In Re: F. A., a Minor C/W 62086 ( 2016 )


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  •                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    IN THE MATTER OF: F. A. A/K/A F. A.,                  No. 62086
    A MINOR,
    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    FILED
    Appellant,                                                 JUL 1 4 2016
    vs.                                                        TRAMS K. LINDEMAN
    F. A. A/K/A F. A.,                                     CLERK   or
    SUPREME COURT
    BY
    Resnondents.                                                   DEPUTY CLERK
    IN THE MATTER OF: F. A. A/K/A F. A.,                   No. 62087
    A MINOR,
    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    F. A. A/K/A F. A.,
    Respondents.
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
    These are consolidated appeals from a juvenile court order
    denying the State's petitions to certify respondent, F.A., to stand trial as
    an adult. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark
    County; William 0. Voy, Judge.
    We first address F.A.'s claim that the juvenile court's order
    should be affirmed because the State failed to establish prosecutive merit.
    Specifically, F.A. contends that the juvenile court erred by concluding that
    the State established prosecutive merit because eyewitness testimony is
    inherently unreliable and because the weapons allegedly used in the
    offenses were never recovered.
    "To say that there is prosecutive merit is to say that there is
    probable cause to believe that the subject minor committed the charged
    crime." In re Seven Minors, 
    99 Nev. 427
    , 437, 
    664 P.2d 947
    , 953 (1983),
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    disapproved of on other grounds by In re William S., 
    122 Nev. 432
    , 
    132 P.3d 1015
     (2006); see also Sheriff v. Hodes, 
    96 Nev. 184
    , 186, 
    606 P.2d 178
    ,
    180 (1980) ("The finding of probable cause may be based on slight, even
    marginal evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)). "An adversary
    hearing is not required, and the probable cause finding may be based on
    evidence taken from the petition, sworn investigative reports, witnesses'
    affidavits, police affidavits, or other informal but reliable evidence." In re
    Three Minors, 
    100 Nev. 414
    , 418, 
    684 P.2d 1121
    , 1123-24 (1984),
    disapproved of on other grounds by William S., 122 Nev. at 442 n.23, 
    132 P.3d at
    1021 n.23. The juvenile court's ruling regarding prosecutive merit
    will not be overturned absent substantial error.   Cf. Sheriff v. Provenza, 
    97 Nev. 346
    , 
    630 P.2d 265
     (1981) (district court's rulingS regarding probable
    cause will not be overturned absent substantial error).
    Here, the juvenile court considered documentary evidence that
    F.A. robbed three victims of their cell phones and one victim of his iPod.
    In three of the robberies, the victims claimed that the perpetrator revealed
    a handgun in his waistband, while the fourth victim claimed that the
    perpetrator utilized a knife. All four victims identified F.A. in photo
    lineups, and the fourth victim's iPod was turned over to police by F.A.'s
    mother, who informed police F.A. had given her the iPod. Based on this
    evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court did not substantially err by
    determining that the charged offenses were supported by prosecutive
    merit.   See Wise v. State, 
    92 Nev. 181
    , 183, 
    547 P.2d 314
    , 315 (1976)
    (declining to reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence based on "the
    'inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification").
    The State contends that the juvenile court abused its
    discretion when it denied the State's petitions to certify F.A. pursuant to
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    NRS 62B.390(1), or discretionary certification. Specifically, the State
    claims the juvenile court should not have considered F.A.'s subjective
    factors, or the third category outlined in Seven Minors, because the first
    two categories clearly warranted certification.    See Seven Minors, 99 Nev.
    at 434-35, 
    664 P.2d at 952
    . Additionally, the State argues that even if the
    juvenile court properly considered the subjective factors, it impermissibly
    denied the certification petitions solely because of F.A.'s amenability to
    treatment in the juvenile system. Id. at 439-40, 
    664 P.2d at 955
    . "[T]he
    [juvenile] court retains broad discretion in making discretionary
    certification decisions in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Seven
    Minors." In re William S., 
    122 Nev. 432
    , 441-42, 
    132 P.3d 1015
    , 1021
    (2006). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the [juvenile] court's decision is
    arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." In re
    Eric A.L., 
    123 Nev. 26
    , 33, 
    153 P.3d 32
    , 36-37 (2007) (alteration in
    original) (quoting Jackson v. State, 
    117 Nev. 116
    , 120, 
    17 P.3d 998
    , 1000
    (2001)).
    Having considered the parties' arguments and reviewed the
    record before this court, we conclude the State has failed to demonstrate
    that the juvenile court arbitrarily or capriciously exercised its discretion or
    that its decision to deny the petitions to certify F.A. exceeded the bounds
    of law or reason. See generally Bradley v. State, 
    109 Nev. 1090
    , 1094-95,
    
    864 P.2d 1272
    , 1275 (1993) (discussing that it is generally a court's written
    order, as opposed to any oral statement, that governs). After multiple
    hearings and careful consideration, the juvenile court determined that
    neither of the first two categories outlined in Seven Minors clearly
    compelled certification; rather, it balanced all three categories from Seven
    Minors and concluded that community safety and public interest were best
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    served by retaining F.A. in the juvenile system.     See In re Eric A.L., 123
    Nev. at 34, 153 P.3d at 37 (recognizing that the juvenile court may, in
    examining the third factor, consider a juvenile's amenability to treatment).
    We discern no abuse of discretion.
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the juvenile court AFFIRMED.
    etkis
    Parraguirre
    )
    Hardesty                                   Douglas
    L./         , J.                                        J.
    Cherro                                     Saitta
    rPitent
    eku                 , J.
    Gibbons                                    Pickering
    cc: Hon. William 0. Voy, District Judge, Family Court Division
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
    Clark County Public Defender
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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