In Re: Discipline of Martin Crowley ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF No. 64457
MARTIN G. CROWLEY, BAR NO. 3049.
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF No. 68200
MARTIN G. CROWLEY, BAR NO. 3049.
FILED
MAY 0 . 92016
• E K. LINDEMAN
BY S lairlE/C
IC
F DE
ORDER OF PUBLIC REPRIMAND 1
Docket No. 68200 is. a review of a Northern Nevada
Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that this court hold
suspended attorney Martin Crowley in contempt for violating the order
suspending him from the practice of law. See In re Discipline of Cro-wley,
Docket No. 59895 (Order of Suspension, July 22, 2013).'
The panel determined that Crowley violated the suspension
order by (1) failing to timely pay the costs of the prior disciplinary
proceeding, (2) .failing to meet the notice requirements of SCR 115, and (3)
continuing to practice law after his suspension. The panel concluded that
in so doing, Crowley violated SCR 102.5 (aggravation and mitigation).
SCR 115 (notice of change in .license status; winding down (Z practice):
RPC 3.4(c) (fairness to opposing party and counsel: knowingly disobey an
'Docket No. 64457 consists of Crowley's motion to stay the order
suspending him from .the Practice of law. No good . cause appearing, we
deny the motion. and Docket No. 64457 is now closed.
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obligation under the rules of a tribunal); RPC 5.5(a) (unauthorized
practice of law); and RPC 8.4 (misconduct). The panel recommended that
this court issue an order finding Crowley in contempt and directing him to
pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding.
We employ a deferential standard of review with respect to the
hearing panel's findings of fact, SCR 105(3)(b), and thus, will not set them
aside unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial
evidence, see generally Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev., Adv.
Op. 9, 294 P.3d 427, 432 (2013); Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221
P.3d 699, 704 (2009). In contrast, we review de novo a disciplinary panel's
conclusions of law and recommended discipline. SCR 105(3)(b); In re
Discipline of Stubff, 108 Nev. 629, 633, 837 P.2d 853, 855 (1992).
While he argues that his actions were justified or mitigated,
Crowley admits, and the record supports, that he violated the suspension
:order by (1) failing to pay the costs of the prior disciplinary proceeding. (2)
failing to comply with the notice requirements of SCR 115, and (3) by
practicing law in signing a demand letter in personal injury case several
weeks after he was suspended.
Crowley denies that his other actions as determined by the
disciplinary panel were improper. We conclude that, in addition to signing
the demand letter in the personal injury case after he was suspended,
Crowley's actions in meeting with a client to review a trust document and
writing a letter regarding his conclusions based on that review also
constituted the practice of law in violation of the suspension order. See In
re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232, 1241-42, 197 P.3d 1067, 1074
(2008) (application of law to facts and "advising a client about his or her
legal rights and recommending future actions" constitutes practice of law);
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In re Burrell, 882 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Alaska 1994) (writing the "type of
letter an attorney would write on a client's behalf' constitutes the practice
of law); In re Jones, 241 P.3d 90 (Kan. 2010) (while an attorney who has
been suspended from the practice of law is permitted to work as a
paralegal or similar for a licensed attorney, the suspended lawyer's
functions must be limited exclusively to work of a preparatory nature
under the supervision of the licensed attorney and must not involve client
contact); State v Schumacher, 519 P.2d 1116 (Kan. 1974) (along with
numerous other violations, preparing correspondence concerning legal
matters while suspended supported holding attorney in contempt for
violating prior disciplinary order); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Brennan, 714 A.2d 157 (Md. 1998) (in context of reviewing licensed
.attorney's conduct in assisting with the unauthorized practice of law, court
:.determined that a suspended attorney engaged in the practice of law when
?he failed to disclose to clients during meeting to discuss representation in
a matter that he was suspended and accepted fee from them, even though
his further involvement was limited to nonlegal work). 2
The purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, the
courts, and the legal profession, not to punish the attorney. State Bar of
Nev. v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 213, 756 P.2d 464, 527-28 (1988). In
determining appropriate attorney discipline, this court considers four
factors: "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or
actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors." In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. at
2 Substantial evidence does not support that the other actions
identified by the panel constitute sanctionable violations of the suspension
order.
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1246, 197 P.3d at 1077. We conclude that contempt is not the appropriate
remedy here and therefore decline the panel's recommendation that we
issue an order finding Crowley in contempt; however, we also conclude
that discipline is warranted for Crowley's violations of the suspension
order. Considering the relevant factors, we conclude that a public
reprimand is the appropriate discipline. See ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules &
Standards, Standard 8.3(a) (2015) (indicating that a public "Ideprimand is
generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently violates the terms of a
prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential
injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession").
Accordingly, we hereby publicly reprimand Martin Crowley for
violating the suspension order as described above. We admonish Crowley
that further instances of practicing law while suspended may result in
•,additional, harsher discipline, including disbarment. See id. Standard
•8.1(a) (providing for disbarment when a previously disciplined lawyer
intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a disciplinary order,
causing injury to a client, the public, legal system, or the profession).
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Finally, Crowley shall pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding in
Docket No. 68022 prior to applying for reinstatement. 3
It is so ORDERED.
Ait.02----Cs; ,
Parraguirre
6--\ta.t fret-47c J.
Hardest erry
, J.
Gibbons
DOUGLAS, J., with whom SAITTA, 3.. agrees dissenting:
I dissent, as I do not believe that a public reprimand is an
adequate sanction for Crowley's violations of the suspension order.
Douglas /
I conc
, J.
Saitta
3 This
is in addition to the conditions set forth in the suspension
order in Docket No. 59895.
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cc: Chair, Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board
Martin G. Crowley
C. Stanley Hunterton, Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada
Kimberly K. Farmer, Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada
Perry Thompson, Admissions Office, U.S. Supreme Court
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