Micone v. Micone , 2016 NV 14 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                   132 Nev., Advance Opinion 14
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    KERSTAN MICONE, N/K/A KERSTAN                        No. 67934
    HUBBS,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    FILED
    MICHAEL MICONE,                                               MAR 03 2916
    Respondent.                                               TIFAAHI K. UNDEMAN
    cLE@Iptiot •    ME CQIII'
    BY                   )00   1,   A
    CHIEit dEP-11
    Appeal from a post-divorce decree order modifying child
    custody and support. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court
    Division, Clark County; Rena G. Hughes, Judge.
    Affirmed impart, reversed in part, and remanded.
    Black & LoBello and John D. Jones, Las Vegas,
    for Appellant.
    Prokopius & Beasley and Donn W Prokopius, Las Vegas,
    for Respondent.
    BEFORE HARDESTY, SAITTA and PICKERING, JJ.
    OPINION
    By the Court, PICKERING, J.:
    This is an appeal from a district court order modifying a child
    custody and support decree to change primary physical custody from the
    child's mother to the child's grandparents. The grandparents were not
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    parties to the action, and the district court did not notify the parents that
    the grandparents were being considered as a custodial option. Without
    joinder of the grandparents, notice to the parents that the grandparents
    might be awarded custody, and the requisite findings to overcome the
    parental preference, the district court's order cannot stand. We therefore
    reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.
    I.
    In 2009, appellant Kerstan Micone and respondent Michael
    Micone divorced. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their
    two minor children, while Kerstan received primary physical custody of
    both children. The divorce decree provided that after the 2009 school year,
    the children would attend public school unless both parents agreed to pay
    for private school. The Micones' daughter (I.M.) received poor grades in
    Las Vegas public schools, possibly due to I.M.'s dyslexia, so Michael agreed
    to pay half of I.M.'s private school tuition if she would attend private
    school in Reno. Kerstan and Michael agreed that it was in I.M.'s best
    interest for her to live during the school year with her paternal
    grandparents in Reno. Thereafter, in August 2013, I.M. moved to her
    grandparents' house in Reno, where she currently resides and attends
    school, returning to live with Kerstan in the summer.
    In 2014, Michael, who lives in Reno, moved to change custody,
    seeking primary physical custody of I.M. Kerstan opposed any change in
    physical custody, conceding that she allowed I.M. to live with her
    grandparents in Reno, but objecting that this did not mean she agreed to
    change her physical custody status. On January 15, 2015, the district
    court found it was in I.M.'s best interest to reside with her grandparents
    and awarded primary physical custody to I.M.'s paternal grandparents,
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    who were neither parties to, nor intervenors in, the action. The district
    court concluded that because I.M. "is, and has been, residing with her
    paternal grandparents since August 2013, neither parent has primary or
    shared physical custody of the child after that date." Kerstan appeals.'
    This court reviews a child custody determination for an abuse
    of discretion. See Wallace v. Wallace, 
    112 Nev. 1015
    , 1019, 
    922 P.2d 541
    ,
    543 (1996). While we have not authoritatively addressed child custody
    awards to nonparty nonparents, we have held that a court must have
    jurisdiction over a party before it can enter judgment affecting that party.
    See Young v. Nev. Title Co.,   
    103 Nev. 436
    , 442, 
    744 P.2d 902
    , 905 (1987)
    ("A court does not have jurisdiction to enter judgment for or against one
    who is not a party to the action."). Applying Young to child custody cases
    is consistent with how other courts have addressed this issue. See Landry
    v. Nauls, 
    831 S.W.2d 603
    , 605 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); see also Elton H. v.
    Naomi R., 
    119 P.3d 969
    , 979 (Alaska 2005) (requiring that a nonparty
    grandmother consent to becoming a party upon remand to be considered a
    custodial option).
    'We reject Kerstan's issue-preclusion-based challenge to the district
    court's order barring modification of certain child support arrearages, as
    the order relies on video transcript from a June 26, 2013, hearing, which
    Kerstan failed to include in the record on appeal. See Carson Ready Mix,
    Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 
    97 Nev. 474
    , 476, 
    635 P.2d 276
    , 277 (1981)
    (declining to consider matters that do not properly appear in the record on
    appeal); see also Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 
    123 Nev. 598
    ,
    603, 
    172 P.3d 131
    , 135 (2007) ("When an appellant fails to include
    necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the
    missing portion supports the district court's decision.").
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    In Landry, the Texas Court of Appeals considered whether the
    trial court abused its discretion by awarding permanent managing
    conservatorship to the nonparty paternal grandmother without
    overcoming the parental preference 
    statute. 831 S.W.2d at 606
    . The court
    held that "[lit is no longer sufficient for the trial court to merely state that
    an award of custody to a nonparent is in the best interest of the child." 
    Id. at 605.
    Instead, a nonparent must either "bring or intervene in a custody
    suit" and present evidence to overcome parental preference to be awarded
    custody of a minor child. 
    Id. We conclude
    that Landry is consistent with
    Nevada law, as NRS 125.510 (2013) 2 demonstrates that the court should
    have jurisdiction over parties in child custody disputes. NRS 125.510
    ("The party seeking such an order shall submit to the jurisdiction of the
    court for the purposes of this subsection." (emphasis added)) (repealed by
    2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 445, § 10, at 2586); see also NRS 125A.345(3) ("The
    obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a child
    custody proceeding conducted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter
    are governed by the law of this state as in child custody proceedings
    between residents of this state.").
    If a court awards custody to a nonparent that neither brought
    nor intervened in the custody action, the parties' due process rights may
    be violated. See Gonzales-Alpizar v. Griffith, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 2, 
    317 P.3d 820
    , 827 (2014) (providing that procedural due process requires
    reasonable notice and an opportunity to present objections); see also NRS
    2While the Legislature repealed NRS 125.510 in 2015, the same
    language was added to NRS Chapter 125C. See A.B. 263, 78th Leg. (Nev.
    2015).
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    125A.345(1) (requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard for child
    custody determinations); Anonymous v. Anonymous,         
    353 So. 2d 515
    , 519
    (Ala. 1977) (holding award of child custody to nonparty grandparent
    violated parent's due process rights because "the custody dispute centered
    around and was focused upon, the parties"); Elton 
    H., 119 P.3d at 979
                    (requiring the parties to the dispute to have sufficient notice of the
    possibility that a nonparty will receive custody to satisfy due process).
    Here, the district court's unilateral award of custody to the
    nonparty grandparents failed to provide the notice and opportunity to be
    heard that fundamental fairness, indeed, due process, requires on an issue
    as important as child custody. In Michael's motion to change custody, and
    Kerstan's opposition, both parties argued how I.M.'s best interest would be
    served or disserved by primary custody lying with Michael, as opposed to
    Kerstan, or vice versa. Neither party briefed or argued whether awarding
    primary physical custody to the grandparents was justified or would be in
    I.M's best interest. The surprise award of custody to the nonparty
    grandparents violated the Micones' due process rights.          See Gonzales-
    Alpizar, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 
    2, 317 P.3d at 827
    .
    Additionally, the district court failed to make specific findings
    that awarding custody to either Michael or Kerstan would be detrimental
    to I.M. and the award of custody to the paternal grandparents was in
    I.M.'s best interest. See NRS 125.500(1) 3 (requiring a district court to find
    that "an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child
    3 Similarto NRS 125.510, the Legislature repealed NRS 125.500 in
    2015, but added the same language to NRS Chapter 125C. See A.B. 263,
    78th Leg. (Nev. 2015).
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    and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interest of the
    child" before awarding custody to a nonparent). Though the district court
    found that Michael and Kerstan consented to I.M. residing with her
    grandparents, Kerstan maintains that she did not consent to changing her
    custody status. Thus, the district court needed to make the requisite
    findings under NRS 125.500 before awarding custody to the grandparents.
    We note that Kerstan argues a change in custody is
    unwarranted when a custodial parent sends a child to live with a third-
    party for educational or similar interests, such as sending a child to
    boarding school. See, e.g., DaSilva v. DaSilva, 
    15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59
    , 62 (Ct.
    App. 2004). Kerstan did not present this argument below until her
    reconsideration motion, which the district court declined to hear pending
    appeal in this court. Upon remand, the district court should consider
    these arguments on the merits, as it is inappropriate for this court to do so
    without the issues being decided below. CI Arnold v. Kip, 
    123 Nev. 410
    ,
    417, 
    168 P.3d 1050
    , 1054 (2007).
    To be awarded custody of a minor child, a nonparent must
    either "bring or intervene in a custody suit" and present evidence to
    overcome the parental preference. Here, because the grandparents
    neither brought nor intervened in the custody suit, the district court failed
    to notify the Micones that it was considering the grandparents as a
    custodial option, and the district court did not make the requisite findings
    to overcome the parental preference, we conclude that the district court
    abused its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's award of
    primary physical custody to the nonparty grandparents, affirm its order
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    regarding issue preclusion, and remand for proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    J.
    We concur:
    J.
    Hardesty
    ,   J.
    Saitta
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