Laborers' Int'l Union of N. America, Local 169 v. Truckee Carson Irrigation Dist. ( 2014 )

 NRS 338.141 and seeking to compel rejection of those bids. TCID filed a
motion to dismiss the writ petition, which the district court granted upon
determining that the Union and Maciel lacked standing and that the bid
was properly awarded to A&K Earthmover.
The Union and Maciel appeal, contending that they have
standing because Union employees, including Maciel, would likely have
been employed on the project if noncompliant bids were rejected and the
only responsive bidder, with whom the Union has a collective bargaining
agreement, were chosen instead. The Union and Maciel also point out
that the public works statutes are intended to promote the public's
interest in securing competition, preserving public funds, and protecting
against corruption. They argue that, as citizens and taxpayers who would
likely have benefitted from K.G. Walters' selection as the responsive
bidder, they should be allowed to pursue the public's interest in ensuring
that the public works statutes are strictly complied with here. TCID
disagrees, noting that the project has been completed and arguing that
neither the Union nor Maciel would be directly benefitted by the issuance
of the writ, and that they are not proper parties to pursue any remedy on
the public's behalf. We agree with TCID and conclude that the district
court did not err.
The Union and Maciel lack standing
A writ of mandamus is available to compel a legal duty to act.
NRS 34.160. A writ of prohibition is available to arrest the exercise of
extra-jurisdictional judicial functions. NRS 34.320. To obtain either type
of writ relief, however, petitioners must demonstrate that they are
beneficially interested in the relief sought. Heller v. Legislature of Nev.,
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120 Nev. 456, 460-61, 93 P.3d 746, 749 (2004); see NRS 34.170; NRS
34.330. Beneficial interest exists when the petitioners have a "direct and
substantial interest that falls within the zone of interests to be protected
by the legal duty asserted.' Heller, 120 Nev. at 461, 93 P.3d at 749(quoting LindeIli v. Town of San AnseImo, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 461 (Ct.
App. 2003)). In other words, "the writ must be denied if the petitioner will
gain no direct benefit from its issuance and suffer no direct detriment if it
is denied." Id. (quoting Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Alameda, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 747 (Ct. App. 2000), disapproved of on
other grounds by Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach,
254 P.3d 1005, 1013 (Cal. 2011)). Although we typically review district
court orders denying writ relief for abuse of discretion, whether the Union
and Maciel have standing is a question of law, Arguello v. Sunset Station,
Inc., 127 Nev. , 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011), which we review de novo.
Clark Cnty. v. S. Nev. Health Dist., 128 Nev. „ 289 P.3d 212, 218
(2012).
The Union and Maciel argue that they had standing because
the potential for employment of Union workers gave them a beneficial
interest in the enforcement of NRS 338.141. But this is a speculative,
rather than direct and substantial interest. And it is derivative of the
prime contractor's interest in being awarded the public works contract, an
interest which the contractor itself has decided not to pursue. Moreover,
the purported benefit of Maciel's and the Union members' future
employment is beyond NRS 338.141's zone of interests. Bidding statutes,
such as NRS 338.141, do not seek to serve subcontractors or union
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members who desire employment. They protect the public by promoting
competition, preserving public funds, and preventing corruption. Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Clark Cnty., 94 Nev. 116, 118-19, 575 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1978).
Accordingly, with regard to potential employment, the Union and Maciel
have demonstrated no beneficial interest in personally obtaining writ
relief here.
Although the Union and Maciel argue that they should be
allowed to pursue this matter on behalf of the public's interest in
promoting fair competition and preserving taxpayer funds, we have
recognized standing to obtain relief on behalf of the public only in limited
circumstances. See, e.g., Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno, 125
Nev. 625, 629-32, 218 P.3d 847, 849-52 (2009) (providing that citizens had
standing to challenge a land annexation under NRS 268.668 because the
statute provided that "any person ... claiming to be adversely affected" by
an annexation can challenge it); State Bar of Nev. v. List, 97 Nev. 367, 368,
632 P.2d 341, 342 (1981) (allowing citizens to challenge the governor's
failure to comply with the law); City of Las Vegas v. Cragin Indus., Inc., 86
Nev. 933, 935-37, 939-40, 478 P.2d 585, 587-88, 589 (1970) (recognizing
citizens' taxpayer standing to challenge the placement of above-ground
electrical wires within their taxing district), disapproved of on other
grounds by Sandy Valley Assocs. v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n, 117
Nev. 948, 955-56 n.7, 35 P.3d 964, 969 n.7 (2001), abrogated by Horgan v.
Felton, 123 Nev. 577, 586, 170 P.3d 982, 988 (2007); Blanding v. City of
Las Vegas, 52 Nev. 52, 74, 280 P. 644, 650 (1929) ("A taxpayer
cannot .. . maintain [an action] where he has not sustained or is not
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threatened with any injury peculiar to himself as distinguished from the
public generally . ."); State ex rel. Piper v. Gracey, 11 Nev. 223, 230
(1876) (discussing citizen standing in dicta but finding that the petitioners
had a direct and substantial interest in the relief sought).
While the Union and Maciel contend that their rights as
citizens and taxpayers were adversely affected by virtue of the project
being awarded to A&K Earthmovers, whose bid allegedly did not comply
with NRS 338.141(1)-(3), they neither sufficiently show how such rights
were actually harmed nor address the existence of the conditions that
would have triggered the various requirements for a bid to include the
specific information that NRS 334.141(1)-(3) mandates. See NRS
334.141(1)-(3) (2011) (amended 2013) (requiring bids to contain certain
information when particular conditions exist). Nor do they persuade us
that a decision by this court could impact such rights given the fact that
this dispute concerns a statute that has since been amended, see 2013
Nev. Stat., ch. 487, § 6, at 2970-71, and a project that has been completed
by a bidder whose bid identified that it would "be performing the [w]ork
under this [c]ontract."
Despite the Union's and Maciel's argument that redress is
unavailable if they are not allowed to challenge the award, that is so only
because the parties allowed to bring a challenge by NRS 338.142 have not
done so, not because there is no means to do so at all. As a result, we
conclude that the circumstances do not warrant the recognition of
standing.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in
determining that the Union and Maciel lacked standing.' Thus, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
, C.J.
Gibbons
Hardesty
Saitta
cc: Hon. William Rogers, District Judge
Laurie A. Yott, Settlement Judge
Michael E. Langton
Rands & South
Third District Court Clerk
'We have considered the remaining contentions on appeal and
conclude that they lack merit. Although we directed the parties to show
cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot and to address
whether an exception to the mootness doctrine applies, we need not reach
those issues, given our conclusion that the Union and Maciel lack
standing.
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