Matlean (James) v. State ( 2015 )

 we conclude that the district court did not err in rejecting this challenge to
the guilty plea.
Second, appellant contends that the district court erred by
denying his claim that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered because
counsel offered to pay him $20,000. Appellant's testimony at the
evidentiary hearing makes clear that he weighed the different options
available to him, considered the consequences of his decision, and
concluded that pleading guilty was in his best interest. See Stevenson, 131
Nev., Adv. OP. 61, 354 P.3d at 1281 ("The test for determining whether a
plea is valid is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant."
(quoting Doe. v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2007))). Appellant's
assertion that he was coerced was also inconsistent with other statements
he made. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err by
denying this claim.
Third, appellant contends that the district court erred by
denying his claim that counsel was ineffective "because [he] would have
insisted upon trial instead of pleading guilty since he had two viable
defenses and attempted to withdraw his guilty plea three times before
sentencing but trial counsel refused." To the extent appellant argues that
counsel was ineffective for encouraging him to plead guilty, appellant fails
to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
58-59 (1985) (holding that a petitioner must demonstrate that his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty); Kirksey v.
State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). To the extent
appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
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withdraw his plea before sentencing, the district court concluded that the
motion would not have been granted because appellant was unable to
articulate any valid grounds to withdraw his plea. See NRS 176.165. We
agree. See Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166
(2005) (giving deference to the district court's factual findings but
reviewing its legal conclusions de novo). Therefore, we conclude that no
relief is warranted on this claim. 1
Having concluded that appellant's contentions lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
, C.J.
Hardesty
Pickering
'Appellant raises several claims which were not presented below,
were raised for the first time in his reply, or are not cognizable in a
postconviction petition. We decline to consider these claims. Specifically,
we decline to consider appellant's claims that (1) counsel was ineffective
because "an objective [sic] reasonable attorney would have presented
[appellant's] voluntary intoxication and mental illness during trial to
negate the specific intent to commit first degree murder," (2) counsel was
ineffective because he failed to insert a clause in the guilty plea agreement
allowing appellant to withdraw his plea if the district court felt the
recommended sentence was too lenient, (3) counsel was ineffective for
failing to complete an investigation before advising appellant to plead
guilty, and (4) the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
appellant outside the sentence recommended in the guilty plea agreement.
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cc: Ninth Judicial District Court Dept. 2
Mary Lou Wilson
Attorney General/Carson City
Douglas County District Attorney/Minden
Douglas County Clerk
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reVOL eTh-±.