Jb Carter Prop. II, LLC v. Gashtili ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                 JB Carter Properties II appealed, arguing that the district
    court's refusal to grant its motion to reinstate its contract claims, which
    had previously been disposed of on partial summary judgment, was in
    error and that the district court erred in finding that Gashtili's
    withdrawal of certain funds was covered by NRS 86.291(1) and that
    Gashtili was not liable for breach of fiduciary duty.' We review an order
    denying a motion to amend the pleadings or to reconsider for an abuse of
    discretion.   State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Sutton,   
    120 Nev. 972
    , 987-
    88, 
    103 P.3d 8
    , 18-19 (2004); State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Thomas, 101 Nev.
    'We observe that appellant's briefs and the joint appendix do not
    comply with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure. NRAP 28(e)(1)
    requires "[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record" to be
    supported by a citation to the record. (Emphasis added.) Appellant's
    briefs contain numerous unsupported assertions of fact. In this regard,
    one record citation at the end of a paragraph is generally insufficient to
    support all assertions contained in the paragraph, and assertions made in
    the discussion section of the briefs must also be supported, even if
    previously supported in the facts section. NRAP 30(c)(1) requires the
    appendix pages to be consecutively numbered. This requires each volume
    after the first to be consecutively numbered as well, beginning with the
    page number after the last page number of the previous volume.
    Beginning each volume with page number 1 does not comply with this
    rule. Although we have considered the merits of this case, parties that do
    not comply with the rules concerning briefs and appendices risk sanctions,
    including having their appeal dismissed for non-compliance rather than
    considered on the merits. Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts, LLC,
    130 Nev., Adv. Op. 23, 
    322 P.3d 429
    , 434-35 (2014) (dismissal); Thomas v.
    City of N. Las Vegas, 
    122 Nev. 82
    , 95-96, 
    127 P.3d 1057
    , 1066-67 (2006)
    (monetary sanctions).
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA                                               2
    (0) 1947A (Ke44
    293, 296, 
    701 P.2d 1012
    , 1014 (1985). 2 We will uphold the district court's
    factual findings "if not clearly erroneous and if supported by substantial
    evidence."   Weddell v. H20, Inc., 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 
    271 P.3d 743
    , 748
    (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Regarding JB Carter Properties ll's contract claims, partial
    summary judgment was initially granted in favor of Gashtili because no
    evidence of an operating agreement existed. At trial, Bartus Carter (JB
    Carter Properties II's principal), Gashtili, and Brown all testified that
    they signed an operating agreement. Consequently, JB Carter Properties
    II orally moved to conform the pleadings to the trial testimony or for
    reconsideration of the partial summary judgment to reinstate its contract
    claims, arguing that the three principals signed an operating agreement
    and, therefore, one must exist. The district court orally denied the motion
    when JB Carter Properties II was unable to provide the operating
    agreement's terms On appeal, JB Carter Properties II argues that the
    2 Respondent's argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider
    the denial of appellant's motion to reconsider lacks merit. While we lack
    jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a post-judgment order denying a
    motion to reconsider because no rule or statute provides for an appeal
    from such an order, see, e.g., Phelps v. State, 111 Nev. . 1021, 1022, 
    900 P.2d 344
    , 345 (1995), a party may challenge an order denying a motion to
    reconsider on appeal from a final judgment, where "the reconsideration
    order and motion are properly part of the record on appeal from the final
    judgment," if the reconsideration motion was made after the final
    judgment, Arnold v. Kip, 
    123 Nev. 410
    , 417, 
    168 P.3d 1050
    , 1054 (2007), or
    where a reconsideration motion is made and then resolved by interlocutory
    order before entry of final judgment, Consol. Generator-Nev., Inc. v.
    Cummins Engine Co., 
    114 Nev. 1304
    , 1312, 
    971 P.2d 1251
    , 1256 (1998).
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    3
    (0) I947A
    district court abused its discretion in denying the motion, and it further
    argues that the operating agreements that it attached to its opposition to
    Gashtili's motion for partial summary judgment provided the terms of the
    operating agreement.
    But, as Gashtili responds, Carter testified that, while he
    believes that an operating agreement existed, he had never seen a fully
    executed operating agreement. Moreover, while Carter, Gashtili, and
    Brown all testified that they signed an operating agreement, none of them
    indicated that the version they signed was either of the versions provided
    with JB Carter Properties II's opposition. And finally, when the district
    court questioned JB Carter Properties II's counsel regarding the terms of
    the operating agreement, counsel replied that no one had provided a
    document with the terms. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying JB Carter
    Properties II's motion to conform the pleadings or for reconsideration.   See
    State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys.,    120 Nev. at 987-88, 
    103 P.3d at 18-19
    ;
    State Indus. Ins. Sys., 101 Nev. at 296, 
    701 P.2d at 1014
    ; see generally
    Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 
    322 F.3d 218
    , 225 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that,
    in a breach of contract action, the plaintiff has the burden to prove the
    existence and the essential terms of the contract).
    JB Carter Properties II's other argument is that Gashtili's
    surreptitious withdrawal of funds was a breach of fiduciary duty. The
    evidence presented indicated that, while Gashtili withdrew certain funds
    without informing Carter, Gashtili had the authority to withdraw the
    funds.   See NRS 86.291(1) (stating that, in the absence of an operating
    agreement, the "management of a limited-liability company is vested in its
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    4
    (0) I947A
    members in proportion to their contribution to its capital"). Further,
    Brown testified that the funds were withdrawn and applied to legitimate
    Fastran expenses. Given the evidence provided in the record, we conclude
    that substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that
    Gashtili's withdrawals were not a breach of fiduciary duty.   Weddell, 128
    Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 
    271 P.3d at 748
    . Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    Saitfa
    J.
    14-"b11:iniy:                              Pickering
    cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge
    Michael H. Singer, Settlement Judge
    Michael R. Mushkin & Associates, P.C.
    Greenberg Traurig, LLP/Las Vegas
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    5
    (0) 1947A 440194