Fedor v. Fedor ( 2015 )

 attorney a letter of settlement after filing his motion. Respondent filed an
opposition and a countermotion for additional attorney fees. After a
hearing, the district court entered an order on August 27, 2013, denying
appellant's motion to set aside and granting respondent's countermotion
for attorney fees in the amount of $4,942.67. On September 23, 2013,
appellant filed this appeal from the August 27 order.'
Appellant first challenges the $2,142.85 attorney fees award
arguing that he had complied with EDCR 5.11. EDCR 5.11(a) provides
that before any family division motion is heard by the court, the movant
must attempt to contact the opposing party for the purpose of resolving
the matter without court intervention and that failure to do so may result
in sanctions and attorney fees awarded to the non-movant if, in the court's
opinion, the issues would have been resolved if the movant had made the
attempt. Appellant contends that he sent a letter to opposing counsel
requesting settlement after filing his motion and that the district court
failed to make any specific finding about whether the matter could have
been resolved.
'In his civil appeal statement filed in this court, appellant also
challenges the order denying his motion to modify custody entered on
April 22, 2013, with notice of entry served on April 24, 2013. Appellant
did not timely appeal from that order, and we lack jurisdiction to consider
it. See NRAP 4(a)(1); Healy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 103
Nev. 329, 331, 741 P.2d 432, 433 (1987) (noting that an untimely notice of
appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court).
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Having considered appellant's argument and reviewed the
record before this court, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding the attorney fees. See Miller v. Wilfong, 121
Nev. 619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005) (providing that a district court's
award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). The record
reflects that under the circumstances of the case appellant's actions did
not comply with the intent and requirements of EDCR 5.11.
Appellant also contends that the $4,942.67 attorney fees
award was punitive and not based on the work actually performed, and
that appellant should have been awarded his pro se fees and costs. We
conclude that the district court had legal grounds upon which to base the
award and did not abuse its discretion in awarding the attorney fees to
respondent or in denying any request for fees and costs incurred by
appellant. See NRS 18.010(2)(b) (allowing the court to award attorney
fees to the prevailing party when a claim is brought without reasonable
ground or to harass the prevailing party); EDCR 7.60(b)(1), (3), (5)
(allowing the imposition of attorney fees as a sanction when a party
presents a frivolous motion, unreasonably increases costs, or refuses to
comply with a court order). Additionally, respondent's request for
attorney fees was supported by a memorandum of fees and costs and a
statement of the factors under Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85
Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), and appellant did not file an
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opposition to respondent's memorandum of fees and costs setting forth the
amount of attorney fees requested, see EDCR 2.20(e) (providing that a
party's failure to file a written opposition to a motion may be construed as
an admission that the motion is meritorious and consent to granting the
motion). We, therefore,
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
, J.
, J.
cc: Hon. Cynthia Dianne Steel, District Judge, Family Court Division
Gregory Fedor
R. Nathan Gibbs
Eighth District Court Clerk
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