Nev. Checker Cab Corp. v. Dist. Ct. (Ferentz) ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
NEVADA CHECKER CAB No. 66349
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
FILED
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE FEB 0 3 2016
MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT
TRACE K. LINDEMAN
JUDGE, CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
Respondents, BY t_
DEPUTY CLERK
and
ION FERENTZ,
Real Party in Interest.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition or
mandamus challenging a district court order denying a motion to dismiss
or to remand the underlying matter to justice court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Webster Lomanang worked as a taxi cab driver for petitioner
Nevada Checker Cab (NCC). Lomanang rear-ended real party in interest
Ion Ferentz, causing injuries. Ferentz filed a complaint for damages in
justice court against Lomanang and Yellow Checker Cab (YCC), a
different cab company than NCC. NCC informed Ferentz that he named
the wrong cab company in the complaint. Ferentz failed to amend the
complaint or to serve NCC. Counsel for NCC withdrew as counsel for
Lomanang because they were unable to correspond with him.
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Ferentz subsequently obtained a default judgment against
Lomanang and YCC in the amount of $5,380.84, which he sought to collect
from NCC. NCC refused to satisfy the judgment because it no longer
represented Lomanang. Ferentz filed suit in district court, seeking
payment of the judgment, as well as compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of what he contended was bad faith on the part of NCC for
refusing to pay the judgment. In sum, Ferentz alleged that the judgment,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages exceeded $10,000. NCC
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, or, alternatively, to remand the
matter to justice court, because the bad faith damages are not recoverable
against NCC. The district court held a hearing and denied the motion.
This writ petition followed.
DISCUSSION
Writ relief is appropriate
"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion."
Humphries v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 85, 312 P.3d
484, 486 (2013) (quoting Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote omitted)); see
also NRS 34.160. "Normally, this court will not entertain a writ petition
challenging the denial of a motion to dismiss," Buck waiter v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 200, 201, 234 P.3d 920, 921 (2010), but may
do so when "(1) no factual dispute exists and the district court is obligated
to dismiss an action pursuant to clear authority under a statute or rule; or
(2) an important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of
sound judicial economy and administration militate in favor of granting
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the petition," State v. Eighth Judicial Din. Court (Anzalone), 118 Nev.
140, 147, 42 P.3d 233, 238 (2002).
We elect to entertain the petition for a writ of mandamus in
this case because no factual dispute exists and because there is clear
authority obligating the district court to dismiss the action.'
The district court erred in denying NCC's motion to dismiss
In considering a writ petition, this court reviews legal
questions de novo. Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 518,
525, 262 P.3d 360, 365 (2011). "The [dlistrict [c]ourts in the several
[fludicial [d]istricts of this State have original jurisdiction in all cases
excluded by law from the original jurisdiction of justices' courts." Nev.
Const. art. 6, § 6. NRS 4.370(1)(a) (2013) grants jurisdiction to justice
courts for cases in which "the sum claimed . . . does not exceed $10,000." 2
See also Royal Ins. v. Eagle Valley Constr., 110 Nev. 119, 120, 867 P.2d
1NCC also seeks a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is
appropriate when a district court acts "without or in excess of [its]
jurisdiction." NRS 34.320; see also Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 21, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012).
Although we conclude in this order that the amount in controversy did not
exceed the justice court's jurisdictional limit of $10,000, we treat this writ
as one of mandamus because the district court had jurisdiction to hear and
determine the outcome of the motion to dismiss. See Goicoechea v. Fourth
Judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 287, 289, 607 P.2d 1140, 1141 (1980) (stating
that we will not issue a writ of prohibition "if the court sought to be
restrained had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter under
consideration").
2 In 2015, the Legislature increased the jurisdictional limit of the
justice court to $15,000. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 200, § 2.2, at 945. However,
at the time this case was filed, the statutory jurisdictional limit was
$10,000. NRS 4.370(1)(a) (2013). Thus, the $10,000 limit applies to this
case
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1146, 1147 (1994) (determining that "the justice[ ] court has exclusive
jurisdiction 'if the damage claimed does not exceed $[10,000]." (quoting
NRS 4.370(1)(b)). Thus, the question here becomes whether Ferentz's
claims for emotional distress and punitive damages can be considered part
of the "damages claimed," such that the amount in controversy exceeds the
justice court's jurisdictional limit of $10,000.
NCC argues that Ferentz cannot establish a bad faith claim,
and thus, is not entitled to emotional distress and punitive damages. It
reasons that Ferentz does not have a contractual relationship with NCC
pursuant to Gunny v. Allstate Insurance Co., 108 Nev. 344, 830 P.2d 1335
(1992). In response, Ferentz makes a two-step argument. First, Ferentz
argues that because NCC insured Lomanang, he can collect the amount he
was awarded in the default judgment—$5,380.84—from NCC under NRS
485.3091(5). 3 Second, Ferentz argues that by refusing to pay him, NCC
acted in bad faith, allowing him to claim damages that exceed $10,000.
Ferentz argues that because he already obtained a judgment, a
contractual relationship exists allowing him to bring a bad faith claim
under Gunny. However, we recently held that NRS 485.3091 does not
"grant[ ] a third-party claimant an independent cause of action for bad
faith against an insurer." Torres v. Nev. Direct Ins. Co., 131 Nev., Adv.
Op. 54, 353 P.3d 1203, 1205 (2015). In so holding, we explained that
[t]hird-party claimants do not have a
contractual relationship with insurers and thus
3 NCC does not dispute the applicability of NRS 485.3091(5), thus,
for the purposes of this order, we assume that Ferentz is entitled to collect
$5,380.84 from NCC. In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev., Adv, Op.
91, 337 P.3d 758, 761-62 (2014) (concluding that a respondent's failure to
address appellant's argument resulted in confessed error).
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have no standing to claim bad faith. Gunny u.
Allstate Ins. Co., 108 Nev. 344, 345, 830 P.2d 1335,
1335-36 (1992). While we intimated in dicta in
Gunny that a third-party claimant who is a
specific intended beneficiary of an insurance policy
might have a sufficient relationship to support a
bad faith claim, seeS id. at 345-46, 830 P.2d at
1336, nothing in Nevada's absolute-liability
statute creates a contractual relationship between
an insurer and a third party for bad faith.
The majority of jurisdictions also conclude
that third-party claimants do not have a private
right of action against an insurer. . . .
Here, NRS 485.3091 provides no express
language that permits a third-party claimant to
pursue an independent bad faith claim against an
insurer. Absent such a provision, we will not read
language into a statute granting a private cause of
action for an independent tort. See Richardson
Constr., Inc. u. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 123 Nev. 61,
65, 156 P.3d 21, 23 (2007) ("[W]hen a statute does
not expressly provide for a private cause of action,
the absence of such a provision suggests that the
Legislature did not intend for the statute to be
enforced through a private cause of action.").
Torres, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 54, 353 P.3d at 1211.
Ferentz sustained injuries when he was rear-ended by
Lomanang, and NCC insured the cab driven by Lomanang. According to
Torres, whether Ferentz was a specifically intended beneficiary is
irrelevant. Id. Ferentz, as a third-party claimant, does not have a
contractual relationship with NCC, and NRS 485.3091 does not grant him
an independent cause of action for bad faith against NCC. As a result,
Ferentz cannot maintain a claim for emotional distress and punitive
damages against NCC. Therefore, because the amount of the default
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judgment obtained by Ferentz is $5,380.84, making the amount in
controversy less than $10,000, we further conclude that the district court
erred in denying NCC's motion to dismiss or to remand the underlying
matter to justice court.
Accordingly we
ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF mandamus instructing the
district court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to
remand the matter to justice court.
C.J.
Parraguirre
J.
J.
cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
Marc C. Gordon
Tamer B. Botros
Vannah & Vannah
Eighth District Court Clerk
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