Maiza v. King ( 2016 )


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  •                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    SALAH MAIZA, INDIVIDUALLY; AND                         No. 64966
    NEVADA CHECKER CAB
    CORPORATION,
    Appellants,
    FILED
    vs.                                                         JAN 15 2016
    DENISE KING,                                                TRACE K. LINDEMAN
    Respondent.                                              CLERK Q,SUPREME COURT
    BY
    DEPUTY4"CLERI
    ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
    AND ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
    This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion
    to confirm an arbitration award inclusive of attorney fees, costs, and
    interest, and denying a motion to vacate the award. Eighth Judicial
    District Court, Clark County; Kenneth C. Cory, Judge.
    Respondent has moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that
    the parties agreed that the arbitration decision is final and binding and to
    waive their right to appeal. Appellants oppose the motion, arguing that
    they are not challenging the decision by the panel but rather the district
    court's decision regarding the timing of respondent's requests for interest,
    costs, and attorney fees. The motion to dismiss is denied. Although the
    parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrators' decision and to waive their
    rights to litigate the dispute and/or appeal the arbitrators' award, both
    parties filed district court motions after the arbitration award issued and
    litigated in district court the matters of interest, costs, and fees. The
    appeal is limited to the timeliness issue and the court's decision denying
    appellants' motion to vacate the award under NRS 38.241(1)(d). Given the
    limited scope of this appeal, we conclude that the waiver provision does
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    not require the appeal's dismissal." Hudson v. Horseshoe Club Operating
    Co., 
    112 Nev. 446
    , 457, 
    916 P.2d 786
    , 792 (1996) (discussing waiver).
    On appeal, appellants argue that the district court improperly
    interpreted the parties' arbitration agreement in determining that
    interest, costs, and attorney fees matters were governed by NRS 17.115,
    NRS 18.020, and NRCP 68, such that respondent's motions for such
    awards were timely filed under NRCP 54(d)(2)(B), which provides that a
    motion for attorney fees "must be filed no later than 20 days after notice of
    entry of judgment is served." Appellants argue that the arbitration was
    governed by NRS Chapter 38, and respondent therefore was required to
    move under NRS 38.237 to modify or correct the award within 20 days
    after receiving the arbitration award, which she failed to do.
    Having considered the parties' arguments, we conclude that
    the district court did not err in confirming the arbitration award inclusive
    of interest, costs, and fees, and declining to vacate the award. The parties'
    agreement provides that the "Offer of Judgment Rule as specified in
    NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 shall apply to the arbitration proceedings for
    the purposes of determining the prevailing party," and that the "prevailing
    party shall recover costs pursuant to NRS 18.005 and attorney's fees and
    prejudgment interest pursuant to NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68." Although
    the parties also reserved their rights under certain provisions of NRS
    Chapter 38, including NRS 38.237, the district court found that because
    the agreement expressly provided that the offer of judgment rule shall
    apply and the prevailing party shall recover prejudgment interest, costs,
    and attorney fees, the agreement's references to NRS 17.115, NRS 18.005,
    'Appellants' request for sanctions is denied.
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    and NRCP 68 created an exception to the provisions under NRS Chapter
    38 regarding the timeliness for filing a motion to modify, correct, or vacate
    the award. The court therefore determined that under NRCP 54(d)(2)(B),
    respondent's district court motion was timely filed less than 20 days after
    service of notice of the court's order and judgment confirming the
    arbitration award with prejudgment interest. We perceive no reversible
    error in that determination. 2 See Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro, 131
    Nev. Adv. Op., 73, 
    359 P.3d 105
    , 106 (2015) (recognizing that when there
    is no dispute of fact, contract interpretation presents a legal issue, which
    calls for de novo review on appeal); Thomas v. City of N. Las Vegas, 
    122 Nev. 82
    , 97, 
    127 P.3d 1057
    , 1067 (2006) (providing that a district court
    order confirming an arbitration award is reviewed de novo on appeal).
    Appellants also argue that the district court erred by denying
    their motion to vacate the award under NRS 38.241(1)(d) on the ground
    that two of the arbitrators exceeded their powers by removing the third
    arbitrator from the panel. The district court denied the motion, finding
    nothing to indicate that the result would have been any different if the
    matter were referred back to the panel with the third arbitrator
    participating. We perceive no error in this decision either. First, at the
    status check hearing, appellants stated that the arbitrator's removal did
    21n WPH Architecture, Inc. v. Vegas VP, LP, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 88,
    
    360 P.3d 1145
    , 1148-49 (2015), we determined that a party's request for
    costs and attorney fees under NRCP 68, NRS 17.115, and NRS 18.020 did
    not require an arbitration panel to award costs and fees because NRS
    38.238(1) makes such awards permissive in an arbitration proceeding.
    Here, in contrast, the parties' agreement expressly provided that NRCP
    68, NRS 17.115, and NRS 18.020 governed in determining the prevailing
    party, who shall be awarded prejudgment interest, costs, and fees.
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    not "matter because it's a majority decision anyway," so "it's neither here
    nor there." When later asked, appellants were unable to articulate what
    form of relief they wanted the district court to grant in regard to the
    arbitrator's removal. Regardless, appellants have not met their burden of
    demonstrating how the award was made in excess of the arbitrators'
    powers given that the agreement provided that the panel would decide
    respondent's claims, which it did, resulting in a binding majority decision.
    The third arbitrator's removal did not occur until after that arbitrator
    agreed that respondent was the prevailing party. See Health Plan of Nev.,
    Inc. v. Rainbow Med., LLC, 
    120 Nev. 689
    , 697, 
    100 P.3d 172
    , 178 (2004)
    (explaining that absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence,
    "courts will assume that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his or her
    authority and confirm the award"). The district court correctly confirmed
    the award, and consequently, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    Saitta
    cc: Hon. Kenneth C. Cory, District Judge
    Nathaniel J. Reed, Settlement Judge
    Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger/Reno
    Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger/Las Vegas
    Ann & Associates, PC
    Parker, Nelson & Associates
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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