In Re: Parental Rights as to E. W. ( 2015 )

 child's best interest, and (2) parental fault exists. NRS 128.105 (1999)
(amended 2015); In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 91,
337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014). The district court found that terminating
appellants' parental rights was in E.W.'s best interest and found three
parental fault grounds: parental unfitness, failure of parental adjustment,
and risk of serious injury to E.W. if returned to appellants' home. See
NRS 128.105(2)(c)-(e) (1999) (amended 2015). Appellants argue that their
case plans and the services provided to them by respondent did not
account for their cognitive delays, and thus, their failure to complete their
case plans, make behavior changes, and reunify with E.W. were not
grounds to terminate their parental rights. Having considered the parties'
arguments and reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court
correctly applied the law, and substantial evidence supports the district
court's factual findings. See A.L., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 91, 337 P.3d at 761
(providing that this court reviews the district court's findings of fact for
substantial evidence, and questions of law de novo).
Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding of
parental fault. As to parental unfitness, testimony established that E.W.
was diagnosed with failure to thrive while in appellants' care and medical
causes of this condition were ruled out. Appellants did not display
appropriate recognition of E.W.'s hunger cues and when E.W. was
removed from appellants' home his weight had become so low for his age
that it no longer appeared on an infant growth chart. Additionally,
appellants were unable even together to exhibit appropriate parenting
after E.W. was removed. For example, Jennifer was aggressive toward the
child during visits, and Michael was passive toward the child and Jennifer
and was unable to correct Jennifer when she demonstrated inappropriate
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parenting, such as improper feeding. This evidence supports the district
court's determination that appellants failed to provide E.W. with proper
care and were unfit parents. See NRS 128.105(2)(c) (1999) (amended
2015); NRS 128.106(1) (2013) (amended 2015) (providing that when
determining parental fitness, a court shall consider any mental deficiency
that "renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and
continuing physical or psychological needs of the child"); NRS 128.018
(defining parental unfitness).
The district court's finding that appellants failed to adjust is
also supported by substantial evidence.' See NRS 128.105(2)(d) (1999)
(amended 2015). Appellants did not meet their case plan objectives, and
testimony established that appellants did not make behavior changes
necessary to provide proper care for E.W. Moreover, two children
previously living in appellants' home had been diagnosed with failure to
thrive and removed by respondent, but appellants were not able to admit
or recognize the nutritional deficiency that led to the failure-to-thrive
diagnosis and the safety threat the children faced as a result of
insufficient nutrition and care. The testimony regarding appellants'
inability to make behavior changes, complete their case plans, and
demonstrate a sufficient understanding of these children's failure-to-
thrive conditions supports the district court's finding of appellants' failure
to adjust. 2 NRS 128.0126 (stating that failure of parental adjustment
1 Tothe extent appellants argue that the district court improperly
made findings regarding appellants' previous experience with respondent
based on hearsay, we conclude that this argument lacks merit.
2 Becausesubstantial evidence supports the district court's failure-to-
adjust findings, it is immaterial to the outcome of this appeal that the
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occurs when a parent is unable to substantially correct "the circumstances,
conduct or conditions which led to the placement of their child outside of
their home"); see In re Parental Rights as to A.P.M., 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 66,
P.3d (2015) (holding that "a completed case plan does not
prohibit the district court from terminating parental rights if termination
is otherwise warranted").
Substantial evidence also supports the district court's third
finding of parental fault: a risk of serious physical injury to E.W. if he
were to be returned to appellants' home. See NRS 128.105(2)(e) (1999)
(amended 2015). Testimony established that E.W. failed to thrive in
appellants' care prior to removal and that appellants had failed to adjust
their behavior to consistently display appropriate parenting. NRS
128.013(c), (d) (providing that "injury" to a child's health occurs when a
parent neglects to provide the child proper subsistence, or fails to provide
the child adequate care).
Appellants additionally argue that terminating their parental
rights was not in E.W.'s best interest. NRS 128.109(2) (1999) (amended
2015) provides that when a child is removed from the home under NRS
Chapter 432B and resides out of the home for 14 of 20 consecutive months,
a court must presume that terminating the parental rights serves the
child's best interest. Appellants contend that applying the best-interest
presumption under NRS 128.109(2) is unfair because respondent failed to
develop an appropriate case plan tailored to appellants' needs and
contributed to the time lapse that triggered the presumption. NRS
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district court declined to apply the evidentiary presumption provided by
NRS 128.109(1)(b) (1999) (amended 2015).
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128.109(3), however, states that the NRS 128.109(2) presumption "must
not be overcome or otherwise affected by evidence of failure of the State to
provide services to the family." NRS 128.109(3) (1999) (amended 2015).
Additionally, appellants did not provide sufficient evidence that additional
services could bring about reunification within a reasonable time. NRS
128.107(4). Finally, substantial evidence supports the district court's
findings that E.W. was placed with an experienced and stable foster
family, with whom E.W. is well bonded, and thus, terminating appellants'
parental rights is in E.W.'s best interest.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3
'U 7
s., , •
Gibbons Pickering
cc: Hon. Deborah Schumacher, District Judge, Family Court Division
Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc.
Hutchison & Steffen, LLC
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
3 The district court found appellants had rebutted the NRS
128.109(1)(a) (1999) (amended 2015) presumption regarding token efforts,
however, because only one parental fault ground is required to terminate
parental rights under NRS 128.105(2) (1999) (amended 2015), the absence
of token efforts does not affect the outcome of this case.
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