In Re: Petition of Ballard ( 2015 )

 an order terminating parental rights is properly entered under NRS
128.110, however, that order may not be set aside. NRS 128.120
(providing that unless a parent restores their parental rights under NRS
128.190, "the court has no power to set aside, change or modify" a valid
termination order). Appellant neither alleges that the termination order
was issued in violation of NRS 128.110 nor that her parental rights have
been restored under NRS 128.190. Instead she argues that newly
discovered evidence—the acquittal of the criminal child abuse and neglect
charges—warrants setting the termination order aside. The termination
order was not based on appellant's criminal proceedings, however, and
was based on other grounds, including appellant's failure to comply with
her case plan, stop using drugs, and remedy the situation that led to the
children's removal. Additionally, changed circumstances occurring after a
parental termination order is entered do not overcome NRS 128.120's
prohibition on setting aside parental termination orders. NRS 128.120;
see In re Ronald V., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting
California's counterpart to NRS 128.120, and holding that courts lack
jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks to parental termination orders that
are based on changed circumstances). Thus, the district court did not err
when it denied appellant's motion to set aside the order terminating her
parental rights. NRS 128.120; Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660 667, 221
...continued
independent action for relief from judgment not subject to the NRCP 60(b)
time limitation. Doan v. Wilkerson, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 48, 327 P.3d 498,
501 (2014). Because NRS 128.120 prohibits appellant's requested relief
regardless of the procedural mechanism with which it is sought, we need
not decide the proper construction of appellant's motion.
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P.3d 699, 704 (2009) (providing that on appeal questions of law are
reviewed de novo).
As to the district court order denying appellant's petition to
inspect the court records of the adoptions, NRS 127.140(2) provides that
"[t]he files and records of the court in adoption proceedings are not open to
inspection by any person" unless certain statutorily provided exceptions
apply. Appellant's appeal statement fails to address the district court's
order denying her petition to inspect the court records of the adoption and
provides no argument that appellant should have been granted permission
to inspect the adoption records. We therefore affirm the district court's
order denying appellant's petition to inspect the court's records regarding
the adoptions. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330
n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that this court need not
consider claims that are not addressed in appellant's briefs and cogently
argued and supported by relevant authority).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
J.
Gibbons
, J.
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cc: Hon. Frank P. Sullivan, District Judge, Family Court Division
Fredrica C.B.
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Eighth District Court Clerk
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