City of North Las Vegas v. Ruiz ( 2015 )

 exclude his statements and vacate the arbitration decision because the
City obtained his statements in violation of his rights under the POBR,
and the statements played a critical role in the arbitrator's decision.
The district court agreed with Ruiz. The district court
excluded Ruiz's first statement, finding that the City obtained it in
violation of the POBR, and his following three statements as fruit of the
poisonous tree. Accordingly, the district court vacated the arbitrator's
decision, remanded for a new arbitration on the unprofessional conduct
charge, and threw out the untruthfulness charge. The City now brings
this appeal.
Under common law grounds for reviewing arbitration rulings,
we allow an arbitrator "broad discretion" in reaching decisions. Clark
Cnty. Ethic. Ass'n v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 122 Nev. 337, 341, 131 P.3d 5,
8 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). We will only overturn an
arbitrator's factual decisions if they are "arbitrary, capricious, or
unsupported." Id. A decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported, if it
is not "supported by substantial evidence in the record." Id. at 344, 131
P.3d at 9-10. "Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 71, 335 P.3d 125,
144 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). We will only overturn an
arbitrator's legal decisions if he "manifestly disregarded the law." Clark
Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 122 Nev. at 341, 131 P.3d at 8. In determining whether
an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, "the issue is not whether the
arbitrator correctly interpreted the law, but whether the arbitrator,
knowing the law and recognizing that the law required a particular result,
simply disregarded the law" or "missed the law." Id. at 342, 131 P.3d at 8-
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9 (internal quotations omitted); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v.
Sutter, 569 U.S. 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (explaining that
limited judicial review of arbitration decisions "maintains arbitration's
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway" (internal quotations
omitted)).
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the
arbitrator's factual findings. Further, the arbitrator did not manifestly
disregard the law. For instance, the arbitrator found that that the City
did not violate the POBR when it obtained Ruiz's four statements. In
contrast, the district court concluded that the City obtained the first
statement in violation of the POBR, and the following three statements
were fruit of the poisonous tree. The district court stated that the
arbitrator's decision to "admit into evidence Officer Ruiz's four (4)
statements was arbitrary and capricious, and made in manifest disregard
of the law because the statements should have been suppressed as all
were taken in violation of Officer Ruiz's rights." But the district court
failed to explain how the arbitrator manifestly disregard the law,
especially considering that Nevada has no case law applying the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine to potential POBR violations.
We conclude that the district court did not apply the proper
deference to the arbitrator's decision. Under the correct level of deference,
the district court should have confirmed the arbitrator's decision. Further,
because the arbitrator's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or in
manifest disregard of the law, the district court abused its discretion in
granting Ruiz injunctive and extraordinary relief. See Chateau Vegas
Wine, Inc. v. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 265
P.3d 680, 684 (2011) (reviewing a "district court's decision to grant a
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permanent injunction for an abuse of discretion"); Nevadans for the Prot.
of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 894, 901, 141 P.3d 1235, 1240
(2006) (stating that "this court generally reviews a district court's denial of
a request for extraordinary relief under an abuse of discretion standard").
On remand, we instruct the district court to enter an order confirming the
arbitrator's decision.' Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order.
,C.J.
Hardesty
J.
arraguirre
y
J.
Cherry Saitta
ibbons
'We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude
that they are without merit.
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cc: Eighth Judicial District Court Dept. 2
Lansford W. Levitt, Settlement Judge
Marquis Aurbach Coifing
Law Office of Daniel Marks
Eighth District Court Clerk
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