Landers v. Quality Communications ( 2014 )


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  •                  Landers' failure to exhaust his administrative remedies rendered his
    claim nonjusticiable, meaning the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
    over his claims. Landers appeals.
    Landers' complaint is barred by claim preclusion because he could have
    raised his state law claims in the federal complaint, and the federal court's
    dismissal was a valid final judgment
    The parties primarily argue whether the district court
    properly granted summary judgment based on Landers' failure to exhaust
    his administrative remedies under NRS Chapter 608. However, we do not
    need to reach this issue because Landers' underlying complaint is barred
    by claim preclusion.'
    Quality argues that Landers' claims are barred by claim
    preclusion based on the federal district court judgment that dismissed his
    federal complaint for failure to state a claim. We agree . 2
    Claim preclusion applies when (1) the parties or their privies
    are the same, (2) there is a valid final judgment, and (3) the subsequent
    action involves the same claims that were or could have been brought in
    'If we were to agree with the district court that Landers was
    required to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Labor
    Commission—at best a close question—we are concerned that the
    appropriate judicial response would be dismissal without prejudice while
    the parties pursue their administrative remedies, not summary judgment,
    assuming Landers still had time to take advantage of any available
    administrative remedies. In light of our conclusion on the claim
    preclusion issue, we need not resolve this issue.
    We have authority to consider the claim preclusion argument
    2
    Quality made to the district court and may affirm a district court order
    when the district court "reached the correct result, albeit for different
    reasons." Ford v. Showboat Operating Co., 110 Nev. . 752, 756, 
    877 P.2d 546
    , 549 (1994) (internal quotations omitted)).
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    the prior action.   Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm't Mgmt., Inc.,
    
    736 F.3d 1239
    , 1245 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Five Star Capital Corp. v.
    Ruby 
    124 Nev. 1048
    , 1054, 
    194 P.3d 709
    , 713 (2008). Landers argues that
    the second and third elements are not met. 3
    The federal district court dismissal was a valid final judgment
    Landers argues that the federal district court judgment cannot
    be given preclusive effect under Nevada law because the federal court's
    ruling was based on the federal Twombly-Iqbal "plausibility" pleading
    standard.    See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,     
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007);
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009). Landers notes that Nevada
    has not adopted Twombly but instead uses the pleading standard set forth
    in Washoe Medical Center, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Company, 
    112 Nev. 494
    , 496, 
    915 P.2d 288
    , 289 (1996) ("The complaint cannot be dismissed
    for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the
    plaintiff could prove no set of facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact,
    would entitle him to relief.") (quoting Edgar v. Wagner, 
    101 Nev. 226
    , 228,
    
    699 P.2d 110
    , 112 (1985)). Thus, Landers argues that his state law
    complaint would not need to meet the Twombly standard used to dismiss
    his federal complaint, and therefore, the federal dismissal cannot be given
    preclusive effect. We disagree. 4
    is clear that the parties are the same under both complaints.
    3 1t
    Thus, the first element of claim preclusion is met. See Herb Reed 
    Enters., 736 F.3d at 1245
    .
    4 We  acknowledge that Landers has appealed the federal district
    court's dismissal, but the order of dismissal maintains its preclusive effect.
    See Edwards v. Ghandour, 
    123 Nev. 105
    , 117, 
    159 P.3d 1086
    , 1094 (2007),
    continued on next page . . .
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    Under federal claim preclusion law, "unless the court in its
    order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal . . . other than a
    dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a
    party under [FRCP] 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits." 
    5 Stew. v
    . U.S. Bancorp, 
    297 F.3d 953
    , 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting FRCP
    41(b)). Based on that rule, the Stewart court concluded that "a dismissal
    for failure to state a claim under [FRCP] 12(b)(6) is a 'judgment on the
    merits' to which [claim preclusion] applies." 
    Id. at 957
    (quoting Federated
    Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 
    452 U.S. 394
    , 399 n.3 (1981) ("The dismissal for
    failure to state a claim under [FRCP] 12(b)(6) is a judgment on the
    merits.") (internal quotations omitted). Thus, we conclude that the federal
    district court's order dismissing Landers' original complaint for failure to
    state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) was a valid final judgment on the
    merits.
    This underlying complaint was based on the same claims that could
    have been brought in the prior federal district court action
    The final factor for claim preclusion is whether the later action
    is based on the same claims that were or could have been brought in the
    previous action.     Herb Reed 
    Enters., 736 F.3d at 1245
    . Landers argues
    that this action involves class action claims under state law that could not
    . . . continued
    disagreed with on other grounds in Five 
    Star, 124 Nev. at 1053-54
    , 194
    P.3d at 712-13.
    5 5imilarly,under Nevada law, a dismissal can be an adjudication on
    the merits that carries preclusive effect. Five 
    Star, 124 Nev. at 1054
    n.27,
    194 P.3d at 713 
    n.27.
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    have been asserted in its federal complaint, and therefore claim preclusion
    does not apply. Landers contends that federal courts have declined to
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent NRS Chapter 608 class
    action claims and, as a result, the federal courts have severed and
    remanded such NRS Chapter 608 class action claims to state court.
    Landers argues that federal courts have done so based on the belief that
    the opt-out process under FRCP 23 and the opt-in process under the FLSA
    were incompatible. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). Thus, Landers asserts
    that due to "this prior determination of the federal district court, Landers
    was required to pursue separate stateS and federal actions if he wished to
    secure all of the relief available to him under the FLSA and Nevada law."
    Until recently, the issue of whether a plaintiff can
    simultaneously maintain an opt-out class action claim based on state law
    with an opt-in FLSA action had been largely unsettled within federal
    courts. See Williams v. Trend west Resorts, Inc., 
    2007 WL 2429149
    , at *34
    (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2007) (acknowledging that courts have been split, but
    ultimately finding the class action mechanisms of the FLSA and FRCP 23
    are "incompatible"). But see Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 
    266 F.R.D. 468
    , 471-73 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (summarizing cases on both sides of the issue,
    and ruling that federal courts can consider both claims in the same case).
    However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
    recently ruled that FLSA collective actions and state law class actions "can
    peacefully coexist."   Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc.,   
    713 F.3d 525
    , 528 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that all federal circuit courts to consider
    the issue have held that the different mechanisms for opting in or out "do
    not require dismissal of the state claims"), cert. granted, 
    134 S. Ct. 1490
                    (2014).
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    In light of Busk, we conclude that Landers could have asserted
    his NRS Chapter 608 claims in the original federal complaint.
    Accordingly, this element of claim preclusion is satisfied.      See also 18
    Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
    Practice and Procedure, § 4412, at 289 n.19 (2d ed. 2002) (summarizing
    cases concluding that if a plaintiff who files a federal complaint is unsure
    whether the federal court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
    state law claims, the plaintiff should nonetheless invoke the federal court's
    supplemental jurisdiction and assert the state law-based causes of action
    to escape claim preclusion if the federal claims fail).
    Therefore, all elements of claim preclusion are satisfied, and
    the doctrine bars Landers' complaint. Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Pickering
    Parpguirre
    J.
    Saitta
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    cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge
    Janet Trost, Settlement Judge
    Gabroy Law Offices
    Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation
    Lionel Sawyer & Collins/Las Vegas
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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