State, Dept. of Health and Human Serv's v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Nev. ( 2015 )


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  •                 reasons stated below, we conclude that the PUC misinterpreted NRS
    427A.797 when it altered the ADSD's budget and therefore exceeded its
    statutory authority.
    In reviewing the PUC's final decision, our role is identical to
    that of the district court.   Nev. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Nev.,
    
    122 Nev. 821
    , 834, 
    138 P.3d 486
    , 495 (2006). Thus, we
    may affirm the decision of the [PUC] or set it aside
    in whole or in part if substantial rights of the
    petitioner have been prejudiced because the final
    decision of the Commission is:
    (a) In violation of constitutional or statutory
    provisions;
    (b) In excess of the statutory authority of the
    Commission.
    NRS 703.373(11); see also Nev. Power 
    Co., 122 Nev. at 834
    , 138 P.3d at
    495.
    The ADSD is not limited in using the surcharge money at the deaf-and-
    hard-of-hearing centers to funding services with a nexus to
    telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system
    The PUC's interpretation of NRS 427A.797 is an issue of law
    that we review de novo. Nev. Power 
    Co., 122 Nev. at 834
    , 138 P.3d at 495.
    We interpret unambiguous statutes based on their plain meaning.        D.R.
    Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 
    123 Nev. 468
    , 476, 
    168 P.3d 731
    , 737 (2007). "A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being
    understood in two or more senses by reasonably well-informed persons."
    
    Id. As an
    initial matter, we address whether the surcharge money
    may only be used to fund services with a nexus to telecommunication
    devices and the dual-relay system. Here, the statutory scheme is helpful.
    See In re CityCenter Constr. & Lien Master Litig., 
    129 Nev. 310
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    P.3d 574, 580-81 (2013) (interpreting a statute by looking to a related
    statute and construing them harmoniously); Hernandez v. Bennett -Huron,
    128 Nev. „ 
    287 P.3d 305
    , 315 (2012) (identifying ambiguity as a
    justification for looking beyond the statute at issue and referencing the
    statutory scheme).
    The Legislature directed that the provisions of NRS Chapter
    427A are to be "liberally construed to effect its stated purposes." NRS
    427A.030 (emphasis added). The Legislature expressly stated its intent to
    serve the holistic needs and interests of people with disabilities, including
    people with impaired hearing. NRS 427A.010. The statute provides, in
    pertinent part, that the State, "within the limits of available resources,"
    shall help people with disabilities
    secure equal opportunity to the full and free
    enjoyment of and access to:
    (a) Full participation in the social and
    economic life of the State;
    (b)    Opportunities       for    remunerative
    employment;
    (d) Freedom and independence in planning
    and managing their lives, including, without
    limitation, the ability to exercise individual
    initiative;
    (0 The best possible physical and mental
    health, without regard to economic status;
    (g) Necessary health, personal assistance
    and independent living services that are designed
    to enable persons with disabilities to avoid
    receiving institutional care, or to transition from
    an institutional setting back to their communities;
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    (h) Respite for family members of persons
    with disabilities from their duties as primary
    caregivers; and
    (i) Meaningful participation in a wide range
    of civic, cultural and recreational opportunities.
    NRS 427A.010(2). Inasmuch as NRS 427A.797 is unclear regarding the
    specific services that the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers may provide
    and what must be funded by the surcharge money, the statutory scheme
    and its stated purpose offers a reliable basis for concluding that the
    Legislature intended something broader than what the PUC purports.
    Thus, we hold that the surcharge may fund services at the centers that
    serve the various interests in NRS 427A.010.
    The PUG lacks authority to determine ADSD's budget
    The first provision of NRS 427A.797 (the "program provision")
    requires the ADSD to create and manage a program that helps people
    with impaired speech or hearing obtain and use telecommunication
    devices or a "dual party-relay system." NRS 427A.797(1). While the
    program provision tasks the ADSD with creating and managing the
    program, it also requires the program to be "approved by the [PUC]." 
    Id. The second
    provision of NRS 427A.797 (the "surcharge
    provision") requires "the Commission" to establish a surcharge amount
    that customers of telephone companies must pay. NRS 427A.797(2). The
    amount of the surcharge must be enough to (1) finance the program
    concerning telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system that the
    ADSD creates and manages, (2) "Mund the centers for persons who are
    deaf or hard of hearing operated by this State," and (3) cover a portion of
    costs that the ADSD incurs in carrying out the provisions of a statutory
    scheme regarding regulation of interpreters and realtime captioning
    providers. 
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    The third provision of NRS 427A.797 (the "account provision"),
    creates an "Account for Services for Persons With Impaired Speech or
    Hearing" that the ADSD administers. NRS 427A.797(3). The money that
    the ADSD obtains pursuant to the surcharge provision is credited to this
    account, which can be used for enumerated purposes, including:
    (d) For the general administration of the
    program developed and administered pursuant to
    [the program provision];
    (f) To fund the centers for persons who are
    deaf or hard of hearing operated by this State[.]
    
    Id. Thus, in
    both the surcharge provision and the account
    provision, the Legislature identified funding for the program that concerns
    telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system separately from
    funding for the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers. Given that the
    Legislature, on two occasions, listed the telecommunication device/dual-
    relay system program separately from the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing
    centers, and since the Legislature did not mention the centers when
    defining the telecommunication device/dual-relay system program, we find
    that the centers are distinct from the program and its purpose.
    The language in NRS 427A.797 does not authorize the PUC to
    alter the ADSD's budget. The program provision permits the PUC to
    approve or disapprove of the program concerning telecommunication
    devices and the dual-relay system. NRS 427A.797(1). The surcharge
    provision permits the PUC to "establish by regulation" the amount of the
    surcharge that must be "sufficient to . . [c]over the costs of the program,"
    which provides telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system, and
    to fund the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers. NRS 427A.797(2).
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    Therefore, at most, the PUC can approve or disapprove of the program
    concerning telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system and set a
    surcharge rate to finance that program and the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing
    centers. See NRS 427A.797.
    However, that is not to say that the PUC must set the
    surcharge rate at whatever level the ADSD requests. The PUC is still
    bound by NRS 704.001(4), which requires the PUC to provide customers
    with just and reasonable utility rates. Thus, while the PUC cannot
    approve or disapprove of funding for individual budget items of the ADSD,
    it may find that the overall amount requested by the ADSD leads to an
    unjust or unreasonable surcharge rate for customers, and it may adjust
    the surcharge rate accordingly.   See Nevada Power Co. v. Eighth Judicial
    Dist. Court, 
    120 Nev. 948
    , 957, 
    102 P.3d 578
    , 584 (2004) (holding that
    "Mlle only limit on the PUC's authority to regulate utility rates is the
    legislative directive that rates charged for services provided by a public
    utility must be 'just and reasonable' and that it is unlawful for a public
    utility to charge an unjust or unreasonable rate" (citation omitted)). 2
    2 The  dissent uses this "just and reasonable" requirement to argue
    that "all approved rates reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by
    the customer who must pay them," K N Energy, Inc. v. Fed. Energy
    Regulatory Gomm'n, 
    968 F.2d 1295
    , 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and thus the
    ADSD should be limited in using the surcharge money at the deaf-and-
    hard-of-hearing centers to fund services with a nexus to
    telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system. The caselaw used
    by the dissent to support this contention, however, concerns discretionary
    rate setting by public utilities, 
    id. at 1296;
    see also Sithe/ Independence
    Power Partners, L.P. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 
    285 F.3d 1
    , 1-3
    (D.C. Cir. 2002); Illinois Commerce Comm 'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
    Comm'n, 
    721 F.3d 764
    , 769-72 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom.
    Schuette v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 571 U.S. , 
    134 S. Ct. 1277
                                                                           continued on next page...
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    Conclusion
    We hold that the PUC misinterpreted NRS 427A.797 and,
    thus exceeded its statutory authority when it altered the ADSD's budget.
    As a result, the PUC prejudiced the ADSD's substantial rights because it
    precluded the ADSD from exercising authority that it possessed.
    Therefore, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED and
    REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
    this order.
    242   G"dia"te
    °
    Parraguirre
    J.
    Saitta
    PICKERING, J., dissenting:
    The majority identifies the question on appeal as being
    whether the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by "alter[ing] the
    ADSD's budget." Majority at 1. In actuality, the conduct by the PUC in
    question intrudes less into the ADSD's domain than the majority's
    ...continued
    (2014), and cert. denied sub nom. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
    Fed. Energy Regulatory C'omm'n, 571 U.S. , 
    134 S. Ct. 1278
    (2014), not
    legislatively mandated surcharges for the purpose of funding services for
    the deaf and hard of hearing, as in the present case.
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    characterization of the circumstances suggests, inasmuch as the PUC only
    acted to "set[ ] the telecommunication device for the deaf surcharge rate
    per access line for telecommunication customers in Nevada" by refusing to
    fund items in the ADSD's budget that lacked a nexus to
    telecommunication devices for the deaf. Thus, the central issue raised
    here is more properly framed as the extent to which an executive agency
    like the ADSD, which has neither democratic accountability nor that
    which exists between a utility provider and customer, can demand that
    the PUC impose a surcharge for services entirely divorced from those
    services that the PUC is tasked with regulating, and can do so without
    allowing the PUC meaningful oversight authority—that is, what limits
    exist as to the scope of services a utility's customer can be expected to fund
    through his or her payments to said utility?
    Based on the Legislature's statement that the provisions of
    NRS Chapter 427 are to be "liberally construed," the majority lays out the
    astonishing proposition that "[t]he ADSD is not limited in using the
    [PUC's] surcharge money. . . to fund[] services with a nexus to" the utility
    services that the PUC regulates. Majority at 2. This, then, is the world
    which the majority envisions—if the Legislature has instructed that a law
    imposing a surcharge be broadly interpreted to ensure its purposes are
    fulfilled, those who pay the bills upon which said surcharge is imposed
    may permissibly be required to subsidize every socially desirable but
    otherwise unfunded spending program through that surcharge; a
    legislatively imposed surcharge upon internet users to fund the purchase
    of laptops for disadvantaged youth, for instance, could be extended by an
    interpreting executive agency •to fund public schools generally, simply
    because the extension of that surcharge would be consistent with the
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    Legislature's purpose of improving educational opportunities for low-
    income students, and the Legislature had instructed that the surcharge
    provision be read "liberally." Even setting common-sense objections aside,
    this ideation is simply incorrect. The Legislature's instruction that certain
    laws be liberally construed is merely linguistic—it mandates this court's
    generosity in its interpretation of statutory language, not in the doling out
    of surcharge funds to deserving programs—and therefore its scope is
    constrained by the actual textual limits of the relevant statutes. In the
    instant case, it is NRS 704.001(4), which requires that any utility charges
    imposed by the PUC be "just and reasonable," that ought to constrain our
    interpretation of NRS 427A.797.
    In the context of federal law, particularly the federal Natural
    Gas Act and Federal Power Act, utility charges are limited—as they are in
    Nevada—to those which are "just and reasonable," and, as derived from
    this limitation, the concept of "cost-causation" sets the outward bounds of
    service costs that may be imposed on utility customers.     See K N Energy,
    Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 
    968 F.2d 1295
    , 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Sitheandependence
    Power Partners, L.P. v. F.E.R.C., 
    285 F.3d 1
    , 5 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Illinois
    Commerce Comm'n v. EE.R.C., 
    721 F.3d 764
    , 770-71 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
    denied sub nom. Schuette v. F.E.R.C., 
    134 S. Ct. 1277
    (2014), and cert.
    denied sub nom. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 134 S.
    Ct. 1278 (2014). This cost-causation principle provides that, "all approved
    rates must reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by the
    customer who must pay them"; or, put in the majority's terms, there must
    exist a direct nexus between the benefit the customer draws from a utility
    and the charges assessed against that customer.           Illinois Commerce
    
    Comm'n, 721 F.3d at 770
    ; see Majority at 1-2 & n.1. The majority admits
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    that it is "unlawful for a public utility to charge an unjust or unreasonable
    rate" given NRS 704.001(4), but denies that cost-causation has any
    bearing on the determination, providing no alternative and instead
    attempting to elide the question of what categories of charges a utility
    may justly and reasonably impose on its customers via surcharge.
    Majority at 6-7.
    But, if neither cost-causation nor any similar nexus is
    required to render a surcharge "just and reasonable," and if instead a
    "liberal" reading of NRS 427A.797 tasks the PUC legislatively with using
    its rate-setting authority to underwrite social programs completely
    untethered from its utility services, a real question exists as to the
    section's constitutionality. Under such an interpretation, NRS 427A.797's
    surcharge provision would essentially be an "enforced contribution to raise
    revenue" instead of one created "to reimburse the state for special services
    rendered to a given party." Starr v. Governor, 
    802 A.2d 1227
    , 1229 (N.H.
    2002). And, despite its official title, the contribution mandated by NRS
    427A.797's surcharge provision would therefore be not a surcharge, but a
    tax.   
    Starr, 802 A.2d at 1229
    ; see also Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Tax
    Assessor, State of Me., 
    116 F.3d 943
    , 946 (1st Cir. 1997) (the imposition of
    a "tax-like" surcharge is taxation). Generally speaking, because "[t]he
    only security against the abuse of [the taxation] power, is found in the
    structure of the government itself," M'Culloch v. State, 
    17 U.S. 316
    , 428
    (1819), a legislature may not, constitutionally, delegate its power to tax to
    another branch of government unless the individual state's constitution
    otherwise provides, see, e.g., Schultes v. Eberly, 
    2 So. 345
    , 346 (Ala. 1887);
    Stewart v. Daytona & New Smyrna Inlet Dist., 
    114 So. 545
    , 547 (Fla.
    1927); State ex rel. Howe v. City of Des Moines,    
    72 N.W. 639
    , 643 (Iowa
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    1897); Mouledoux v. Maestri, 
    2 So. 2d 11
    , 15 (La. 1941) (power to tax can
    be delegated but not surrendered based on constitutional language); Scott
    v. Donnelly, 
    133 N.W.2d 418
    , 424 (N.D. 1965); Multnomah Cnty. v. Luihn,
    
    178 P.2d 159
    , 165 (Or. 1947); Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of
    Pittsburgh, 
    346 A.2d 269
    , 291 (Pa. 1975); State ex rel. Field v. Smith, 
    49 S.W.2d 74
    , 79 (Mo. 1932); see also 84 John Bourdeau, et al., C.J.S.
    Taxation § 14 (2014) (collecting cases), which Nevada's does not. See Nev.
    Const. art. IX, § 2(1); Nev. Const. art. X, §1(1) (tasking the Legislature
    with imposing any necessary tax). We should therefore endeavor to avoid
    propounding such an interpretation of the section, Ford v. State, 127 Nev.
    , 
    262 P.3d 1123
    , 1130 (2011) (stating that an interpretation of a
    statute that casts it into constitutional doubt should be eschewed),
    especially given that the Legislature's inclusion of the "just and
    reasonable" statutory limitation makes it entirely unlikely that it intended
    to affect such an unconstitutional delegation.
    Thus, I cannot accept that the PUC was required to "set a
    surcharge rate to finance ... the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers" despite
    that many items in the centers' budgets—which, between 2011 and 2013,
    included "trainings addressing domestic violence, child welfare, and
    human trafficking issues, workshops addressing credit history, identity
    theft, and tax issues, job coaching, mental health counseling, workshops
    addressing breast cancer, diabetes, and hepatitis issues; cooking classes;
    gingerbread house making classes; jeopardy games; bowling outings;
    seminars on how to play poker; summer camps; and grant writing
    courses," among other activities—were entirely divorced from any utility
    service provided by the PUC. As demonstrated, if the PUC determined
    that the surcharge required to fund the centers was unreasonable or
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    unjust for the absence of any connection between the services funded and
    the services that the PUC provides, it was legally obliged to adjust the
    surcharge. To the extent that the majority has held otherwise, thereby
    granting the Legislature unsought power to fund via utility surcharges as
    set by an administrative agency, social programs unrelated to the services
    that the utility provides, this court has announced a proposition so
    extraordinary that it surely ought to have done so in a published
    disposition.
    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    greceitt. WI        J.
    Pickering, J.
    cc: Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge
    Robert L. Eisenberg, Settlement Judge
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Attorney General/Las Vegas
    Public Utilities Commission of Nevada
    Carson City Clerk
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