certificate holders
would not meet as required under factors (b) and (d). Under NRS
706.8827(2)(b), the applicant must show that "[t]he proposed operation
will be consistent with the legislative policies set forth in NRS 706.151."
NRS 706.151 directs the Taxicab Authority to "provide for fair and
impartial regulation," promote safety and economical service, and to
"discourage any practices which would tend to increase or create
competition that may be detrimental to the traveling and shipping public
or the motor carrier business . . . ." NRS 706.151(1). NRS 706.8827(2)(d)
provides that the applicant must show "[t]he holders of existing
certificates will not meet the needs of the territory for which the certificate
is sought if the certificate is not granted."
We conclude that the Taxicab Authority's interpretation of
NRS 706.8827 was sound. With respect to NRS 706.8827(2)(b), the
Taxicab Authority balanced the entry of a new market participant with
the financial viability of current competitors and the needs of the public.
Due to the economic downturn, the Taxicab Authority concluded that 40
additional medallions would be inconsistent with NRS 706.151. This
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conclusion was within its statutory directive and discretion, and supported
by substantial evidence. See NRS 706.8827(2)(b); NRS 705.151(1).
NRS 706.8827(2)(d) refers to "territory" generally, not a
particular portion of the population. HandiCab encouraged the Taxicab
Authority to read the phrase "will not" as "have not;" however, this
reading is not consistent with the language of the statute. Further,
HandiCab argues that it was seeking restricted, handicapped medallions;
however, the only restriction on these medallions is the type of vehicle
that can be used, not the type of passengers that can be picked up.
Finally, the Taxicab Authority did not act in an arbitrary or capricious
manner when it concluded that HandiCab failed to show the existence of
genuine issues of material fact regarding (1) whether need existed for 40
new handicapped-equipped vehicles that could pick up and drop off
anyone, anytime, anywhere, and (2) whether existing certificate holders
will not meet that need.
The Taxicab Authority's grant of summary judgment was not in excess of
its constitutional or statutory authority
HandiCab argues that the Taxicab Authority should not have
granted the intervenors' motions for summary judgment without holding a
full hearing. We disagree. NRS 233B.121(1) provides that in a contested
case, all parties must be afforded an opportunity for hearing after
reasonable notice. The parties must have the opportunity to respond and
present evidence and argument on all issues involved. NRS 233B.121(4).
HandiCab did not object to the filing of dispositive motions during the pre-
hearing conference and, in fact, agreed to their deadlines. HandiCab
submitted its pre-filed testimony, received notice of the motions for
summary judgment, provided briefing in response, and submitted oral
argument at the Taxicab Authority hearing. Therefore, we conclude that
the Taxicab Authority's grant of summary judgment was within its
constitutional and statutory authority. See NRS 233B.135(3)(a).
The Taxicab Authority's conclusion that HandiCab's discovery request was
overbroad was neither arbitrary nor capricious
HandiCab argues that the Taxicab Authority should have
allowed it to conduct discovery into all of the intervening cab companies'
financial records showing profits and losses, operating expenses, and
income for 2003 to 2007. We disagree.
The Taxicab Authority's conclusion that HandiCab's discovery
requests were overbroad was within its discretion. The Taxicab Authority
also directed HandiCab to review its website, which contains industry-
wide reports on profitability of individual cab companies. The language of
NRS 706.8827 refers to "existing certificate holders" generally, which
could include cab companies that were not intervenors, and the industry-
wide statistics provided on the Taxicab Authority's website would be
sufficient to make such a showing. Further, the intervenors invited
HandiCab to review reports and trip sheets detailing the use of handivans
in their office. The Taxicab Authority also encouraged HandiCab to
redraft its discovery requests, which was not done. "[T]he legal process
due in an administrative forum 'is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." Minton v. Bd. of Med.
Examiners, 110 Nev. 1060, 1082, 881 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1982); see also
Dutchess Bus Servs, Inc. v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 124 Nev. 701, 713, 191 P.3d
1159, 1167 (2008) (providing that the discovery provisions of the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to administrative agencies).
Therefore, we conclude the Taxicab Authority's decision to deny
HandiCab's overbroad discovery request was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. See NRS 233B.135(3)(f). As a consequence, the district court
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did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in denying HandiCab's petition
for judicial review. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.'
Douglaa—,
Saitta
cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
E. Paul Richitt, Jr., Settlement Judge
Martin & Allison, Ltd.
Snell & Wilmer, LLP/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Las Vegas
Moran Law Firm, LLC
Mark E. Trafton
Marc C. Gordon
Tamer B. Botros
Eighth Judicial District Court Clerk
'We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude
they are without merit.
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