Catholic Diocese, Green Bay v. John Doe 119 , 2015 NV 29 ( 2015 )

131 Nev., Advance Opinion 2.61
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF GREEN BAY, 1 No. 62840
INC.,
Appellant,
vs.
FILED
JOHN DOE 119, MAY 2 8 2015
Respondent. TRA K Lir DEM AN
1 c l. 0 A i
BY
;I
CHIEF 'Oa r r,
Appeal from a final judgment in a tort action. Eight Judicial
District Court, Clark County; Valorie J. Vega, Judge.
Reversed.
Mazzeo Law LLC and Peter A. Mazzeo, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Matthew L. Sharp, Reno; Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., and Michael
G. Finnegan and Jeffrey R. Anderson, St. Paul, Minnesota,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.:
Here we consider whether Nevada courts have personal
jurisdiction over a foreign Catholic diocese. The Catholic Diocese of Green
Bay, a religious organization incorporated and headquartered in
Wisconsin, employed Father John Feeney as a priest. Feeney later served
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It was alleged that, during Feeney's time in Las Vegas, Feeney sexually
assaulted John Doe 119. Doe sued the Diocese of Green Bay for
negligently hiring and retaining Feeney, asserting that the Diocese is
responsible for the injuries caused by the sexual abuse.
We conclude that the district court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the Diocese of Green Bay in this case. The Diocese did
not have sufficient contacts with Nevada. The Catholic doctrine of
incardination, whereby Feeney promised obedience to the Diocese of Green
Bay, is insufficient to establish a legal employment or agency relationship
between Feeney and the Diocese. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
against the Diocese.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Doe filed this negligence suit against the Diocese of Green Bay
in the Eighth Judicial District Court. Doe alleged that Feeney molested
him in 1984, but that it was not until around 2008 that he discovered that
his psychological injuries were the result of Feeney's acts of abuse. Doe
alleged that Feeney was an agent of the Diocese of Green Bay at the time
that he molested Doe in Las Vegas. Doe further alleged that, at the time
of the abuse, the Diocese was aware that Feeney had molested other
children in Wisconsin. He claimed that the Diocese negligently retained
and supervised Feeney and failed to warn others that Feeney was a
danger to children.
After an evidentiary hearing held during the trial, the district
court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Diocese. The district
court found that Feeney served both the Reno-Las Vegas and the Green
Bay Dioceses: While the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas oversaw Feeney's daily
activities, the court found that Feeney was originally incardinated in the
Diocese of Green Bay and, therefore, had made a promise of obedience to
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the Diocese of Green Bay. The court further found that the Diocese of
Green Bay had the ability to restrict Feeney's ministry, could recall him to
Green Bay, and maintained his pension.
Besides any employment relationship, the district court also
found that the Diocese of Green Bay had two other contacts with Nevada.
It found that the Diocese of Green Bay gave Feeney a positive
recommendation via a letter of good standing. And it further found that
the Vicar-General of the Diocese of Green Bay spoke to the Bishop of
Reno-Las Vegas about Feeney's placement.
After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Doe on the negligence claims. The Diocese of Green Bay appealed,
arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
Diocese.
DISCUSSION
When reviewing a district court's exercise of jurisdiction, we
review legal issues de novo but defer to the district court's findings of fact
if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Baker v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 527, 531, 999 P.2d 1020, 1023 (2000)
(stating standard of review for personal jurisdiction).
For a court to have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, a plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that (1) Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS 14.065, is satisfied; and (2) the
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend due process. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 509, 512, 134 P.3d 710, 712
(2006); Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev.• 687, 693, 857 P.2d
740, 744 (1993). Because Nevada's long-arm statute is coterminous with
the limits of constitutional due process, Arbella Mut. Ins., 122 Nev. at 512,
134 P.3d at 712; see NRS 14.065, these two requirements are the same.
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The United States Supreme Court analyzes the
constitutionality of an exercise of jurisdiction in two distinct ways: general
personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. „ 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). With respect to
general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court typically looks at a corporation's
place of incorporation or its principal place of business in ascertaining
whether jurisdiction exists. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at , 134 S. Ct. at
760. The parties here do not dispute that the Diocese of Green Bay is
incorporated in Wisconsin and that its principal place of business is also in
Wisconsin. Doe does not present any argument that the Diocese is
essentially at home in Nevada. See Daimler, 571 U.S at , 134 S. Ct. at
761. Therefore, general jurisdiction does not apply to this case.
A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the
defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state and an
exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at , 134 S. Ct. at 754. This
court follows a three-part test to determine whether a court may exercise
specific jurisdiction. First, the defendant must "purposefully avail[
himself of the privilege of serving the market in the forum or of enjoying
the protection of the laws of the forum," or the defendant must
"purposefully establish[ I contacts with the forum state and affirmatively
direct[ conduct toward the forum state." Arbella, 122 Nev. at 513, 134
P.3d at 712-13 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the cause of action
must arise "from that purposeful contact with the forum or conduct
targeting the forum." Id. at 513, 134 P.3d at 713 (internal quotations
omitted). Third, "a court must consider whether requiring the defendant
to appear in the action would be reasonable" or, in the United States
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Supreme Court's terminology, whether the exercise of jurisdiction
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comports with fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 512-13, 134 P.3d at
712-13.
Our inquiry is focused on the first part of the test: Did the
Diocese purposefully avail itself of Nevada law or otherwise establish
contacts with or direct conduct toward Nevada? We conclude that it did
not.
Purposeful availment
Purposeful availment occurs when one "purposefully directs
her conduct towards Nevada." Dogra v. Liles, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 100, 314
P.3d 952, 955 (2013). "Thus, 'the mere unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State." Id. (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Furthermore,
"Toreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 295. "Rather, [the foreseeability relevant to due process] is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. at 297.
In a case factually similar to this one, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals held that a Boise priest "select[ing] New Mexico from among
several other possible diocesan destinations in which to seek
employment. . . does not constitute a purposeful act by the Boise Diocese
to avail itself of the benefits and protections of New Mexico law." Doe v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, Inc., 918 P.2d 17, 23 (N.M. Ct. App.
1996). The New Mexico court also noted that giving "permission to leave
Idaho [does not] constitute activity whereby the Boise Diocese could
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in New Mexico for any and all
tortious acts alleged to have subsequently been committed by" the priest.
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Id. The court emphasized that it was "the acts of the Boise Diocese, not
the acts of [the priest], that must provide the basis for this state exercising
personal jurisdiction over the Boise Diocese." Id.
Other courts have also focused the inquiry on whether a
diocese purposefully placed a priest in another state or, conversely, the
priest was acting of his own accord. The Washington Court of Appeals
held that jurisdiction did exist where the diocese itself placed the priest in
Washington. Does 1-9 v. Compcare, Inc., 763 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1988). Conversely, in an unpublished case, a Delaware Superior
Court found no jurisdiction where the priest unilaterally traveled into
Delaware to molest children. Tell v. Roman Catholic Bishops of Diocese of
Allentown, 2010 WL 1691199, at *1546 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2010).
Likewise, our inquiry focuses on the Diocese's purposeful
conduct toward Nevada. Feeney's unilateral choice to seek employment
here is not relevant. The question is whether the Diocese established
minimum contacts with Nevada, either by direct contact with the state or
through Feeney as its agent.
The Diocese's contacts with Nevada
According to the district court's findings, the Diocese of Green
Bay had the following contacts with Nevada: (1) it gave Feeney a letter of
recommendation, (2) it spoke to the Bishop of Reno-Las Vegas about
Feeney, (3) it periodically monitored and had contact with Feeney, and (4)
it maintained some sort of employment or controlling relationship with
Feeney.
Contrary to the district court's findings, the Green Bay
Diocese's letter of recommendation is not evidence of purposeful availment
in Nevada. The letter was addressed to a Bishop in California regarding
Feeney's possible employment in California. It was merely Feeney's
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unilateral act of seeking employment in Nevada that resulted in the
letter's transmission to the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas. Such unilateral
acts on the part of a third party cannot create jurisdiction over a
defendant. See Dogra, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 100, 314 P.3d at 955. And,
along the same lines, the Green Bay Diocese's receipt of a phone call from
the Las Vegas Diocese, possibly regarding an employment
recommendation, is not purposeful availment of a foreign jurisdiction's
law.
Only the third and fourth facts, the alleged monitoring and
employment of Feeney, could have any bearing on personal jurisdiction.
The alleged monitoring appears to have been little more than the
occasional letter between Feeney and the Vicar General of the Diocese of
Green Bay—but receiving and sending letters is not purposeful availment.
The content of the letters, however, may indicate a relationship with
Feeney during his time in Las Vegas. This of course suggests the
following issue: Was Feeney an employee or agent of the Diocese of Green
Bay such that it, through Feeney, subjected itself to Nevada's jurisdiction?
Agency, control, and the doctrine of incardination
The district court found that Feeney was employed by both the
Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas and the Diocese of Green Bay. The district
court's analysis appears to center on three findings. First, it found that
the Diocese of Green Bay maintained Feeney's pension. Second, it found
that the Diocese monitored Feeney and could restrict his ministry. Third,
it found that Feeney had made a promise of obedience to the Diocese
through the Catholic doctrine of incardination.
"At common law, an employment relationship was defined by
agency principles. . .." Boucher v. Shaw, 124 Nev. 1164, 1167, 196 P.3d
959, 961 (2008). "An agency relationship results when one person
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possesses the contractual right to control another's manner of performing
the duties for which he or she was hired." Hamm v. Arrowcreek
Homeowners' Ass'n, 124 Nev. 290, 299, 183 P.3d 895, 902 (2008). To
determine control in an employment relationship under Nevada labor
statutes, courts consider the following indicia: "whether the employer has
the right to direct the daily manner and means of a person's work,
whether the worker is required to follow the putative employer's
instructions, and whether the worker can refuse work offered without
ramification." State Dep't of Emp't, Training Sz Rehab., Emp't Sec. Div. v.
Reliable Health Care Servs. of S. Nev., Inc., 115 Nev. 253, 258, 983 P.2d
414, 417 (1999).
The district court's finding that the Diocese of Green Bay
maintained Feeney's pension is not supported by the record. The record
shows that Feeney's pension was maintained by a separate group, the Leo
Benevolent Association. This association maintained contact with the
Reno-Las Vegas Diocese during Feeney's employment there.
The district court also found that the Diocese of Green Bay
monitored Feeney and that the Diocese could restrict Feeney's ministry or
recall him to Green Bay. But there does not appear to be any evidence
that the Diocese of Green Bay assigned daily tasks to Feeney that he could
not refuse consistent with his employment.
The court's remaining support for finding an employment or
agency relationship is the ecclesiastical doctrine of incardination. The
Diocese's canonical law expert gave uncontradicted testimony explaining
incardination as a kind of bond tying the priest to the diocese that ordains
him:
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Let's say for example, a priest with the Diocese of
Salt Lake City, who's incardinated there, chooses
to serve in the Diocese of Las Vegas. Well, he
remains incardinated in virtue of his ordination
the Diocese of Salt Lake City.
So when a cleric, deacon, priest or bishop, is
incardinated in the diocese, it creates a bond with
that diocese where that is kind of home base for
that cleric. The diocese of incardination would
have, for example, obligations of support. The
diocese also makes a determination that there's a
pastoral need in this diocese for you to help out
with pastoral ministry. That's why we're
ordaining you to this diocese and that's why we're
going to create this tight relationship with the
diocese.
The expert testified that incardination has no bearing on supervisory
authority; the bishop in whose territory the priest is serving has
supervisory authority. In other words, incardination alone is irrelevant to
supervision and supervisory authority in the Catholic Church is tied to
geographical location, with a bishop having complete authority to
supervise priests ministering in his particular territory. Further, the
Diocese's expert gave uncontradicted testimony that the Diocese did not
have unrestricted authority, under Catholic doctrine, to recall Feeney or
restrict his ministry.
We conclude that the ecclesiastical system of incardination
does not conclusively establish employment or agency. The doctrine of
incardination did not give the Diocese of Green Bay control or supervision
over Feeney's day-to-day work in the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas. In light
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of the uncontradicted deposition and expert testimony, the district court's
finding that Feeney could be recalled to Green Bay at any time was clearly
erroneous. The district court made no other finding, and Doe does not
point to any evidence showing, that the Diocese of Green Bay controlled
Feeney's ministry in Las Vegas. Accordingly, the district court erred in
holding that the Diocese of Green Bay controlled Feeney as an employee or
agent in Nevada.
The doctrine of incardination may have some significance
for courts. Certainly courts must sometimes consider a religious
organization's ecclesiastical structure when making decisions regarding
the organization. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. &
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976). We cannot opine on
ecclesiastical matters; on those we must defer to the religious entity. Id.
But whether the religious entity's corporate structure creates an
employment relationship is a question of civil law that we may determine
without opining on ecclesiastical matters. CI Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People 60 (Eerdmans 2014)
("If. . . the subject of a dispute falls outside" of ecclesiastical matters, "the
court should. . . hear the case. Many aspects of the relationship between
clergy and religious employers do not implicate ecclesiastical matters.").
Here, the legal standards of employment such as control and direction, see
Reliable Health Care Servs., 115 Nev. at 258, 983 P.2d at 417, control our
analysis, not the ecclesiastical doctrine of incardinationi-
'Belatedly, the United States Supreme Court recently held that
churches have absolute autonomy to determine who will serve as •their
ministers. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. „ 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) ("According the
state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the
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CONCLUSION
The Diocese of Green Bay did not have sufficient contacts with
Nevada to show that it purposefully availed itself of the state's laws and
protections. Feeney was not the Diocese's agent during his ministry in
Las Vegas. His promise of obedience to the Diocese of Green Bay, through
the ecclesiastical doctrine of incardination, is not sufficient to establish an
agency or employment relationship. Therefore, we conclude that the
district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Diocese. We
reverse the district court's decision.
J.
Cherry
We concur:
, C.J.
Hardesty Parraguirre
J.
Do '
Gibbons
. . . continued
faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions."). Although we
do not opine on the issue today, courts must be aware of the First
Amendment issues that may be raised by these kinds of negligence
actions.
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