Woods v. Kings Row Trailer Park ( 2015 )

 and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant; (2) intent to cause
emotional distress or reckless disregard for causing emotional distress; (3)
[ ] the plaintiff actually suffered extreme or severe emotional distress; and
(4) causation"); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc., 125
Nev. 374, 385, 213 P.3d 496, 503 (2009) (holding that defamation requires:
"(1) a false and defamatory statement. . .; (2) an unprivileged publication
to a third person; (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual
or presumed damages"' (internal quotations omitted)). The statute of
limitations on these claims is two years, NRS 11.190(4)(c); Lund v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. , n.6, 255 P.3d 280, 285 n.6 (2011)
(applying NRS 11.190(4)(c) to a defamation claim); NRS 11.190(4)(e), and
it does not appear from the face of the complaint that this statute ran out
before the complaint was filed. Kellar v. Snowden, 87 Nev. 488, 491, 489
P.2d 90, 92 (1971) (holding that dismissal is not appropriate unless the
alleged statute of limitations bar is apparent on the face of the complaint).
But the district court was correct in its application of NRS
651.120's shorter limitations period to Woods's claims seeking to redress
discrimination in public accommodations under NRS Chapter 651. NRS
11.500 does not apply. Woods voluntarily dismissed the suit that he filed
in the federal district court; NRS 11.500 allows a party to recommence an
action in a court having jurisdiction only where a different court dismissed
'Although Woods did not allege publication in lawyerly terms, his
allegations permit an inference that Bill Steele or "Rick the Handyman"
made crude comments in front of Woods' girlfriend and/or mother which, if
proved, could establish publication. See W States Constr. v. Michoff, 108
Nev. 931, 936, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1992) ("A complaint need only set
forth sufficient facts to demonstrate the necessary elements of a claim for
relief. . . .").
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the same action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte equitably
toll the statute of limitations because Woods voluntarily chose not to
pursue his racial discrimination claim in the federal court. See Seino v.
Employers Ins. Co. of Nev., 121 Nev. 146, 152, 111 P.3d 1107, 1112 (2005)
(holding that equitable tolling suspends the running of a statute of
limitations when the interests of justice so require and listing the
appropriate factors). Thus, because Woods filed suit in state court after
the one-year statute of limitations in NRS 651.120 had expired, the
district court correctly dismissed Woods' Chapter 651 claim.
Because the district court erred by dismissing Woods'
complaint in its entirety based on the one-year statute of limitations in
NRS 651.120, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. On
remand, Woods may yet amend as of right under NRCP 15(a) so we need
not address his appeal of the district court's asserted failure to grant him
leave to amend his pleadings.
It is so ORDERED.
J.
Gibbons
J.
Pickering (
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cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge
Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP
Larry C. Johns
Eighth District Court Clerk
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