Guitron v. State ( 2015 )

131 Nev., Advance Opinion 27
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
MIGUEL JOSE GUITRON, No. 64215
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
FILED
Respondent. MAY 2 1 2015
T C E K. Lit .•EMAN
CLE '
BY
HIE DEH H
Appeal from a conviction by a jury of incest, four counts of
sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14, and two counts of
lewdness with a minor under the age of 14. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge.
Affirmed.
Phillip J Kohn, Public Defender, and Amy A. Feliciano and Kedric A.
Bassett, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Elissa Luzaich, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and SILVER, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, SILVER, J.:
In this appeal, we consider whether evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to support a jury verdict finding appellant Miguel
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Guitron guilty of incest and sexual assault with a minor under the age of
14. Additionally, we must determine whether the district court erred by
denying Guitron's motion to admit evidence of the victim's prior sexual
knowledge, and clarify the procedure for the admission of such evidence.
We also consider whether the district court erred by refusing to give
Guitron's proposed inverse instruction and denying Guitron's Batson
challenges. Although we conclude the district court erred in denying the
motion to admit evidence and in failing to give the proposed instruction,
these errors were harmless. Accordingly, we affirm
FACTS
Guitron met the victim's mother, Anita, in Las Vegas in 1997
or 1998. The couple dated for some time, after which Anita moved to
Michigan. When she left Las Vegas, Anita was approximately two to three
months pregnant with the victim, who she asserts is Guitron's child.
However, Anita did not tell Guitron she was pregnant and she had no
contact with Guitron for some years after leaving Las Vegas. When the
victim was five years old, Anita applied for child support from Guitron,
which the court awarded following a positive paternity test.
In October 2010, Guitron called Anita while she was living in
Ohio with the victim and her two other children fathered by another man.
The victim, who was then 11 years old, overheard the conversation,
realized it was her father on the phone, and asked to speak with him. The
victim testified that during this first telephone conversation, Guitron told
her he was her father. Anita described the victim as "a kid in a candy
store" upon speaking with her father for the first time.
Following this phone call, Anita moved back to Las Vegas in
late 2010 and resumed her relationship with Guitron. The victim, who
was in elementary school and enrolled in an Individualized Education
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Plan because she was a slow learner, was thrilled to finally meet her
father. Guitron began living with the family shortly after the move.
During this time, the victim discussed sex with Anita and had at least
some knowledge and understanding of sex.
When the victim was 12 years old, Anita realized the victim
was pregnant. Initially, the victim told Anita a neighbor boy was the
father. The next day, Anita took the victim to a pregnancy center where
medical personnel confirmed she was eight months pregnant. Based on
the victim's statements during the examination, the medical staff called
the police and alleged Guitron had sexually assaulted the victim. The
victim then admitted to both Anita and the police that Guitron was the
baby's father. She explained she initially lied because Guitron told her to
say the neighbor boy was the father. DNA testing by the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department conclusively proved Guitron was the
father of the victim's baby. Additionally, Guitron sent letters to the victim
during the pendency of the case, openly admitting he was the baby's
father.
At trial, based on his statement during an interview to
detectives prior to his arrest, Guitron asserted he and the victim only
engaged in sex on one occasion. Further, he alleged the victim initiated
that single sexual encounter, which occurred while Guitron was
intoxicated and partially unconscious. Guitron argued the victim was
sexually curious and wanted to have sex with him, and she was capable of
understanding the consequences of her actions despite her age. He also
asserted the State did not meet its burden of proof on the incest charge
because the State did not present DNA evidence proving he was the
victim's father. The State countered with evidence Guitron had groomed
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the victim and engaged in sexual conduct with her on multiple occasions,
even when the victim resisted his advances. The State also presented
witness testimony that Guitron was the victim's father.
The jury convicted Guitron of incest, four counts of sexual
assault with a minor under the age of 14, and two counts of lewdness with
a child under the age of 14. Guitron appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Guitron contends (1) the State presented
insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of incest and sexual
assault with a minor under the age of 14; (2) the district court erred by
denying Guitron's motion to admit evidence of the victim's prior sexual
knowledge; (3) the district court erred by refusing to give Guitron's
proposed inverse instruction; and (4) the district court erred by denying
Guitron's Batson challenges.
Sufficiency of evidence
Guitron contends the State presented insufficient evidence for
the jury to convict him of incest and sexual assault with a minor under the
age of 14. We disagree.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis omitted); Mitchell v. State,
124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). As "it is the function of the
jury, not the appellate court, to weigh the evidence and pass upon the
credibility of the witness," Walker v. State, 91 Nev. 724, 726, 542 P.2d 438,
439 (1975), we do not determine the defendant's guilt, but rather consider
"whether the jury, acting reasonably, could have been convinced [beyond a
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reasonable doubt] by the evidence it had a right to consider," Wilkins v.
State, 96 Nev. 367, 374, 609 P.2d 309, 313 (1980). The jury deter mines the
weight and credibility of conflicting testimony, and we will not disturb the
jury's verdict where substantial evidence supports the jury's findings. See
Shannon v. State, 105 Nev. 782, 791, 783 P.2d 942, 947 (1989); Bolden v.
State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also McNair v. State, 108
Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992).
Incest
NRS 201.180 defines incest as occurring when "[IA ersons being
within the degree of consanguinity within which marriages are declared
by law to be incestuous and void [either] intermarry with each other
or. . . commit fornication or adultery with each other." A parent and
natural child are within the degree of consanguinity wherein a marriage
between the two would be declared by law incestuous and void. See NRS
122.020(1), held unconstitutional on other grounds by Latta v. Otter, 771
F.3d 456, 476-77 (9th Cir. 2014). Further, fornication is defined as sexual
intercourse between two unmarried people. Douglas v. State, 130 Nev.
327 P.3d 492, 494 (2014).
On appeal, Guitron argues his conviction for incest is not
supported by the evidence, solely because the State failed to present DNA
evidence conclusively proving he is the father of the victim.
Although neither party raises NRS 51.265, that statute
provides:
Reputation among members of a person's family
by blood or marriage, or among his or her
associates, or in the community, is not
inadmissible under the hearsay rule if it concerns
his or her birth, marriage, divorce, death,
legitimacy, relationship by blood or marriage,
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ancestry or other similar fact of his or her personal
or family history.
Here, both the victim and her mother, Anita, testified Guitron
was the victim's father. The victim testified that the first time she spoke
with Guitron by telephone he identified himself as her father. Anita
testified she was pregnant by Guitron when she broke up with him and
moved from Las Vegas. Further, Guitron paid child support for the victim
after paternity tests concluded he was the father of the victim. Thus, the
jury heard testimony from both the victim and Anita that Guitron was the
victim's father. Therefore, under NRS 51.265, the jury could reasonably
conclude from the evidence presented, Guitron was the victim's father.
Additionally, evidence presented at trial demonstrates that
Guitron himself admitted numerous times he was the biological father of
the victim. NRS 51.035(3)(a) provides a party's own statement offered
against him is not hearsay and is admissible against him. Here, Guitron
admitted to detectives that DNA testing confirmed his paternity in prior
child support proceedings and he repeatedly told detectives the victim was
his biological child. Thus, Guitron's numerous admissions to detectives
are admissible evidence sufficient to prove paternity beyond a reasonable
doubt, despite the State's lack of DNA evidence of paternity to the jury.
Furthermore, although not addressed by either party, NRS
51.345(1) excepts from the hearsay rule statements that, at the time they
are made, would subject the declarant to criminal liability or social
disapproval, and that a reasonable person in the position of the declarant
would not have made unless he believed it to be true. At trial, the State
presented letters written by Guitron to the victim. In those letters,
Guitron told the victim "you are my beautiful daughter" and "I love you,"
and instructed the victim to remember "we had [a] talk in the backyard
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about the fact about [C.G.] being your sister and your daughter and my
daughter, too. Remember me and you said that's going to be weird like on
Jerry Springer show. But me and you got a daughter together." This final
line was followed by a drawing of three pink hearts. Guitron further told
the victim he was "sorry," stating "I will be back. I can't wait till I can see
you and the baby. . . . [C.Gs] is my daughter and I need to see her."
Thus, in addition to the DNA evidence showing conclusively
Guitron was the baby's father, Guitron wrote several letters to the victim
asserting she was his daughter and the victim's baby was also his child.
As this open admission of incest would (and did) subject Guitron to both
criminal liability and social disapproval, and because Guitron did not
argue he did not believe the statements to be true, these letters were
likewise admissible evidence upon which the jury may have based its
verdict. Thus, based on Guitron's own statements, the jury could
reasonably infer he was the biological father of the victim.
Accordingly, because ample evidence reflects Guitron is the
father of both the victim and her baby, we affirm the incest conviction.
Sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14
We next turn to the question of whether the evidence
supported the jury's verdict finding Guitron guilty of sexual assault with a
minor under the age of 14. As relevant to this appeal, MRS 200.366
defines sexual assault as occurring where a person "subjects another
person to sexual penetration. . . against the will of the victim or under
conditions in which the perpetrator knows or should know that the victim
is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the
nature of his or her conduct." Guitron argues he should not have been
convicted on this charge because the evidence showed the victim consented
to having sex, and did not support the jury's finding Guitron knew or
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should have known the victim did not understand the consequences of her
conduct.
At trial, Guitron did not dispute he and the victim had sexual
intercourse or the victim's baby was his child Instead, Guitron asserted
he had committed a lesser crime of statutory sexual seduction. The victim
testified at trial that she was in love with Guitron and Guitron was in love
with her. Guitron's counsel argued to the jury the victim initiated sex by
climbing on top of him while he was intoxicated because she was curious
about sex and wanted to know what a penis felt like inside of her vagina.
The State, however, countered that this victim was vulnerable
and unable to understand the consequences of her actions. Further,
because of the victim's age and vulnerability, Guitron intentionally
manipulated the victim into having sex with him. The State presented
evidence the victim was "like a kid in a candy store" the first time she
spoke with Guitron on the telephone, as she was excited to meet the father
she had never known. Anita, her mother, testified the victim was a slow
learner and was in a special program at school, which required the victim
to have an Individualized Education Plan. During the time Guitron lived
with the victim and her family, he groomed the victim by telling her he
loved her, he wanted to marry her, and he wanted to spend the rest of his
life with her. The victim testified at one point Guitron gave her a diamond
ring and told her he wanted to marry her. When the victim gave the ring
back, Guitron swallowed the ring. Thereafter, Guitron left her a teddy
bear with his ring around the bear's neck. The victim took the necklace
from the bear's neck and began to wear his ring on a necklace. Ultimately,
the 12-year-old victim fell in love with Guitron, a man in his mid-40s.
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The State also presented evidence the victim was initially
reluctant to have sex with Guitron for fear of getting pregnant. The victim
testified Guitron began having sexual intercourse with her around
November or December 2011, when she was 12 years old. She testified
she did not initiate sex with Guitron. Instead, she testified to several
specific instances where Guitron had pressured her into having sex with
him, and at least one occasion where she voiced her concern to Guitron
about becoming pregnant. The victim also told the jury they had engaged
in sex more than ten times.
The State argued the victim was not capable of understanding
her actions due to her age and immaturity, and thus she was incapable of
giving consent. She did not know how to prevent pregnancy: she took
One-A-Day vitamins because she believed they would prevent pregnancy
and did not use condoms A caseworker testified the victim did not know
how to adequately care for a newborn, and the victim was initially more
concerned about continuing her relationship with Guitron than about
trying to understand her situation as a parent. These facts support the
State's position that this victim was not prepared for pregnancy, did not
understand how to prevent it, and did not understand the stigma
associated with having her father's baby.
Therefore, the record reflects sufficient evidence supporting
the verdict Guitron was guilty of sexual assault with a minor under the
age of 14. The State presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of
fact to conclude the victim did not understand the consequences of her
actions, she was incapable of giving her consent, and Guitron knew or
should have known the victim was mentally or physically incapable of
resisting his conduct when he engaged in sex with her. See Jackson, 443
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U.S. at 319; Shannon, 105 Nev. at 790-91, 783 P.2d at 947 (citing NRS
200.366).
Motions to admit evidence of a victim's prior sexual knowledge
We next consider Guitron's argument the district court erred
by denying his motion to admit evidence of the victim's prior knowledge of
sexual conduct. Prior to trial, Guitron filed a motion in limine requesting
the district court grant his motion to introduce evidence the 12-year-old
victim had gleaned "vast sexual knowledge" from viewing Internet
pornography with her friend from middle school. He argued this evidence
was relevant to his defense the victim was actually the one who initiated
sex with him because she was curious from viewing pornography and
wanted to know what a penis felt like in her vagina. He also argued this
evidence contradicted the State's theory this victim was slow or immature,
as it showed she actually understood the consequences of her actions and
consented to sexual intercourse with Guitron while he lay intoxicated on
his couch.
"We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude
evidence for an abuse of discretion." Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267,
182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). A court's error will not be grounds for reversal
where it does not affect the defendant's substantial rights, NRS 178.598,
and even if the error is a constitutional violation, the guilty conviction may
still stand if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Obermeyer v. State, 97 Nev. 158, 162, 625 P.2d 95, 97 (1981). To be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, an error of constitutional dimension
cannot have contributed to the verdict. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172,
1189, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008).
Nevada's rape shield law limits the degree to which a
defendant may inquire into the victim's past sexual history. NRS 50.090;
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Summitt v. State, 101 Nev. 159, 161, 697 P.2d 1374, 1375 (1985). But, due
process affords defendants the right to present evidence in support of their
arguments, Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 596, 614 P.2d 532, 534
(1980), and the rape-shield law does not bar such evidence where its
admission is necessary to protect the defendant's fundamental rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, including where the
evidence is used to show the victim's prior independent knowledge.
Summitt, 101 Nev. at 162-64, 697 P.2d at 1376-77. Thus, where the
defense uses such evidence not to advance a theory of the victim's general
lack of chastity, but to show knowledge or motive, it may be admissible.
Id. at 163-64, 697 P.2d at 1377.
In Summitt, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed this
exception, holding a district court committed reversible error by denying a
defendant's motion to admit evidence of the six-year-old victim's prior
sexual knowledge. 101 Nev. at 160, 697 P.2d at 1375. The supreme court
held the district court should admit evidence offered by the defendant that
the victim had been sexually assaulted when she was four in order to
dispel the inference—which the jury would otherwise likely draw—that a
six-year-old victim would be incapable of describing a sexual assault
unless it had actually occurred.' Id. at 162, 697 P.2d at 1376. The Nevada
"The supreme court in Summitt quoted favorably the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H.
1981), wherein it stated:
"We believe that the average juror would
perceive the average twelve-year-old girl as a
sexual innocent. Therefore, it is probable that
jurors would believe that the sexual experience
she describes must have occurred in connection
continued on next page...
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Supreme Court approved New Hampshire's approach to determining
whether to admit such evidence, adopting the rule that once the defendant
seeks to admit evidence that may be precluded by the rape shield law, the
district court must provide an opportunity whereby the defendant may
show the evidence should be admitted because its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. at 163, 697 P.2d at 1377. In making
this determination,
the trial court must undertake to balance the
probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial effect, see NRS 48.035(1), and. . . the
inquiry should particularly focus upon "potential
prejudice to the truthfinding process itself," i.e.,
"whether the introduction of the victim's past
sexual conduct may confuse the issues, mislead
the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an
improper or emotional basis."
...continued
with the incident being prosecuted; otherwise, she
could not have described it. However, if statutory
rape victims have had other sexual experiences, it
would be possible for them to provide detailed,
realistic testimony concerning an incident that
may never have happened. To preclude a
defendant from presenting such evidence to the
jury, if it is otherwise admissible, would be
obvious error. Accordingly, a defendant must be
afforded the opportunity to show, by specific
incidents of sexual conduct, that the prosecutrix
has the experience and ability to contrive a
statutory rape charge against him."
Summitt, 101 Nev. at 164, 697 P.2d at 1377 (emphasis added) (quoting
Howard, 426 A.2d at 462).
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Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 521 (Wash.
1983)).
Here, the district court held a hearing prior to trial regarding
the defendant's motion in limine. Guitron made an offer of proof the
victim had obtained prior sexual knowledge by watching Internet
pornography with one of her friends and her knowledge was relevant to
rebut the State's theories the victim did not consent and Guitron knew the
victim was mentally incapable of consenting to having sexual intercourse.
Further, Guitron argued this evidence was relevant to support his
statement to the police that this victim was curious about sex and had
actually initiated sex with him. If admitted, Guitron argued, this evidence
would be probative to his defense of statutory sexual seduction and would
rebut the State's theory this case involved sexual assault. In response, the
State presented almost no argumentS except to assert evidence that the
victim's prior sexual knowledge was irrelevant because the victim had the
defendant's baby and the pair clearly engaged in sex. The State never
expressly addressed Guitron's defense.
The district court's subsequent ruling denying the defendant's
motion was flawed under Summitt. The district court failed to explain its
findings in light of the defense theory in this case and made no findings
regarding the probative value of the evidence. Instead, the court
summarily denied Guitron's motion, finding this evidence was too
prejudicial.
As relevant here, statutory sexual seduction occurs when any
sexual penetration or ordinary sexual intercourse transpires between a
person older than 18 and a person younger than 16, where either of the
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parties act "with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust
or passions or sexual desires of either of the persons." NRS 200.364(6)(b).
Here, Guitron was an adult over the age of 18 and the victim
was under the age of 16. The victim had known Guitron for only a short
time, not her entire life. The victim told the police, and later the jury, she
and Guitron had fallen in love with one another. 2 Testimony suggested
the victim was sexually curious and willing to engage in sex with Guitron. 3
Because the baby's DNA conclusively showed Guitron and the victim had
sexual contact, the only issue for the jury to determine was whether this
victim was incapable of understanding the consequences of her actions
(the State's theory) or whether the victim consented to having sex with
Guitron (the defendant's theory).
Significantly, Guitron did not seek to admit evidence that the
victim had watched Internet pornography to muddy the victim's
reputation or to attack her credibility; rather, he sought to bolster his
defense through the statement he made to police that this victim had prior
knowledge of sex, wanted to experience sex as a result of her curiosity, and
consented to have sex with him. Thus, under the analysis set forth in
Summitt, this evidence was relevant to his defense of statutory sexual
seduction, and was more probative than prejudicial considering the facts
of this case.
2 Guitron
gave the victim presents, including rings and teddy bears,
and promised to marry her. She gave her baby Guitron's name.
3 Anfta told the police the victim said she wanted to know what a
penis felt like inside of her.
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Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion and erred
by denying the defendant's motion to admit evidence of the victim's past
sexual knowledge. Furthermore, the district court made inadequate
findings regarding the admission of this evidence.
We take this opportunity to clarify the procedure for
submitting and admitting or denying evidence of a victim's prior sexual
knowledge. We hold that if a defendant in a criminal case makes a motion
in limine pursuant to Summitt prior to trial, the defendant must make a
detailed offer of proof as to what evidence the defendant seeks to admit at
trial. The district court must conduct a hearing and the defendant must
present justification for admission of the evidence, detailing how the
evidence is relevant to the defense under the facts in the case. The district
court must, thereafter, weigh the probative value of the proffered evidence
against its prejudicial effect. In weighing the offer of proof, the district
court must consider the prejudicial effect to the truthfinding process, as
well as whether this evidence may confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or
cause the jury to decide the case based on an improper or emotional basis.
See Summitt, 101 Nev. at 163, 697 P.2d at 1377.
The district court must conduct this hearing on the record so
as to provide the appellate court with a meaningful opportunity to review
the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. We also hold, following
this hearing, the district court must state on the record its findings of fact
and conclusions of law, detailing what evidence shall be admissible and
what evidence will not be admissible according to its ruling.
Despite the lack of findings by the district court in this case,
we nevertheless affirm Guitron's conviction because the district court's
error was harmless. Unlike the facts in Summitt, where a six-year-old
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alleged sexual assault and no admitted facts provided an alternate basis
for the child's knowledge of sexual conduct, the facts in this case are
notably distinguishable. Specifically, although Guitron was precluded
from presenting evidence regarding the victim's conduct of viewing
Internet pornography, the district court allowed Guitron to present
evidence and argue the victim was knowledgeable about sex prior to
having sexual intercourse with Guitron.
Here, the 12-year-old victim admitted at trial she had
knowledge about sexual conduct prior to having sex with Guitron. In fact,
she explained to the jury she had conversations with her mother about
sex, she knew about the birds and the bees, and she knew where babies
came from. She even elaborated she told Guitron not to ejaculate inside of
her vagina because she did not want to get pregnant Anita confirmed this
testimony and even told the jury the victim stated she was the one who
initiated sex with Guitron.
During closing arguments, defense counsel analogized the
victim to other teenage girls starring in the MTV reality show 16 and
Pregnant. Defense counsel argued the victim was knowledgeable about
sex, understood the consequences of her actions, consented to and initiated
sex, was in love with Guitron, and wanted to continue the romantic
relationship. The defense urged the jury to disregard the State's theory
that this crime was a sexual assault under conditions in which Guitron
knew or should have known the victim was mentally or physically
incapable of resisting his conduct. Finally, the district court specifically
instructed the jury on statutory sexual seduction, and provided this charge
as an alternative option for the jury's consideration on the verdict farm.
Therefore, the record overwhelmingly reflects Guitron was not precluded
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from advancing the defense theory that Guitron committed the lesser
offense of statutory sexual seduction as opposed to sexual assault of a
minor.
Given the overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict in
this case, and the fact that Guitron was not precluded from advancing his
defense to the jury, we conclude the district court's error did not contribute
to the jury's verdict and was therefore harmless. Accordingly, we will not
overturn the jury's verdict despite the district court's error.
The inverse elements instruction
Guitron further claims the district court erred by rejecting his
proposed inverse elements instruction as to the crime of sexual assault
with a minor under the age of 14. He asserts under Crawford v. State, 121
Nev. 744, 753, 121 P.3d 582, 588 (2005), the district court was required to
give the jury his inverse elements instruction. We agree.
"The district court has broad discretion to settle jury
instructions, and this court reviews the district court's decision for an
abuse of that discretion or judicial error." Id. at 748, 121 P.3d at 585.
However, the district court may not refuse to give a proposed defense
instruction simply because it is substantially covered by the other
instructions given. Id. at 750-54, 121 P.3d at 586-89. In Crawford, the
Nevada Supreme Court stated:
Wins court has consistently recognized that
specific jury instructions that remind jurors that
they may not convict the defendant if proof of a
particular element is lacking should be given upon
request. This court has also recognized that a
positive instruction as to the elements of the crime
does not justify refusing a properly worded
negatively phrased position or theory instruction.
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Id. at 753, 121 P.3d at 588 (footnote omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
Notwithstanding, if a proposed inverse or negatively phrased
element instruction is misleading or would confuse the issues, the district
court will not err by refusing to give it to the jury. Carter v. State, 121
Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005). In Carter, the Nevada Supreme
Court clarified a defendant is not entitled to instructions that are
"misleading, inaccurate or duplicitous." Id. Even if a court errs by
refusing to give an instruction, the error will be harmless if the reviewing
court is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict was
not attributable to [that] error." Crawford, 121 Nev. at 756, 121 P.3d at
590.
At trial, the court's elements instruction read:
A person who subjects a minor under fourteen to
sexual penetration, against the minor's will or
under conditions in which the perpetrator knows
or should know that the minor is mentally or
physically incapable of resisting or understanding
the nature of his/her conduct, is guilty of sexual
assault with a minor under fourteen.
Guitron proposed a negatively phrased elements instruction
that stated:
If the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that any sexual penetration of a minor
under fourteen was against the minor's will or
under conditions in which the perpetrator knows
or should know that the minor is mentally or
physically incapable of resisting or understanding
the nature of his/her conduct, then you must find
the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Sexual
Assault with a Minor Under Fourteen.
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The district court rejected Guitron's proposed instruction after
considering Crawford. It reasoned inverse instructions generally create
confusion and lack clarity for jurors, as inverse instructions add
unnecessary extra explanations.
Here, the record shows Guitron proposed a negatively phrased
elements instruction pursuant to Crawford. Contrary to the district
court's conclusion, the proposed inverse instruction was not misleading
and would not have created confusion. Thus, the district court abused its
discretion and erred when it denied the defendant's proposed inverse
elements instruction.
Nevertheless, we conclude this error was harmless under the
circumstances presented here. The jury was accurately instructed
regarding the elements of sexual assault. As discussed above, substantial
evidence supported the jury's verdict Guitron committed sexual assault
with a minor under the age of 14. The State presented considerable
evidence the 12-year-old victim was unable to understand the
consequences of her actions or consent to having sexual relations with
Guitron. The State's evidence showed Guitron groomed the victim and
pressured her into having sexual relations against her will. Given the
overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict, we are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt the verdict was not attributable to the court's refusal to
give the inverse instruction. See Crawford, 121 Nev. at 756, 121 P.3d at
590. Accordingly, we do not reverse the verdict on this ground.
Batson challenges
Finally, Guitron contends that under Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), and its progeny, the State improperly used its peremptory
challenges to remove non-white venire persons from the jury pool in
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violation of Guitron's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.
We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held "that
prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised on the basis of race, Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985), and that, where racial bias is
likely to influence a jury, an inquiry must be made into such bias." Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976), and Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986));
Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.
The three-pronged Batson test for determining whether illegal
discrimination has occurred requires: (1) the opponent of the peremptory
strike to show a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) the proponent of the
strike to provide a race-neutral explanation, and (3) the district court to
determine whether the proponent has "in fact demonstrated purposeful
discrimination." Diomampo v. State, 124 Nev. 414, 422, 185 P.3d 1031,
1036 (2008) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98). The reason for excluding a
juror under the second prong need not be either persuasive or plausible so
long as it does not deny equal protection. Id. At the third prong, the
district court must determine whether the opponent of the strike has met
his burden of demonstrating the proponent's explanation is a pretext for
discrimination. See Conner v. State, 130 Nev. „ 327 P.3d 503, 508-
09 (2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3767 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2015)
(No. 14-1130). This burden is a heavy one. See Hawkins v. State, 127
Nev. „ 256 P.3d 965, 967 (2011) (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
upholding of a preemptory strike despite the prosecution's "lame" race-
neutral reason). The district court's factual findings regarding whether
the proponent of a strike has acted with discriminatory intent is given
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great deference, Diamampo, 124 Nev. at 422-23, 185 P.3d at 1036-37, and
we will not reverse the district court's decision "unless clearly erroneous,"
Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 334, 91 P.3d 16, 30 (2004).
Here, the record indicates Guitron initially objected to the
State's preemptory strike of Prospective Juror 31, an Asian male, and the
district court initially determined Guitron had failed to make a prima
facia case as to that juror. After the State exercised a preemptory
challenge to excuse Prospective Juror 52, an African-American female,
Guitron renewed his objection, arguing the State had exercised more than
half of its preemptory challenges on minorities. The district court did not
specifically find Guitron had established a prima facie case; instead, the
court turned to the State for the race-neutral explanations. Under these
circumstances we conclude the district court mooted the first step of the
Batson analysis. See Ford v. State, 122 Nev. 398, 403, 132 P.3d 574, 577
(2006). CI Watson v. State, 130 Nev. „ 335 P.3d 157, 169 (2014)
(discussing situations where the first Batson step is not mooted). It
therefore fell to the State to provide a race-neutral explanation. Burkett v.
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
The State indicated it had struck Juror 31 because he was a
single father who automatically believes children. 4 As to Juror 52, the
State indicated it was currently prosecuting Juror 52 for a sex offense.
The State further noted Juror 52 claimed she was molested when she was
young and her daughters were also molested, but she did not think it
appropriate to move forward with charges. Further, Juror 52 appeared
The record reflects that Juror 31 automatically believes children
4
merely because they are children, and he articulated no reason for his
tendency to believe children.
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10, 1947B e
more upset over being the victim of identity theft than over being
molested. Following these explanations, Guitron acknowledged he had the
burden to demonstrate these reasons were a pretext for discrimination.
See Conner, 130 Nev. at 327 P.3d at 508-09. To meet this burden,
Guitron argued the State's failure to strike similarly situated jurors
evinced pretext. The district court found the State's reasons to be race-
neutral and rejected the Batson challenge.
The State's reasons were clear, reasonably specific, facially
legitimate, and did not communicate any inherent discriminatory intent.
See id. at , 327 P.3d at 508. The record reflects key differences between
Jurors 31 and 52 and the jurors who were not struck by the State. 5 As
Guitron was required to sufficiently demonstrate it was more likely than
not the State acted with racially discriminatory intent or purpose, id. at
, 327 P.3d at 509; Kaczmarek, 120 Nev. at 334, 91 P.3d at 30, Guitron
failed to meet his burden and these differences undermine Guitron's
argument and support the district court's finding. Under these facts the
district court did not err in denying the Batson challenges.
CONCLUSION
Guitron's convictions of incest and sexual assault with a minor
under the age of 14 are supported by substantial evidence. To the extent
the district court erred in failing to allow evidence of the victim's prior
sexual knowledge and failing to give Guitron's inverse elements
5Guitron argued Proposed Jurors 24 and 47 were similarly situated
to Proposed Jurors 52 and 31. Juror 24, however, was not being
prosecuted for a crime, and Juror 47 stated she would consider all of the
evidence and try to be fair in weighing a child's testimony. We further
note Guitron used a preemptory challenge to strike Proposed Juror 47
from the jury.
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instruction, those errors were harmless and do not warrant reversal.
Finally, Guitron failed to show the district court erred by denying his
Batson challenges. Accordingly, we affirm the jury's verdict.
J.
Silver
We concur:
S.
C.J.
Gibbons
erasesc J.
Tao
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