Fulbright & Jaworski v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. , 2015 NV 5 ( 2015 )

131 Nev., Advance Opinion 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, A No. 65122
TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIP; AND JANE MACON, A
TEXAS RESIDENT,
Petitioners,
vs. 5 2015
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
NANCY L. ALLF, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
VERANO LAND GROUP, LP, A
NEVADA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Real Party in Interest.
Original petition for a writ of prohibition challenging a district
court order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Petition granted in part and denied in part.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. and Alex L. Fugazzi and Kelly H. Dove, Las Vegas;
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. and Matthew L. Lalli, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Petitioners.
Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, and J. Randall Jones, Matthew S. Carter,
and Carol L. Harris, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest.
BEFORE HARDESTY, C.J., DOUGLAS and CHERRY, JJ.
*46: Corm7i eJ per laer -4v piikkit*r,
- 1 5 -6.58 1 4
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, C.J.:
In this original petition for a writ of prohibition, we consider
whether a Texas-based law firm's representation of a Nevada client in a
Texas matter, by itself, provides a basis for specific personal jurisdiction in
Nevada. While we conclude that it does not and grant petitioners' petition
for a writ of prohibition insofar as it seeks to vacate the district court's
order denying their motion to dismiss, we nonetheless, deny petitioners'
writ petition to the extent that it seeks to direct the district court to grant
their motion to dismiss because additional evidence may have been
procured in discovery while this writ petition was pending that may
support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.
FACTS
The underlying lawsuit seeks redress for complications that
arose in connection with a real-estate development project in San Antonio,
Texas. As is relevant to this writ petition, the project began in 2006 when
three individuals, who were the managers of a Nevada limited liability
company named Triple L Management, LLC, began acquiring parcels of
real estate in San Antonio. The real estate was acquired based on its
proximity to a yet-to-be-constructed branch campus of Texas A&M
University, and Triple L's managers solicited funds from investors based
on the real estate's projected increase in value.
By July 2006, Triple L's managers had raised more than $20
million from individual investors who were predominantly Nevada
residents, and escrow closed on the acquired property that same month. 1
Title to the property was put in the name of real party in interest Verano
Land Group, LP, a limited partnership created by Triple L's managers
wherein Triple L retained managerial control as Verano's general partner
and the investors were designated as limited partners. Verano was
registered as a Texas partnership, and in December 2006, Verano (via its
general partner Triple L, via Triple L's three managers) sought out and
retained the Texas law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski,ILLP, a petitioner
herein, to provide Verano with legal guidance pertaining to the
development project. 2 At the time of this case's underlying events,
Fulbright & Jaworski was a limited liability partnership registered in
Texas with offices throughout the United States, although it had no offices
in Nevada and none of its attorneys were licensed to practice in Nevada.
As Verano's complaint in the underlying action would later explain,
Verano solicited Fulbright & Jaworski based upon the fact that one of its
partners, petitioner and Texas resident Jane Macon, was the former city
'The complaint in the underlying action also indicates that, at some
point, another $45 million was generated from the same investors, which
was used to purchase additional acreage near the projected location of the
Texas A&M campus. The complaint, however, does not allege that
petitioners were involved in generating those additional funds.
2 The record contains conflicting evidence as to whether petitioners
helped Triple L's managers create Verano and register Verano as a Texas
partnership or if, instead, Triple L's managers did so on their own before
retaining petitioners. At any rate, throughout the time that petitioners
served as Verano's counsel, Verano was managed by a Nevada-based
general partner, and because petitioners do not appear to take issue with
the characterization, we refer to Verano as a Nevada-based client.
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attorney for San Antonio and was therefore "highly experienced and
connected in the San Antonio development and planning arena."
Between 2006 and 2010, Macon served as Fulbright &
Jaworski's point of contact for Verano, and Macon, in turn, dealt with
Verano's general partner, Triple L, regarding the legal matters pertaining
to Verano's development project. During that time, Macon sent numerous
e-mails and placed repeated phone calls to Triple L's managers in Nevada
concerning Verano's project. Petitioners also sent billing invoices to Triple
L's Nevada mailing address, which were paid from a Nevada bank
account. During 2007 and 2008, Macon worked with Triple L, Texas
A&M, and the City of San Antonio to finalize an agreement wherein
Verano would donate a portion of its real estate to Texas A&M and, in
exchange, the City of San Antonio would provide Verano with roughly
$250 million in public funds, which Verano would use to further develop
the property that it retained. As part of consummating this agreement,
however, Macon and Triple L created a separate entity, VTLM Texas, LP,
that was to serve as Verano's agent for purposes of dealing with Texas
A&M and the City of San Antonio. 3 Consequently, under the finalized
exchange agreement, Verano donated roughly 700 acres of land to Texas
A&M, and VTLM Texas was denominated as the entity entitled to receive
the public funds.
In August and September of 2010, Macon traveled to Las
Vegas on two occasions to participate in two presentations to Verano's
3 Macon would later explain that a separate entity was created in an
attempt to minimize Verano's investors' income tax liabilities. The
propriety of that decision appears to be a primary component of Verano's
claims against petitioners.
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investors regarding the project's status. Shortly after those presentations,
and allegedly as a result of the information conveyed at the presentations,
Verano's investors began to question whether Triple L and its managers
were adequately representing Verano's interests. Thereafter, near the end
of 2010, a supermajority of Verano's investors voted to remove Triple L
from its role as Verano's general partner and to replace Triple L with a
new general partner. Throughout most of 2011, Macon continued to
represent Verano, and in so doing, communicated with Verano's new
general partner regarding the status of the project. By late 2011,
however, the attorney-client relationship between petitioners and Verano
had terminated. The record does not clearly reflect the date on which the
relationship was terminated or which party terminated the relationship,
but in any event, in November 2011, Verano's new general partner re-
registered Verano as a Nevada partnership.
Verano then instituted the underlying action in 2012, naming
petitioners as defendants. 4 Generally speaking, Verano's complaint
alleged that petitioners had breached their fiduciary duties and engaged
in self-dealing by donating more of Verano's land to Texas A&M than
Verano had originally intended to donate and by assisting Triple L in
creating VTLM Texas in order to usurp the City of San Antonio's public
funds. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, contending that their contacts
with Nevada were insufficient to subject them to personal jurisdiction.
4Verano also named Triple L, Triple L's three managers, VTLM
Texas, and various other entities as defendants. Those defendants are no
longer parties to the underlying action.
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Verano opposed the motion, arguing that petitioners were subject to both
general and specific personal jurisdiction. In particular, Verano contended
that Fulbright & Jaworski's contacts with Nevada in unrelated matters
were sufficient to subject the firm to general personal jurisdiction for
purposes of the underlying matter. Additionally, Verano contended that
petitioners were subject to specific personal jurisdiction because they had
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Nevada by
agreeing to represent a Nevada-based client, by directing correspondence
to that client in Nevada, and by participating in two presentations in
Nevada.
The district court agreed that Verano had made a prima facie
showing that petitioners were subject to both general and specific personal
jurisdiction and denied petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners then
filed this writ petition. After the writ petition was filed, the parties
continued to engage in discovery in preparation for trial until this court
entered an order staying the underlying proceedings.
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
"A writ of prohibition is available to arrest or remedy district
court actions taken without or in excess of jurisdiction." Viega GmbH v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. „ 328 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2014).
Writ relief is an extraordinary remedy, and this court typically exercises
its discretion to consider a writ petition only when there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Id. While an
appeal is generally considered to be an adequate legal remedy precluding
writ relief, Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d
840, 841 (2004), the right to appeal is inadequate to correct an invalid
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Viega, 130 Nev. at ,
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328 P.3d at 1156. Because petitioners challenge the district court's ruling
regarding personal jurisdiction, we elect to exercise our discretion and
consider this writ petition. Id. This court reviews de novo a district
court's determination of personal jurisdiction. Id.
Jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
When a nonresident defendant challenges personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction
exists. Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 692, 857 P.2d
740, 743-44 (1993). In so doing, the plaintiff must satisfy the
requirements of Nevada's long-arm statute and show that jurisdiction does
not offend principles of due process. Id. at 698, 857 P.2d at 747; NRS
14.065. Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a
nonresident defendant must have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum state so that subjecting the defendant to the state's jurisdiction will
not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 509, 512,
134 P.3d 710, 712 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). "Due process
requirements are satisfied if the nonresident defendants ['s] contacts are
sufficient to obtain either (1) general jurisdiction, or (2) specific personal
jurisdiction and it is reasonable to subject the nonresident defendant[ to
suit [in the forum state]." Viega, 130 Nev. at , 328 P.3d at 1156.
Because Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS 14.065, permits personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the exercise of
jurisdiction would violate due process, our inquiry in this writ petition is
confined to whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Fulbright & Jaworski
and Macon comports with due process. Id.
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Thus, in order to overcome petitioners' motion to dismiss,
Verano needed to make a prima facie showing of either general or specific
personal jurisdiction by "produc[ing] some evidence in support of all facts
necessary for a finding of personal jurisdiction." Trumr6 109 Nev. at 692,
857 P.2d at 744. Because the district court determined that Verano had
made a prima facie showing of general and specific personal jurisdiction as
to both Fulbright & Jaworski and Macon, we consider the two bases for
jurisdiction in turn.
Verano has not made a prima facie showing of general personal
jurisdiction
"A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a [nonresident
defendant] when its contacts with the forum state are so "continuous and
systematic" as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum
State." Viega, 130 Nev. at , 328 P.3d at 1156-57 (quoting Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. „ 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2011)); see also Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 122 Nev. at 513, 134 P.3d at
712 ("[G]eneral personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant's forum
state activities are so substantial or continuous and systematic that it is
considered present in that forum and thus subject to suit there, even
though the suit's claims are unrelated to that forum." (internal quotations
omitted)). A general jurisdiction inquiry "calls for an appraisal of a
[defendant's] activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide."
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. n.20, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20
(2014).
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In support of its prima facie showing of general personal
jurisdiction over Fulbright & Jaworski, 5 Verano introduced evidence
showing that a Fulbright & Jaworski attorney was a registered lobbyist
during both the 2007 and 2009 Nevada legislative sessions and that seven
Fulbright & Jaworski attorneys had been admitted pro hac vice in Nevada
for the purpose of representing two different clients in lengthy litigation,
stemming back to the early 2000s and unrelated to the underlying
litigation, that "resulted in multi-million dollars of verdicts." Contrary to
the district court's conclusion that this evidence was sufficient to make a
prima facie showing of general jurisdiction over Fulbright & Jaworski, we
are not persuaded.
In isolation, the evidence of Fulbright & Jaworski's activities
in Nevada may arguably be substantial, but those activities presumably
comprise only a fraction of Fulbright & Jaworski's overall business. See
Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at n.20, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. Thus, in this
case, we conclude that a registered lobbyist during two legislative sessions
and pro hac vice appearances by Fulbright & Jaworski attorneys in two
lengthy lawsuits in Nevada that result in jury verdicts in their clients'
favor are not substantial activities that are so continuous and systematic
that Nevada can be considered Fulbright & Jaworski's home. To conclude
otherwise would subject Fulbright & Jaworski to suit in Nevada in
connection with any claim that any of its clients throughout the world may
5Although the district court also determined that Macon was subject
to general jurisdiction in Nevada, the basis for that determination is
unclear, as the record contains no evidence to suggest that Macon's
contacts with Nevada were such that she could be subject to general
personal jurisdiction. Thus, we do not further discuss this issue as it
pertains to Macon.
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have against the firm. See Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 122 Nev. at 513, 134
P.3d at 712. Based on this reasoning, we conclude that Verano failed to
make a prima facie showing that petitioners were subject to general
personal jurisdiction, and the district court improperly used general
jurisdiction as a basis for denying petitioners' motion to dismiss.
Verano has not made a prima facie showing of specific personal
jurisdiction
"Unlike general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is proper only
where ``the cause of action arises from the defendant's contacts with the
forum." Dogra v. Liles, 129 Nev. „ 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013)
(quoting Trump, 109 Nev. at 699, 857 P.2d at 748). In other words, in
order to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant,
"[t]he defendant must purposefully avail himself of
the privilege of acting in the forum state or of
causing important consequences in that state.
The cause of action must arise from the
consequences in the forum state of the defendant's
activities, and those activities, or the consequences
thereof, must have a substantial enough
connection with the forum state to make the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
reasonable."
Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev. „ 282 P.3d 751, 755
(2012) (quoting Jarstad v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Gas. Co.,92 Nev.
380, 387, 552 P.2d 49, 53 (1976)). Verano contends, and the district court
agreed, that this standard was satisfied in light of Verano's evidence
showing that petitioners agreed to represent a Nevada-based client and
directed client-related correspondence into Nevada, as well as by virtue of
Macon's participation in the two investor presentations in Nevada. We
must determine whether this evidence, if considered in isolation or
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cumulatively, is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of specific
personal jurisdiction over petitioners. See Consipio Holding, 128 Nev. at
, 282 P.3d at 754; Trump, 109 Nev. at 692, 857 P.2d at 743-44.
Representing a Nevada client on an out-of-state matter does not
necessarily subject an out-of-state law firm to personal
jurisdiction
We first consider whether an out-of-state law firm's
representation of a Nevada client, combined with the communications that
are incident to an attorney-client relationship, is sufficient in and of itself
to subject the law firm to specific personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this identical issue in
Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1279-81 (10th Cir. 2013), and the
court's opinion provides helpful guidance to us here.
In Newsome, a Canadian law firm was hired by a Canadian-
based company and its United States subsidiary doing business in
Oklahoma. Id. at 1262-63. As part of the firm's work for the companies,
the firm helped consummate a business transaction in Canada,
"facilitated" the placement of liens on certain property in Oklahoma, and
received payments from an Oklahoma bank account. Id. at 1280-81. A
bankruptcy trustee for the subsidiary company then sued the Canadian
firm in Oklahoma. Id. at 1263. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the lower court properly dismissed the firm from the case for lack
of personal jurisdiction.
As part of its analysis, the Newsome court canvassed decisions
from other jurisdictions and arrived at what it believed to be a "majority"
approach and a "minority" approach to the issue of whether an out-of-state
law firm's representation of a client is sufficient to subject the law firm to
personal jurisdiction in the client's home state. Id. at 1280. The Newsome
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court identified the "majority" approach as one that declines to find
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state law firm based solely on its
representation of an in-state client. Id. In so doing, the Newsome court
explained, "[Ole majority reasons that representing a client residing in a
distant forum is not necessarily a purposeful availment of that distant
forum's laws and privileges" and that, instead, "Mlle client's residence is
often seen. . . as a mere fortuity." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Similarly, under the majority approach, communications incidental to the
attorney-client relationship that are directed to the forum state simply
because the client resides there are also seen as merely fortuitous and do
not constitute purposeful availment. See, e.g., Saw telle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d
1381, 1391-92 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that "written and telephone
communications with the clients in the state where they happened to live"
were not sufficient to subject an out-of-state law firm to personal
jurisdiction); Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that placing phone calls to the client in the forum state,
mailing letters to the client in the forum state, and accepting payments
from the client's forum-state bank are all "normal incidents
of. . . representation" that, "by themselves, do not establish purposeful
availment"); Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir.
1987) (concluding that phone calls made to the client's home state,
monthly billings mailed to the client's home state, and payments made
from the client's home-state bank were not sufficient to subject an out-of-
state law firm to personal jurisdiction); Exponential Biotherapies, Inc. v.
Houthoff Buruma N.V., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Plaintiff must
establish more than the attorney-client relationship and contacts
incidental to the attorney-client relationship in order to
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meet. . . constitutional due process requirements."); We're Talkin' Mardi
Gras, LLC v. Davis, 192 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640 (E.D. La. 2002) ("[A]11 of the
communications to Louisiana rest on nothing more than the mere fortuity
that [the client] happened to be a resident of Louisiana. They would have
been the same regardless of where [the client] lived. Thus such
communication can not be considered purposeful availment . . . .").
In contrast, the Newsome court explained, "[t]he minority view
reasons that attorneys can accept or reject representing clients in distant
forums, and that those who accept such representation have fair warning
that they might be sued for malpractice in the client's forum." 722 F.3d at
1280 (internal quotations omitted). The Newsome court also recognized
that, under the minority approach, "the normal communications that
make up an active attorney-client relationship are [seen as] the sort of
repeated, purposeful contacts with the client's home forum sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction." Id. (citing Cartlidge v. Hernandez, 9
S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App. 1999)); see Keefe v. Kirschenbaum &
Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1272 (Colo. 2002) (concluding that
"communications and attempted communications with [a client] by mail
and telephone" were among the "purposeful contacts" that an attorney
made with the forum state).
Ultimately, the Newsome court agreed with the majority
approach and affirmed the dismissal of the Canadian law firm for lack of
personal jurisdiction. 722 F.3d at 1280-81. To that end, it concluded
narrowly that "an out-of-state attorney working from out-of-state on an
out-of-state matter does not purposefully avail himself of the client's home
forum's laws and privileges, at least not without some evidence that the
attorney reached out to the client's home forum to solicit the client's
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business." Id. We agree with this conclusion and its formulation of the
majority approach in two key respects. First, we agree that a lack of
solicitation on the out-of-state law firm's part is highly relevant to the
inquiry of whether the firm purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
acting in Nevada. Second, we agree that an out-of-state firm's
representation of a client on a non-Nevada "matter" is highly relevant to
that same inquiry.
Applying the majority approach here leads to the conclusion
that petitioners did not subject themselves to specific personal jurisdiction
in Nevada simply by virtue of representing Verano. It is undisputed that
petitioners did not actively seek out Verano's business, but rather, it was
Verano's general partner that reached out to petitioners in Texas. 6
Similarly, it cannot reasonably be disputed that the "matter" for which
petitioners were retained to represent Verano was a Texas real-estate-
development project. 7 Thus, we conclude that petitioners' representation
of Verano on an out-of-state matter and petitioners' communications with
6 Inthis regard, our decision in Peccole v. Eighth Judicial District
Court, 111 Nev. 968, 899 P.2d 568 (1995), is distinguishable. While we
stated in Peccole that "use of the telephone can be sufficient for 'purposeful
availment," id. at 971, 899 P.2d at 570 (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481 (1985)), that statement was made in the
context of concluding that the Colorado defendants may have solicited the
Nevada plaintiffs' business via telephone. See id.
7We disagree with Verano's suggestion that petitioners "always
treated" the project "as an investment project by Nevadans and for
Nevadans." To the contrary, petitioners' engagement agreement with
Verano expressly stated that petitioners were being retained "in
connection with advising you regarding a real estate, economic
development and tax increment financing matters concerning a Texas
A&M University location in San Antonio, Texas (the 'Matter')."
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Verano that were incidental to that representation is, without more, not
sufficient to make a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction.
Based on the existing record, Verano's evidence of petitioners'
additional Nevada contacts is insufficient to make a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction
We next consider whether Macon's attendance at two
presentations in Las Vegas was sufficient contact in Nevada to make a
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. In opposing petitioners'
motion to dismiss, Verano submitted an affidavit from one of its investors
attesting to the fact that he attended two presentations in 2010 in Las
Vegas at which Macon participated. According to the investor, at those
presentations, Macon (1) solicited additional investment funds from
Verano's investors; and (2) failed to disclose the existence of VTLM Texas,
the entity that Macon helped to create as part of the alleged effort to
deprive Verano of the public funds from the City of San Antonio. Based on
this evidence, the district court concluded that Macon had provided "legal
advice" to Verano's investors in Nevada and that, consequently,
petitioners had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting
in Nevada.
We are not persuaded that this evidence amounted to
purposeful availment sufficient to make a prima facie showing of specific
personal jurisdiction. Purposeful availment requires that "[t]he cause of
action. . . arise from the consequences in the forum state of the
defendant's activities." Consipio Holding, 128 Nev. at , 282 P.3d at 755
(internal quotations omitted). Here, although the district court concluded
that Macon provided "legal advice" to Verano's investors at the two
presentations, the record contains no indication of what that legal advice
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was, much less how Verano's causes of action against petitioners arose
from that legal advice. See id.
As the above-described majority approach recognizes, a law
firm does not purposefully avail itself of the benefit of acting in the client's
home state simply by meeting with the client in that state. See, e.g., Sher,
911 F.2d at 1363 (concluding that three trips to the client's home state of
California to meet with the client "were discrete events arising out of a
case centered entirely in Florida [that] appear[ed] to have been little more
than a convenience to the client"); Austad Co., 823 F.2d at 226 (concluding
that a law firm associate's three-day visit to the client's office for the
purpose of reviewing documents was insufficient to show purposeful
availment). Thus, without any evidence as to how Macon's legal advice at
the two Las Vegas presentations related to Verano's causes of action
against petitioners, we conclude that Macon's two trips to Nevada did not
amount to petitioners purposefully availing themselves of the privilege of
acting in Nevada. See Consipio Holding, 128 Nev. at , 282 P.3d at 755.
We further note that the affidavit from Verano's investor,
while providing slightly more detail than the district court's order, suffers
from the same shortcoming. Specifically, although the investor attested to
Macon soliciting additional investment funds, Verano's complaint contains
no allegation that any additional funds were raised as a result of Macon's
solicitations, much less that those funds were somehow misspent and
thereby form a basis for Verano's claims against petitioners. Similarly, it
is not immediately apparent from Verano's complaint how Macon's failure
to mention the existence of VTLM Texas, which at the time of the
presentations had been in existence for at least two years, relates to
Verano's causes of action against petitioners. See id. In any event, we
16
question whether those nonstatements regarding a Texas entity would
"have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant Es] reasonable." Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented to the district court, we
conclude that Verano failed to make a prima facie showing that petitioners
are subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction. In particular, we
conclude that an out-of-state law firm that is solicited by a Nevada client
to represent the client on an out-of-state matter does not subject itself to
personal jurisdiction in Nevada simply by virtue of agreeing to represent
the client. Moreover, because Verano's additional evidence of petitioners'
Nevada contacts have no clear connection to Verano's causes of action
against petitioners, we conclude that Verano failed to make a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction.
We therefore conclude that writ relief is warranted to the
extent that petitioners seek an order directing the district court to vacate
its May 9, 2013, order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss. To the
extent that petitioners seek an order directing the district court to grant
their motion to dismiss, however, we conclude that our extraordinary
intervention is unwarranted at this time. In particular, because Verano
was only required to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction
at the pretrial stage, and because additional jurisdiction-related evidence
may have been produced during discovery that was ongoing during this
writ petition's pendency, Verano is entitled to make a prima facie showing
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of personal jurisdiction with this additional evidence at its disposa1. 8
Accordingly, consistent with the foregoing, we grant petitioners' writ
petition in part and deny the petition in part, and we direct the clerk of
this court to issue a writ of prohibition instructing the district court to
vacate its order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss. 9
, C.J.
Hardesty
We concur:
J.
J.
8 1nthis regard, Verano's December 17, 2014, motion to file a
supplemental appendix is denied. See Zugel v. Miller, 99 Nev. 100, 101,
659 P.2d 296, 297 (1983) ("This court is not a fact-finding tribunal. . . .").
9 1n
light of our resolution of this writ petition, the stay imposed by
our November 21, 2014, order is vacated.
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