Grevelle (Teresa) v. State ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
TERESA ANN GREVELLE, No. 83579
Appellant,
vs.
FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA, SEP 1 5 2022
Respondent.
ELIZABETH A. BROW
CLERKg, S.iPREME C RT
BY
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL DOPUTY CLERK
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Sixth Judicial District Court, Humboldt County;
Michael Montero, Judge.
The district court entered an order honorably discharging
appellant from probation. Sixteen months later, the district court entered
an order vacating the discharge from probation. The district court
explained that it had mistakenly thought that appellant had paid
restitution in full, notwithstanding that the petition for discharge noted
that restitution had not been paid due to economic hardship. The district
court reinstated appellant on probation. Appellant petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, and the district court entered an order denying the petition
and dishonorably discharging appellant from probation.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in
reimposing probation after it had discharged her from probation. Appellant
also argues that reimposing probation rendered an illegal sentence because
it resulted in a term of supervision that exceeded the longest period
permitted by NRS 176A.500. That is, appellant challenges aspects of the
probationary term, not the validity of the underlying conviction.
The writ of habeas corpus provides recourse for "[e]very person
unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his or her liberty,
under any pretense whatever" in order "to inquire into the cause of such
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OF imprisonment or restraint." NRS 34.360. If the restraint is improper, the
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court must order the person's release. NRS 34.480. "A person who has been
discharged from probation[] [i]s free from the terms and conditions of
probation." NRS 176A.850(4)(a).
Appellant has been discharged from probation and thus is no
longer subject to a restraint on her liberty that may be relieved through
habeas corpus. See Nev. Const., art. 6, § 6(1) (limiting district court's
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus "on behalf of any person who is
held in actual custody in their respective districts, or who has suffered a
criminal conviction in their respective districts and has not completed the
sentence imposed pursuant to the judgment of conviction"); Cordova v. City
of Reno, 920 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[T]here is no reason to
believe a Nevada court would entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
[pursuant to NRS 34.360] from one who is no longer incarcerated or
otherwise confined or restrained."). Despite denying appellant's petition,
the district court discharged appellant from probation, such that there is no
further restraint on appellant's liberty for this court to remove, and this
appeal is accordingly moot. See Personhood Neu. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599,
602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) (recognizing that events occurring after filing
may render the matter moot if they prevent the court from granting
effective relief).
Appellant argues that the appeal is not moot, given the
collateral consequences of a dishonorable discharge. We disagree. While a
habeas challenge to the validity of a conviction that is filed before the
petitioner's release may survive after the petitioner's release, Martinez-
Hernandez v. State, 132 Nev. 623, 627, 380 P.3d 861, 864 (2016), the same
reasoning does not sustain a challenge to an unlawful restraint after the
petitioner is no longer restrained. In the former circumstance, a court may
still provide relief from the invalid conviction, but in the latter
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circumstance, the court can provide no further relief once the petitioner has
already been released. See Dir., Nev. Dep't of Prisons v. Arndt, 98 Nev. 84,
86, 640 P.2d 1318, 1319 (1982) (providing that habeas requires "presently
unlawful" detention); Application of Rainsberger, 77 Nev. 399, 402, 365 P.2d
489, 491 (1961) (observing that the inquiry under a habeas challenge to
unlawful restraint "is limited to the question of whether or not [petitioner]
is entitled to immediate release"). The possibility that the dishonorable
discharge will lead to a future detention does not alter this conclusion. See
Arndt, 98 Nev. at 86, 380 P.3d at 864 ("The threat of future restraint will
not provide a basis for habeas corpus remedy."). We conclude that appellant
has not shown that the appeal presents a live controversy on which we may
grant some forrn of relief.'
Accordingly, we
ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.2
Parraguirre
, J. Sr.J.
Cadish
'We observe that a challenge to the district court's jurisdiction is
properly raised through a petition for a writ of prohibition. We express no
opinion as to whether such a petition would be appropriate under the
circumstances presented.
2The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
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decision of this matter under a general order of assignrnent.
OF
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cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge
Jeffrie Ryan Miller
Miller Law, Inc.
Attorney General/Carson City
Humboldt County District Attorney
Humboldt County Clerk
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