Bowles v. Ruan Transp. ( 2015 )


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    23 P.3d 255
    , 258 (2001) ("[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and
    unambiguous, a court should give that language its ordinary meaning and
    not go beyond it.").
    Second, we conclude that although the appeal officer abused
    her discretion in admitting the two newspaper articles about Bowles'
    felony conviction into evidence, the abuse did not affect Bowles'
    substantial rights.    See M.C. Multi-Family Dev., L.L.C. v. Crestdale
    Assocs., 
    124 Nev. 901
    , 913, 
    193 P.3d 536
    , 544 (2008) (stating that we
    review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion); see also NRCP 61.
    The articles did not affect Bowles' substantial rights because Bowles
    admitted to the appeal officer that he had been convicted of a felony.
    Third, we conclude that the appeal officer did not abuse her
    discretion in affording Bowles' testimony no weight.        See MC. Multi-
    Family Dev., 124 Nev. at 913, 
    193 P.3d at 544
    . Per NRS 50.095(1),
    Bowles' felony conviction could be one of the factors in the appeal officer's
    credibility determination. Determining how much weight to afford
    Bowles' testimony was the appeal officer's decision to make. See DeChant
    v. State, 
    116 Nev. 918
    , 924, 
    10 P.3d 108
    , 112 (2000) ("[I]t is exclusively
    within the province of the trier of fact to weigh evidence and pass on the
    credibility of witnesses and their testimony." (internal quotations
    omitted)); see also Nev. Indus. Comm'n v. Reese, 
    93 Nev. 115
    , 120-22, 
    560 P.2d 1352
    , 1354-56 (1977) (explaining that administrative agencies are
    imbued with the power to perform functions that are quasi-judicial in
    nature, such as the weighing of evidence).
    Finally, we conclude that the appeal officer did not clearly err
    in finding that substantial evidence supported the proffered reason for
    Bowles' expulsion—copyright infringement.      See State Emp. Sec. Dept. v.
    SUPREME COURT
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    Hilton Hotels Corp., 
    102 Nev. 606
    , 608, n.1, 
    729 P.2d 497
    , 498 n.1 (1986)
    (explaining that we will not reverse an administrative agency's factual
    finding even if "it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of
    the evidence"), superseded by statute on other ground as stated in
    Countrywide Home Loans v. Thitchener,          
    124 Nev. 725
    , 
    192 P.3d 243
    (2008). A reasonable mind could accept the supporting evidence, an email
    and two letters, as adequately supporting the appeal officer's conclusion.'
    Nassiri, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 327 P.3d at 489 (stating that substantial
    evidence "is evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequately
    supporting the agency's conclusions"). Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Saitta
    gekuda                , J.
    Pickering
    cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge
    Snell & Wilmer, LLP/Las Vegas
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas
    Carson City Clerk
    'We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude
    that they are without merit.
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