Bock v. Bock ( 2015 )

 addresses respondent's business income rather than his personal income.
See Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009)
(explaining that a district court's factual findings will be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence in the record). Thus, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining appellant's
alimony award.
Appellant also contests the district court's division of
community property and debt, and the categorization of respondent's asset
management business as respondent's separate property. As the business
was formed before the marriage and respondent remained the sole owner,
substantial evidence in the record supports the district court's
determination that it was separate property. See Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev.
1355, 1359, 929 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1996) (providing that the disposition of
community property is in the discretion of the trial court). Because the
business was separate, appellant bore the burden of establishing a
community interest in the property, but she made no such claim. Thus,
because substantial evidence supports the district court's equal division of
community assets and debts, the district court did not abuse its
discretion.'
Although appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by not directing respondent to pay appellant's attorney fees, she
does not identify a specific request for fees that remained pending before
'The record indicates that appellant acknowledged in open court
that certain personal and credit card debts were her separate debts, and
thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in allocating these solely
to her.
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the district court. 2 Additionally, the record indicates that appellant
received multiple awards of fees throughout the litigation and we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Sargeant v.
Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 227, 495 P.2d 618, 621 (1972) (providing that a
district court may award attorney fees that are not excessive in divorce
cases).
Appellant further argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion to continue the evidentiary hearing,
arguing that respondent's late disclosed expert report violated NRCP 16.1
and warranted granting a continuance. A motion for continuance is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court, S. Pac. Transp. Co. v.
Fitzgerald, 94 Nev. 241, 243, 577 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1978), and the record
does not indicate the district court abused its discretion here.
Finally, appellant contends that the district court abused its
discretion and violated her procedural due process rights when it heard
testimony from the parties in a hearing held after the divorce trial.
Appellant fails, however, to identify which procedural rule the district
court proceedings violated. Concerning her due process rights, we discern
no violation as appellant's motion raised issues of property division that
would require the presentation of additional evidence, and thus she was
on notice that the court may take additional evidence on the subject at the
hearing. See generally, Gonzales-Alpizar v. Griffith, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 2,
317 P.3d 820, 827 (2014) (providing that due process requires notice
2 Even if a request for fees remained pending at the divorce trial, the
absence of a ruling in the divorce decree awarding fees constitutes a denial
of the claim. Bd. of Gallery of History, Inc. v. Datecs Corp., 116 Nev. 286,
289, 994 P.2d 1149, 1150 (2000).
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reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the action, and an
opportunity to present their position).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3
, J.
Pitie J.
Pickering
cc: Hon. T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr., District Judge, Family Court Division
Hon. Cynthia N. Giuliani, District Judge, Family Court Division
Paul H. Schofield, Settlement Judge
Black & LoBello
Wells & Rawlings
Eighth District Court Clerk
3 Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the district
court's findings, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied appellant's NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59(e) request for relief.
Additionally, appellant fails to address why NRCP 60(b) relief would have
been appropriate.
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