Smith v. State, Dept. of Employment Security Div. ( 2015 )

 (explaining that a person is ineligible for unemployment benefits when he
or she voluntarily left employment without good cause); Kolnik v. Nev.
Emp't Sec. Dep't, 112 Nev. 11, 16, 908 P.2d 726, 729 (1996) (noting that
mixed questions of law and fact are entitled to deference and the agency's
conclusions will not be disturbed by this court if they are supported by
substantial evidence). Although harassment by fellow employees can
constitute good cause for voluntarily quitting a job if the claimant
informed his employer of the harassment and gave his employer an
opportunity to understand the nature of his objection before resigning, see
Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 654
A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), unsubstantiated complaints do not
constitute good cause for voluntarily quitting a job for unemployment
benefits purposes, see In re Jones, 602 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993).
Here, the appeals referee had to weigh the evidence presented
to her, including the parties' testimonies and the documentary evidence
submitted, and consider whether appellant had resigned for good cause.
She found that appellant "perceived he was being harassed," that he knew
he was not in jeopardy of losing his job, and that he did not make an
internal complaint with the human resources department so as to
reasonably attempt to preserve his employment before resigning. While
the administrative record contains evidence of a dispute between
appellant and his employer, there is no evidence, aside from appellant's
testimony, of harassment or abuse by his fellow employees or employer.
As this court will not reweigh the evidence or replace the appeals referee's
judgment as between two reasonable but conflicting views, see NRS
233B.135; Nellis Motors v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 124 Nev. 1263,
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1269-70, 197 P.3d 1061, 1066 (2008) (explaining that this court will not
reweigh the evidence, reassess witness credibility, or substitute our
judgment for that of the appeals officer on questions of fact), and
substantial evidence supports the appeals referee's determinations, see
Wright v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 122, 125, 110 P.3d 1066,
1068 (2005) (recognizing that substantial evidence may be inferred from
the lack of certain evidence), we conclude that the Board of Review's
decision to affirm the appeals referee's ruling was not arbitrary or
capricious. See NRS 233B.135(3)(f); McCracken v. Fancy, 98 Nev. 30, 31,
639 P.2d 552, 553 (1982). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial
of appellant's petition for judicial review.
It is so ORDERED.'
QUIParraguirre
J. AAA.
Cherry
cc: Hon. Adriana Escobar, District Judge
Bradley Smith
State of Nevada/DETR
Eighth District Court Clerk
'We have considered appellant's other arguments and conclude they
lack merit. See NRS 233B.135(1) (explaining that judicial review is
confined to the administrative record); Garcia v. Scolari's Food & Drug,
125 Nev. 48, 52-53, 200 P.3d 514, 517 (2009) (setting forth the district
court's standard for presenting evidence not part of the administrative
record).
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